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Research articles

Vol. 4 (2026)

When is Technology Good and Why? Human Capacities and Predicative Goodness in Design Ethics

DOI
https://doi.org/10.59490/jhtr.2026.4.8006
Submitted
January 29, 2025
Published
2026-10-13

Abstract

In this paper we examine the limitations of evaluating designed objects solely through ‘attributive goodness’ and argue for incorporating ‘predicative goodness’: that is, whether designs contribute to human flourishing. Building on Avigail Ferdman’s take on the ‘capacities approach’ (2024), which links technological affordances to the development of fundamental human capacities, we propose extending her work to assess the predicative goodness of designed things. By analysing how designs support or hinder core human capacities, we can develop more ethical design practices. We outline a framework for applying the capacities approach across design domains and explore its implications for design ethics, arguing that this approach is useful as design is increasingly applied to societal challenges.

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