Can a Building Be an Apparatus?

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Abstract

When Michel Foucault introduces the term, dispositif, commonly translated as ‘apparatus’, he uses the architectural example of the Panopticon to illustrate how power is exercised. A building, according to this line of thinking, seemingly has the capacity to exercise control on its occupants. But is this really the case? This paper examines the thinking of Foucault on the subject, and questions to what extent we can conceive of a building as being in and of itself an apparatus. It goes on to explore Foucault’s subsequent reflections on the subject in his interview with Paul Rabinow, ‘Space, Knowledge and Power’, where he seems to qualify his earlier remarks on the Panopticon. It then opens up the theory of affordances to question whether a building – or any other entities that could be perceived as operating as a tool or mechanism within the social realm – has the agency to control behaviour. Finally, the paper introduces Gilles Deleuze’s subsequent remarks in ‘Postscript on the Societies of Control’ where he contributes to the debate about the political agency of form by arguing that in our present age there has been an erosion in the hegemony of the physical, and current forms of control are more gaseous and invisible in their operations than a mere physical building. The paper concludes that it is too simplistic to regard a building in and of itself as an apparatus. At best it could be perceived as an element within a ‘system of relations’ that might constitute the apparatus.

Keywords

apparatus, dispositif, panopticon, control, affordance, disciplinary societies, societies of control
Introduction

Architects, it would seem, are prone to exaggerate the social impact of their profession. Indeed, Le Corbusier even believed that architecture could prevent revolution. ‘Architecture ou Révolution,’ wrote Le Corbusier in 1922. ‘It is the question of building which lies at the root of the social unrest of today; architecture or revolution.’ (Le Corbusier, 1989). Le Corbusier, along with with many architects of the Modern Movement, was convinced of the social impact of architecture. In an era of great social and political change, he perceived architecture as a crucial instrument in addressing the ills of contemporary society. An appropriate architecture would combat social unrest. Architecture could prevent revolution.

But what capacity does architecture actually have to influence social and political life? Are architects correct in believing that architecture wields so much power, or is this simply a delusion, common no doubt in other disciplines too, where professionals in one field consider their field to have a greater potential to change the world than it actually has?

Let us focus firstly on the relationship between architecture and politics. There are many ways in which architecture might be perceived as being political. Some have attempted to ‘read’ a certain politics into architectural form. However, it is precisely in these semantic readings of architecture that the fragility of associations between architecture and the political become most apparent. In their discussion of ‘democratic’ architecture, for example, Charles Jencks and Maggie Valentine recognise the subject as problematic. They observe that neither Frank Lloyd Wright nor Vincent Scully, both of whom had written on the subject of architecture and democracy, had managed to relate the politics to any typology or style of building (Jencks and Valentine, 1987). Yet while they also note that Aldo Rossi and others had claimed that there was no direct link between style and politics, they themselves persist in an attempt to define an ‘architecture of democracy’. Their approach relies on semantic readings. For Jencks and Valentine, as it transpires, the problem rests ultimately in the complex ‘codes’ that ‘democratic architecture’ adopts. It must avoid excessive uniformity (‘An architecture of democracy that is uniform is as absurd as a democracy of identical citizens’), yet equally it should avoid excessive variety (‘an architecture where every building is in a different style is as privatised as a megalopolis of consumers.’) ‘Thus a democratic style,’ they conclude, ‘is at once shared, abstract, individualised and disharmonious.’ Jencks and Valentine emphasise the aesthetic dimension, as though this has some direct bearing on the political. Yet their argument is undone by its own internal inconsistencies. How can classical architecture symbolise both Greek democracy and Italian fascism? Can there be any essential politics to a style of architecture? Can there ever be a ‘democratic architecture’?

Here we must recognise that political content in architecture must be seen as associative. Architecture can only be imbued with political content through a process of ‘mapping’. Architecture achieves its political – and hence equally its gendered – status through semantic associations, which exist within a temporal framework and are inherently unstable. These semantic associations depend on a historical memory within the collective imagination. Once this memory fades the semantic associations will be lost, and the building may be re-appropriated according to new ideological imperatives. Thus, the pyramids’ emblems, no doubt, of totalitarian rule to the slaves who built them, have now shifted their symbolic content to icons of tourism. A similar process inevitably occurs when a building changes its use, from Victorian villa to academic department, from police station to brothel, from dictator’s palace to casino. Unless the memory of its previous social use is retained, all earlier associations are erased. While a building, through its associations,
might appear as deeply political, it must be understood that these politics are not an attribute of the architectural form itself. Political content does not reside in architectural form. It is merely grafted on to it by a process that is strictly allegorical. To perceive the political meaning, one has to understand the allegorical system in which it is encoded. Yet this is not the allegorical system that one might identify, for example, with Renaissance painting, where allegory relies on a narrative of fixed symbols with which the painter works. The allegory to which I refer is an allegory of association. A closer comparison, therefore, might be the way in which abstract painting has been read as political, and promoted by the CIA – so the story goes – as a tool of post-war propaganda.

Fredric Jameson highlights the problem of the allegorical nature of this ‘mapping’ of the political onto the architectural. Whatever political content might seem to be invested in architectural form may subsequently be erased or rewritten:

I have come to think that no work of art or culture can set out to be political once and for all, no matter how ostentatiously it labels itself as such, for there can never be any guarantee that it will be used the way it demands. A great political art (Brecht) can be taken as a pure and apolitical art; art that seems to want to be merely aesthetic and decorative can be rewritten as political with energetic interpretation. The political rewriting or appropriation, then, the political use, must be allegorical; you have to know that this is what it is supposed to be or mean – in itself it is inert (Jameson, 1997).

Rather than exploring semantic readings of the politics of architecture, we might therefore do better to explore the potential of architecture to influence a certain politics of use through its physical layout and form. Here it might be useful to step outside the discourse of architecture itself, and engage with the ideas of the French philosopher, Michel Foucault, on the subject.

**Foucault and the Logic of the Apparatus**

‘Dispositif’ is a term introduced by Foucault.¹ Loosely, it could be translated into English as ‘apparatus’. In an interview in 1977 Foucault defines it as follows: ‘What I’m trying to pick out with this term is, firstly, a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions – in short, the said as much as the unsaid. Such are the elements of the apparatus. The apparatus itself is the system of relations that can be established between these elements’ (Foucault, 1980). As Foucault states clearly enough, architectural forms are ‘elements’ of the apparatus. Within the constraints of this article, however, the challenge is to examine whether or not a building in and of itself can be considered an apparatus, as inferred by the expression used in the call for papers, ‘building-as-apparatus’.

One of the central preoccupations for Foucault is the relationship between power and space, and he throws some light on this issue in his discussion of Bentham’s Panopticon. The principle that Foucault is trying to illustrate is that the architecture may be perceived as being part of an apparatus for ‘creating and sustaining a power relationship independent of the person who operates it.’ (Foucault, 1979). In this now-famous piece, Foucault explores the question of how architectural form may influence social behaviour. The Panopticon is a plan for a disciplinary enclosure. This might be a prison, school, or hospital. The precise function of the space

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1 Dispositif is a term that has been picked up by others, notably Italian philosopher, Giorgio Agamben, and elaborated further. This article, however, will be restricted to an overview of Foucault’s understanding of the term.
is not as important as the fact that it is designed to accommodate some kind of disciplinary operation. What is highly important, however, is the spatial arrangement of the structure.

The Panopticon has a central tower in which the guard sits, and the cells are arranged radially, so that from the tower the guard is afforded a view all around — as the name ‘Panopticon’ implies — into each of the cells. Meanwhile, the openings in the tower itself, through blinds and other devices, prevent the inmates in the cells from knowing whether or not the guard is watching them. Thus, the inmates remain under the perpetual control of the gaze of the guard. As Foucault notes, ‘Hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power.’ (Foucault & Leach, 1997).

The arrangement therefore leaves the inmates under a perpetual state of potential surveillance, and serves, according to Foucault, to subjectify the inmates and turn them into docile subjects. For Foucault, it therefore operates as a ‘diagram’ for the way in which ‘disciplinary societies’ operate. However, the lateral division of the cells into hermetic units also prevents any communication with the neighbouring cell, and therefore further enhances the potential exercising of control: ‘Each individual, in his place, is securely confined to a cell from which he is seen from the front by the supervisor; but the side walls prevent him from coming into contact with his companions. He is seen, but he does not see; he is the object of information, never a subject in communication. The arrangement of his room, opposite the central tower, imposes on him an axial visibility; but the divisions of the ring, those separated cells, imply a lateral invisibility. And this invisibility is a guarantee of order.’ (Foucault & Leach, 1997).
This arrangement functions successfully irrespective of the nature of those contained in the disciplinary structure. It is a ‘figure of political technology that may and must be detached from any specific use.’ (Foucault, 1997) Although its most obvious use would be as a prison, the Panopticon could equally serve as a hospital, a lunatic asylum or indeed a factory: ‘If the inmates are convicts, there is no danger of a plot, an attempt at collective escape, the planning of new crimes for the future, bad reciprocal influences; if they are patients, there is no danger of contagion; if they are madmen, there is no risk of their committing violence upon one another; if they are schoolchildren, there is no copying, no noise, no chatter, no waste of time; if they are workers, there are no disorders, no theft, no coalitions, none of those distractions that slow down the rate of work, make it less perfect or cause accidents.’ (Foucault, 1997). Moreover, its contemporary manifestation could take the form of CCTV cameras, or speed cameras on a motorway. In the latter case, the motorist is oblivious as to whether s/he is actually under surveillance but is often forced to monitor his/her speed for fear of receiving a fine.

The real success of the Panopticon is not only that it is highly efficient in terms of personnel needed to make it function, but also that it moves beyond the limitations of a simple enclosure. The heavy bulk of an architectural form dedicated solely to incarceration gives way to a more sophisticated combination of surveillance and architectural form: ‘The heaviness of the old ‘houses of security’ with their fortress-like architecture, could be replaced by the simple, economic geometry of a ‘house of certainty’. (Foucault, 1997).

Moreover, the structure contributes to a system whereby the inmate becomes complicit in his own subjectification: ‘He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection.’ (Foucault, 1997).

At first sight, then, Foucault would seem to be arguing for the capacity of a building to engender a form of social control that would somehow guarantee the subjectification of the subject. This would hardly appear controversial to a profession, which subscribes largely to the somewhat utopian views espoused by Le Corbusier on the capacity for architecture to effect social change. But are things quite as they seem at first sight?

**The Problem of the Diagram**

One of the key signs that Foucault’s discussion of the Panopticon is not quite as straightforward as it might first appear to those with an architectural background is the fact that he refers to the Panopticon as a ‘diagram’. Foucault’s interest in the diagram is influenced partly by Leibniz who celebrates diagrammatic thinking as a form of reasoning based on visual representations. This helps us to understand what Foucault means when he refers to the Panopticon as a ‘diagram’, or – in other words – as a visual representation (in Leibniz’s terms) of the exercise of power: ‘But the Panopticon must not be understood as a dream building: it is the diagram [my italics] of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form.’ (Foucault, 1997).

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3 Although Bentham’s Panopticon was never built, the principle of the layout can be seen in numerous buildings, such as James Stirling’s Seeley History Library, Cambridge. Here the control desk is positioned centrally, with all the desks and shelves are laid out radially around it, affording an unobstructed view and allowing the librarian to monitor the entire space. A more sophisticated form of panopticism operates with close circuit surveillance cameras.
What makes this example of the Panopticon so interesting is that it reverses the traditional role of the diagram. Whereas a diagram is commonly used by architects to explain a design for a building, here the building itself serves as a ‘diagram’ – as an explanatory device – that articulates the way in which power operates. Importantly, this should alert architects to the fact that the ‘diagram’ to which Foucault is referring is quite different to the standard notion of the diagram in architectural culture. It might even be helpful to suggest an alternative term, such as ‘model’ or ‘allegory’, instead of ‘diagram’, invested as it is with so many architectural associations.

In the late 1990s there was a brief but intense interest in the theme of the ‘diagram’ within certain high profile circles of architectural theory. This interest was grounded in certain remarks about the ‘diagram’ to be found not only in the work of Foucault, but also of another French philosopher, Gilles Deleuze, who often worked in collaboration with Felix Guattari. To anyone with little background in the work of Foucault and Deleuze it would appear that – in addressing the diagram – they are talking about something very familiar to architects. After all, the diagram has long been a part of architectural discourse. But are architects and Deleuze really talking about the same thing when they refer to the ‘diagram’? By extension, we should also ask whether the standard architectural interpretation of the ‘apparatus’ is anywhere close to Foucault’s understanding of the term.

Not only does Deleuze write extensively about ‘diagrams’ in The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque and elsewhere, but he also employs actual diagrams to illustrate his ideas (Deleuze, 1993). Although, at first sight, Deleuze’s use of the term seems to be similar to architects’ use the term, it soon becomes clear that it is quite different. For example, his diagram of the Baroque house (also referred to as ‘an allegory of the monad’) looks like a cross section through a building. However, as Greg Lambert explains, far from being any kind of architectural drawing or diagram, it is really an ‘allegory’ used to theorize the baroque construction of the conceptual pair: reading-seeing. Without dwelling on Lambert’s insightful explanation of the allegory, it is clear that this is neither a diagram in the conventional sense, nor does it have anything to do with architectural form. It is an allegory of philosophical concepts (Lambert, 2002).
There is, however, a further way in which Deleuze uses the concept of the ‘diagram’. In his text, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sense, Deleuze uses it as a strategy to initiate a painting. Here the diagram – or ‘graph’ as Bacon calls it – serves to disrupt the given conditions and open up the space of the imagination. The ‘diagram’, as a strategy for developing a painting, seems to be based on chaotic and random actions – generative techniques that allow the artist to break free of conventions. Whether or not Deleuze is convincing in this incursion into the domain of painting, this further use of the ‘diagram’ opens up yet another possible meaning of the term that is radically different to Deleuze’s other uses of the term.

The diagram is no longer an explanatory visualisation but a generative tool. It is not a visualisation of the use of power, as in the case of the Panopticon. Nor has it anything to do with explanation, as suggested in Deleuze’s own use of literal diagrams. Rather, it refers to a projective or generative technique within the field of art that is clearly related to his other notion of the ‘abstract machine’, as that which actualises the ‘virtual’. As Deleuze notes: ‘The diagrammatic or abstract machine does not function to represent, even something real, but rather constructs a real that is yet to come.’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987).

It is clear, then, that there is more than a little ambiguity in the discourse of the ‘diagram’. As noted above, Foucault refers to a building itself as a ‘diagram’. On the one hand Deleuze acknowledges that what he calls a ‘diagram’, Bacon calls a ‘graph’, while Deleuze himself also refers to a ‘diagram’ as an ‘analogy’. On the other hand, there is a clear distinction between Deleuze’s own use of the term to refer to an explanatory drawing – and indeed his own use of actual diagrams – and a generative technique for producing a work of art. In the end, the ‘diagram’ in the work of Foucault and Deleuze seems to have so many different meanings, that it is almost impossible to come up with one single over-arching definition of the term.

What is clear, however, is that for Foucault the building itself does not exercise power. Rather it is a ‘diagram’ for the exercise of power. If we follow the logic of Leibniz, then we might surmise that the building is only a ‘visual representation’ of the exercise of power. This alone should be enough to raise concern over any claim that a building in itself can be an apparatus for the exercise of power.

**Space, Knowledge and Power**

If, however, we are to accept the somewhat loose interpretation of the term ‘diagram’ in the work of Foucault as a visual representation of the exercise of power, what role exactly does the Panopticon play in the exercising of that power? And what does Foucault actually mean when he says that the Panopticon can be part of the ‘thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble’ that constitutes the apparatus?

Foucault revisits this question of the capacity of a building to influence social behaviour in a subsequent interview with Paul Rabinow, where he acknowledges that architects are not necessarily ‘the masters of space’ that they once were or believed themselves to be (Foucault, 1997). Here, Foucault appears not so much to reverse as to qualify the position on the capacity for architecture to determine social behaviour.

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4 What does this act of painting consist of? Bacon defines it in this way: make random marks (lines-traits); scrub, sweep, or wipe the canvas in order to clear out locales or zones (color-patches); throw the paint, from various angles and at various speeds. Now this act, or these acts, presuppose that there were already figurative givens on the canvas (and in the painter’s head), more or less virtual, more or less actual. It is precisely these givens that will be removed by the act of painting, either by being wiped, brushed or rubbed, or else covered over... For example, the head: part of it will be cleared away with a brush, broom, sponge, or rag. This is what Bacon calls a ‘graph’ or a diagram.’ Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003, p. 100.
On the question of whether there could be an architecture which would act as a force of either liberation or oppression, Foucault concludes that ‘liberation’ and ‘oppression’ are not mutually exclusive, and that even in that most oppressive of structures, such as the concentration camp, some form of ‘resistance, disobedience and oppositional groupings’ may still exist (Foucault, 1997). Moreover, liberty, for Foucault, is a practice, that cannot be ‘established by the project itself’, nor can it be necessarily guaranteed by the institutions and laws that are introduced in order to supposedly guarantee them:

‘I do not think that there is anything that is functionally – by its very nature – absolutely liberating. Liberty is a practice. So there may, in fact, always be a certain number of projects whose aim is to modify some constraints, to loosen, or even to break them, but none of these projects can, simply by its nature, assure that people will have liberty automatically, that it will be established by the project itself. The liberty of men is never assured by the institutions and laws that are intended to guarantee them. This is why almost all of these laws and institutions are quite capable of being turned around. Not because they are ambiguous, but simply because ‘liberty’ is what must be exercised.’ (Foucault, 1997).

There have been architects, of course, who have attempted to produce buildings ‘dedicated to liberating effects’. (Foucault, 1997). Foucault cites the example of Le Corbusier as someone who had attempted to do so, despite the fact that he has been perceived by some as a form of ‘crypto-Stalinist’. However, architecture cannot in itself be liberating or repressive. As Foucault comments, ‘I think that it can never be inherent in the structure of things to guarantee the exercise of freedom. The guarantee of freedom is freedom.’ (Foucault, 1997).

In the interview, Rabinow presses Foucault on whether there could be any example of a building that could prove liberating, but Foucault is quite adamant that buildings cannot guarantee any form of politics. Liberty is a practice and it cannot be based on the order of objects, such as buildings: ‘No. It cannot succeed. If one were to find a place, and perhaps there are some, where liberty is effectively exercised, one would find that this is not owing to the order of objects, but, once again, owing to the practice of liberty.’ (Foucault, 1997).

Architectural form, Foucault concludes, cannot in itself resolve social problems. It is only politics that can address such issues, although architecture can contribute in some way provided that its physical arrangement is such that it does not hinder the practice of the political. Thus, Foucault concludes: ‘I think that architecture can and does produce positive effects when the liberating intentions of the architect coincide with the real practice of people in the exercise of their freedom.’ (Foucault, 1997). Foucault is therefore not contradicting but merely qualifying his earlier comments on the Panopticon. It is not the form of the Panopticon which controls the behaviour of the inmates. Rather it is the politics of use – the fact that the building is operating as a prison, for example – which is ultimately determinant of behaviour, and the architecture is merely supporting the politics of use through its layout.

As such, Foucault makes it abundantly clear that architectural form in itself cannot exert any liberating effect. It cannot be an apparatus of freedom. The same applies to machines that can only have any impact when there is a ‘convergence’ between their operations and the political effects intended: ‘Men have dreamed of liberating machines. But there are no machines of freedom, by definition. This is not to say that the exercise of freedom is completely indifferent to spatial distribution, but it can only function when there is a certain convergence.’

The position of Foucault on this matter is clear. In opposition to the utopian visions of Le Corbusier and others, Foucault would emphasise the politics of everyday life over architectural form as the principal determinant of social behaviour. ‘The architect,’ he comments, ‘has no power over me. . . If I want to tear down or change a house he built for me, put up new partitions, add a chimney, the architect has no control.’ (Foucault, 1997). According to such an approach, there could be no ‘revolutionary’ architecture in the sense
of an architecture that might constitute some critical force of change. Yet this is not to deny the capacity for architecture to ‘produce positive effects’ when its layout coincides with the layout required to enable a certain practice of politics. Such an approach, of course, brings an important temporal dimension into consideration. As political practice changes, so the efficacy of the architectural form to support that practice may itself be compromised.

**Theory of Affordances**

How are we to explain the potential of architecture to have ‘positive effects’ when its form seems to facilitate a certain politics of use? Let us start by stating that from a post-structuralist perspective, tools have no agency. They cannot force us to do anything. The same goes for a building. As Foucault has noted, a building cannot force us to behave in a certain way.

Indeed, one key problem for post-structuralists is that phenomenologists are often guilty of ascribing ‘agency’ to an object. This returns with a vengeance if we consider the controversial Actor Network Theory (ANT) promoted by Bruno Latour. ANT assumes that objects ‘act’ in social networks. Latour himself uses the example of a door-closer ‘on strike’ to illustrate his point (Latour, 1988). However, the most well-known architectural example of ascribing agency to objects is perhaps Louis Kahn asking a brick what it wants to do, as though the brick has the capacity to think and speak. “You say to a brick, ‘What do you want, brick?’ And brick says to you, ‘I like an arch.’ And you say to brick, ‘Look, I want one, too, but arches are expensive and I can use a concrete lintel!’ And then you say: ‘What do you think of that, brick?’ Brick says: ‘I like an arch.’” (Weinwright, 2013). This – for the post-structuralists – is simply a question of ventriloquism, of projecting onto the object a form of anthropomorphic agency. Of course, there is always a natural tendency to think in this way. Many of us call our cars names, and perhaps even speak to them. And, as Lacan has observed, there is a ‘primordial anthropomorphism’ that underpins knowledge, and he therefore questions “whether all knowledge is not originally knowledge of a person before being knowledge of an object, and even whether the knowledge of an object is not, for humanity, a secondary acquisition.” (Lacan, 1975).

However, from a post-structuralist viewpoint, the problem is that we end up ‘appropriating’ the object – be it door-closer or brick – as though we understand it.

If, however, we were to look for a theory that might explain the potentialities of architectural forms to support a politics of use, we might start by considering the ‘theory of affordances’. The theory of affordances suggests that there is a particular action or set of actions that is afforded by a tool or object. Thus, a knob might afford pulling – or possibly pushing – while a cord might afford pulling. This is not to say that the tool or object has agency as such. In other words, the tool or object does not have the capacity to actually ‘invite’ or ‘prevent’ certain actions. Rather it simply ‘affords’ certain operations that it is incumbent on the user to recognise, dependent in part on a set of pre-existing associations that have been made with that tool or object. Likewise, that action or set of actions is also dependent upon the capacity of an

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individual to undertake those actions. Thus, certain actions might not be afforded to small children or those without the strength or agility to perform those actions. Moreover, certain tools afford certain operations, but do not preclude other operations. For example, we might perhaps affix a nail with a screwdriver – albeit less efficiently – if we do not have a hammer at hand. We might also recognise that it is easier to cut wood with a saw than with a hammer, and that the technique of cutting with a saw affords a limited range of possible operations.

Again, what applies to tools can also apply to buildings, in that both could be described loosely as ‘systems’ that might be used to accommodate certain actions. In other words, we might describe the architectural form of the Panopticon as ‘affording’ the possibility of it being used for the purpose of a disciplinary space, such as a prison. Yet the Panopticon itself has no agency. It does not force the occupants to behave in a certain way. It is the politics of use that engenders that, not the architectural form. Imagine, for example, that the logic of the Panopticon were to be reversed, such that the inmates in their cells were to invite the gaze. Turn the Panopticon into a dance club with the inmates gyrating in their cells inviting the gaze of those in the centre, and you have the same building operating efficiently according to a fundamentally different programme. 7

**Societies of Control**

There is, however, a further concern that needs to be addressed in questioning the capacity of a building to serve as an apparatus. This concern emerges out of Deleuze’s own subsequent contributions to the issues that Foucault had raised about the exercise of power. Following on from Foucault’s text, Deleuze wrote a further text, ‘Postscript on the Societies of Control’. Deleuze is, of course, a champion of Foucault’s work, and is quick to praise his analysis of the Panopticon. However, Deleuze also notes that Foucault was also operating in a temporal framework: ‘But what Foucault recognized as well was the transience of this model.’ (Deleuze, 1992). Foucault recognised that ‘societies of sovereignty’ had given way to ‘disciplinary societies’. According to Deleuze, however, ‘disciplinary societies’ themselves have now given way to ‘societies of control’: ‘Foucault located the disciplinary societies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; they reach their height at the outset of the twentieth. . . But everyone knows that these institutions are finished, whatever the length of their expiration periods. It’s only a matter of administering their last rites and of keeping people employed until the installation of the new forces knocking at the door. These are the societies of control, which are in the process of replacing the disciplinary societies.’ (Deleuze, 1992).

The factory, Deleuze notes, has given way to the corporation (Deleuze, 1992). And with it a new form of control has begun to take charge, whose shift is most obvious in approaches towards money. The fixed value of gold has given way to floating rates of exchange, just as we have shifted from spaces of enclosure to societies of control, a shift epitomised for Deleuze as one between two animals, ‘the monetary mole’ and the serpent: ‘The old monetary mole is the animal of the spaces of enclosure, but the serpent is that of the societies of control. We have passed from one animal to the other, from the mole to the serpent, in the

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7 Here I want to introduce a new concept into the theory of the Panopticon – the concept of camouflage. If there was a weakness in Bentham’s model of the Panopticon, it was perhaps that it did not allow for the potential of subterfuge. The visibility of the prisoners in front of the guards, guaranteed, according to Foucault, the subjectification and consequent docility of the prisoners, just as the operations of Big Brother would guarantee, according to Orwell, a society of control in 1984. But the other Big Brother – the Big Brother of 21st century reality television – suggests that there is an alternative strategy now at work – a strategy of deception and masquerade. The way to resist the gaze of Big Brother is perhaps to invite the gaze of Big Brother - to posit a form of compliance at least on the surface level, and yet underneath to offer a form of resistance. The logic of the burka or the Trojan Horse.
system under which we live, but also in our manner of living and in our relations with others. The disciplinary man was a discontinuous producer of energy, but the man of control is undulatory, in orbit, in a continuous network.’ This leads Deleuze to conclude: ‘The coils of a serpent are even more complex than the burrows of a molehill.’ (Deleuze, 1992).

Likewise, we have witnessed an erosion of the hegemony of the physical. This has important ramifications for any discourse based on the logic of enclosure by a physical form, such as the Panopticon. Control now takes a less physical and more invisible form - credit: ‘Man is no longer man enclosed, but man in debt.’ (Deleuze, 1992).

Perhaps most importantly, however, Deleuze recognises that the regime of the apparatus that Foucault was addressing in his discourse about disciplinary societies has given way to another regime, a regime not of the mechanical tool involving energy, but a regime of the computational tool, whose modus operandi is entirely different, and more viral in its operations: ‘Recent disciplinary societies equipped themselves with machines involving energy, with the passive danger of entropy and the active danger of sabotage; the societies of control operate with machines of a third type, computers, whose passive danger is jamming and whose active one is piracy and the introduction of viruses.’ (Deleuze, 1992).

Conclusion

This brings us back to the question of the apparatus. What becomes clear is that in and of itself a building cannot act as an apparatus. At best, in Foucault’s terms, it can operate within a ‘system of relations’ that might be established between various elements that might include – or equally might not include – architectural forms. It is this ‘system of relations’ that constitutes the apparatus. Rather than referring to a building as ‘apparatus’ we might therefore refer to a building as ‘a constituent element within a system that constitutes an apparatus’.

There is, however, a further issue that is raised by Deleuze on the model that Foucault is proposing. If we are to link Foucault’s discourse on the apparatus with the specific model of the Panopticon, which he uses to illustrate the operations of the apparatus, we have to accept that the model belongs to the ‘disciplinary societies’ of the 18th and 19th centuries and does not apply to the ‘societies of control’ that now exists in the 21st century. Moreover, according to that logic, the mechanistic logic of the Panopticon has given way to the viral logic of the age of computation, an entirely different logic.

As such, we might further qualify our comments on the capacity for a building to operate as ‘a constituent element within a system that constitutes an apparatus’, in that even this is contingent on the temporal framework in which we are operating. It is therefore clear that any unconditional claim that a building can operate as an apparatus is deeply flawed.
References


