Cities for or against citizens?

Socio-spatial restructuring of low-income neighbourhoods and the paradox of citizen participation

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Dissertation

for the purpose of obtaining the degree of doctor
at Delft University of Technology,
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by

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To Miguel, Bruno and Mauro
Preface

This study was inspired by the numerous neighbourhood organisers, community leaders, housing activists and common citizens who are fighting on a daily basis against urban injustices, as well as by the public officials and planners who are advocating for the production of just cities considering the interest and priorities of citizens. This journey began in the midst of the global financial crash in the city of Rotterdam and ended a number of years later in New York City when cities had recovered from what became a devastating urban crisis. Previous to this crisis large cities across America and Western Europe were indulged with financing from global capital which concentrated mostly in central investment areas to boost economic growth while feeding and scaling up neoliberal economic agendas. These agendas became increasingly infiltrated in urban policy at all levels accelerating uneven growth and increasing the gap between affluent and poor urban neighbourhoods. By the inception of the economic recession, segregation and urban decline in cities had a long history, and national states daunted by the ghettoisation of these areas had explored numerous urban restructuring programmes in these territories. However, this time with the collapse of large financial institutions, corporations and the housing market, working class and low-income districts were suddenly plagued by foreclosures, evictions, unemployment and despair. This time, the unprecedented financial and urban nature of the crisis made the effects more impactful, especially for those with less economic and political power.

As this urban crisis there have been many in previous decades but this time I did not review it in books. It took place in my lifetime as a young adult, urban researcher and itinerant immigrant. I experienced the construction of the current urban condition since the 1990s while working in Mexico, the Netherlands and the United States. I have collected compelling memories and testimonies that until now I am able to discern. Most importantly, before and during the period of my research I had the opportunity to work for long periods of one or two years, in low-income and immigrant districts affected by disinvestment and investment in a number of cities including Bordeaux (France), Lecce (Italy), Guelph (Canada), Philadelphia (US), Rotterdam (the Netherlands) and New York City (US). While collaborating with municipalities, academic institutions, local organisations and citizens it was striking to me the similarities in terms of local urban struggles and demands across impoverished neighbourhoods as well as the convergences in urban policy and programmes envisioned at different government levels to ameliorate and fix the effects caused by the ongoing urban, economic and social restructuring of cities.
What I realized is that cities and citizens are increasingly affected by global conflicts, politics and crises, and therefore are facing common challenges. Fixed jobs are disappearing, housing is increasingly unaffordable, poverty is becoming systematic, migration is rising, urban segregation is growing, and racial tensions are far from vanishing. Certainly, the social, economic and physical impact inflicted by global forces seemed to share similar characteristics. However, I also found divergences in local responses coming from the state and local stakeholders as well as in urban restructuring approaches due to the different degrees of exposure to market-driven development and the financialisation of cities. Furthermore, something that overwhelmingly captured my interest is the organising and mobilising efforts led by local community groups, civic associations and common citizens to improve their own communities, livelihoods and neighbourhoods while enduring the ‘slow violence’ inflicted by the resilient and expansive neoliberal agendas in cities. Lastly, one of the most compelling but also perplexing discoveries that drove me to focus on this study was the increasing promotion of citizen participation and integration in urban restructuring policies and programmes. Particularly in places where market forces were unleashed and investment was projected. Certainly, city, housing and neighbourhood action plans have been drafted across cities claiming to rescue areas from decline and poverty and on the way improving the livelihoods of residents. However, in my experience, the reality has been far from those promises in liberal and conservative political environments.

For this study I selected two contrasting metropolitan areas I have worked and am knowledgable in, New York City and The Randstad Holland. Despite their differences, both areas are widely recognized for their legacy in progressive housing and urban programmes in their respective contexts, and do share community-led schemes that had democratized urban restructuring processes. Additionally, I selected as case studies the neighbourhoods of Bushwick and Tarwewijk in the municipalities of Brooklyn and Rotterdam, respectively. A number of public policies and programmes have targeted these two low-income neighbourhoods for development in recent years and consequently brought about different challenges for residents. While Bushwick is becoming the most contested district in Brooklyn with the increasing conflicts between developers and community groups advocating for housing justice, Tarwewijk is moving from a neighbourhood welcoming immigrants and stigmatised with drug dealing and abuse practices to an up-and-coming area for the young professional and the ‘creative class’. In both geographical areas the physical condition is improving and the housing market is picking up, although disproportionally (way more in Brooklyn than in Rotterdam), yet long term residents are anxious as housing prices rise and local businesses change to serve new residents. Thus, it is becoming uncertain who is benefiting from public programmes, housing subsidies, tax incentives, and city grants while raising the following question: Are cities for citizens or against citizens?
Acknowledgements

Without doubt the most inspiring and influential experience throughout this journey was working in New York City and the Randstad Holland. I would like to particularly thank the city of Brooklyn and Rotterdam. Their history, communities, diversity, working neighbourhoods and resiliency to continuous transformations not only taught me the best and the worst of the two worlds, but also encouraged me to pursue my dreams of becoming an urbanist committed to social and spatial justice and completing my doctoral studies.

I could not have succeeded to finish this thesis without the inspiration of the multitude of people working diligently to produce just cities, who I met during the length of this rewarding journey, and without the assistance of my family, tutors and colleagues from Delft University of Technology (NL) and The New School (USA). I would particularly like to thank my promotor and copromotor at the Chair of Spatial Planning and Strategy. Prof. Vincent Nadin for admitting me into the TUDelft doctoral programme and for your valuable guidance throughout my studies. Dr. ir. Paul Stouten for being always by my side guiding me and sharing his valuable knowledge on urban policy and regeneration in the Netherlands, in particular the different approaches and implications in the city of Rotterdam. I admire him not only for his career as an activist, urbanist and academic, but also because he is such a reliable and honorable person to work with.

I am very grateful to the most important and inspiring persons in my life. Miguel, Bruno, and Mauro endured this odyssey with unconditional support and love. I cannot express with words my gratitude to have you by my side. Miguel, you taught me everything is possible regardless of the circumstances. Thanks for pushing me to fiercely follow my dreams. Bruno and Mauro, you grew up during the development of my research in Rotterdam and Brooklyn, so you are a product of these two cities just like this doctoral thesis. Thanks for being my inspiration and accompanying me to all those long community meetings. I am also thankful to my parents for their encouragement throughout my life. And to my partners and dear friends of Cohabitation Strategies, Emiliano Gandolfi and Lucia Babina, with whom I had worked along with my life partner Miguel Robles-Duran in challenging projects and environments for over a decade and whom I greatly admire and have learned so much from.

Last but not least, I want to thank the National Council of Sciences and Technology from Mexico who supported me during the first four years of my doctoral studies. And, Parsons School of Design at the New School for awarding me research funds to travel to the Netherlands a number of times to conduct and conclude this doctoral thesis.
Cities for or against citizens?
# Contents

List of Tables 16  
List of Figures 17  
Abreviations 19  
Summary 21  
Samenvatting 27

## PART 1  Introduction

1  Cities for citizens in a context of urban restructuring 37

1.1  Introduction 37

1.2  Problem statement 39

1.3  Research aim 44

1.4  Methodological approach 46

1.5  Case studies 51

1.6  Research design and structure of the dissertation 57

## PART 2  Cities for or against citizens?

2  Socio-spatial restructuring in low-income districts and the paradox of citizen participation 65
2.1 Introduction 65

2.2 Struggles and mobilisations in the production of the city 66

2.3 Economic restructuring 74

2.4 Uneven development at the city level 77

2.5 From urban renewal to urban regeneration and beyond 82

2.6 Participation and integration as part of the new urban restructuring strategy 86

2.7 Conclusion 93

PART 3 The evolution of urban restructuring

3 Unfolding urban programmes facilitating community involvement in low-income districts in New York City: Decentralisation on planning, funds, and power? 99

3.1 Introduction 99

3.2 Policy approaches and decentralisation instruments assisting in the restructuring of low-income districts through citizen participation 101

3.3 Public grants and programmes assisting in the implementation of local plans and the formation of new neighbourhood-based power structures 119

3.4 Changes in neighbourhood governance and participation 129

3.5 Conclusion 133

Cities for or against citizens?
4 Public efforts promoting citizen participation and integration in the Randstad Holland: Socio-spatial restructuring of low-income neighbourhoods  

4.1 Introduction  

4.2 Urban policy, programmes and approaches facilitating citizen participation: From community organisation to empowerment  

4.3 Decentralisation and action plans  

4.4 Conclusion  

PART 4 Socio-spatial restructuring in low-income districts in New York City and the Randstad Holland  

5 Housing as an urban restructuring strategy in Brooklyn: The case of Bushwick  

5.1 Introduction  

5.2 Bushwick decline: Fires and redlining  

5.3 War on poverty  

5.4 Housing as an urban revitalisation strategy  

5.5 The case of the Rheingold Brewery rezoning  

5.6 The impact of urban restructuring trends in Bushwick  

5.7 Conclusion  

13 Public efforts promoting citizen participation and integration in the Randstad Holland
### 6 Politics, practices and constrains of urban restructuring through citizens active engagement in Rotterdam: The case of Tarwewijk

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>From working class to a deprived district</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>Housing renewal as an urban restructuring strategy to improve ‘problematic’ neighbourhoods</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>Urban restructuring public instruments</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>Power structures governing priority districts</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>Urban restructuring trends</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### PART 5 The new state-led urban restructuring strategy: Analysis and alternatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Urban and housing development trends affecting low-income and minority districts</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>Urban restructuring as an instrument of speculation, competitiveness and economic growth</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>Outward diffusion of urban restructuring from central to peripheral areas</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>Rise of area-based policy, investments and urban interventions</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>Social mixing as policy to fight segregation and promote disaggregation</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.6 State-lead gentrification and displacement in the name of development 295
7.7 New institutional configurations and regulatory policy 298
7.8 Waning of housing for the urban poor and the working class 302
7.9 Citizens participation as state instrument for the pacification, control and bargaining of low-income neighbourhoods in transformation 307
7.10 Conclusion 309

8 Alternatives to the new urban restructuring strategy: Reflections 315
8.1 Introduction 315
8.2 Housing cooperatives, mutual housing associations and community land trusts as an alternative to gain control over land and community livelihoods 317
8.3 Distributing power from housing associations to owners associations, housing cooperatives and other alternative forms of housing providing democratic participation in the transformation of neighbourhoods 321
8.4 Conclusion: Counteracting the pacification, control, and bargaining of low-income neighbourhoods 327

References 333
Appendix A: Interviews 345
Curriculum Vitae 347
Selected Publications 349
List of Tables

1.1 Population and density in New York City and the Randstad Holland in 2010. 53

1.2 Facts of case study cities and districts. 53

2.1 Citizen participation purposes and strategies in urban restructuring of low-income districts. 89

3.1 Community initiated and 197-a plans by borough up to 2010. 113

3.2 New York City’s 197-a plans up to 2010. 114

5.1 Demographic changes in Bushwick. 180

5.2 Arson and fires in Bushwick. 182

5.3 Rheingold Revitalization Plan. 194

5.4 Housing units authorized by new residential building permits and units issued new certificate of occupancy in Bushwick from 2000 to 2013. 203

5.5 Social, economic and housing changes in Bushwick from 2000 to 2015. 214

6.1 Tarwewijk ethnicity (%). 246

6.2 Average standardized disposable household income, % of households. 255

6.3 Safety Index in Tarwewijk, Charlois and Rotterdam. 258

6.4 Changes in households, housing and ownership in Tarwewijk from 2006 to 2014. 275
List of Figures

1.1 Urban and housing policies in the United States and the Randstad Holland 43
1.2 Metropolitan areas and municipalities selected for this research 52
1.3 Brooklyn’s community districts including Community District 4 and Bushwick 54
1.4 Rotterdam’s boroughs including Charlois and the district of Tarwewijk 55
1.5 Research design and structure 58
3.1 New York City’s 147-a plans approved from 1998 to 2010 116
4.1 Rotterdam’s urban growth 148
4.2 Urban renewal in Rotterdam from 1974 to 1985 152
4.3 Cities addressed by the Big City Policy in 1994 161
4.4 Rotterdam’s selected districts for the 56-District Approach programme in 2003 164
5.1 Locaiton of Bushwick, Brooklyn 179
5.2 Brooklyn’s Community Districts and areas selected for the Model Cities Program 184
5.3 Hope Gardens in 2010 187
5.4 Bushwick’s housing structures by year of construction 188
5.5 Urban and housing renewal areas in Bushwick 196
5.6 Rezoned sites in New York City up to 2015 201
5.7 ‘The Colony’ a controversial luxury condo at 1209 Dekalb Avenue in Bushwick 204
5.8 New housing developed in the Rheingold Brewery Rezoning site in 2017 211
5.9 Buildings with at least one rent stabilized unit in Bushwick 216
5.10 Changes in the Hispanic population in Bushwick from 1990 to 2010 218
6.1 Rotterdam’s boroughs, including Charlois and the district of Tarwewijk 227
6.2 Tarwewijk’s neighbourhoods and surrounding areas 230
6.3 A property still vacant and in need of rehabilitation in 2009 233
6.4 Tarwewijk today 234
6.5 Housing developments by year and in relation to urban policy 236
6.6 Housing Renewal in Tarwebuurt. Source: Tinus de Does. 238
6.7 Gerststraat today 239
6.8 Selected districts by the 56-District Approach in Rotterdam 247
6.9 Housing renovation in Bas Jungeriusstraat in 2009 248
6.10 Rotterdam’s designated boroughs for the 40-Empowered Districts 250
6.11 Rank of Rotterdam’s 40-Empowered Districts 252
6.12 Moerkerkeplein in Millinxbuurt 254
6.13 Average standarised household income in Rotterdam and Tarwewijk 257
6.14 Mijnkintbuurt in 2009 262
6.15 Klushuizen in the Mijnkintbuurt in 2009 267
6.16 Klushuizen in the Millinxbuurt in 2009 268
Cities for or against citizens?
## Abreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMI</td>
<td>Area Median Income</td>
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<tr>
<td>AVV</td>
<td>Aankopen Verbeteren Verkopen [Purchase Renovation Sale]</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Community Action Program</td>
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<td>CAA</td>
<td>Community Action Agencies</td>
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<td>CIP</td>
<td>Capital Improvement Program</td>
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<td>CETA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Employment and Training Act</td>
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<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community Based Organizations</td>
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<td>CDA</td>
<td>City Demonstration Agencies</td>
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<td>CDBG</td>
<td>Community Development Block Grant</td>
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<td>CDC</td>
<td>Community Development Corporations</td>
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<td>CDP</td>
<td>Community Planning and Development</td>
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<td>CMP</td>
<td>Community Management Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPC</td>
<td>City Planning Commission</td>
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<td>DAMP</td>
<td>Division of Alternative Management Programs</td>
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<td>FHA</td>
<td>Federal Housing Administration</td>
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<td>HARP</td>
<td>Housing Asset Renewal Program</td>
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<td>HIP</td>
<td>Housing Improvement Program</td>
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<td>HUD</td>
<td>Housing and Urban Development</td>
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<td>HPD</td>
<td>Housing Preservation and Development</td>
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<td>HVV</td>
<td>Huisvestingsvergunning [Housing permit]</td>
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<tr>
<td>TIL</td>
<td>Tenant-Interim Lease</td>
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<td>LLC</td>
<td>Limited Liability Corporation</td>
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<td>MCA</td>
<td>Model Cities Administration</td>
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<td>DEIS</td>
<td>Draft Environmental Impact Statements</td>
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<td>OEO</td>
<td>Office of Economic Opportunity</td>
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<td>MRNY</td>
<td>Make the Road New York</td>
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<td>NEP</td>
<td>Neighborhood Entrepreneurship Program</td>
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<td>NRP</td>
<td>Neighborhood Redevelopment Program</td>
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<td>NSP</td>
<td>Neighborhood Stabilization Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>NYCHA</td>
<td>New York City Housing Authority</td>
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<td>OVDB</td>
<td>Organisatie van en door Bewoners [Organisation for and by Residents]</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONC</td>
<td>Office of Neighborhood Government</td>
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<td>PLP</td>
<td>Participation Loan Program</td>
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RBSCC</td>
<td>Ridgewood Bushwick Senior Citizen Council</td>
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<td>SEP</td>
<td>Sweat Equity Program</td>
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<td>UDAAP</td>
<td>Urban Development Action Area Project</td>
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<td>ULURP</td>
<td>Uniform Land Use Review Process</td>
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<td>UHP</td>
<td>Urban Homesteading Program</td>
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<td>UHAB</td>
<td>Urban Homesteading Assistance Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>VVE</td>
<td>Vereniging van Eigenaren</td>
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<tr>
<td>VROM</td>
<td>Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening Ministry [Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Summary

Urban renewal has evolved into an ambitious and sophisticated urban strategy, recognised as urban revitalisation in America and urban regeneration in Western Europe. This new urban strategy, which tends to be area-based and state-sponsored, claims for the most part to coordinate a wide range of resources, partners and public agencies to bring about social, economic and spatial improvements in underdeveloped and impoverished city areas while improving the livelihoods of the local residents. However, as this study asserts, the objectives behind this new urban strategy have considered, for the most part, the interests of those formulating and implementing such efforts rather than local residents and stakeholders, and produced in turn ‘attractive’ neighbourhoods increasing city revenues, boosting real estate prices, attracting new investments and alluring new residents. Most importantly, citizen participation and gentrification have been concurrently promoted in urban restructuring policy and programmes bringing about a paradox. Citizens have been devised as both subjects and objects of governance (Uitermark, 2014). Urban restructuring programmes have called for residents’ involvement in decision making frameworks while imposing urban revitalisation and regeneration approaches guiding the fate of their neighbourhoods and putting communities at risk of displacement.

This study uses comparative research to investigate the way that urban renewal targeting low-income neighbourhoods has evolved into a new urban strategy involving principles and tactics ingrained in neoliberal economic principles. The study shows that this applies in cities led by market-driven development where governments facilitate more than regulate urban growth, and in cities partially exposed to market-driven development and led by interventionist governments which regulate and guide urban restructuring transformations. New York City and The Randstad Holland have been selected as study areas. Above all, the role public policy, instruments and institutional frameworks have played in facilitating citizens’ involvement in decision making in these contrasting contexts is particularly scrutinised looking at two neighbourhoods in the municipalities of Brooklyn and Rotterdam; Bushwick and Tarwewijk, respectively. The study exposes the motives, successes and drawbacks of public programmes and instruments fostering citizen participation and community-led change, in an effort to both create awareness of potential risks in the case of unsuccessful initiatives, and envision the exchange and adaptation of some of those successful schemes for the production of more equitable neighbourhoods.

This thesis asks to what extent urban restructuring trends converge in the two contrasting geographical areas since both territories have been exposed to the
same global agents and influences that have impacted urban restructuring policy and interventions (i.e. neoliberal economic policies, global financing, interurban competition, etc). However, it recognizes that the outcomes may manifest differently due to differences in welfare programmes, urban policy, implementation frameworks, local and global housing markets at the neighbourhood level, as well as variations in local governance structures and instruments facilitating civic participation in urban and housing restructuring programmes.

**Citizen participation in urban restructuring in America and Western Europe**

Citizen participation was widely recognised in urban and housing public programmes in America and Western Europe during the 1960s and 1970s. In a time of political and economic shifts and as a result of citizen struggles and social movements, the democratisation of decision making in planning became a political act. Feeling alienated from the urban transformations taking place in their own neighbourhoods, citizens organised and demanded to be part of the production of cities. Citizen demands were gradually adopted and institutionalised by public policies and programmes. However, such progressive approaches did not last for long. Citizen participation in urban renewal and housing programmes lost agency as liberal urban policy was gradually overthrown beginning with the recessions of the late 1970s and the conservative governments that followed in the 1980s and beyond. National states and municipalities began withdrawing from those endeavours while coordinating efforts to attract private partners and investment to pursue larger and more ambitious urban restructuring interventions in cities. Certainly, the community-driven scope of a number of public programmes shifted to a more ambitious one that sought to achieve economic growth and profitable urban development bringing about shifts in urban restructuring policy, programmes, funds and leadership over the following decades. Evidently, as neoliberal economic agendas became more and more ingrained in urban policy and programmes guiding urban restructuring, uneven development and segregation became more stark bringing new urban challenges across cities. What is interesting is that in a context of increasing decentralisation, privatisation, and deregulation of urban restructuring interventions that have impacted directly citizens and particularly low-income communities, national states began once again promoting citizen participation. As national states have increasingly devolved decision-making and resources to lower government levels, municipalities and their partners, from the private and not-profit sectors, have been more involved in making and implementing local policies and addressing citizens and community needs. However, the motive, scope, impact and outcome of current local policies and programmes fostering the involvement of low-income and minority groups in urban restructuring programmes
have left many questions unresolved. A number of studies assert that the deliberate activation of specific community groups by national states and their partners in urban restructuring programmes has been promoted: (1) to deal with the unprecedented economic and social consequences that emerged out of the neoliberal project through socially interventionist and ameliorative public policies and programmes (Peck & Tick, 2002; Uitermark, 2014); (2) to control and discipline vulnerable and deprived groups who have been victims of the byproducts of the current neoliberal urbanisation and who should be ‘integrated’ through highly engineered measures (Albers & van Beckhoven, 2010; Brenner, Peck & Theodor 2009; Schickel & van der Berg, 2011; Uitermark, 2014; Uitermark & Duyendak, 2008); and (3) to build coalition politics by assembling strategic alliances in areas undergoing political and socio-spatial restructuring while seeing themselves as symbols of the community to legitimise their powers and in turn assert control and gain support to fulfil ongoing plans without opposition (Harvey, 1989). This study delves into these claims by scrutinising recent urban restructuring approaches in two different geographical contexts and investigating policies and programmes advocating for citizen participation.

**Research content and questions**

This study is structured in five sections: (1) introduction (2) theoretical framework; (3) politico-institutional historical context; (4) case study research; and (5) final analysis of comparative research. The first section, *Introduction*, outlines the research framework of this study including problem statement, aim, methodological approach and selection of case studies as well as the design and structure of this research. The second section, *Cities for or against Citizens*, includes Chapter 2 which provides a theoretical understanding of the way urban restructuring discourses, objectives and strategies have evolved in America and Western Europe. It introduces *the right to the city* as one of the main demands citizens, academics, activists, advocate planners, civic and grassroots groups have called for, and mobilised around, to fight the injustices produced by contemporary neoliberal urbanisation. It then explains the way that economic restructuring has led to new socio-spatial configurations and politico-economic relations in cities with impactful outcomes, such as uneven development and segregation and new institutional policy and governance frameworks. In relation to such new developments, the shift of urban renewal into a more ambitious and coordinated global and economic strategy is presented in conclusion to section two, enquiring about the state’s continuous promotion of participation and integration of citizens in urban restructuring policies and programmes targeting low-income neighbourhoods in both geographical areas.
The third section, *The Evolution of Urban Restructuring*, provides the politico-institutional historical context of urban restructuring in New York City and the Randstad Holland. It encompasses Chapter 3 and 4 which carefully explain public policy, programmes and instruments involving or facilitating citizen participation in urban restructuring and housing programmes in low-income neighbourhoods from the postwar years until today. Chapter 3 focuses on policies and programmes calling for ‘citizen participation’ ‘for the first time and the War on Poverty programmes which institutionalised the ‘widespread participation of the poor’ for the improvement of deprived inner city areas, to the tenant-led sweat equity housing management programmes that emerged after the city’s nadir of the 1970s, and the public policies and instruments of devolution which gave way to the professionalisation of grassroots movements, and in turn, the growth of the non-profit sector currently in charge of community and housing development. On the other hand, Chapter 4 explains the evolution of social oriented policies and participatory programmes promoted for the restructuring of low-income neighbourhoods in the Randstad Holland, from community work [opbouwwerk] with specific goals and targets and Building for the Neighbourhood [Bouwen voor de Buurt], a collective and politicised urban renewal effort bringing about political and social change, to more recent policy programmes promoting the integration and participation of low-income and marginalised communities. The historical account of these two chapters provides an overview of the endeavours national states have undertaken at different levels facilitating citizen participation and community-led initiatives, as well as their successes and shortcomings. Both chapters offer a policy context useful for the analysis of the most recent urban restructuring frameworks and trends, which are examined in the following chapters. The ultimate objective of this section is to answer the following question: How have public policy and programmes targeting low-income and minority districts evolved with the decentralisation of national state’s power and resources?

The fourth section, *Socio-spatial Restructuring in Low Income Neighbourhoods in New York City and the Randstad Holland*, involves case study research. Composed of Chapter 5 and 6, it delves into the socio-spatial restructuring of two low-income neighbourhoods in New York City and the Randstad Holland; Bushwick and Tarwewijk, respectively. The way urban restructuring policies and programmes depicted in the previous two chapters have evolved and transformed socio-spatial configurations through shifts in housing provision —including planning, funding and development schemes— and local urban governance are illustrated in detail. Above all, policies, programmes and local initiatives promoting the involvement of citizens in decision making processes are particularly examined. Additionally, the role of local stakeholders in the implementation of those policy frameworks is presented considering decentralisation, privatisation and deregulation trends in housing and...
urban restructuring. Lastly, a critical analysis of the purpose, evolution and outcomes of public policies, planning strategies, participatory endeavours and trends facilitating the restructuring of low-income income neighbourhoods is offered. The central questions in this section are the following: How have changes in public policy and programmes played out in cities with liberal governments and unregulated market-driven development and in cities with interventionist governments and regulated market driven developments? How and why have national states promoted the integration and participation of residents of low-income and minority groups throughout the evolution of urban restructuring processes?

The last section, The New State-Led Urban Restructuring Strategy: Analysis and Alternatives, offers a final analysis and a reflection on the comparative research. It is composed of Chapter 7 and 8. Chapter 7 provides a summative analysis of the previous chapters by delving into the way urban revitalisation and regeneration in low-income neighbourhoods in America and Western Europe, respectively, have evolved into a new urban restructuring strategy with clear objectives, locations, and approaches. The urban restructuring trends outlined in this section depict current state-sponsored policies, strategies, tools and measures promoted in disinvested areas to integrate these segregated sites into the new economic functions of cities. Additionally, it lays out the way citizens have been concurrently perceived by policy and public programmes as part of the new urban restructuring strategy. This section concludes with Chapter 8 which reflects on the rise of urban mobilisations and counteracting urban practices responding to the increasing disability of citizens to be part of the transformation of their own living environments. This last section aims to answer the main question of this investigation: Are cities being restructured for the welfare of citizens or are they being reshaped against the will, needs and interests of their own citizens?

**Urban restructuring trends and alternatives**

The final analysis of the study, as it was mentioned above, lays out the current directions of urban restructuring that are identified, while examining the evolution of urban restructuring policies, programmes, and strategies of implementation targeting low-income neighbourhoods in New York City and the Randstad Holland. As part of the findings of this study, the following urban restructuring trends were identified: (1) urban restructuring being used by national states as an instrument for speculation, competitiveness and economic growth; (2) an increasing outward diffusion of urban restructuring from urban centres to peripheral areas; (3) a rise of area-base policies, investments and urban interventions; (4) ‘social mixing’ as urban policy to diversify housing opportunities and in turn promote socially and economic
diverse neighbourhoods; (5) a generalisation of state-led gentrification in urban restructuring policy and programmes; (6) new regulatory policy and institutional configurations; (7) the waning of housing provision for the poor and the working-class; and lastly, and most importantly for this study, (8) citizen participation being devised as a state instrument for the pacification, control and bargaining of low-income neighbourhoods in transformation. These trends certainly bring to light the fate of low-income communities and neighbourhoods, but also underscore the fields and spaces—from policy, programmes and governance frameworks to urban and housing planning approaches—where intervention is needed to generate more equitable neighbourhoods.

Against this background, and concluding the final analysis, this study also highlights successful approaches and practices facilitating citizen- and community-lead urban restructuring processes in New York City and the Randstad Holland. Historically, as this study shows, progressive policies have promoted and, in many cases, managed to create democratic tools and processes of planning and development, particularly in times of crisis and when the private sector is not willing nor able to intervene. Such policies and their outcomes have proven, even with their shortcomings, that cities for citizens can be produced with a fair distribution of political power, resources and benefits. Alternative forms and models of housing development which have been devised, for the most part, by common citizens responding to the urgency of both creating housing according to their own needs and priorities and producing less alienated dwelling environments are underscored including housing cooperatives, community land trusts, self-management housing programs and other non-speculative and regulated housing development schemes. Interestingly, just as the policy and planning approaches of the two case studies tend to converge, so do the principles and purpose of the urban restructuring models in many ways. But the effects manifest themselves differently due to the differences in institutional policy and government frameworks in each context. These schemes have been presented throughout this study but are particularly emphasised at the end of this study since they offer a valuable insight into alternative ways of restructuring low-income neighbourhoods, and urban districts in general, so as to produce more equitable cities, in other words—cities for citizens.
Samenvatting

In Stadsvernieuwing heeft zich ontwikkeld tot een ambitieuze en geraffineerde stedelijke strategie die wordt ingezet voor revitalisatie van steden in Amerika en stedelijke regeneratie in West-Europa. Deze strategie, die gewoonlijk regiogebonden is en door de nationale overheid wordt gesteund, heeft meestal de ambitie om een breed scala van middelen, partners en overheidsinstanties op één lijn te brengen ten behoeve van sociale, economische en ruimtelijke verbeteringen in onderontwikkelde en verpauperde stadsdelen, en tegelijkertijd de levensstandaard van de lokale bevolking te verhogen. Toch zijn, zoals uit deze studie blijkt, de doeleinden van deze nieuwe stedelijke strategie eerder in het belang van degenen die de maatregelen bedenken en uitvoeren dan in dat van de lokale bewoners en stakeholders, en hebben ze bijgevolg 'aantrekkelijke' buurten opgeleverd die de inkomsten van de stad vergroten, de onroerendgoedprijzen doen stijgen, nieuwe investeringen trekken en nieuwe bewoners lokken. Het belangrijkste punt is dat burgerparticipatie en gentrificatie in het stadsvernieuwsbeleid naast elkaar zijn gestimuleerd, wat tot een paradox heeft geleid. Burgers worden aangemerkt als zowel subjecten als objecten van bestuur (Uitermark, 2014). In stadsvernieuwingprogramma’s wordt gepleit voor betrokkenheid van de bewoners bij de besluitvormingskaders terwijl met diezelfde programma’s revitalisatie- en regeneratiemethoden worden opgelegd die het lot van hun wijken bepalen en hun gemeenschap dreigen te verdringen.

In deze studie wordt aan de hand van vergelijkend onderzoek nagegaan hoe de stadsvernieuwing ten behoeve van buurten met lage inkomens is uitgegroeid tot een nieuwe stedelijke strategie met uitgangspunten en tactieken die zijn geworteld in neoliberale economische principes. De studie laat zien dat dit het geval is in steden die zich laten leiden door marktgestuurde ontwikkeling, waarbij overheden de stedelijke groei niet zozee reguleren als wel faciliteren, maar ook in steden die maar gedeeltelijk blootstaan aan marktgestuurde ontwikkeling en worden geleid door interventionistische overheden die de veranderingen in het kader van de stadsvernieuwing reguleren en begeleiden. Als onderzoeksregio’s zijn New York City en de Randstad Holland geselecteerd. Vooral de rol die het beleid, de instrumenten en de institutionele kaders van de overheid hebben gespeeld bij het bevorderen van de betrokkenheid van burgers bij de besluitvorming in deze contrasterende contexten, is grondig tegen het licht gehouden in een onderzoek naar twee wijken, respectievelijk Bushwick in Brooklyn en Tarwewijk in Rotterdam. Het onderzoek legt de motieven, successen en nadenken bloot van overheidsprogramma’s en -instrumenten ter bevordering van burgerparticipatie en verandering vanuit de gemeenschap. Daarbij wordt getracht het bewustzijn van de mogelijke risico’s van mislukte initiatieven te
vergroten, maar ook ideeën en aanpassingen vanuit bepaalde succesvolle projecten uit te wisselen met het oog op meer gelijkwaardige buurten.

In dit proefschrift wordt de vraag gesteld in hoeverre trends in stadsvernieuwing in deze twee tegengestelde regio’s convergeren doordat ze beide blootstaan aan dezelfde mondiale factoren en invloeden die van invloed zijn op beleid en interventies in de stedelijke vernieuwing (neoliberaal economisch beleid, globalisering van de financiële sector, interstedelijke concurrentie, enz.). Wel wordt erkend dat de resultaten verschillend kunnen zijn als gevolg van lokale verschillen in sociale regelingen, stedelijk beleid, uitvoeringskaders, de plaatselijke en mondiale huisvestingsmarkt, en als gevolg van variaties in lokale bestuursstructuren en -instrumenten ter bevordering van burgerparticipatie in stadsvernieuwingsprogramma’s.

### Burgerparticipatie in de stadsvernieuwing in Amerika en West-Europa

Burgerparticipatie werd in de jaren zestig en zeventig van de twintigste eeuw in Amerika en West-Europa op grote schaal opgenomen in overheidsprogramma’s voor stadsvernieuwing. In een tijd van politieke en economische veranderingen en onder invloed van burgerinitiatieven en maatschappelijke bewegingen werd de democratisering van de besluitvorming in de ruimtelijke ordening een politiek feit. Omdat zij zich verwond voelden van de stedelijke veranderingen in hun eigen buurten, begonnen burgers zich te organiseren en hun plek in de vormgeving van steden op te eisen. De eisen van de burgers werden geleidelijk overgenomen en geïnstitutionaliseerd in overheidsbeleid en -programma’s. Deze progressieve aanpak was echter geen lang leven beschoren. De burgerparticipatie in stadsvernieuwingprogramma’s verloor aan momentum naarmate het progressieve stedelijke beleid geleidelijk werd teruggedrongen tijdens de recessies aan het einde van de jaren zeventig en de daaropvolgende opkomst van conservatieve regeringen in de jaren tachtig en daarna. Nationale en gemeentelijke overheden begonnen zich terug te trekken uit deze programma’s en private partners en investeerders aan te trekken voor de uitvoering van grotere en ambitieuzere herstructureringsinterventies in de steden. De focus op participatie van de gemeenschap in een aantal overheidsprogramma’s verschoof naar een veel ambitieuzere focus op economische groei en winstgevende stedelijke ontwikkeling die zou leiden tot verschuivingen in het beleid, de programma’s, de financiering en het management van de stadsvernieuwing in de volgende decennia. Naarmate neoliberaal economische agenda’s steeds meer verweven raakten met het stedelijk beleid ten aanzien van stadsvernieuwing, namen de ongelijkheid in ontwikkeling en de segregatie overduidelijk toe, met als gevolg nieuwe uitdagingen in de steden. Het is interessant dat in een context van toenemende decentralisering, privatisering en deregulering van stadsvernieuwingeninterventies met
directe gevolgen voor de burgers – met name groepen met lage inkomens –, nationale overheden opnieuw de burgerparticipatie begonnen te stimuleren. Naarmate nationale overheden in toenemende mate de besluitvorming en middelen hebben gedelegeerd aan lagere overheden, zijn gemeenten en hun private en non-profitpartners meer betrokken geraakt bij de vaststelling en uitvoering van lokaal beleid en het vervullen van de behoeften van de burgers en de gemeenschap. Het motief, de reikwijdde, de impact en de uitkomst van het huidige lokale beleid ter bevordering van de betrokkenheid van groepen met lage inkomens en minderheden in stadsvernieuwsprogramma’s laten echter veel vragen onbeantwoord. In een aantal studies wordt geconcludeerd dat de opzettelijke activering van specifieke groepen in de gemeenschap door nationale overheden en hun partners in stadsvernieuwsprogramma’s is gestimuleerd: (1) om het hoofd te bieden aan de ongekende economische en sociale consequenties van het neoliberale project in de vorm van sociaal ingrijpend en negatief uitpak kend overheidsbeleid (Peck & Tickle, 2002; Uitermark, 2014); (2) om kwetsbare en achtergestelde groepen, die het slachtoffer zijn geworden van de bijwerkingen van de huidige neoliberale verstedelijking en moeten worden ‘geintegreerd’ met zeer verfijnde maatregelen, in bedwang te houden en te disciplineren (Albers & van Beckhoven, 2010; Brenner, Peck & Theodor 2009; Schickel & van der Berg, 2011; Uitermark, 2014; Uitermark & Duyvendak, 2008); en (3) om een coalitiebeleid tot stand te brengen door strategische allianties te vormen in regio’s die politieke en sociaal-ruimtelijke herstructurering ondergaan terwijl ze zichzelf beschouwen als symbolen van de gemeenschap om hun bevoegdheden te legitimeren en op hun beurt controle uit te oefenen en steun te verwerven om plannen te blijven uitvoeren zonder oppositie (Harvey, 1989). In de studie worden deze claims onderzocht door in te gaan op recente benaderingen ter bevordering van burgerparticipatie in twee verschillende geografische contexten.

**Inhoud en onderzoeksvragen**

Deze studie bestaat uit vijf delen: (1) inleiding, (2) theoretisch kader, (3) politiek-institutionele historische context, (4) casestudy-onderzoek en (5) uiteindelijke analyse van het vergelijkend onderzoek. In het eerste deel, Introduction, wordt het onderzoekskader van deze studie geschat, inclusief probleemstelling, doel, methodologische aanpak en selectie van casestudy’s, alsmede de opzet en structuur van dit onderzoek. Het tweede deel, Cities for or against Citizens, bevat hoofdstuk 2 waarin theoretisch inzicht wordt geboden in de wijze waarop het discours, de doelstellingen en de strategieën van de stadsvernieuwing zich in Amerika en West-Europa hebben ontwikkeld. Hierin wordt the right to the city (‘het recht op de stad’) geïntroduceerd als een van de belangrijkste eisen waarvoor burgers, wetenschappers, activisten, stedelijke pleitbezorgers en actiegroepen zich hebben
ingeset en gemobiliseerd, om de onrechtvaardige gevolgen van de hedendaagse neoliberale verstedelijking te bestrijden. Vervolgens wordt verklaard hoe economische herstructurering in de steden heeft geleid tot nieuwe sociaal-ruimtelijke configuraties en politiek-economische relaties met reële gevolgen, zoals ongelijke ontwikkeling en segregatie, en nieuwe institutionele beleids- en bestuurskaders. In verband met dergelijke nieuwe ontwikkelingen wordt de verschuiving van de stadsvernieuwing naar een ambitieuze en gecoördineerde wereldwijde economische strategie gepresenteerd aan het eind van het tweede deel, waarbij wordt ingegaan op de voortdurende stimulering van burgerparticipatie en -integratie in stadsvernieuwingsprogramma’s gericht op buurten met lage inkomens in beide onderzochte regio’s.

In het derde deel, The Evolution of Urban Restructuring, wordt de politiek-institutionele historische context van de stadsvernieuwing in New York City en de Randstad Holland beschreven. Dit deel bevat de hoofdstukken 3 en 4, waarin een gedetailleerde beschrijving wordt gegeven van het beleid, de programma’s en de instrumenten die de overheid heeft ingezet om burgerparticipatie toe te passen of te bevorderen in stadsvernieuwingsprojecten voor buurten met lage inkomens sinds de Tweede Wereldoorlog. In hoofdstuk 3 ligt de nadruk op beleid en programma’s voor stadsvernieuwing in New York City, vanaf de programma’s waarin voor het eerst werd gepleit voor ‘burgerparticipatie’ en de War on Poverty waarin de ‘brede participatie van de armen’ werd geïnstitutionaliseerd met het oog op verbetering van achtergestelde binnenstadswijken, tot de door huurders geleide eigenbeheerprogramma’s (‘sweat equity programmes’) die ontstonden nadat de stad in de jaren zeventig een dieptepunt had beleefd, en de decentralisatie door het stadsbestuur die ruimte bood voor de professionalisering van belangenbewegingen van bewoners en de groei van de non-profitsector die nu verantwoordelijk is voor het gemeenschaps- en huisvestingsbeleid. Daarentegen wordt in hoofdstuk 4 de ontwikkeling beschreven van het sociale beleid en de participatieprogramma’s ten behoeve van de stadsvernieuwing in armeren buurten in de Randstad Holland, van opbouwwerk met specifieke doelstellingen en Bouwen voor de Buurt, een collectief en gepolitiseerd stadsvernieuwingsinitiatief voor politieke en maatschappelijke verandering, tot meer recente beleidsprogramma’s die de integratie en participatie van arme en gemarginaliseerde bevolkingsgroepen stimuleren. De historische verantwoording in deze hoofdstukken vormt een overzicht van de inspanningen die nationale overheden zich op verschillende niveaus hebben getroost om burgerparticipatie en initiatieven vanuit de gemeenschap te faciliteren, en van hun successen en tekortkomingen. Beide hoofdstukken schetsen een beleidscontext die bruikbaar is voor de analyse van de laatste kaders en trends in de stadsvernieuwing, die in de volgende hoofdstukken worden beschreven. Dit deel is uiteindelijk bedoeld om antwoord te geven op de volgende vraag: Hoe hebben het overheidsbeleid en de bijbehorende programma’s die zich richten op wijken met lage inkomens en minderheden, zich ontwikkeld in relatie tot de decentralisering van de bevoegdheden en middelen van de nationale overheid?
Het vierde deel, *Socio-spatial Restructuring in Low Income Neighbourhoods* in New York City and the Randstad Holland, behandelt het casestudy-onderzoek. Het bestaat uit de hoofdstukken 5 en 6 en gaat in op de sociaal-ruimtelijke herstructurering van twee buurten met lage inkomens in New York City en de Randstad Holland, respectievelijk Bushwick en Tarnewijk. De wijze waarop de in de vorige twee hoofdstukken beschreven stadsvernieuwingsprogramma’s zich hebben ontwikkeld en de sociaal-ruimtelijke configuraties hebben getransformeerd door middel van verschuivingen in het huisvestingsaanbod (inclusief plannings-, financierings- en ontwikkelingsregelingen) en het lokale stedelijke bestuur, wordt uitvoerig geïllustreerd. In het bijzonder worden beleidsmaatregelen, programma’s en lokale initiatieven ter bevordering van de betrokkenheid van burgers bij besluitvormingsprocessen bestudeerd. Daarnaast wordt de rol van lokale stakeholders bij de uitvoering van die beleidskaders gepresenteerd, met oog voor de trends met betrekking tot decentralisering, privatisering en deregulering in de stadsvernieuwing. Ten slotte wordt een kritische analyse gegeven van de boodschap, de evolutie en de uitkomsten van het overheidsbeleid, de plannerstrategieën, participatiepogingen en trends die de herstructurering van buurten met lage inkomens hebben gefaciliteerd. In dit deel zijn de volgende centrale vragen aan de orde: Hoe hebben de veranderingen in het beleid en de programma’s van de overheid uitgepakt in steden met een liberaal bestuur en ongereguleerde marktgestuurde ontwikkeling en in steden met een interventionistisch bestuur en gereguleerde marktgestuurde ontwikkelingen? Hoe en waarom hebben nationale overheden de integratie en participatie van bewoners met lage inkomens en minderheidsgroepen gestimuleerd gedurende de hele evolutie van de stadsvernieuwingenprocessen?

In het laatste deel, *The New State-Led Urban Restructuring Strategy: Analysis and Alternatives*, wordt een uiteindelijke analyse gepresenteerd en gereflecteerd op het vergelijkend onderzoek. Dit deel bestaat uit de hoofdstukken 7 en 8. In hoofdstuk 7 wordt een samenvattende analyse van de voorgaande hoofdstukken gegeven door in te gaan op de manier waarop de stedelijke revitalisering en regeneratie in arme buurten in respectievelijk Amerika en West-Europa zich hebben ontwikkeld tot een nieuwe stadsvernieuwingssstrategie met heldere doelstellingen, locaties en methoden. De in dit deel geschatste stadsvernieuwingsstrends geven een beeld van de huidige door de nationale overheid gesteunde beleidsmaatregelen, -strategieën en -instrumenten die in achterstandsbuurten worden bevorderd om deze gesegregeerde locaties te integreren in de nieuwe economische functies van steden. Daarnaast wordt getoond hoe in het beleid en in overheidsprogramma’s in het kader van de nieuwe stadsvernieuwingssstrategie wordt aangekeken tegen de burgers. Dit deel eindigt met hoofdstuk 8, waarin wordt gereflecteerd op de opkomst van stedelijke mobilisatie en praktijken die ingaan tegen het toenemende onvermogen van burgers om deel uit te maken van de transformatie van hun eigen leefomgeving. In dit laatste deel wordt
getracht een antwoord te geven op de belangrijkste vraag van dit onderzoek: Worden steden vernieuwd voor het welzijn van de burgers of worden ze getransformeerd tegen de wil, behoeften en belangen van hun eigen burgers?

**Trends en alternatieven in de stadsvernieuwing**

In de slotanalyse van de studie worden zoals gezegd de huidige richtingen aangegeven waarin de stadsvernieuwing zich beweegt, en wordt de evolutie onderzocht van het beleid, de programma’s en de uitvoeringsstrategieën voor stadsvernieuwing gericht op armere buurten in New York City en de Randstad Holland. Binnen de uitkomsten van deze studie werden de volgende stadsvernieuwings trends geïdentificeerd: (1) het gebruik van stadsvernieuwing als instrument voor speculatie, concurrentievermogen en economische groei door nationale overheden; (2) een toenemende verspreiding van de stadsvernieuwing vanuit stedelijke centra naar de periferie; (3) een toename van plaatsgebonden beleid, investeringen en stedelijke interventies; (4) ‘sociale vermenging’ als stedelijk beleid voor de diversificatie van huisvestingsmogelijkheden en de bevordering van sociaal en economisch diverse buurten; (5) een veralgemeeningsvorm van door de nationale overheid gestuurde gentrificatie in het beleid en de programma’s voor stadsvernieuwing; (6) nieuwe vormen van toezicht en institutionele configuraties; (7) de afname van huisvestingsvoorzieningen voor mensen met lage inkomen; en tot slot voor deze studie de belangrijkste trend: (8) burgerparticipatie die door de nationale overheid wordt ingezet als instrument voor pacificatie en beheersing van, en onderhandelingen met, buurten met lage inkomens tijdens de transformatie. Deze trends belichten zeker het lot van wijken en buurten met lage inkomens, maar onderstrepen ook de gebieden (van beleid, programma’s en bestuursskaders tot methoden van stadsvernieuwing en -planning) waarop ingrijpen nodig is om meer gelijkwaardige buurten te realiseren.

Tegen deze achtergrond en als afsluiting van de slotanalyse benadrukt deze studie ook succesvolle methoden en praktijken ter bevordering van burger- en gemeenschapsinitiatieven in stadsvernieuwingsprocessen in New York City en de Randstad Holland. Van oudsher, zo laat deze studie zien, wordt met progressief beleid (in veel gevallen met succes) gestreefd naar democratische instrumenten en processen voor stadsplanning en -ontwikkeling, met name in tijden van crisis en wanneer de private sector niet kan of wil ingrijpen. Dergelijke beleidsmaatregelen en de uitkomsten ervan bewijzen, ondanks hun tekortkomingen, dat steden voor bewoners kunnen worden gerealiseerd met een eerlijke verdeling van politieke macht, middelen en voordelen. De aandacht wordt ook gevestigd op alternatieve vormen en modellen van huisvestingsontwikkeling die grotendeels zijn ontworpen door gewone burgers in reactie op de noodzaak om huisvesting volgens hun eigen wensen en prioriteiten en
Cities for or against citizens?
PART 1 Introduction
1 Cities for citizens in a context of urban restructuring

§ 1.1 Introduction

The historical geographical patterns of public and private investment and disinvestment in cities have produced uneven development and socio-spatial segregation throughout the history of urbanisation. As Harvey (1982) asserts, the shifts in the location of investment areas have been intimately related to the over-accumulation of capital leading to the falling of profit and therefore a ‘crisis’, and in turn its search of new investment territories for profit making. Along with recent global economic shifts and the increasing expansion of global capital investment and financing into cities bringing about new profitable functions and meaning to urban areas, the outcomes of uneven development have become more stark than ever.

National states have played a critical role because they have tried to arrest or limit the effects of investment on uneven development, whilst at the same time facilitating investment in urban areas that may create uneveness. Development of an urban area concurrently creates underdevelopment of others, which in turn creates opportunities for a new phase of development (Smith, 1996). Most importantly, underdeveloped areas, mostly low-income and minority neighbourhoods, have been particularly the target of state-led urban restructuring policies and strategies with ambiguous agendas throughout time.

In this context, urban renewal has evolved into an ambitious and sophisticated urban restructuring strategy, recognised as urban revitalisation in North America and urban regeneration in Western Europe, bringing physical improvements and economic growth, often at the expense of local communities in disinvested low-income and minority neighbourhoods. This new urban restructuring strategy, which tends to be area-based and state-sponsored, claims, for the most part, to coordinate a wide range of resources and public agencies to improve the social, economic, and spatial conditions of undeveloped and impoverished city areas while improving the livelihoods of the local residents. However, as this study asserts, the objectives behind it have considered, for the most part, the interests of those formulating and implementing such efforts rather than local residents and stakeholders, and produced, in turn,
‘attractive’ neighbourhoods increasing city revenues, boosting real estate prices, attracting new investments and alluring new residents (better off households). Most importantly, gentrification and citizen participation have been concurrently entrenched in urban restructuring processes bringing about a paradox. Residents have been devised as both objects and subjects of governance (Uitermark, 2014).

This study aims to enquire thorough exploratory comparative research the way urban renewal targeting low-income neighbourhoods has evolved into a new urban restructuring strategy involving principles and tactics ingrained in neoliberal economic policy in (1) cities led by market-driven development and governments facilitating more than regulating urban growth, and (2) cities partially exposed to market-driven development and led by interventionist governments constantly regulating urban restructuring transformations. Above all, it scrutinises the role that public policies, instruments and institutional frameworks facilitating citizens’ involvement in decision making has played in these contrasting contexts by examining two particular districts in New York City and the Randstad Holland. The value of this comparative research lays on the fact that both urban areas have a rich legacy of progressive urban and housing policies and programmes, which have advocated for equitable development though decades. However, there has been a shift in such policies and programmes recently.

This thesis asserts that urban restructuring trends may converge in these two contrasting geographical areas since both territories have been similarly exposed to global agents and influences impacting urban restructuring interventions (i.e., economic policies, global financialisation of cities, etc.). However, these developments may manifest differently due to differences in welfare programmes, urban policy, implementation frameworks, local and global market forces at the local level, as well as variations in local governance structures and instruments facilitating civic participation in urban and housing restructuring programmes. Thus, in summary the ultimate objective of this thesis is fourfold. First, it provides a theoretical understanding of both the drives and agents of urban restructuring, and policy and academic discourses around the participation and integration of citizens in such urban transformations. Second, it delineates the evolution of urban restructuring policies and strategies involving citizen participation in low-income districts from postwar years until today. Third, it delves into the shift of renewal into urban revitalisation and regeneration, in New York City and the Randstad Holland, and the successes and drawbacks of public programmes and instruments facilitating citizen participation and community-led change. Fourth, it identifies urban restructuring trends in low-income districts and reflects on the exchange and adaptation of some progressive schemes examined throughout this study for the production of more equitable communities and the development of low-income neighbourhoods without displacement.
§ 1.2 Problem statement

National states have targeted disinvested and low-income city areas through numerous public policies and programmes in America and Western Europe for over one hundred years. Policy and planning schemes to improve these spaces have moved from reformist approaches focused on cleansing tenements and dilapidated structures to give room to the construction of new housing and planning models in the late 19th century, to the first urban renewal programmes involving urban redevelopment, rehabilitation and conservation processes in the first half of the 20th century. Urban renewal partially sponsored by the state took place mostly during the interwar period, and it was until the post-war years that large-scale state-sponsored projects came about and took force. This happened mostly in slums and urban areas, which had declined due to economic downturns, suburbanisation, and abandonment of inner city districts by the solid working class. In both geographical areas subsidised low-income housing became central. Urban renewal programmes fully dependent on public financing were particularly concerned with the provision of welfare benefits, such as social housing. During periods of hardship public powers took ‘charge of what hitherto was part of a market economy...but housing does not necessarily become a public service’. However, housing surfaced ‘into social consciousness as a right’, it was particularly acknowledged by ‘the discontent engendered by the [housing] crisis’ (Lefebvre, 1996, p. 78) of the time.

‘Liberal urban policy...was systematically defeated beginning with the political economic crises of the 1970s and the conservative national administrations that followed in the 1980s’ (Smith, 2002, p. 93), in America and in Western Europe (the Netherlands resisted way longer). Along with the decentralisation, privatisation and deregulation of urban policy (since mid 1990s in the Netherlands), a new form of subsidised private-market urban renewal gradually replaced the previous model promoting a coordinated and systematic partnership of public planning with public and private capital (Smith, 2002). As Smith asserts (2002), while state-sponsored postwar urban renewal promoted scattered private-market urban renewal in American and West European cities, the increasing privatisation of those transformations in central city areas, as well as inner-city land and housing markets since the 1980s, has gradually provided the platform and tools on which large-scale multifaceted urban revitalisation and regeneration plans are currently established (Smith, 2002).

Unquestionably, urban renewal has moved to a more sophisticated process related to the ongoing economic and spatial restructuring of cities, in which neoliberal economic agendas are increasingly interwoven to achieve ambitious economic and social transformations besides physical and environmental improvements. This new
urban restructuring strategy, recognised as urban revitalisation in America and urban regeneration in Western Europe, has been instrumental to capital accumulation and the commodification of urban spaces in cities. Furthermore, since it has been accomplished through public policy, management and planning (Couch & Fraser, 2003) it can be regarded, similarly to urban renewal, a state-led endeavour. However, this time it is orchestrated at different government levels considering the interests and resources of powerful corporate partners, over peoples concerns and needs, including but not limited to national and global corporations, investors and financial institutions. Urban restructuring interventions continue to be increasingly facilitated by the state at various spatial scales by ‘changing institutional-territorial modes of governance and their acting role in enforcing new locational policies’ (Mayer, 2009b, p. 40). In this process, national states rather than promoting balanced urban and infra structural development are mobilising different types of locational policy and exposing certain spaces to competitive pressures and global investments which, in turn, have produced socio-spatial inequality as the basis for economic development (Brenner et al., 2009).

However, whilst facilitating urban restructuring in collaboration with powerful interests, national states are concurrently interceding to deal with the aftermath of urban restructuring which involves the emergence of progressive agglomerations of underdeveloped and neglected spaces and people — in other words spatial segregation — in specific city areas. The most outstanding outcome is that the same instruments of this new urban restructuring strategy, urban revitalisation and regeneration, are being used in peripheral low-income neighbourhoods to tackle uneven growth and socio-spatial segregation at the city level. And, as in central city areas, the role of the state has been more moderating than directing. Its responsibilities have been delegated in many instances to private for-profit corporations. This includes the provision and management of low-income and social housing, debilitating the voice and eroding the power of local entities usually involved in the provision of those social benefits.

Additionally, current policy approaches to de-concentrate entangled urban problems (such as poverty, housing decline, crime, and social exclusion) and boost economic growth in these low-income neighbourhoods have, for the most part, prioritised places rather than people in both geographical areas. As Lefebvre argued, the state has used space as ‘its privilege instrument’ (2009, p. 226) for the rationalisation, ordering and control of territories in a state of ‘chaos’, which can be translated to ‘crisis’ nowadays. Therefore, state strategies have served also for ‘monitoring, information gathering, revenue extraction, regulation, control and discipline’ (Brenner & Elden, 2009, p. 370) of targeted territories and, in turn, the maintenance of stability and management of social and political life.
Neighbourhoods have been targeted by national states and municipalities which have aimed to integrate them in the economic growth of cities through area-based public programmes aiming, above all, to boost housing development and, consequently, to increase property taxes, change local economies and attract investment and residents with better socioeconomic position. However, while neighbourhoods improve and thrive, existing residents are often burdened by the cost of those changes and eventually find themselves forced to leave. And yet, this has not been widely recognised. At least not by national states and their powerful partners. The objectives and strategies behind recent urban restructuring policies targeting low-income neighbourhoods have not been openly exposed. Similarly, the direct and indirect impact that urban restructuring interventions have had on existing residents, mostly unrepresented and deprived groups has been silenced. These issues are particularly interesting considering that the rhetoric behind many area-based programmes and approaches of implementation promoted by public policy for the restructuring of low-income neighbourhoods has been the involvement of residents and local stakeholders. Citizen participation, integration and cooperation have been the hallmark of numerous state-sponsored urban revitalisation and regeneration initiatives addressing the social, economic and physical improvement of disadvantaged neighbourhoods, from ‘national restructuring programmes’ and ‘city visions’ to ‘city housing plans’ and ‘local action plans’.

Lastly, public policy and urban restructuring approaches have evolved in America and Western Europe driven by similar agendas but the outcomes and impact have differed due to a variety of reasons. While urban policy has been led by liberal governments with increasingly neoliberal agendas using innovative financial tools to boost development and rehabilitation of depressed urban areas for quite some time in America and the UK, a number of shifts in urban policy addressing these areas have taken place in some West European countries. They include progressive policies led by socio-democratic governments providing widespread social benefits to more decentralised and deregulated policies increasingly leaning towards liberal ones with the decline of welfare states. It is important to note that when I refer to Western Europe, I mean the northern countries of West Europe —the UK, France, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands—without including the Scandinavian countries. It is also important to note that these countries are different in terms of welfare and housing systems and therefore I am not referring to specific aspects but to generalised trends discussed in academic circles. What is interesting about these two different geographical areas is that they have been influenced and challenged by the same global agents (e.g. neoliberal capitalism, globalisation of the division of labour, etc.). However, their responses have been shaped according to national institutional frameworks of policy and governance (e.g. welfare programmes, urban renewal programmes, etc.) and local responses coming from local stakeholders including citizen mobilisations and shifts
from protest to programme. But as yet we have to acknowledge that urban policy as well as implementation approaches in both territories have been historically influenced by each other’s propositions, visions and models.

There is a tendency to talk about differences between those places with opposing welfare, economic and urban agendas. But there are similarities between countries fully exposed to neoliberal policy, where urbanisation has tended to be market-driven with uneven distribution of benefits, and where countries with welfare systems and interventionist governments have regulated and negotiated neoliberal policy and where urbanisation has tended to be state-driven with a more fair distribution of benefits. How are there both differences and similarities between New York City and the Randstad Holland? This is a provocative question particularly because this study is addressing urban restructuring processes mostly led or facilitated by the state in these two territories, whose conditions differ in many ways including their welfare and housing systems. What is interesting about these two metropolitan areas is that policy influences can be traced and most recently similar urban trends can be identified, as illustrated in Figure 1.1. New York City may be the capital of neoliberal urban trends but the Randstand Holland is gradually adapting some of those urban practices (Brenner & Theodore, 2002).

Influential studies have delved into urban restructuring policies, interventions and trends in both geographical areas. However, there are limited comparative studies on the way these developments, mostly supported by national states, are executed at the local level in low-income areas in America and the Netherlands, which represent governments with non-interventionist and interventionist urban and housing policies. The conflicting objectives of urban policy, programmes and implementation approaches, outlined above, raise critical questions about the true motives of these interventions in their contrasting contexts. The agency citizens and local groups hold as subjects of governance while their territory is being used as an instrument of rationalisation, control and sometimes profit making raise the following question: Are cities for or against citizens?
FIGURE 1.1 Urban and housing policies in the United States and the Randstad Holland
§ 1.3 Research aim

This research advances the study of urban and housing restructuring of low-income and minority neighbourhoods focusing particularly on public policies, programmes and instruments promoting the involvement of citizens in policy making and implementation. Area-based approaches of urban restructuring in these neighbourhoods are examined considering two paradoxical realities. The state has targeted and used these specific spaces as instruments to establish a ‘provisional stabilisation of processes of capital accumulation, state regulation and socio-political life’ (Brenner & Elden, 2009), or what Harvey calls ‘structured coherence’ (1982, 1989). On the other hand, the continued evidence that these territories represent the site of struggles for grassroots or popular democratic control in cities (Lefebvre, 2009). In the search to understand the evolution and global trends of urban restructuring strategies in low-income neighbourhoods and particularly the conflicting interests and asymmetrical agency of national states and citizens, special attention is given to urban areas led by unregulated market-driven development and non-interventionist urban policies (in liberal welfare states), and those led by regulated market-driven development and interventionist urban policies (in socio-democratic welfare states), such as New York City and the Randstand Holland, respectively. The aim of this study is:

1. To provide a theoretical understanding on the way urban restructuring discourses, objectives and strategies targeting in particular low-income neighbourhoods have evolved in America and Western Europe considering the following; (a) recent economic restructuring changes and the socio-spatial and politico-economic configurations these shifts have promoted; (b) urban renewal as a key instrument of states to bring about physical change and its shift from a physical endeavour into a more ambitious and coordinated strategy involving new economic, social and political relationships; (c) the social, economic, physical and political implications of these two developments mentioned above at the local level; (d) and the continued promotion of participation and integration of citizens as part of urban restructuring strategies.

2. To examine the evolution of public policy and programmes involving community organising and citizen participation for housing and urban restructuring in low-income neighbourhoods in New York City and the Randstad Holland. This historical account aims to provide an overview of the endeavours national states have undertaken facilitating citizen participation and community-led initiatives, as well as their successes and shortcomings. Additionally, it intends to provide a policy context to analyse current policy and development frameworks providing instruments to integrate and involve citizens in the restructuring of disinvested and marginalised neighbourhoods.
To delve into the socio-spatial restructuring of two specific neighbourhoods looking at the impact of urban restructuring shifts, from urban renewal to urban revitalisation and regeneration, in Bushwick (Brooklyn) and Tarwewijk (Rotterdam) respectively. The detailed analysis of these two low-income neighbourhoods focuses on the following aspects; (a) economic shifts leading to urban decline and segregation; (b) public policies, programmes and instruments implemented for the restructuring of these two inner city neighbourhoods (particular attention is given to those policies facilitating the involvement of local residents); (c) the role of the state, the private sector and local stakeholders in the implementation of those policy frameworks considering decentralisation, privatisation and deregulation trends in housing and urban restructuring; and (d) an assessment of the evolution and outcomes of public endeavours and trends facilitating the restructuring of low-income income neighbourhoods.

To identify, through a comparative analysis of the contrasting case studies, the current trends shaping the global urban restructuring strategy that is transforming the physical, social and economic infrastructures of low-income neighbourhoods and communities across cities in America and Western Europe.

Finally, considering the analysis of this investigation and existing avenues of community control over housing, this study provides some reflections on alternatives to the new urban restructuring strategy.

In summary, the underlying premise of this study is that urban renewal has shifted to urban revitalisation and regeneration in America and Western Europe, respectively, and in turn to a more complex urban restructuring process following global economic trends and involving global partners and financing. Such urban restructuring processes have been facilitated by the state to transform disinvested low-income districts while public instruments and programmes have promoted the integration and participation of residents as part or during transformative urban and housing processes. With this in mind, the following research questions were framed for this study:

- How have public policy and programmes targeting low-income and minority districts evolved with the decentralisation of national state’s power and resources?
- How have such changes in public policy and programmes played out in cities with liberal governments and unregulated market-driven development, and in cities with interventionist governments and regulated market-driven developments?
- How and why have national states promoted the integration and participation of residents of low-income and minority groups throughout the evolution of urban restructuring processes?
- What are the latest urban restructuring trends and in which way they assist in the welfare of poor and vulnerable groups?
- Are cities being restructured considering the welfare of citizens?
§ 1.4 Methodological approach

This study used two complementary research approaches: comparative research using contrasting case studies and conjunctural analysis. At the same time, in both approaches, quantitative, qualitative and participatory methodologies were used. According to Aalbers (2011), ‘contrasting case studies can be considered a specific form of comparative research’ (p. 47), and a way of studying a particular phenomenon without precisely conducting a comparative analysis. Aalbers (2011) asserts that ‘comparative analysis is a form of comparative research which goes beyond identifying similarities and differences; it attempts to understand two or more cases in terms of one particular model. Often the comparative analysis has a real interest in the cases as such, while many other forms of comparative research, including contrasting case studies, use this approach to clarify ones analytical or theoretical interest in a subject and to minimise the possibility of geographical bias’ (p. 47).

Skocpol and Somers (1980) define different logistics to juxtapose historical patterns from two or more times or places, and their usefulness in order to study social change. As part of those paths they examine comparative inquiries in ‘contrast of contexts’, a method using comparative research to bring about the unique features of each particular case and to expose the way those particular features affect the formulation of presumed general process, practices or theories. In this method of inquiry, according to Skocpol and Somers (1980), usually issues, themes and questions which serve as frameworks for pointing out differences between or among cases and the ‘integrity of each case as a whole is carefully respected’ (p. 178). Additionally, as Bendix notes (1976, p. 247), this method ‘leaves room for divergent answers’ and divergences are more transparent. Comparative inquiries ‘increase the visibility of one structure by contrasting it with another’ (1977, pp. 16-17).

In this study comparative research using contrasting case studies is used to understand theoretical assumptions on the evolution and outcomes of urban restructuring in low-income districts in cities exposed in different ways to neoliberal urbanisation, as well as to frame global trends of urban policy and governance related to these interventions. Following other studies taking similar approaches (Aalbers, 2011; Portes et al., 1997), the intention is to test how the study of urban restructuring in low-income districts across contrasting settings may offer a greater scope and theoretical relevance than those limited to cases in similar contexts. According to Aalbers (2011, p. 47) ‘a contrasting case study stresses the importance of contextual factors, yet it also problematises these contextual factors’. Most importantly, he notes, this method ‘selects cases which are different in order to compare similar processes under different conditions’ (2011, p. 49).
For this comparative research two contrasting metropolitan areas were selected; New York City, representing urban areas lead by unregulated market-driven development and non-interventionist urban policies (in the United States of America, a liberal welfare state), and the Randstad Holland representing urban areas led by regulated market-driven development and interventionist urban policies (in the Netherlands, a socio-democratic welfare state). In these metropolitan areas two districts were selected as case studies for in depth analysis, Bushwick in the municipality of Brooklyn (USA) and Tarwewijk in the municipality of Rotterdam (NL).

Contrast-oriented comparative research cares about general issues and processes that cross-cut particular times and places, such as urban decline and urban restructuring, and which may reveal rich details of diverse societies, cultures, and idiosyncrasies and how they are inextricably interrelated (Skocpol & Somers, 1980). Furthermore, contrast-oriented comparison takes chronology very seriously and therefore addresses the way issues, themes, practices or theories exhibit continuity or discontinuity over time (Skocpol & Somers, 1980). Similarly, time is considered rigorously in this study. For instance, each case study considers social, economic and political changes taking place through time. This is where I will introduce the second research approach used for the case study research.

Conjunctural analysis involves the analysis of the intersections and contradictions of various forces and actions affecting a specific space or process. It is used in this study to examine the agents and outcomes of urban restructuring strategies asserting citizen participation in each case study. Conjunctural analysis often involves time; chronicles, narratives, genealogies, chronologies and periodisations (Jessop, 2012). In this specific study, periodisations in chronological order were used to examine specific periods involving actions and implications where public policies, programmes and implementation frameworks involved in urban restructuring processes — influenced by diverse social, economic, spatial and political forces — claimed and sponsored citizen involvement. The periodisations connect a number of actions (policies) and processes (interventions) through specific time frames to eventually assist in understanding recent developments of the study in question. For instance, a historical and contextual overview of the main topic of this investigation, which is outlined in Chapters 3 and 4, spans from the postwar period until the mid 2010s, while the main object of study is particularly scrutinised in a more specific period; starting in the late 1970s and concluding in the mid 2010s.

The methods involved in both research approaches include quantitative and qualitative research, as well as less traditional approaches which required collaboration and active involvement with local organisations and institutions. As part of the quantitative research, census data analysis is used. Old archives as well as current
census publications were analysed to track shifts in demographics, income, poverty, and changes in housing and the built environment, including housing ownership and real estate values, among other aspects. The spatial distribution of some of these shifts, at the city level and in some cases district level, was mapped using geographic information systems (GIS). Key spatial data sets were acquired from open source libraries. A graduate student with skills in GIS, Mariana Roberti-Bomtempo, assisted me pulling the different data sets from various sources and developing the maps while I worked on cross-referencing data and data visualisation.

The qualitative research involved secondary source research, fieldwork, participant observation and informal conversations with local residents and community experts. I also conducted twenty semi-structured interviews to residents, community leaders, local experts, representatives of grassroots groups, members of non-profit organisations, housing corporations, public agencies, and local officials (please see Appendix A). Most of the semi-structured interviews were audio recorded. Additionally, I participated in multiple community meetings and events to learn about local struggles, needs, priorities and visions.

Besides quantitative and qualitative research this study is grounded in the knowledge I acquired by actively getting involved with local stakeholders and in local projects and initiatives in both areas of study. Over the last ten years, in my own planning practice, I have engaged in action-research using and learning the methodological approaches of participatory action research developed by Fals-Borda (1991). Participatory action-research is an experiential approach to economic, social, political and physical change which actively engages people in generating knowledge about their own living conditions in order to produce a reorganisation of urban socio-economic systems and relations of power (Rendón, 2015). According to Fals-Borda (1991), this collective and experiential research approach aims to eliminate the asymmetry implicit in subject-object relationships (professionals/researchers-people/communities) by constructing subject-subject associations to generate authentic participation in urban research and planning processes. This symmetry, he notes, encourages people to become active in their communities, self-conscious of their own knowledge and assets, and involved in the decision making process. While working on this investigation I participated, facilitated and, in some instances, organised a number of activities engaging residents, local non-profits organisations and community experts in activities promoting knowledge exchange and the production of new local knowledge. However, it is important to note that my endeavours were not meant to lead to (or propose) specific changes in the areas of study. As researcher, I always listened and let participants decide the fate of their communities. Most importantly, I would like to clarify community voices are not directly included in this investigation. I included my own
analysis of the issues at hand discussed and experienced by residents and community leaders during the time this investigation.

In the case of Rotterdam, I worked as a member of Cohabitation Strategies\(^1\) in the district of Tarwewijk from 2009 to 2010. The 4th International Architecture Biennale Rotterdam, Open City: Designing Coexistence, commissioned Cohabitation Strategies to curate an exhibition addressing segregation in the Netherlands. As part of this exhibition, we decided to conduct a research in Tarwewijk since it was recently designated by the state as one the most ‘problematic’ districts in the Netherlands. The aim of our project was to expose what segregation meant for both the central government and Tarwewijk residents. For this project we collaborated with Cultureel Denkwerk, a civic organisation investing in the livelihood of Tarwewijk through art and culture. This organisation was founded with the support of the Pact op Zuid programme, which at the time was an instrument to distribute funds from the central government to housing associations and community organisations to combat deprivation and to promote urban restructuring in low-income neighbourhoods. Its founder and leader, Eric Duallert, who is a resident extremely knowledgeable about and active in the district, introduced us to a number of community organisations and members and provided us a working space (studio) in the district to conduct a six-month research project. During this time we did fieldwork and interviewed a number of leaders of local schools, community centres, and civic organisations. We also had numerous informal conversations with long-term residents. The outcome of this study was disseminated within the community through a small publication and neighbourhood tours, and across the city through the biennale exhibition and a number of talks and panels. The Other City: Exposing Tarwewijk was the name of exhibition project. In the public events local and international experts (including Erik Swoygedouw) were invited, as well as residents, public officials and members of the local housing association. After the first six months of research, the exhibition and the different events organised in and outside the district, this research project continued for another six months sponsored by the Stimuleringsfonds voor Architectuur (we were awarded to develop a project on urban segregation). During this time I took responsibility for examining the different policies affecting this district including the Big Cities Policy and its area-based approaches and programmes promoting urban restructuring in districts like Tarwewijk. Unfortunately, the funds supporting this

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\(^1\) Cohabitation Strategies is a non-profit organization dedicated to socio-spatial research, design and development based in Rotterdam. It was founded by Lucia Babina, Emiliano Gandolfi, Miguel Robles-Durán and Gabriela Rendón in year 2008, in the midst of the global economic crisis. Since then this organization has been involved in a number of action-research projects in low-income neighbourhoods experiencing urban and housing changes, investment or disinvestment, in Western Europe and America including the Netherlands, Italy, France, Canada and the United States.
investigation were not renewed at the end of the first term of this award. Thus, after working for over a year in the district our studio moved out from Tarwewijk. However, and despite the fact that the funds were withdrawn and our envisioned action-research was not fully accomplished, my interest continued and evolved into this investigation. I continued working on my own, firstly focusing more into policy analysis and theoretical approaches and then doing fieldwork and conducting more interviews to answer particular questions related to my PhD investigation, especially regarding the local impact of policy and programmes promoting urban regeneration in the area.

In the case of Bushwick, I became involved, as an urban researcher as well as an academic, in a number of local activities and initiatives related to housing and urban revitalisation of the neighbourhood. I started investigating the area, having informal conversations with community members, meeting up with leaders of community organisations, and attending to community meetings in year 2011. Later on, from 2013 to 2015, I organised and instructed three research/design studios in the area\(^2\) involving collaborations and partnerships with a number of local community groups and non-profit organisations providing housing and community services in the area. During this period I organised with my graduate students a number of community initiatives including two participatory vacancy surveys, community workshops and panels. However, it wasn’t until the summer of 2013 when a large rezoning plan was announced at the local community board meeting that I became actively involved, as a researcher and planner, in the area. After anxious residents (whom I had meet previously) contacted me to learn about the implications of such rezoning, I proposed a workshop to create awareness of the process and the impact of the large housing development planned in the site, which had the potential to displace hundreds of long term residents. I organised the workshop alongside graduate students\(^3\) from the MS Design and Urban Ecologies programme in a local venue. I invited members of the Right to the City Alliance and community planner Tom Angotti to participate in the day-long session. Residents reached out to community leaders and members of the city-council office. At the end of the workshop, a steering committee was formed to track the rezoning application and the future housing development. Community members asked me to take part of the committee as an advisor, and soon after I got involved in dozens of meetings and discussions with different local organisations.

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\(^2\) The students involved in the research/design studios I coordinated and instructed were from the MS Design and Urban Ecologies programme at Parsons School of Design, The New School, where I currently work as an Assistant Professor of Urban Planning.

\(^3\) This cohort of students participated in the first studio I organised and instructed in Bushwick in Spring 2013. They were quite knowledgeable about the urban and housing condition of the district and led parts of the workshop.
housing corporations, civic groups and local officials. A large coalition was formed aiming to start a process of negotiation with the developer/investor to mitigate the impact of such rezoning. During the process, dialogue and cooperation was built among local residents, civic associations, community development corporations and local officials. Unfortunately, the rezoning application, along with the housing development it proposed, was eventually approved providing less benefit than burdens to the community (see Chapter 5). During my involvement in this committee I had the opportunity to discuss relevant housing and urban development issues and visions with residents and local experts.

§ 1.5 Case studies

New York City and the Randstad Holland were selected as the context areas for this study considering the following criteria. Firstly, both metropolitan areas have been recognised for their legacy in public policy, planning and housing schemes in their respective contexts, America and Western Europe. Secondly, the shift of urban renewal into a more ambitious and overreaching urban restructuring strategy has been present and documented in both geographical areas. Thirdly, public policies and programmes facilitating citizens participation in the restructuring of low-income districts have been formulated and implemented in New York City as well as the Randstad Holland and, in some instances, such frameworks have influenced the other's public endeavours as shown in Figure 1.1. Finally, while New York City has been regarded as the real estate capital of the world because of its neoliberal policies of urban and housing development, the Randstad Holland has been recognised as the capital of the state regulated urban development, spatial planning, urbanisation and housing provision schemes. However, and despite the contradictions in the orientation of their urban planning and implementation tools and approaches, urban policy and programmes with neoliberal agendas have increasingly materialised in similar ways in these two territories in recent years. Therefore, these two geographical areas represent very good comparative cases to delve into the study here in question.

The selected urban areas are not comparable in size since New York City is much more compact than the Randstad Holland but they are comparable in population (see Figure 1.2). The population density of New York City doubles the one of the Randstand Holland (see Table 1.1). New York City is the most populated and dense city in the United States. It is composed of five boroughs —The Bronx, Brooklyn, Queens, Manhattan and Staten Island. Originally Queens, State Island and the Bronx were
1 New York City

2 Randstad Holland

FIGURE 1.2 Metropolitan areas and municipalities selected for this research
separate villages adjacent to Manhattan and Brooklyn, which were two consolidated cities. Manhattan was the only area considered as New York City until the four boroughs where annexed in 1898 to become what it is now known as New York City. The five boroughs are now connected by a complex transit system although each one conserves its own character; the past is still present in their historic districts. On the other hand, the Ransd stad Holland, although is not a city per se, it is one of the most populated metropolitan regions of Western Europe. It comprises the largest cities of the Netherlands — Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht — plus other medium and small-size cities. This conglomerate of cities is, similarly to NYC, connected by an effective transit system and each city owns a particular character.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 1.1</th>
<th>Population and density in New York City and the Randstad Holland in 2010.</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NEW YORK CITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>8,175,133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area (km²)</td>
<td>790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density (person/km²)</td>
<td>2,098</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.S Census Bureau (2010), Randstad Region Europe (2010), New York City Department of City Planning (2010), U.S Census Bureau (2010), TNO (2006).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 1.2</th>
<th>Facts of case study cities and districts.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BROOKLYN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>2,595,259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign-born population*</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median household income</td>
<td>$48,201 dlls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renter-occupied rate (%)</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public/Social housing (% of rental)</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In the Netherlands the persons descending from a parent of another country receive the term of allochtoon (foreigner) even when having a Dutch parent, and regardless if they were born in the Netherlands or abroad.
In the United States only the persons born in a different country are recognised as foreign regardless of their citizenship status.

Brooklyn and Rotterdam are the two case study cities selected from New York City and the Randstad Holland, respectively, in order to make an in-depth analysis of the phenomenon of study. Brooklyn is currently recognised as a borough, although it used to have the rank of an independent city before it was incorporated to New York City, whereas Rotterdam is officially a city. Nevertheless, both are considered in administrative terms as municipalities with their own elected local government.
Brooklyn is the most populated borough of New York City and the second-most densely populated county in the United States. In a similar way Rotterdam is the second-largest city in the Randstad Holland, and the Netherlands. However, it is not possible to compare them neither in size nor in density. Brooklyn is around four times larger in population and two times more dense than Rotterdam (see Table 1.2).

The municipality of Brooklyn is formed by 18 community districts, which vary in size, population and socio-economic composition. The wealthiest districts, where investment and development has concentrated, are mostly located in the northwest side of Brooklyn, while the most distressed and disinvested ones are situated in its south-east end. The municipality of Rotterdam is formed by 14 boroughs [deelgemeenten], which similarly to Brooklyn, differ in terms of their socio-economic composition (see Figure 1.3 and 1.4). The northern part of Rotterdam holds most of...
the middle-income and wealthy districts of the city while the southern part most of the working class and low-income districts. The Maas [Meuse] river is the physical marker of the division between the north and the south. Numerous neighbourhoods constitute Brooklyn’s community districts as well as Rotterdam’s boroughs. Housing and urban restructuring policies in both municipalities have recently concentrated in low-income and underdeveloped districts. The cities selected as case studies share many similarities. First, both were originated by Dutch settlers and developed because of port activities and commerce. Second, during the last half of the 20th century,

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4 The first Europeans settlers in Brooklyn were Dutch during the 1630s. In 1646 the Village of Breukelen was authorised by the Dutch West India Company to became the first municipality of New Nederland, what is now know as New York State.
both municipalities experienced de-industrialisation, unemployment, dramatic population shifts, urban decline and crime, besides many other changes affecting their urban composition and physical structure. Third, both areas have been targeted for the implementation of numerous urban and housing policy programmes, and their experiences and outcomes have been implemented in other urban areas. Fourth, Brooklyn and Rotterdam have a long history of urban decline and restructuring, as well as planning and community activism. Fifth, both municipalities are recognised by their demographic diversity. Brooklyn and Rotterdam have a long history of immigration thus both have a high rate of foreign-born residents. The concentration and integration of immigrants in both municipalities is particularly interesting for this study since this investigation asserts that most of the urban restructuring policies and programmes particularly target low-income and immigrant neighbourhoods with weak housing markets. Lastly, housing ownership in both municipalities share similar percentages in regard to owner-occupied and rental housing. However, the share of public housing within the rental housing differ significantly. In Rotterdam almost half of the housing stock is social housing, while in Brooklyn only one-fifth of the housing units is subsidised, meaning owned and managed by public or non-profit agencies. In Brooklyn most of the rental housing is in hands of private entities, while in the Rotterdam it is mostly owned by housing associations (see Table 1.2).

Bushwick and Tarwewijk are the neighbourhoods selected for the in-depth research of this study (see Figures 1.3 and 1.4). These neighbourhoods have experienced significant social, economic, and physical decline; Bushwick during the 1970s and 1980s and Tarwewijk during the 1980s and 1990s. Public policy and real estate practices played an important role in the decline of these neighbourhoods (redlining, milking and promotion of homeownership opportunities outside these areas). After long periods without public and private investment, these areas became the focus of urban and housing renewal programmes. Most recently, to alleviate the shortage of housing in the city they have been targeted by area-based urban restructuring plans drafted and implemented by public-private partnerships. These interventions have taken place in these areas mostly to promote economic growth, to reactivate the housing market and to increase real estate values. The area-based approaches in these two districts differed in many ways but converged in the promotion of citizens participation in decision making and community-led initiatives. The outcomes of these approaches have been contested and unclear. They need further investigation.

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5 Bushwick, a piece of land owned by natives in New Netherland, was acquired by the Dutch West India Company in 1638. It was settled by Dutch families and named Het Dorp. Its named changed later on to Boswijk (Town in the woods) and eventually to Bushwick.
§ 1.6 Research design and structure of the dissertation

The design of this research is structured in five interrelated sections (see Figure 1.2); (1) introduction (2) theoretical framework; (3) politico-institutional historical context; (4) case study research; and (5) final analysis of comparative research. The first section, introduction, frames this study by briefly describing the problem statement, the research aim, the methodological approach, the selection of case studies as well as the design and structure of the research. The second section, theoretical framework, reviews the concepts and theories related with the phenomenon of study — urban restructuring of low-income and minority neighbourhoods through citizen participation — while looking at a number of interrelated social, economic, and spatial aspects, which had impacted such a phenomenon. Additionally, this section defines specific problems/issues addressed in this investigation as well as theories and hypothesis of particular interest, which need further investigation. The third section, politico-institutional historical context, explains (separately) the evolution of urban restructuring over the years in New York City and the Randstad Holland to eventually create a better understanding of recent urban restructuring endeavours, as well as the similarities and differences in both territories. Particular attention is given to policies and programmes fostering, in one way or the other, the inclusion of citizens in policy and planning related to urban renewal and most recently urban restructuring plans and processes. This section feeds and leads to the fourth one, case study research, which carefully delves into the socio-spatial restructuring of two particular districts in Brooklyn (New York City) and Rotterdam (Randstad Holland). This section examines urban policy, public programmes, and participatory and community-based initiatives as well as market-driven urban and housing development strategies taking place in the study areas (low-income and minority districts). Additionally, it examines some of the outcomes in each case study to provide a comprehensive analysis of the evolution and current trends of urban restructuring in low-income and minority districts. Lastly, the fifth section, final analysis of comparative research, examines some of the major findings in both geographical areas. Particular attention is given to current trends of urban restructuring, the differences and similarities in each context, as well as to the advance of some of the hypotheses and theories highlighted in the second section. It also offers a reflection on alternatives to mitigate some of the outcomes inflicted by those urban restructuring trends looking particularly at neighbourhood organising and planning.
PART 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
SOCIO-SPATIAL RESTRUCTURING IN LOW-INCOME NEIGHBOURHOODS AND THE PARADOX OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

SOCIAL
Macro societal drift towards inequality
Middle class weakens and urban poor become more vulnerable with decline of welfare states
Stigmatisation of undesirable, ethnic and marginalised classes
Concentration of ethnic minorities, immigrants, working class pushed down due to lack of education, new technical skills or foreign labour competition
Displacement due to profit-driven urbanisation

ECONOMIC (Brenner; 2009; Soja, 1997)
Global expansion of capitalism from industries to cities
De-industrialisation of core countries and regions and industrialisation of peripheral ones
Cities experience industrial decline and transform into technological, knowledge and service urban areas
Competition between cities for the relocation of new industries and between districts for public funding and private investment.
Decline of unionised and full employment contracts and introduction of flexible and part time ones
Polariation between high pay/high skill and low pay/low skill workers
Unemployment, poverty and segregation

SPATIAL (Brenner, 2009; Mayer, 2009)
Cities exposed to global economic forces and competitive market pressures by state institutions
Cities exposed to fiscal austerity imposed by the weakening of states' distributive capacities and pursue market oriented policies
Cities exposed to deregulation of industries, finances, social provisions and urban restructuring
Rise of profit-oriented housing and urban development
Interurban and locational competitiveness and real estate speculation
Concentrations of investment, development, and production
Progressive agglomerations of underdevelopment, urban decline, socio-spatial segregation and poverty

EXPANSION OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM
URBANISATION USURPS INDUSTRIALISATION
Lefebvre (1968) and Harvey's (1989) Urban Coherence
Space as instrument of the state for its own reproduction and to impose its own rationality
Urban restructuring through bureaucracy and technocracy
Urban Restructuring through Planning

SOCIAL STRUGLES
CALL FOR THE RIGHT TO THE CITY
Lefebvre's Right to the City (1968)
The right to be part of the production of cities; autogestion, self-help housing, direct democracy, participatory planning.
Douglass and Friedmann's Cities for Citizens (1998)
Relationship between civil society and state.
Harvey's Right to the City (2008)
The right to change ourselves by changing the city.
Brenner, Marcuse and Mayer's Cities for People, not for Profit (2009)
Constructing cities that correspond to human social needs.

CONTESTED SPACES = DISINVESTED AND NEGLECTED NEIGHBOURHOODS

UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT, URBAN DECLINE AND SEGREGATION
Investment and improvement of housing and urban infrastructures and services in particular areas while blocking development in others.
Wacquant's Advanced Marginality (1999) Fragmentation city level and residential differentiation.

URBAN RENEWAL
shift from physical interventions to social, spatial, environmental and economic transformations, accomplished through public policy, management and planning

URBAN REVITALISATION
America/New York City
from state sponsored to subsidized private market interventions
ameliorate impact of neoliberalism

HOUSING AT THE CORE
from state sponsored to subsidized private market interventions
bring about social control and safety

UREGNERATION
Western Europe/Randstad Holland
build coalition politics prevent conflict

FIGURE 1.5 Research design and structure
3: POLITICO-INSTITUTIONAL HISTORICAL CONTEXT
THE EVOLUTION OF URBAN RESTRUCTURING

1960s - 2010s
urban policy
local programmes
participatory initiatives
decentralisation of
power and resources
deregulation of
urban revitalization/
regeneration and
urban development
privatization and
financialisation
social and housing
provision

4: CASE STUDY RESEARCH
SOCIO-SPATIAL RESTRUCTURING IN LOW-INCOME DISTRICTS

5: FINAL ANALYSIS OF COMPARATIVE RESEARCH
THE NEW STATE-LED URBAN RESTRUCTURING STRATEGY

URBAN AND HOUSING RESTRUCTURING TRENDS
AFFECTING LOW-INCOME AND MINORITY DISTRICTS

ALTERNATIVES TO THE NEW STATE-LED URBAN
RESTRUCTURING STRATEGY

Cities for citizens in a context of urban restructuring
The study is composed of eight chapters organised in five parts. In addition to Part one, which includes this chapter, the dissertation is structured as follows. Part two is composed of Chapter 2, which provides a theoretical understanding of the way urban restructuring discourses, objectives and strategies targeting particularly low-income neighbourhoods have evolved in America and Western Europe. Firstly, it introduces the right to the city as one of the main demands citizens, academics, activists, advocate planners, civic and grassroots groups have called for and mobilised around to fight against the struggles and injustices produced by contemporary neoliberal urbanisation. It then unfolds the way economic restructuring has led to new socio-spatial configurations and politico-economic relations in cities with impactful outcomes, such as uneven development and new institutional policy and governance frameworks, just to mention a few. In relation to such new developments, the shift of urban renewal into a more ambitious and coordinated global and profit-making strategy is presented in conclusions acknowledging and enquiring about the continued promotion of participation and integration of citizens in urban restructuring policies and programmes targeting low-income neighbourhoods in both geographical areas.

Part three of this study, which encompasses Chapter 3 and 4, carefully explains public policy, programmes and instruments involving or facilitating citizen participation in housing and urban restructuring processes in low-income neighbourhoods from postwar years until today in New York City and the Randstad Holland, respectively. Chapter 3 focuses on New York City, it particularly explores the urban renewal programmes calling for ‘citizen participation’ for the first time, the War on Poverty programmes which institutionalised the ‘widespread participation of the poor’ for the improvement of deprived inner city areas, the tenant-led sweat equity housing management programmes that emerged after the city’s nadir of the 1970s, and the public policies and instruments of devolution which gave way to the professionalisation of grassroots movements and the current non-profit industrial complex in charge of community and housing development today. On the other hand Chapter 4 focuses on the evolution of social oriented policies and participatory programmes fostered for the restructuring of low-income neighbourhoods in the Randstad Holland, from opbouwwerk [community work] with specific goals and targets, and Bouwen voor de Buurt [Building for the Neighbourhood], a collective and politicised urban renewal effort bringing about political and social change, to more recent policy programmes promoting the integration and participation of low-income and marginalised communities. The historical account of these two chapters provides an overview of the endeavours national states have undertaken at different levels facilitating citizen participation and community-led initiatives, as well as their successes and shortcomings. Both chapters offer a policy background and context useful for the analysis of the most recent urban restructuring frameworks and trends, which are examined in the following chapters.
Part four, composed of Chapter 5 and 6, delves into the socio-spatial restructuring of the two low-income neighbourhoods selected as case studies in New York City and the Randstad Holland: Bushwick and Tarwewijk, respectively. The way urban restructuring policies and programmes depicted in the previous two chapters have evolved and transformed socio-spatial configurations through shifts in housing provision — including planning, funding and development schemes — and local urban governance are illustrated in detail. Policies, programmes and local initiatives promoting the involvement of citizens in decision making processes are particularly examined. Additionally, the role of local stakeholders in the implementation of those policy frameworks is presented considering decentralisation, privatisation and deregulation trends in housing and urban restructuring. Finally, a critical analysis of the evolution and outcomes of public policies, planning strategies, participatory endeavours and trends facilitating the restructuring of low-income income neighbourhoods is offered.

Lastly, part five, which includes Chapter 7 and 8, intends to respond to the main enquiry of this study: Are cities for or against citizens? By examining, through a comparative analysis, the intricate aspects that gave shape to the new urban restructuring strategy and in turn defining the current policy and planning trends taking place in and shaping the fate of low-income communities and districts in New York City and the Randstad Holland. The assertions included in the last part of the dissertation are the final analysis of the previous chapters which carefully delve into the way urban renewal in low-income neighbourhoods in America and Western Europe, respectively, have evolved into a new urban restructuring strategy — global and overreaching — with clear objectives, locations, and approaches. The trends outlined in this section clearly depict state-sponsored policies, strategies, tools and measures promoted in disinvested and declining areas to integrate these segregated sites into the new economic function of cities. Additionally, this section lays out the way citizens have been concurrently perceived as both objects and subjects of governance by policy and public programmes as part of the new urban restructuring strategy, and concludes with reflections, in Chapter 8, on alternatives to mitigate the negative outcomes of the urban restructuring trends mentioned above. The last chapter underscores, as a call for further research and action, existing alternative models of housing ownership and management as well as emancipatory forms of neighbourhood organization and planning leading to more equitable cities and communities.
PART 2 Cities for or against citizens?
2 Socio-spatial restructuring in low-income districts and the paradox of citizen participation

§ 2.1 Introduction

This chapter offers a theoretical framework around the social and spatial restructuring of low-income neighbourhoods, and the community struggles and mobilisations brought about by such transformations in America and Western Europe from the 1970s onwards. Firstly, the constant struggle of citizens and disfranchised groups to shape the production of the city is examined through theories around the call for the right to the city. Henry Lefebvre first asserted this theory in the late 1960s promoting a revolutionary social change that came from the streets and in turn prompted the rise of urban social movements across cities and nations during a moment of significant economic restructuring and urban struggles. The evolution of these urban social movements into urban practices and public programmes advocating for cities for citizens is also examined. Additionally, the most recent reawakening of the call for the right to the city which was declared by David Harvey in the midst of the global financial crash of 2008 and spread widely mobilising communities, activists, academics, urban managers and even politicians. Secondly, this section provides an overview of some of the key events that characterise the global economic restructuring that started in the late 1970s. These events brought about significant restructuring of cities along with the aggravation of the urban struggles that incited the urban mobilisations driven by the call for the right to the city. Thirdly, theories around the uneven development brought about by such economic and urban restructuring at the city level as well as its outcomes — including urban decline and socio-spatial segregation — are examined along with the rationale national states have used to addressed such developments. In particular, the logic of uneven development in cities is examined by considering Harvey, Smith and Lefebvre’s theoretical propositions and by acknowledging that urban decline and segregation is a product of capitalism as much as a state product. Fourthly, considering this claim, the way national states have responded to and tackled economic, social, and physical decline and polarisation in cities will be discussed following diverse theories and arguments. The evolution from urban renewal to urban regeneration (revitalisation...
in America) is particularly emphasized as well as the most recent expression of urban restructuring—interventions facilitated by the state with larger scope, powerful partners, diversified investment, and limited regulation—which, as this section shows, has been widely debated in academic circles. In this particular case, Smith’s theories on the new global restructuring strategy are revised. They lead to some enquiries by following Smith’s assertions on the way capital moves to underdeveloped areas in cities promoting districts with housing, services and amenities catered to affluent groups rather than existing inhabitants. And by acknowledging Lefebvre’s claim on national states’ obsession on the integration and participation of the non-integrated and non-participants to achieve urban coherence through planning and restructuring, a paradox is revealed within the purpose of the new urban restructuring strategy. Lastly, this section concludes the enquiries of such paradox by examining current policy discourses highlighting some of the drivers promoting participation in urban policy and programmes which sponsor the restructuring of disinvested and declining low-income neighbourhoods. Theoretical approaches on the motives behind the activation and involvement of non-integrated and non-participant citizens by public policies, programmes and subsidies sponsoring local urban revitalisation and regeneration interventions are reviewed. In particular, theories addressing the following rationale:

1. Amelioration of the impact of the neoliberal project through socially interventionist public policies and programmes;
2. Control and discipline of vulnerable and deprived groups that have been victims of the byproducts of the current neoliberal urbanisation and who represent a threat to the local government;
3. Building coalition politics by reconfiguring governance structures in areas undergoing urban transformations to prevent conflicts among local institutions, private partners and the local community.

In summary, this chapter provides a theoretical understanding on the grounds, drivers, agents, politics and trends of socio-spatial restructuring in low-income districts and unearths the central role national states continue to play. This raises questions regarding the way public policy and programmes have devised concurrently citizens as objects and subjects of governance (Uitermark, 2014).

§ 2.2 **Struggles and mobilisations in the production of the city**

Lefebvre’s influential publication *The Right to the City* (1996) (originally published in French as *Le Droit á la Ville*), disseminated in 1968, offered a needed critique on the way cities were urbanising through increasingly capitalist and state driven interests without any social and political consciousness. In the light of urban decay inflicted by decisions foreign to those inhabiting the city, he claimed ‘the right to the city as
a transformed and renewed right to urban life’. Lefebvre’s demand called for the production of the urban prioritising use value, while challenging the existing power relations by claiming the right of common citizens to be part of the production of cities. He asserted, that ‘only the working class can become the agent, the social carrier or support of this realisation’ (p. 158). Undoubtedly, the right to the city acknowledged the rise of citizen movements pursuing the organisation of political life and urban spaces. It recognised such mobilisations as the contemporary urban struggle joining traditional ones, mostly related to work and the workplace. The right to the city was rooted in a pivotal moment for cities. Lefebvre’s Urban Revolution, published two years later, addressed that the ‘urban problematic’ was not only becoming global but also was usurping industrialisation as space was increasingly used for capital accumulation (Lefebvre, 2003). Lefebvre’s propositions and theories became an ode to the possibilities of revolutionary social change that came from the streets (Smith, 2003, p. xiv). In the context of urban renewal and civil unrest, urban movements rose pursuing to build a more democratic society while shifting activism from the factory to the neighbourhoods across cities (Mayer, 2009a).

The core urban struggles driving urban movements in the late 1960s and early 1970s were deficiencies in housing and public services, rent strikes and campaigns against slum clearance, urban restructuring to give way to car infrastructures, and the erosion of citizen political power in the production of cities. The urban movements that arose were more militant in Europe and more pragmatic in America (Mayer, 2009a). During this time, Castells, a student and critic of Lefebvre, explored in one of his early publications, Urban Social Movements (1977), the emergence of new forms of urban politics based on territorial interest and driven by changes in collective consumption. He explored the way changes in the provisions of social-collectivist institutions fuelled conflicts between citizens and the state. At that time, Urban Social Movements offered a new form of political expression when market oriented polices were beginning to erode the power of trade unions and tenants organisations. But it was not until 1983 with The City and the Grassroots: a Cross-Cultural Theory of Urban Social Movements when Castells set an historical and then current understanding of the relationship between cities and social change. He asserted that combining activism around collective consumption— services that required mass provision by the state such as housing, transportation and education— with struggles for community culture and political self-management. Urban social movements were capable of producing a city organised on the basis of use value, autonomous local cultures, and decentralised participatory democracy (Castells, 1983, pp. 319-320). Castells (1983) provided a comprehensive account of the evolution and reproduction of urban mobilisations of the time (and before). From the rent strike of Glasgow in the United Kingdom in 1915, which culminated with the emergence of social rental housing, to the American riots in inner city areas, the urban trade unionism in the grand ensembles of France, the
neighbourhood mobilisation in San Francisco’s Mission district, and the transformative Madrid’s citizens movement in inner and outer city districts. Between the late 1960s and the late 1970s urban mobilisations manifested strongly worldwide responding to the restructuring of capitalism, its new socio-spatial configurations in cities, and the state’s paternalistic and repressive institutions assisting disenfranchised citizens.

During the austerity of the 1980s, the retrenchment of Keynesian-welfarist institutions took place as the global shift toward a neoliberal paradigm was in motion (Mayer, 2009a). The inception of privatisation, decentralisation and deregulation of urban processes and interventions brought new challenges. Local governments confronted with fiscal crisis and pressured by entangled urban problems, developing mostly in inner city neighbourhoods, acknowledged the potential of community organisations and civic groups to assist to solve such problems and eventually urban movements shifted their strategies ‘from protest to program’ (Mayer 2009a). The institutionalisation of some movements led to new public programmes for housing and neighbourhood renewal fostering, in some instances, self-management or autogestion.

Autogestion [self management], which was originally pursued to enhance worker’s control at factories, became a form of democratic political mobilisation after the revolts of the late 1960s, and, eventually, was promoted as an urban practice seeking decentralisation of political power (Brenner & Elden, 2009). In Comments on a New State Form (2009) [originally published in 1979] Lefebvre regarded autogestion as a strategy who carries within its self along with the ‘withering away of state’ — Marx and Engels’ concept — as state power and welfare institutions transform into a radically decentralised framework and the civil society takes control of decision making. In this context, and asserting that ‘the ”real” should not obscure that of the possible... rather the possible should serve as exploring the real’ (p. 125), Lefebvre envisioned a ‘possible’ political utopia where the state rather than serving as an instrument for capital accumulation and control would facilitate spatial autogestion, direct democracy, and democratic control. Lefebvre saw autogestion not as a panacea but as a conflictual process where participants engage in self-criticism, debate, deliberation, conflict and struggle. He was fully aware that this form of ‘counter-power’ was constantly at stake in the struggle since it may be easily co-opted by less radical undertakings (Lefebvre, 2009, p. 135).

Indeed, during the austerity of the 1980s, public programmes promoting spatial autogestion and participatory planning processes began with radical ideals, but eventually weakened with the institutionalisation and professionalisation of their activities and those initially leading those endeavours. Undoubtedly, the relationship between the state and citizen movements shifted, in many cases, from opposition to cooperation. This unfolded a fragmentation between groups that turned militant
actions into development and delivering services, and groups whose demands were not fulfilled by the new arrangements, and who eventually radicalised (Mayer, 2009a). During this time progressive urban renewal programmes involving tenants in decision making processes took place in The Randstad Holland (see Chapter 4) while sweat equity approaches (self-management) where introduced to rehabilitate thousands of neglected buildings and stabilised dozens of declining neighbourhoods in New York City (Chapter 3). This was a remarkable time of state intervention fostering and supporting (funding) policies democratising housing. Unfortunately, it did not last for long. This was a period when the state kept citizen mobilisations busy while gaining time to shift gears towards the full neoliberalisation of cities.

Lefebvre’s *The Right to the City* was revived and widely disseminated when it was translated to English in 1998. Interestingly, the same year Douglass and Friedmann’s *Cities for Citizens: Planning and the Rise of Civil Society in a Global Age* was published responding to the market strategies that began penetrating into urban policy and programmes since 1980s. In the midst of a prosperous period of capital accumulation and new spatial configurations widening social and economic disparities within and among nations, an inclusive democracy practiced at the local level was, once again, pursued. This call in the search of socially just outcomes acknowledged the inevitable, long-established, and often complex, relationship between civil society and the state. This claim asserted that the tensions between the expanding accumulation processes and localised actions contesting those processes to gain access to and control of power will continue to be part of political life in the coming future. And therefore, in order to achieve this social project, the rise of the civil society was critical. This assertion calling for the rise of citizen participation in the production of cities involved three interconnected citizen rights. The first one, *the right to voice*, involved a ‘democratic struggle for inclusiveness in democratic procedures, for transparency in government transactions, for accountability of the state to its citizens and, above all, for the right to… all citizens…to be heard in the matters affecting their interests and concerns at the local level of life-space and community’ (Douglass & Friedmann, 1998, p. 2). The second one, *the right to difference*, involved ‘the social struggle for public policies that acknowledge and assert the value of socially constructed differences in the collective identities of groups living side by side in the increasingly multicultural cities’ and that are ‘responsive to differences in need and material interest by groups… who have been historically marginalised and disempowered’ (Douglass & Friedman, 1998, p. 2). The last one, *the right to human flourishing*, involved a ‘struggle for increased access to the material bases of social power…for the basic conditions of livelihood’ (Douglass & Friedmann, 1998, p. 2).

When Lefebvre’s *right to the city* was revisited in the late 1990s and *cities for citizens* was claimed, the agreements and cooperation reached between local governments and
mobilisations had weakened. National and local governments prioritised neoliberal market mechanisms and use the city as a tool for economic growth by employing urban revitalisation and regeneration as their ultimate instrument. During this period of uneven growth, the focus of urban policy and programmes began shifting from urban poverty to social exclusion (Brenner & Theodore, 2003). Furthermore, social, political, and spatial criteria began to be included in public programmes to promote economic competitiveness while ‘social infrastructures, political culture and ecological foundations of the city are being transformed into economic assets’ (Mayer, 2009a, page 365). During this time the claim of cities for citizens did not envision to overturn the state, nor to replace it, but to transform it in ways that will serve all of its citizens. It called, once again, for a rebalancing of power relations between the powerful and the powerless, and considered planners instrumental to activate citizen participation and increase local groups and communities’ social power. Unfortunately, citizen participation in planning was not a representative feature of those years, at least not for gaining political power. Although this claim and some of its propositions was coopted and institutionalised by public agencies and municipalities across cities (see Mayer, 2009a). For instance, as Mayer notes (2009a, p. 365) urban visions and mobilisations were geared towards ‘the development of the revitalised urban machine’ by using participatory tools and initiatives for local planning and governance, however, with limited advisory powers\(^6\). Nevertheless, and despite progressive movements that had long been fragmented, there were certainly significant gains in ideology and practice\(^7\).

The right to the city was readdressed by David Harvey (2008) in the midst of the global financial crash of 2008, at the time when long-lasting urban restructuring strategies searching to move capital into cities for profit making became fully global through the integration of financial markets and failed affecting millions of people across nations. The right to the city was recognised as ‘one of the most precious and yet most neglected of human rights’ (Harvey, 2008, p. 23) as financial institutions promoting the financialization of cities, or debt-finance urban development, were rescued by national states while common people lost their homes and livelihoods without any helping hand. In this context, militant academics, planners, activists, community leaders and groups of active citizens raged with the continued failures in the production of ‘just’ cities and began mobilising to assert the right to the city or, as Harvey asserts, ‘the right to change ourselves by changing the city’ (2008, p. 23).

\(^6\) Community initiated plans in NYC and local action plans in the Randstad Holland originated in the late 1990s, at the time of the Le Droit a la Ville re was translated to English and Cities for Citizens was published.

\(^7\) Some of the practices include in Cities for Citizens such as participatory budgeting have been spread across nations.
Similarly to the claims of cities for citizens which, as it was mentioned above, have been coopted mostly by local governments, the claims of the right to the city have been widely used, although sometimes without militant propositions nor progressive political agendas. From local and transnational organisations (The Right to the City Alliance) to local and national governments (Brazil), and from international grassroots coalitions (The International Alliance for Inhabitants) to intergovernmental organisations (UN-Habitant and UNESCO) this call has asserted to gear public policy to benefit people rather than corporations (see Mayer 2009a). Unquestionably, it has become a desperate cry and a critical awakening today, when the state and corporations have tended to dispossess in a coordinated way specific citizens and communities not only from the city’s decision-making processes, but also from the city itself as a result of the ongoing ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Harvey, 2004, 2008). As Federici (2012) asserts, the systematic disinvestment by the state in the reproduction of the work-force — the dismantling of the welfare state — has resulted ‘in a temporal fix between reproduction and accumulation’ (p. 102) as subsidies related to housing, healthcare, education, pensions, and public transport have been cut and high fees have been set upon them. Workers have been left with the responsibility of their own reproduction, regardless the fall of incomes and employment and the rise in cost of housing and basic services. The reproduction of labour power has been, for the most part, privatised and ‘turned into an immediate point of accumulation’ (Federici, 2012, p. 102). In this context, the right to the city has spread as a desperate call involving numerous human rights (health, food, education, security, etc). However, the right to transform the city as well as the right to housing have been perhaps the most coveted in western capitalist societies in recent years, not only by the urban poor but also by the urban middle class (like in New York City, San Francisco, London, Paris), as the world population increasingly concentrate in cities and cities are increasingly dominated by a few.

Invigorated by Harvey’s reawakening of the right to the city and responding to the increasing commodification of cities, Brenner, Marcuse and Mayer (2009)— radical academics working for quite some time in America and Western Europe— called for Cities for People, not for Profit in 2009 underscoring the ‘political priority of constructing cities that correspond to human social needs’(p. 176) and urging for the exploration of theoretical and practical perspectives to mobilise towards alternatives to capitalism. They declared, ‘cities are not only sites for strategies of capital accumulation; they are also arenas in which the conflicts and contradictions associated

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8 The right to the city became a federal law in Brazil. However, due to the country’s decentralisation of power it has been interpreted and implemented in different ways.
with historically and geographically specific accumulation strategies are expressed and fought out' (p. 176).

Considering all these claims, it is evident that the struggle for participating in and shaping the production of cities has been contested for quite some time. This has happened particularly for three reasons. Firstly, the state and the territory interact in such away that they are mutually constitutive (Lefebvre, 2009). Undoubtedly, as Lefebvre claims, space has been the ‘privileged instrument’ (p. 226) of the state to impose its own rationality. Secondly, capitalism needs new territories—call them real estate, neighbourhoods, districts, cities or nations—for its expansion, reproduction and profit making. And lastly, citizens need space for their own social reproduction, not only the one related with labor-power to produce commodities and reproduce the market (Marxist terms), but also the reproductive work related with complex activities and services providing the social, and biological, care required to reproduce the next generation (Barbagallo & Federici 2012). Thus, ‘self-reproductive movements’, which are mobilisations ‘that do not separate political work from the activities necessary to the reproduction of our life’ (Barbagallo & Federici, 2012, p. 2) are intricately related to space. Thus, acknowledging there is a considerable unbalance of power and resources between the state, corporations and citizens, we can discern that the fight for territory is far from being over. Undoubtedly, the struggle for alternative ways to produce cities for citizens, rather than against citizens, continues to be present across cities, from academic forums and town hall meetings to community task forces and peoples assemblies in slums, barrios and inner city neighbourhoods. However, to achieve a systemic change it is critical to understand the demands, objectives and strategies of those currently established in positions of domination and shaping cities, and of those who are mobilising in opposition to established forms of urbanisation (Lefebvre, 2009; Brenner, Marcuse, & Mayer, 2009). Most importantly, it is imperative to acknowledge that the state intervention occurs incessantly by means of diverse institutions devoted to the management and production of space (Lefebvre, 2009). Thus, it is crucial to understand the way these two conflicting forces are influencing national states and how governments are, in turn, changing forms of policy, governance, and regulation at different levels.

Lefebvre’s asserted in Space and State (Vol. 4, De l’État, originally published in 1978), back in the late 1970s, that ‘the relation between private interest and the activities of public powers sometimes involves collusion, sometimes a collision’ (Lefebvre 2009,

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9 According to Federici (2013, p. 100) ‘The struggles of the 1960s in Europe and the US, especially the student and feminist movements, have taught the capitalist class that investing in the reproduction of the future generation of workers “does not pay.” It is no guarantee of an increase in the productivity of labor.’
p. 227). In recent years, such secret cooperation or conspiracy between private and public interests and activities has become a norm, and a quite visible one, while the asperities have been strategically worked out (e.g. rise of public-private partnerships). Furthermore, he stated, that the primary function of the state-political space is coordinating the blind forces of growth and imposing its law onto the chaos of ‘private’ and ‘local’ interests, as well as ‘holding together spaces that have been ripped apart and maintaining their multiple functions’ (p. 240) (e.g. neighbourhoods, city districts, regions, etc). In this publication, he illustrates coherently the conflictual but also correlated functions of the state-political space. While it allows the transgressions of private interest that lead to the production of dominant and dominated spaces, it imposes itself on those who threaten to destroy the conditions for social life to guarantee the process of reproduction. Hence, one of the primary roles of the modern state is to prevent the collapse of the structure that extends, from the poor and the working classes to the elite and the political ones, to maintain a stratified system of places, functions, and institutions (Lefebvre, 2009). According to Lefebvre, ‘the process of reproduction does not become functionally autonomous; it is actualised in a space’ (Lefebvre, 2009, p. 242). On the other hand, Lefebvre (2009) noted that citizens or ‘users’ movements (their protests and struggles) have become a worldwide phenomenon by ‘questioning the organisation of society at the same time as that of cities and space’ (p. 227). He argued that these mobilisations, which value space for its use value rather than for its exchange value, have constantly emphasised the relations between people and space while ‘experimenting with modes of action at diverse scales, always in the light of the participant’s experience and knowledge’ (p. 228).

At this point, it is clear that the processes leading to the achievement of the grassroots claims previously outlined have involved, and will involve in the future (under the current capitalist system), cooperation with the state and its institutions since both are seeking social reproduction in cities; grassroots groups for survival, the state for growth via capitalism expansion. Most interesting, as it was mentioned above, the most contested spaces have been and will continue to be those that have been already ripped apart —such as neglected and disinvested neighbourhoods where the poor and working class live—where citizen mobilisations come up with urgency and where the state has tended to intervene to constitute new spaces establishing stability and coherence (for the market) and, as Lefebvre (2009) noted, to impose its own rationality. David Harvey in Urban Politics and Uneven Development (1989), also addresses the search of the ruling-class to achieve a ‘structured coherence’ or, as Brenner and Elden (2009) note, ‘the provisional stabilisation of processes of capital accumulation, state regulation and sociopolitical life’ (p. 370). Both analyses, Lefebvre and Harvey’s, suggest different spatial scales for imposing such rationality and coherence at the national and city scale, and everything in between. In particular, this study aims to analyse the state strategies imposed at the neighbourhood level,
especially in contested disinvested spaces, to achieve such coherence at a larger scale and the way those strategies relate to citizens’ demands in the organisation of space and social life in the process. Brenner and Elden (2009) argue, in relation to Lefebvre’s analysis, that the projects of state rationalisation, ordering and control, which are spatial in nature, entail the classification, division, and management of political-economic life within defined territories. These projects, they argue, tend to impose and keep the coherence in such zones by targeting them for specific types of strategic intervention. Urban restructuring with area-based approaches involving urban renewal and regeneration as core instruments of control (regulation and coherence) are key examples of these projects of state rationalisation.

The following sections aim outline the context of the evolution of urban restructuring inciting the citizen struggles and social mobilisations described above. The agents and outcomes of the latest economic restructuring will be framed as well as the way national states have reorganised their structures and activities to adapt to such changes. Furthermore, some theoretical understandings of the logic of the advancement of uneven development at the city level will be reviewed, as well as different approaches looking at the socio-spatial configurations arising from such form of urban growth. These will be followed by an examination of the state responses to these developments, which have used urban regeneration and revitalisation as instruments for socio-spatial transformation. Lastly, a brief evolution of such urban interventions will be reviewed focusing on the enticement of participation and integration of the non-participants and the non-integrated promoted in the latest policy and urban restructuring strategies.

§ 2.3 Economic restructuring

Some decades have passed since Lefebvre’s (2003) analysis on the way urbanisation usurped industrialisation as space was increasingly used for capital accumulation. An economic restructuring has taken place bringing about significant changes that should be addressed to understand the restructuring of the state and in turn cities. In terms of time, the contemporary restructuring can be framed from the end of the worldwide deep recession of the mid 1970s which marked the end of the period of a capitalist expansion after WWII; the proclamation of the end of an industrial era in developed societies in the north and their simultaneous shift to service-knowledge based economy; and industrialisation of developing societies in the south positioning them as territories of cheap labour; to the financial crash of the late 2000s, which
marked the end of an era of economic urban crises mainly rooted in speculation, marketing and financing of the built environment (Harvey, 2006; Soja, 1997). Capital expansion works in a dialectic framework of accumulation and exploitation, centralities and peripheries, and a polarised division of class and labour. The latest restructuring, which entails a juxtaposition of underdevelopment and development at any scale along the ‘intensification’ and ‘expansion’ of capitalism (Castells, 1992; Soja, 1997), has been extensively examined by many Marxist theorists from the 1970s onwards (Havcy, 2006; Smith, 1984; Soja, 1997). Thus, the focus of this study is not to scrutinise such process. However, since this study addresses such juxtaposition at the city scale, and all scales are interconnected, it is critical to identify some of the restructuring features at the global, national and city scales. According to Soja (1997) and Brenner (2009) the following are some of the key features of the latest restructuring:

1 At the global scale, extreme deindustrialization in core countries and regions, and large-scale industrialisation in peripheral countries and regions, therefore a new international division of labour.

2 At the national scale, industrial decline in cities and regions, and transformation of those into technological, knowledge and services urban areas; intensification of territorial competition with the mobility of industry and industry-related capital and the introduction of new technical, financial and service complexes; and in turn the de-concentration of labour and production in some areas and re-concentration of those in other areas.

3 At the city scale competition in public funding and private investment for urban planning, development and restructuring; centralisation and concentration of private capital materialised in large areas of investment with diversified production, finance, real estate and services, and therefore the generation of new urbanities of control and power; the erosion of unionised industrial labour and introduction of a flexible and less-unionised one; fragmentation and polarisation of occupations between high pay/high skill and low/pay/low skill workers; erosion and downgrading of the middle class and surplus of work forces experiencing impoverishment to an unprecedented degree; and, consequently, spatial differentiation and segregation based on socio-economic status.

In regard to space, the juxtaposition of underdevelopment and development is evident at any scale. City regions in advance societies have been transformed to spaces of command and management, while others in developing societies have turned into global production platforms. On one hand, ‘global corporate capital has outsourced and off-shored different parts of the production and marketing processes, exploiting geographical, cultural and political differences’ (Mayer, 2009b, p. 39). And, on the other hand, it has tended to accumulate in strategic central areas and regions putting significant pressure for infrastructure investment and improvements of housing and
urban services in those areas while blocking urban development in marginal areas. This pressure has brought finance capital more directly into planning and urbanisation differing with the previous period of spatial restructuring where finance capital had not a primarily role of urbanisation but industrialisation (Lefebvre, 2003; Soja, 1997). However, it is critical to acknowledge that, the ongoing spatial production and organisation of cities has not been exclusively supported by corporate and finance capital but also by national states. National states have facilitated the co-ordination and implementation of new tactics of urban restructuring. Therefore, it is also quite relevant to identify the way the ongoing restructuring has influenced the function of the state and its institutions. According to Brenner (2009);

1  Supranational and national state institutions continue to expose cities and city-regions to global economic forces and competitive market pressures.
2  Heightened fiscal austerity is imposed upon regional and local governmental institutions weakening their distributive capacities and entrenching marketing-oriented policy orientations.
3  Naturalisation of profit-based forms of economic development as a priority within urban governance.
4  Erosion of power-based of national government rising regional and local governance. Weakening of state control and regulation of industry, finances, spatial restructuring and social provision.
5  Interurban competition is sustained in policy circles at various spatial scales; increasing emphasis on the need for institutions and policies to promote locational competitiveness. Governance models have become increasingly entrepreneurial as territorial competition intensifies at every scale.
6  Urban policies seek to attract high and middle class residents to areas experiencing urban restructuring using creative marketing strategies, on one hand. On the other hand, policy and programmes targeting ‘possibly dangerous populations’ are carried on in the same areas promoting the displacement of residents and disruption of local communities (Mayer, 2009b).

Urban restructuring can be understood as a process where the very nature of cities is reorganised and transformed in conjunction with the post 1970s forms of global capitalist restructuring, and where the state at various spatial scales has actively facilitated the transformation of urban spaces by ‘changing institutional-territorial modes of governance and their acting role in enforcing new locational policies’ (Mayer 2009b). In this processes, as Brenner (2009) argues, national states are mobilising different types of locational policy exposing certain spaces to competitive pressures and global investments rather than promoting balanced urban and infrastructural development, therefore they have promoted socio-spatial inequality as the basis for economic development. Undoubtedly, the new socio-spatial configurations in cities are
associated with increasing concentrations of investment, development, and production alongside urban competition, privatisation, and super-profits. And, on the other hand, they are intimately related to the progressive agglomerations of neglected spaces, underdevelopment, urban decline and socio-spatial segregation.

§ 2.4 Uneven development at the city level

David Harvey, in The Limits of Capital (1982), describes in detail the tendency for capital to go through periodic but relatively rapid and systematic shifts in the location and amount of capital invested in cities. These shifts in the location of investment areas, he explains, are intimately related to over-accumulation leading to the falling of profit, and therefore a ‘crisis’, and the search in turn of new investment territories for capital to flow and generate more profit. The specific locations of such investment areas depend on the historical geographical patterns created in previous economic booms (e.g. inner-cities, suburban areas, post-industrial areas, new towns, etc). What it is certainly known is that uneven development is brought about promoting socio-spatial polarisation between developed and underdeveloped spaces (Harvey, 1982; Smith, 1996). According to Neil Smith (1996) ‘the logic of uneven development is that development of one area creates barriers to future development, thus leading to an underdevelopment that in turn creates opportunities for a new phase of development’ (p. 84). Geographically, Smith (1996) asserts, this leads to what he calls ‘locational seesaw’ or ‘the successive development, underdevelopment and redevelopment of given areas as capital jumps from one place to another, then back again, both creating and destroying its own opportunities for development’ (p. 84).

Despite this ‘locational seesaw’ has been experienced at different spatial scales, it is in the city where it will be mostly addressed in this study to understand the processes related to urban decline and segregation and, in turn, urban revitalisation and regeneration in America and Western Europe. These state instruments, as it will be explained below, have been used for quite some time by local governments to assert control and rationality to specific urban areas, mostly in spaces that have been ripped apart (previously by capitalism) or where development in other areas have blocked any sort of growth. As it was mentioned previously, these areas have shifted over time. After the economic crisis of the late 1970s, and a long period of investment in city peripheries and suburbs (in the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s), investment tended to flow to disinvested inner city central areas, to ‘revitalise cities’, leaving behind working class districts located for the most part in pre-war inner city areas. These working class
inner city districts have been the target of a number of public policies and programmes during the last couple of decades as the gap between the wealthy (developed areas) and the poor (underdeveloped areas) widens and inner city central areas become over developed without capacity (space) for further investment. Let's keep in mind that similar public endeavours accompanied by capital investment took place beforehand in central inner city areas and they will in new territories left behind at this very moment. What is interesting is what happens between cycles of investment in disinvested territories. As deprived and disfranchised groups are pressured to concentrate and segregate in declining city areas, and struggles related to the dysfunctional social reproduction of those groups become visible and in some instances chaotic —such as unemployment, poverty, illegal practices and crime— local governments are pushed to assert control in those spaces to preserve a certain coherence and in turn pave the way for the new wave of investment (Harvey, 1989; Lefebvre, 2009). Thus, considering these facts, it is evident that urban decline and segregation is a capitalist product as much as a state product.

Urban decline, socio-spatial segregation and social order

Urban decline in disinvested city areas has reached unprecedented conditions in developed societies (e.g. Detroit, Baltimore, Liverpool, Paris Banlieues, etc). Nowadays, the features of urban decline relate to the decrease in the average income, resources and education of residents, and disinvestment reflected in the downgrading of the housing stock, streets, public spaces, community facilities, public transportation as well as public, social and cultural services. In addition, the combination of some of these features have led to the rise of vacancies, the decline of real state values, the downturn of local economies, the rise of illegal practices, and in turn neighbourhood stigmatisation (Aalbers, 2006; Andersen & van Kempen, 2003).

According to Wacquant (1999), along with the ongoing economic modernisation, caused by the global restructuring of capitalism, the formation of a new international division of labour and the growth of knowledge-intensive industries has become the ‘modernisation of poverty’. He asserts (1999) that a new regime of urban marginality has emerged and has been ascendant in advanced societies, what he calls an ‘advanced marginality’. A condition which is fostered by ‘a macro-societal drift towards inequality, the mutation of wage labour, the retrenchment of welfare states, and the spatial concentration and stigmatisation of poverty’ (Wacquant, 1999, p. 1639). Each of these logics, he argues (1999), are inter-linked and manifested physically in developed societies, where poverty used to be scattered, embedded in working-class communities and geographically diffuse. Indeed, the most prominent examples, as he notes (1999),
are reflected now where social segregation has shifted from homogeneous working class groups to a large range of ethnic minorities, immigrants, and working class natives that have been pushed down due to lack of education, new technical skills, or foreign labour competition.

Urban decline and segregation materialise in different ways within and across nations even though some urban areas may share some features (Andersen & van Kempen 2003). According to Wacquant (1999), the rise of urban segregation in Western Europe does not have any convergence with the American pattern since West European neighbourhoods are deeply penetrated by the state and ethnic and racial tensions in them are fuelled not by the growing gap between immigrants and natives, but by their increasing proximity in social and physical space. In West European welfare states the spatial distribution of households can be determined to a large extent by direct and indirect government intervention (Deurloo & Musterd, 1998, p. 387), having as a dominant dividing line class and income (Buck & Fainstein, 1992; Wacquant, 2002). Therefore social and spatial segregation has been associated more with multi-ethnic concentrations of low-income households rather than with ghettos, or racial segregation, as it is the case in American cities where the dividing line is mostly race and ethnicity (Buck & Fainstein, 1992; Wacquant, 2002). However, and despite, the government efforts of prevention and control, social and spatial differentiation is becoming more evident in West European cities (van Kempen, 2007; Musterd & Ostendorf, 1998), quite marked in England and France and less in other countries such as the Netherlands.

There have been numerous approaches to understand neighbourhood change, residential differentiation and segregation, from human ecology and positivist-empirical approaches to behavioural and institutional ones (see van Kempen, 2007). However, as Harvey (1989) asserts, most attempts looking at such phenomena ‘have produced not a single integrated theory’ (p. 109), and the problems lie mostly in the methodology. Perhaps the first vision to study such phenomena in a more dialectical way was proposed by Lefebvre, in The Right to the City (1996, originally published in 1968). He claimed back then that the phenomenon of segregation must be analysed considering various indices and criteria. Firstly, ecological, referring to the organic processes taking place in circumscribed areas such as shantytowns, slums and blighted city areas. Secondly, formal, referring to the deterioration of signs and meaning of the city, the decline of urban space and the dislocation of urban architectural elements. Lastly, sociological, referring to standards of living and life styles, ethnic groups, cultures, etc. Lefebvre (1996), in his final analysis, notes that even when anti-segregationist ideals and intentions are pursued following different approaches, ‘practice tends towards segregation’ (p. 140). The state proceeds from above, he agrees, while capitalist interest proceeds from below to impose self-beneficial
rationality or, what he calls, a coherence of the urban (always in a fragmented way). Such rationality, he notes, separates and delineates the city, while appropriating urban functions and restructuring the urban through bureaucracy and technocracy (e.i. planning, zoning, etc). Lefebvre’s analysis conveys that socially and politically class strategies tend to produce segregation.

A few decades later, Harvey (1989), following a dialectical approach in his theory of residential differentiation also analysed a number of aspects considering class structure as well as social order. This last aspect is particularly interesting for this study, as well as Lefebvre’s analysis on the ideology of coherence. According to Harvey (1989), the fragmentation of the city into distinctive communities is ‘critical’ to successfully achieve the reproduction of the social relations of capitalism and the fragmentation of class-consciousness (when all individuals become conscious of its class identity in the struggle between capital and labor). This fragmentation, he notes, ‘means differential access to scarce resources required to acquire market capacity’, which is ‘defined in terms of the ability to undertake certain kinds of functions within the division of labour’ and ‘comprises a whole set of attitudes, values, and expectations as well as distinctive skills’ (p. 118). Undoubtedly, social differentiation produces distinctive communities and in turn disaggregation of cities. Furthermore, according to Harvey (1989), when this social differentiation and its implications become the focus of social awareness of a community or a neighbourhood, and this social awareness becomes the basis for political action, ‘then community-consciousness replaces class-consciousness as the springboard for action and the locus of social conflict’ (p. 120). Thus, through social differentiation and spatial disaggregation class-consciousness (which has always been a threat to capitalism) is prevented in large urban areas. However, as Harvey states (1989), community-consciousness once created becomes deeply rooted in specific areas and the social, and often spatial, differentiation that surfaces is quite hard to piece together, for instance by the state or the market to achieve specific interests. This is the moment when social order is strategically pursued.

Traditionally, as Harvey notes (1989), ‘capitalism requires to disrupt and destroy what it initially created as part of its own strategy for self preservation’ (p. 123). In the same fashion, community-consciousness tends to be disrupted by the same

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10 Harvey considers three kinds of forces making social differentiation within a population: (1) A primary force which rises out of the power relation between capital and labor; (2) Secondary forces which rise out of the contradictory and always changing character of capitalism: the division of labour and specialisation of function, consumption classes or distributive groupings, authority relations and class-consciousness, and ideology and mobility chances; (3) Residual forces manifesting social relations previously established in a preceding and subordinate mode of production.
forces that produced it. For instance, once capital accumulation reaches its limits in specific city areas, it turns with speculative activities into disinvested communities (where community-consciousness has been created) and disrupts such communities promoting growth. As Harvey states (1989), here is where the contradictions and potentials of social transformation in urban development processes lie. It is evident that social and spatial differentiation is not merely a product of citizens’ preferences, expressions, and visions. It is produced mostly by the forces related to capital expansion and accumulation, on one hand, and the ideology of coherence pursued by the State (in coordination with corporations), on the other. In fact, as Harvey asserts (1989), citizens loss of control of the social conditions of existence when confronted with those forces, which at the neighbourhood level are represented by landlords, speculators, developers, financial institutions, as well as public agencies and local governments. However, such lost of control does not happen without confrontation. Traditionally, when community-consciousness is threatened to be disrupted or destroyed urban mobilisations rise to gain control, and either ally with local officials and governments to fulfill their needs and claims or, as it was outlined above, radicalise and become more confronting and chaotic.

In recent decades, as capitalist and state institutions increasingly coordinate their activities and strategies to achieve their own interests and rationality, neighbourhoods with a fertile soil for capital accumulation, translated in urban development, have become contested arenas. Urban restructuring processes along distinctive and competitive housing markets have led to segregated and stratified patterns of urbanisation and urban transformation while limiting citizens ability to make choices and be part of the production of their own living environment (Harvey, 1989; Uitermark, 2014). Furthermore, in areas where socio-spatial segregation and large-scale rebellions have challenged the ability of local governments to assert power, space organisation as an instrument of social order has been looked after by national states (Uitermark, 2014). In the last decades, aggressive agendas of dispersal and deconcentration were followed by governments in America and in some West European countries (including the Netherlands) where segregation is deepening and increasing class polarisation (Uitermark, 2014). The previous analysis leads to the premise that segregation, like desegregation (integration), represents a form of social control and both processes have taken place through specific instruments favouring the state and capitalist interests.

Certainly, the ideology of coherence, including its cyclical practices of segregation and integration, has been pursued through strategically orchestrated urban restructuring processes in developed societies. The question is how has such coherence, translated to policy, planning and praxis, been carried out in segregated low-income neighbourhoods in recent years? The following section outlines the evolution of urban
renewal practices in deprived, segregated and low-income urban areas in America and Western Europe, focusing particularly on the shift of urban renewal from a state-sponsored intervention pursuing spatial reorganisation of specific sites to a more ambitious one involving powerful partners and pursuing economic, social, political and spatial transformations.

§ 2.5 From urban renewal to urban regeneration and beyond

Urban renewal has been conceived and defined in different ways due to the complexity of the agents, processes and outcomes involved in this process and evolved into a much more complex and comprehensive process in the last two decades. According to some scholars, urban renewal, ‘a process of essentially physical change’ (Couch & Fraser, 2003, p.2), has moved ‘beyond urban development (or redevelopment) with a general mission and less well-defined purpose and urban revitalisation (or rehabilitation) which, whilst suggesting the need for action, fails to specify a precise method of approach’ (Roberts 2000, p. 18). Urban renewal has shifted to urban regeneration, a processes regarded as ‘a comprehensive and integrated vision and action which leads to the resolution of urban problems and which seeks to bring about a lasting improvement in the economic, physical, social and environmental condition of an area that has been subject to change’ (Roberts 2000, p. 17). Certainly, the term urban renewal has shifted to regeneration in Western Europe but urban revitalisation is still used widely to refer to these types of urban interventions in America. Thus, I will use the terms urban regeneration and revitalisation interchangeably while referring to this practice in both territories.

Urban regeneration is associated with the symptoms of economic and urban restructuring, urban decline and its complexities, and integrated visions of social, spatial, environmental and economic improvement, as well as urban transformations accomplished through public policy, management and planning (Couch & Fraser, 2003). Most importantly, this process has been increasingly recognised by national states and municipalities as a panacea to tackle urban decay and social malaise and in turn as an instrument to promote economic growth (Moualert et al., 2002). Nowadays, urban regeneration is considered in most urban policies, city visions, and local plans across nations and cities in developed societies. However, the main drive and the multiple effects related to this process have been undisclosed and those affected by its transformative, and often destructive, forces have been for the most part silenced.
Urban renewal originated as a social reform in England to respond to the increasing unsanitary conditions brought by the rapid industrialisation and urbanisation of cities in the 19th century. Eventually similar approaches were transferred to other parts of Europe and America to deal with the unfolding impoverished conditions of the urban poor in large cities. Philanthropists, social reformers, private entities with a social commitment, and those who started the housing movement supported the first efforts of urban renewal that eventually paved the way to social housing. Nevertheless, social and housing reform were not the only drivers of these deliberate transformations, which often razed entire parts of cities. Aesthetics, functionality and the expansion of private and capital interests were also important motives.

Urban renewal projects partially and fully sponsored by the state took place mostly during the interwar period in America and Western Europe. However, it was until the post-war years that large scale state-sponsored projects surfaced and took force, mostly in war-torn cities and declining urban areas due to economic downturns and white flight to new suburban residential areas (urban renewal as a programme took place in the 1970s in the Netherlands). As part of the experience of postwar suburbanisation, cities were seen as spaces of disorder, crime and danger (Warner 1972). Urban ‘blight’ and ‘decline’ in inner city areas as well the ‘social malaise’ inhabiting those spaces were the target of such programmes, which mostly used a demolition and new construction approach (slum clearance). Along with tackling the growing ‘anti-urbanism’ sentiment of the time, the provision of housing for low-income citizens became central since urban renewal, which ‘was highly regulated and economically and geographically limited’, and ‘was wholly dependent on public financing and therefore had to address issues of broad social necessity, such as social housing’ (Smith, 2002). This was a period of relatively high rates of capital accumulation and profit making in most of the advanced capitalist societies, but by the early 1970s signs of crises of capital accumulation were evident (Harvey, 2006).

Liberal urban policy was gradually subdued beginning with the economic and fiscal crises of the 1970s and the conservative national administrations that followed in the 1980s (Smith, 2002), which believed that the Keynesian compromise had failed as a viable way to manage capital accumulation (Harvey, 2006). Starting with Reagan and Tatcher the provisions of liberal urban policy were either dismantled or weekend in America and the UK, and in turn across Western Europe at different pace (it took longer in the Netherlands). As Neoliberalism consolidated as a new economic orthodoxy regulating public policy in the early 1980s, urban renewal shifted from state-sponsored to a new form of subsidised private-market intervention. Decentralisation, privatisation and deregulation of urban transformations rapidly intensified supported by policies that followed promoting a coordinated and systematic partnership of public planning with public and private capital (Smith, 2002). As Smith (2002) asserts, while
state-sponsored postwar urban renewal promoted scattered private-market urban renewal, those transformations and the increasing privatisation of inner-city land and housing markets since the 1980s have, in turn, provided the platform on which large-scale multifaceted urban regeneration plans are established.

In the early 1980s the ‘revitalisation of cities’ was perceived as integral to the overall economic revitalisation of national states. Since then, national states have withdrawn or circumscribed state involvement in housing investment and urban restructuring (Smith, 1996). For instance, public housing mostly developed through the urban renewal programme was defunded in America while social housing provided by public or subsidised entities stratified or became residual in Western Europe during this time. However, even when the role of the state changed significantly it does not mean that it was completely removed from the equation (Smith, 2002). For instance, Smith (2000) asserts, the relative withdrawal of the national states from subsidies supporting private development that occurred in the 1980s was reversed with the intensification of partnerships between private capital and the local state in the 1990s. In America, this resulted in larger, more expensive, and more symbolic urban restructuring interventions without the aspiration of urban policy to guide or regulate the direction of economic growth (Smith, 2002). Instead, he notes, urban policy (and the state) adapted to the trends already established by the market in search of the highest returns, either directly or indirectly in terms of tax benefits (Smith, 2002).

In Europe, urban renewal took another step influenced by the policy trends that unfolded after the establishment of the European Union in 1993. They included a less regulated private finance industry, greater access to private consultancy firms, as well as competitiveness for the allocation of resources, foreign direct investment, promotion of entrepreneurship and innovation, and the attraction of specific human capital (i.e. the creative and the middle class), just to mention a few (European Commission, 1999). During this period, neoliberal urban policies that had marginally developed during the previous decades scaled up and spread across cities and nations. Urban renewal revolved mostly around central and profitable parts of cities. ‘Old forms and functions, traditional political and organisational configurations, had to give way to a new urbanity, a visionary urbanity that would stand the tests imposed by a global and presumably liberal world order’ (Moulaert et al., 2002). Like in America, ‘rebuilding the city’ became the leitmotif of urban policy, and urban regeneration its central component across cities in Western Europe. It was acknowledged that ‘the urban turned into ruin in the devastating restructuring of the 1970s and 1980s had to be rebuilt’ (Moulaert et al., 2002, p. 550). The narrow scope of urban renewal (e.g. provision of social housing) shifted to a way more ambitious one using space and physical transformations, once again, to achieve specific social and economic objectives but this time scaling them up and implementing neoliberal socioeconomic
logics and principles bringing ‘critical shifts in domains and levels of intervention and in the composition and characteristics of actors and agents, institutional structures, and policy tools’ (Moulaert et al., 2002, p. 556). Thus, the scale and dimension of development ambitions expanded in cities, signaling a shift in the agents of urban renewal from governmental, small private investors and local stakeholders to governmental, corporate, and corporate-governmental partnerships (Smith, 2002). The intensification of partnerships between private capital and the local state resulted in larger, more expensive, and more symbolic urban regeneration interventions in urban centres (Smith, 2002).

Nowadays a new urban restructuring strategy is taking place along the North Atlantic zone, a global one with overpowering partners. What is remarkable, as Smith notes (2002), is the extent to which global capital has been increasingly injected to modest peripheral neighbourhoods. As capital requires to move and space becomes scarce in large cities, low-income neighbourhoods have been put on the map as ‘greenlining' areas. ‘Greenlining’ was originally a grassroots strategy that emerged in Chicago’s South Side to counter redlining practices in the 1970s. It was back then a collective effort to bring investment and services to communities that had been excluded. Most recently a sort of ‘greenlining’ has been pursued in financial and business circuits to promote the opposite of ‘redlining’ in former red-lined or disadvantaged areas and has been widely fuelled by local political will (i.e. public subsidies, tax abatements, improvement of transit and public infrastructure) (Smith, 1996). The promotion of investments, services, and products cater towards specific groups (affluent) in these areas has served to promote multicultural districts with ‘character’ by adding what the newcomers would need, such as lofts, luxury studios, boutiques, flexible office spaces, and the like. What is concerning is that such investments are not benefiting long term residents. As Harvey (2012, p. 78) states, ‘those who create an interesting and stimulating everyday neighbourhood life lose it to the predatory practices of real estate entrepreneurs, the financiers and upper class consumers bereft of any urban social imagination’.

These developments make stronger Smith’s ‘locational seesaw’ (1996) argument. Capital is moving to underdeveloped territories and, this time, a new wave of urban renewal, with significant independence from the public sector, but with considerable public subsidies, is in place supported and led by a new cohort of corporate and state powers and practices with ambitious effort to transform cities (Smith, 2002). The current language of these urban transformations, according to Smith (2002), call them urban revitalisation or regeneration, does imply, among other things, a generalisation of gentrification in low-income areas in transition. While urban revitalisation, along with the influx of middle and affluent classes and the dislocation of existing residents, has been induced by the real estate industry with the assistance of city agencies
in America, urban regeneration with ‘social mixing’ policy prescriptions has been allegedly inflicted by national governments with the assistance of housing associations and development corporations in Western Europe, including the Netherlands (Aalbers, 2010; Uitermark, Duyvendak, & Kleinhans, 2007; Uitermark & Duyvendak, 2008). In both cases, similar objectives have been pursued; improvement of the housing stock, diversification of housing, boost of real estate values, economic growth with new businesses, increase of tax revenues, improvement of safety and public spaces. However, such objectives have not been fully disclosed. In fact have been even veiled by practices of ‘coalition politics’ (see section 2.6).

Lastly, and most importantly for this study, the current wave of urban interventions has tended to revisit and co-opt community practices and participatory endeavours traditionally used by local actors to resist state-sponsored urban interventions (e.i. demolitions, displacement, etc). Citizen participation has been increasingly part of the rhetoric of action plans at the city, district and neighbourhood levels, although residents involvement in the improvement of declining communities has been, for the most part, considered in theory (urban policy) but not fully in practice (implementation programmes). If we acknowledge that massive dislocations of low-income populations inflicted with ‘deliberate violence’ in the name of urban regeneration have been part of the 21st century urban policy across cities (Smith, 2002), we can discern that the outcomes of profit-driven transformations have outweighed the benefits participatory programmes have aspired to provide. However, further research is needed to sustain this assumption and to understand the drivers behind the promotion of citizen participation as part of the latest global urban restructuring strategies.

§ 2.6 Participation and integration as part of the new urban restructuring strategy

At the pinnacle of urban renewal programmes Lefebvre (2009) stated that integration and participation of those who live in need and in poverty, in other words the non-participants and non-integrated, had become urban obsessions to repair the aftermath of the urban coherence that national states and its partners had pursued according to their own rationality to fulfill their interests in developed societies. On one hand, this rationality, as he noted, has tended to fragment and disaggregate the urban along with its social infrastructures and political life. This is a result of planning, zoning, and the division of urban functions that became state and capitalist instruments for the production of cities. On the other hand, it has been evident since then that when
segregated areas reach out to unprecedented conditions and they become too hard to govern and integrate with the rest of the city, integration has then been sought by national states at different levels (Harvey, 1989; Uitermark, 2014; Wacquant, 2008). Undoubtedly, as it was illustrated above, planning has played two contradictory roles, that of segregating as well as of integrating.

Theoretical understandings leading to the contemporary segregation that have given rise to ongoing uneven development taking place in cities have been briefly outlined in the previous sections, as well as the way governments have used area-based interventions as instruments to counteract such segregation. The shift from urban renewal to urban regeneration and in turn into a more ambitious urban restructuring strategy has been examined. The previous sections illustrate that, despite the institutional changes that have come about due to the latest economic restructuring, national states continue to have a leading and managing role in urban revitalisation and regeneration interventions in disinvested and low-income neighbourhoods. Most importantly, it has been addressed that practices of integration have been pursued through participation. Thus, participation of the deprived and the excluded seems to continue to be an urban obsession in today’s urban policy, planning and development agendas. This last section intends to conclude by reviewing current policy discourses highlighting some of the drivers pushing participation in urban policy and programmes sponsoring the restructuring of disinvested and declining low-income neighbourhoods.

National states calling for citizen participation

The activation and involvement of non-integrated and non-participant citizens has been increasingly encouraged in urban policy, local programmes and even public subsidies (as a requirement) sponsoring urban revitalisation and regeneration interventions in disinvested and low-income neighbourhoods. The motive of this trend has been disputed considering the coherence that has been traditionally pursued by national states through planning, the evolution of the neoliberalism project, and the new urban predicaments that have emerged as part of the aftermath of such progressions in recent years (e.g. socio-spatial segregation, urban decline, etc). A number of studies indicate that the deliberate activation of specific community groups has been promoted to (1) ameliorate the impact of the neoliberal project through socially interventionist public policies and programmes; (2) control and discipline vulnerable and deprived groups that have been victims of the byproducts of the current neoliberal urbanisation and who represent a threat to the local government; and (3) build coalition politics by reconfiguring governance structures in areas undergoing
urban transformations to prevent conflicts among local institutions, private partners and the local community.

Let’s review the first claim. According to Peck and Tickell (2002, p. 384), in the North Atlantic zone there has been a shift from the pattern of deregulation and dismantlement that dominated the 1980s, a phase they call ‘roll-back neoliberalism’, to the current ‘phase of active state-building and regulatory reform’, or what they call ‘roll-out neoliberalism’. While ‘roll-back neoliberalism’ was seen as a period characterised by the ‘active destruction and discreditation of Keynesian-welfarist and social-collectivist institutions’, the ongoing ‘roll-out neoliberalism’ has been recognised by the deliberately ‘construction and consolidation of neoliberalised state forms, modes of governance, and regulatory relations’ (p. 384). They assert (2002) that the ongoing phase developed in response to the institutional and political limits that were encountered in the early 1990s to deal with the unprecedented economic and social consequences that emerged out of the ‘market-centric forms of neoliberalism’ (p. 388). In their view, a socially interventionist and ameliorative form of neoliberal project came about at the end 1990s.

Uitermark (2014) agrees that over the last three decades governments that have unleashed market forces have tended to concurrently develop comprehensive strategies of social and spatial renewal in areas with weak market positions. These strategies and its approaches of implementation, which have a tendency to activate communities and formulate neighbourhood development programmes, differ among cities and nations. However, in all instances, the unfolding of comprehensive urban policies for integral neighbourhood development can be seen as a pattern of ‘roll-out neoliberalism’ (Peck & Tickell, 2002, p. 37), particularly when for profit-driven development is promoted along with the creation of new institutions to absorb the shocks that will arise from competitive and unregulated market forces (Uitermark 2014). In America, the institutionalisation of citizen mobilisations and the emergence of the third sector as part of the policies of delegation (that started in the late 1980s as welfare programmes were being simultaneously dismantled) are clear examples of the construction of new forms of local governance and the transfer of social responsibilities to local non-for-profit organisations (which often lack resources and power). Whereas new institutional frameworks involving a diversity of public agencies and officials, at all levels, have been the ones formulating and implementing neighbourhood development programmes at the local level in Western Europe (a good example is the Netherlands). What is interesting is that, in both instances, state and capitalist interests have apparently played a patronising role when trying to engage those at the bottom of the power ladder in local initiatives involving urban revitalisation and regeneration interventions, sometimes even in public-private partnerships. Certainly more research is needed to learn the outcomes.
### TABLE 2.1 Citizen participation purposes and strategies in urban restructuring of low-income districts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PURPOSES (AUTHORS)</th>
<th>CORE ISSUES</th>
<th>STRATEGIES</th>
<th>MECHANISMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ameliorate the impact of the neoliberal project. Sources: Peck and Tickle (2002); Uitermark (2014).</td>
<td>Mitigate poverty, social segregation, and urban decline; absorb shock from market forces.</td>
<td>Creation of new socially responsible institutions, agencies and local initiatives fostering neighbourhood development.</td>
<td>Institutionalisation of citizen and urban mobilisations through the creation of the third sector (non-profit organisations).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discipline and control vulnerable groups who are victims of the byproducts of current neoliberal urbanisation and who represent a threat to the local government. Sources: Uitermark (2014, 2007); Aalbers and van Beckhoven (2010); Brenner, Peck, and Theodore (2009); Smith (2012); Wacquant (1999).</td>
<td>Oversee and manage both disfranchised groups including low-income, minorities and immigrant communities, and hard-to-manage areas experiencing urban decline, poverty, crime, etc. Mitigate social exclusion and attain civil order.</td>
<td>Area-based socially interventionist programmes and paternalistic initiatives to promote integration and achieve control of unmanageable districts.</td>
<td>Flanking mechanisms including economic development policies and community-based programmes to manage emerging crisis; monitor, manage and alleviate neoliberal outcomes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Build coalition politics by reconfiguring governance structures and establishing ruling-class alliances (powerful public-private partnerships). Source: Harvey (1989).</td>
<td>Reorganisation of space, promotion of economic growth and profit making without civil society interference.</td>
<td>Enticement of the civil society to participate in newly governance structures to smoothly achieve new spatial and political reconfigurations.</td>
<td>Replacement of existing community alliances by public-private partnerships dominating and controlling local visions and decisions.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Regarding the second claim, some studies that focused on Western Europe (and the Netherlands in particular) assert that socially interventionist policies and paternalist public-private initiatives are increasingly promoted to discipline and control disfranchised groups, such as low-income, minorities and immigrants (Aalbers & van Beckhoven, 2010; Uitermark, 2014). The increasing concentration of what urban managers call ‘urban problems’ and ‘social disorders’ along with the growing tensions in the everyday management of segregated neighbourhoods have pushed governments and their partners to develop repressive approaches in the name of ‘integration’ (Uitermark, 2014; Uitermark & Duyvendak, 2008). Uitermark (2014) argues that, policies and initiatives activating and involving citizens have been increasingly sought.
by national states (mostly in Western Europe) that have experienced failures in fostering ‘integration’ and ‘social cohesion’ to attain civil order.

Interestingly, such (social and developmental) policies have tended to be ingrained or implemented in coordination with urban regeneration interventions, which have tended to use area-based rather than people-based approaches, some times with puzzling outcomes. Targeted territories have become spaces for experimentation of both, new models of planning and social innovation (Moulaert et al., 2005) and advanced models of repression and surveillance (Schinkel & Van der Berg, 2011; Uitermark & Duyvendak, 2008). Uitermark (2014) asserts this claim while acknowledging the increasing recognition and disposition of neighbourhoods as sites of governance by national governments in Western Europe, including the Netherlands. Wacquant (1999) argues that the monitoring efforts of West European governments have intended to prevent the outcomes that urban areas in America have experienced due to the economisation of public services and long term relegation turning them into ungovernable territories. What is interesting is that currently public policy and urban revitalisation interventions seem to increasingly pursue similar governance endeavours in large urban areas in America. Certainly, it is worthwhile scrutinising the objectives and approaches of these endeavours in both geographical areas.

At the neighbourhood level, urban policy has tended to shape hard-to-manage neighbourhoods by prescribing particular social and economic functions and spatial organisations through urban regeneration and revitalisation interventions. Uitermark (2014) asserts that the development of local infrastructures by local governments ‘for remedial and preventive intervention constitutes an alternative or complementary form of social control to segregation and repression’ (p. 1421). Certainly, these infrastructures are deliberately designed to achieve specific goals and to serve specific classes. Uitermark (2014) has conceptualised what he calls ‘technologies of integration’ inspired by Rose’s (1996) ‘technologies of government’, which involve ‘the complex assemblage of diverse forces, techniques, devices that promise to regulate decisions and actions of individuals, groups, organisations in relation to authoritative criteria’ (Rose, 1996, p. 42). Uitermark’s technologies — monitoring, local-central exchange, social mixing and integral policymaking— certainly represent current measures to promote integration as strategy for achieving control currently taken by West European governments (UK, France, Belgium and the Netherlands). What is interesting is that similar technologies experimenting with different strategies and ‘entailing a number of institutional realignments’ at the city scale have also been identified along the North Atlantic zone, such as the so called ‘flanking mechanisms’ (see Brenner, Peck, & Theodore, 2009, p. 64). In any case, a number of studies addressing both geographical areas have noted that some of these measures are deliberately promoting a state-lead gentrification with the intention of ‘civilising and
controlling’ unmanageable neighbourhoods (Uitermark, 2007; Smith, 2002). Changes in social composition, in other words, the replacement of ‘problematic’ by middle-class households has been pursued by governments to revitalise deprived neighbourhoods with weak markets. According to Duyevendak, Kleinhans and Uitermark (2007), ‘the presence of a civil society that acts in line with rather than against governments’ has been key to policy makers.

The previous assertions are evident when looking to current ‘green-lined’ neighbourhoods in large urban areas in America as well as in Western Europe (such as New York City and the Randstand Holland). Formerly red-lined, blighted, and unprofitable neighbourhoods inhabited by marginalised groups are being revived through aggressive approaches, both social and spatial, to achieve stabilisation and integration (with the rest of the city), and to eventually turn them into vibrant and economically fertile districts. This brings some questions in relation with the integration vis-a-vis control pursued by municipalities and their partners in restructuring processes in low-income districts. Apparently, the ‘integration’ that have resonated in policy circles seems not to be related with citizen activation and participation per se to achieve social developmental goals but with the spatial integration of spaces that were desegregated and ripped apart in previous waves of investment and disinvestment.

Lastly, the third claim addresses the enticement of the civil society to participate in newly governance structures to smoothly achieve spatial and political reconfigurations in low-income districts. The managerial approach of the 1960s and early 1970s which mostly focused on the local provision of services, facilities and benefits to urban populations gave way to entrepreneurial forms of action involving economic development in the late 1970s and 1980s (Harvey, 1989), dismantling city-community coalitions that have formed in previous decades (in the Netherlands until the 1990s). These new forms of action, which promoted local areas to attract investment, involved closer relationships between the public and private sectors. Local governments in order to attract investors ‘offered inducements in the forms of grants, free loans and publicly subsidised infrastructure, and no request for reciprocal involvement with the community’ (Blunkett & Jackson, 1987, pp. 108-142). As Goodman (1979) notes, both state and local governments became ‘the last entrepreneurs’ and in turn entrepreneurialism became central in urban policy formulation at a variety of spatial scales (Harvey, 1989). Most recently, new ways of governance with similar entrepreneurial principles have emerged to reorganise space and promote economic growth having public-private partnerships and, what Harvey (1989) calls, coalition politics as centrepiece. Undoubtedly, as Harvey argues, to forge a ruling-class alliance (see Section 2.4) local officials must work and coordinate actions with higher levels of government and with powerful private interests. The question is
what is the purpose of involving the civil society in such powerful and undemocratic alliances? Harvey (1989) states, politicians and urban managers have tended to enact practices of ‘coalition politics’ in the search of building ruling class alliances with similar interests while seeing themselves as symbols of the community to legitimise their powers. Local officials and urban administrators, as he notes, usually speak in the ‘public interest’ and strategically find ways to assert control or mass support to fulfill ongoing plans while taming any opposition. Certainly, ‘the power to organise space and urban life derives from a whole complex of forces mobilised by diverse social agents’ (Harvey, 1989). However, the formation of coalition politics has traditionally involved privileged groups such as local financiers, industrialists, real estate developers, business corporations and commercial leaders. Other type of alliances with different goals have tended to be concurrently formed among local educational, religious and governmental institutions as well as local labour organisations, neighbourhood groups, social movements and the civil society (Harvey, 1989). In both cases, coalitions often involve a variety of (uneven) resources (capital, knowledge, political power, etc) and specific agendas, which tend to shift in direction. This usually brings about fragmentation and competition rather than integration and collaboration at the local level, as well as ambiguity in the role of public agencies and officials. Harvey (1989) in his theory of ‘structured coherence’ illustrates the impact at the community level.

‘The confusions and instabilities of class-alliance formation create a political space in which a relatively autonomous urban politics can arise. The confusions of roles, orientations, and interest of individuals, groups, factions, and classes, taken together with the disruptions of capital accumulation (growth, technological change, class conflict, and crises of over-accumulation), keep social relations in a perpetual state of flux and often plunge them into the ambiguous tensions of social transformation. The art of politics come into its own’ (Harvey, 1989, p. 152).

In America, particularly in neighbourhoods in transition in large urban areas such as New York City, coalition politics have flourished involving powerful private real estate developers (domestic and global) and replacing long term city-community alliances where tenant organisations and non profit housing corporations were active advocates of preserving and expanding affordable housing opportunities in districts experiencing urban restructuring. The new coalition politics, which undoubtedly had another agenda (profit making), have certainly involved local actors. However, ‘for community organisers and housing activists the question of who funds these new coalitions and
who gets the subsidies are paramount’ (Angotti, 2008). Those with economic and political power have tended to dominate and control the visions and decisions of those without it.

In Western Europe, the coordination of urban policy at different government levels has been pursued by policy makers to effectively intervene in neighbourhoods giving way to new institutional frameworks and governance structures acting as policy regulators and implementors. And, certainly, coalition politics have been central. For instance, in the Netherlands, policy targeting ‘priority’ neighbourhoods has been enforced through city, district and neighbourhood action plans, which have set local goals and plans by promoting new coalitions and cooperation among local public agencies, housing associations, the municipality and most recently private developers. These action plans, which act as contracts between central and local governments, have increasingly pursued the involvement of residents and local groups, particularly the nonparticipants and non integrated, in the newly formed coalitions. However, participation has not been called to foster a democratic form of urban governance but as a criteria that contracts to allocate public funds (Uitermark, 2014), which are often tied to specific policy goals. In this case, similarly to America, ruling-class alliances have tended to control and over power decision making in urban regeneration interventions.

§ 2.7 Conclusion

This theoretical framework highlights the way the latest economic restructuring driven by the global expansion of capitalism has reshaped cities and governance structures, and in turn the livelihoods of low-income communities in advanced societies. It provides an understanding of the logic behind uneven development in cities; the deliberate creation of segregated districts; and the instruments and approaches formulated by states to be implemented in coordination with corporate partners to integrate and turn those territories into liveable and profitable urban areas. This theoretical framework underscores the need to revise the shift from urban renewal to urban regeneration and beyond, particularly focusing on the evolution of urban policy discourses and implementation approaches promoting the activation and involvement of non-integrated and non-participant citizens in urban restructuring processes in low-income districts. Urban policies, city visions, and local plans have increasingly pursued area-based approaches calling for citizen participation in times of crisis. However, even when some of the motives, processes and outcomes involved in this call have been outlined above, further research is needed to construct a more
comprehensive understanding of the most recent advances and trends of what I call the new state-led urban restructuring strategy. This strategy goes beyond urban revitalisation in America and urban regeneration in Western Europe. Therefore, the conceptual understandings of urban revitalisation and regeneration would be further examined in this study focusing particularly in contested spaces (low-income and minority districts) while providing an insight on the impact and current trends of these urban interventions at the neighbourhood level. Additionally, the theories around the urban coherence the state, along with its corporate partners, has devised and imposed in urban restructuring processes will be scrutinised further by considering the different concepts and hypothesis regarding citizens integration and participation described above. In particular theories considering paternalistic, controlling and bargaining means (through programmes, local initiatives and community-partnerships) to achieve such coherence. Lastly, while underscoring the multiple and incessant calls for the right to the city by progressive urban thinkers, city planners, urban social movements, grassroots groups and common citizens, this study intends to give light to the limitations and possibilities around the production of democratic and just cities, particularly between public policy and implementation frameworks.
PART 3  The evolution of urban restructuring
Cities for or against citizens?
3 Unfolding urban programmes facilitating community involvement in low-income districts in New York City: Decentralisation on planning, funds, and power?

§ 3.1 Introduction

In 1964 President Johnson declared a ‘war on poverty’ and instituted a number of federal programs to fight against poverty and urban decay taking place in most of the large American cities. The ‘maximum citizen participation of the poor and minorities’ required and encouraged by those programmes made the anti-poverty policies controversial in politics and popular in neighbourhoods. The federal government’s endeavour to bypass local governments to assist and work directly with communities presented a number of challenges. Programmes went defunct due to local bureaucracies and insufficient funding, but a new organisation of the city was born by preparing community entities and local governments for the coming polices of devolution. After the dissolution of the anti-poverty initiatives, President Reagan declared ‘We fought a war on poverty, and poverty won’ while restructuring welfare programmes and funds assisting low-income neighbourhoods and community development.

During the last three decades the federal government has been actively pursuing the decentralisation of resources and responsibilities to lower levels of government while reducing its involvement in the United States. Federal grant-in-aid programmes that had a significant impact in reducing the plight of low-income individuals declined in the late 1970s to give way to decentralised programmes with more flexible priorities benefiting a wider population. Since the 1980s, federal government has not been the dominant figure in urban and housing policy. state and local governments have become central figures in policy development and implementation, as well as in delineating programmes, partners and forms of participation at the local level.
Despite the increasing devolution of power to lower government levels, there have been some concerns with the question of redistribution. An initial step toward decentralisation came with the transition of categorical grants into block grants. Categorical grants are those issued by the United State Congress, the grant can be spent following narrowly defined purposes and extensive restrictions. In contrast, block grants are those granted from federal to regional government with general spending provisions. Block grants are awarded to states and local governments to be redistributed to the non-profit sector and other subrecipients for the development and implementation of programmes addressing urban improvement, housing rehabilitation and construction, and community development. Citizen participation is often required and encouraged by both, centralised and decentralised programs, especially the integration of poor and minority communities in planning and decision making. Devolution of power and resources to residents to participate in urban transformative processes is in theory desired by public policy and claimed by advocates of community planning and community based organisations. However, individuals and local groups face difficulties accessing such processes and therefore making their voices heard.

This section takes a close look at the different federal and local mechanisms envisioned and implemented to improve the physical, social, economic and political conditions of low-income districts in New York City. More specifically to districts requiring or encouraging citizen participation. Firstly, comprehensive federal anti-poverty urban programmes fostering citizen participation and assisting in the restructuring of targeted areas are presented, as well as their implications at the local level, including the role of the residents in urban transformative processes. In addition, local decentralisation instruments that developed as a result of the emerging policies of devolution and ongoing changes in the political organisation of the city are illustrated, especially those assisting in devolving power to lower levels of government and community planning. For example, the Community Planning Boards and the 197a-plans. Secondly, federal decentralisation instruments such as the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG), and local programmes transferring responsibilities to lower government levels, non-profits and citizens in regard to policy, and programme development and implementation are presented. The objectives and outcomes of these instruments are explained, as well as their implications in the formation of new power relations at the neighbourhood level. Lastly, the shift from centralised and bureaucratic forms of decision-making to decentralised and obscure forms of governance are addressed, especially the implications at the local level in urban programmes and local plans. Nowadays the devolution of resources, power and responsibilities to the very low levels of governance, thus non-profits and local institutions are in question. Even the non profit sector has lost accountability regarding the inclusion of their constituencies in urban transformative process. Constraints and challenges residents
face to participate in local decisions and plans are acknowledged, as well as avenues for citizen participation.

§ 3.2 Policy approaches and decentralisation instruments assisting in the restructuring of low-income districts through citizen participation

With the collective effort of grassroots groups, community leaders, community boards, officials and local governments ‘citizen participation’ was accepted as a feature of city planning over the three decades that followed World War II (Reaven, 2009). The first traces in public policy addressing citizen participation are found in the 1954 Housing Act, which aimed to clear, rehabilitate and prevent slums, as well as to provide new construction of housing. This legislation employed for the first time the term ‘urban renewal’ referring to what was previously known as urban redevelopment. In addition, it encouraged for the first time local governments and citizens’ commitment through the development of the Workable Program for Community Improvement. The Workable Program, as it was called, was an official plan of action undertaken by a locality for effectively dealing with slums and blight through the utilisation of private and public resources (Rhyne, 1960). It was comprised of the following elements: (1) codes and ordinances; (2) comprehensive community plan; (3) neighbourhood analysis; (4) administrative organisation; (5) financing; (6) housing for displaced families; and (7) citizen participation. Although the Workable Program was required to use citizen participation in community planning and include minority groups in order to use public loans and grants for public housing and housing with federal assistance, citizen involvement was largely ignored (Dahl, 1961). In fact, this initiative had a number of disadvantages, but raised awareness of the benefits of citizens’ involvement in urban renewal plans that directly threatened them. Later on citizen participation became a political issue with the requirements of the Great Society’s community-based programmes and War of Poverty initiatives created by the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) and supported by the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 signed by President Lyndon B. Johnson.

Participation of specific groups of citizens, mainly poor and people of colour, was emphasised in planning, policy making and operation of two federal programmes, the

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11 See Rhyne (1960) and Dahl (1961) for a comprehensive account of these facts.
Community Action Program (CAP) and the Demonstration Cities Program, which is better known as the Model Cities Program. Focusing on minorities, disfranchised, and undeserved citizens, the CAP aimed to provide services, assistance, and other activities of sufficient scope and size to give promise of progress toward elimination of poverty (or causes of poverty) through developing employment opportunities, improving human performance, motivation, and productivity, or bettering the conditions under which people live, learn, and work. The programme generated a large number of CAPs with the presence of a large number of private and public Community Action Agencies (CAA) around the country fostering ‘maximum feasible participation of the poor’ (Mollenkopf, 1983).

In order to understand poverty, it is important to mention that the OEO adopted the newly poverty threshold created by Mollie Orshansky\(^{12}\), an economist, as working definition for poverty for statistical, planning and budget purposes one year after the declaration of the War on Poverty (Fisher, 2008). The poverty rate was estimated back then at 19% (this rate has fluctuated, being 15% in 2012). The Johnson administration defined ‘absolute poverty line’ as the threshold below which families or individuals are considered to be lacking the resources to meet the basic needs for healthy living; having insufficient income to provide the food, shelter and clothing needed to preserve health.

According to Strange (1972), the OEO aimed that ‘representatives of the poor’ were included on the boards of directors of the Community Action Agencies, and that these agencies hired poor people and members of ethic minorities. It was desired the engagement of residents, the population served, in the governing body of the community action agencies. Officials of the programme required that ‘representatives of the poor’ would occupy one-third of the CAA’s boards. The one-third provision required was applicable to government, the poor and other private organisations. On the other hand, the Model Cities Program responded to urban crime and blight, as well as to disillusionment of previous urban renewal programmes. The initiative focused on three main objectives: the concentration of resources in high-need areas, coordination of social service efforts across agencies and levels of government, and the mobilisation of citizens and local political leaders in the planning processes. Like in the previous programme, citizen participation was sought alongside concentrated and coordinated government action in specific areas, the so called ‘model neighbourhoods’. However, since the statement of the Community Action Program on ‘maximum feasible participation of the poor’ emerged as one of the most controversial phrases in any domestic legislation, legislative drafters of the Model Cities Program legislation

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12 Orshansky’s thresholds were made the federal government’s official statistical definition of poverty in 1969, and since then there have been a few revisions.
attempted to limit its emphasis on participation by the poor and people of colour by calling for ‘widespread participation’ (Strange, 1972).

Two major departures from the community action approach to participation arise in this last programme (Strange, 1972). First, local governments were given ultimate responsibility for the local administration operation of the programme rather than local private non-profit agencies. Second, participation of the residents was to be limited rather than maximised, and governmental and business participation was guaranteed. Thus, the ‘tree-legged stool’ emphasised in the Community Action Program was not implemented as such. Institutional structures had to be developed to stimulate participation of representatives of the neighbourhood.

The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) was founded in 1965 as part of the Great Society programmes to develop and execute policies on housing, especially those related with the recently conceived Model Cities Program. One year later the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966 was enacted to guarantee federal grants were spent on the programmes’ projects. Later, in early 1967, the Model Cities Committee was responsible for the allocation of resources and reviewing plans initiated by local policy committees, which were at the heart of citizen participation. They were composed of citizens elected by the community. At the local level, City Demonstration Agencies (CDA) were established as a planning resource-allocation-evaluation arm of the local government, they were conceived as public agencies involved with governmental decision making in order to involve citizens in the planning process. HUD took responsibility of the selection of the cities, neighbourhoods and the funding allocation, while city’s officials selected areas experiencing poverty, high vacancy rates and low housing values. The programmes targeted the largest urban centres across the country and the most problematic inner-city neighbourhoods or also known as slums or ghettos.

Instrumental features were conceived to achieve the goals of the programmes through citizen participation. First, the acknowledgment of the importance of participation of low-income and minority groups with a stake in the targeted area. Second, the integration of these groups into private, non-profit and nongovernmental agencies which were established to administer the CAAs. Finally, the programme’s requirement to provide decision-making ranks for those groups rather than limited staff and member positions. Nevertheless, it must be addressed that the ultimate goal of the programmes was not the delegation of power to marginalised groups per se, but reducing poverty and improving the urban conditions of impoverished declining neighbourhoods. Furthermore, it must be acknowledged that the hidden strategy of the programmes to achieve this was to establish a ‘direct relationship between the national government and the ghettos, a relationship in which both state and local
governments were undercut’ (Piven & Cloward, 1971, p. 261). Thus, the controversial War on Poverty programmes were an instrument of the federal government used to force municipalities to work for marginalised groups. The power distribution provided by the federal government aimed to encourage the new local agencies to put pressure on municipal services.

In New York City, social and urban programmes rapidly rose during the short period of the War on Poverty. Minority groups mobilised through a multifaceted political movement and community residents organised to resist ongoing highway and renewal plans (S. Fainstein & N. Fainstein, 1992). Neighbourhoods required a comprehensive analysis of their plans and objectives enforcing citizen participation, which was envisioned as constructive opportunity for social, economic and physical change. The programme was quite promising since it implied citizen mobilisation, participation and empowerment in a city highly active in civic and social movements, however only selected neighbourhoods were able to participate. The five-year experiment had a two-level place-based strategy, as it was explained previously. The programme selected particular cities nation wide, and those cities were required to select model neighbourhoods to direct federal aid. Three large areas were selected for New York City’s Model Cities Program, which was the largest in the nation: Harlem-East Harlem, The South Bronx and Central Brooklyn. HUD announced a grant of 65 million for first-year plans in 1969, the same year the plans were presented. The first-year effort in Central Brooklyn was considered the most advanced in the country. The entire plan in this area was approved, however local disputes prevented receiving funding in some other areas.

The area, in Central Brooklyn targeted more than 425,000 residents, these households maintained an income at half of the average income of the city. Within this area were three blighted neighbourhoods: Bedford-Stuyvesant, Brownsville and East New York (These three neighbourhoods surround Bushwick — the case study that will be illustrated in Chapter 5 — which has undergone urban revitalisation in recent years). The programme developed for East New York has been recognised as carefully thought out by its planners and for being supported by the community (Garvin, 2002). However, the community objectives were not fully achieved. Walter Thabit, an urban planner and activist who worked as a consultant and offered his technical skills to a number of communities in New York City, worked on the Model Cities Program in East New York in the late 1960s. Thabit (2005) later described in his book, *How East New York Became a Ghetto*, the decline of the neighbourhood and the challenges and efforts since the 1960s to redevelop the area, including the outcomes of the War on Poverty programmes. According to him the funding for the programme was not sufficient (in the case of East New York it was one-twentieth of what was needed to make it work) and the some 300 programmes of New York City failed to succeed due to the
complexities of developing and processing the plans through unprepared communities and city bureaucracies. He argues that city agencies did not give up power to the Model Cities Agencies and local groups. Apparently, the Model Cities Committee was unsatisfactory in mobilising the efforts required to implement hundreds of separate projects though dozens of agencies. City officials and communities in general were not satisfied with its performance. Thus the Model Cities Administration (MCA) replaced the committee. Cabinet level administrators that reported directly to the Mayor headed the MCA. The MCA aimed to be a vehicle for planning and policy coordination. However, community participation in such endeavours was not facilitated. The Mayor was accused of ‘centralising power in his own hands’ when reorganising the citywide Model Cities Program and appointing an administrator to report to him. Thus, residents did not provide sufficient input in planning despite the efforts of the programme.

The outcome of the programmes has been discussed widely. In general it has been acknowledged that smaller cities did better than larger ones by focusing on doable projects (Thabit, 2005). Regarding citizen participation, a number of scholars have studied the benefits of participatory processes and the difficulties and failures of local governments to involve citizens in decision making (Aleshire, 1972; Hallman, 1972; Kloman, 1972; Strange, 1972; Weissman, 1978). Strange (1972) highlights some of the restrictions of citizen participation in both programmes. Regarding the Community Action Program, firstly it was conceived as an experimental programme and extended rapidly across the country with some 1,000 Community Action Agencies. This implied a distribution of funding and decrease of resources for Community Action Agencies, many were forced to reduce their activities and eventually close and terminate with the programmes. Secondly, CAPs generated interagency competition in communities since they emerged as new entities. This rivalry eventually decreased but sometimes prevented participation. Thirdly, the programme did not provide sufficient technical and financial support needed to maximise the opportunities for citizen participation. Fourthly, it was difficult to obtain high rank positions; in some cases professional standards were required for staff positions, a condition that restricted opportunities for minority groups for participation through employment. On the other hand, positions in the board of directors were not paid, thus low-income citizens would rather seek for salary jobs. Lastly, the emphasis in citizen participation decreased during the Nixon Administration, as well as funds for organisational activities.

Citizen participation in the Model Cities Program was required in order to be eligible for financial assistance. The programme demanded ‘widespread citizen participation’ and the provision of technical assistance to have the capacity and direct access to the decision making process. Nevertheless, according to Strange (1972) citizen participation was limited since decision making was controlled more by the local government and businesses than citizens. There was an emphasis in planning in the
programme, especially in the first two years, which required specialised staff. This was an obstacle for citizen groups to influence or control the programme, thus their role was limited to giving advice, organising and supporting the programme. Although in some cases ‘community leaders, working with a wide range of professionals, prepared analysis of proposed model neighbourhoods, established goals and objectives, and devised programmes to achieve them’ (Garvin, 2002). Certainly, some civic groups, mostly comprised by poor and minority residents, managed to be part of the programme development process supported by CAAs, Model Cities federal employees, and HUD officials (Strange, 1972). The challenge came with the Nixon Administration since grants were cut. This limited the resources of the neighbourhood units and the citizen initiated projects.

The Community Action Program and the Model Cities Program were dismantled in 1973, soon after the re-election of Richard Nixon. Funds decreased and programmes and agencies were transferred to other government agencies. Some other projects and initiatives were taken over by new local entities. Many community action agencies evolved into local non-profits that would serve communities providing social, educational, employment and other services for low-income groups. The involvement of new groups, mainly of colour and low-income, in the programmes was key for the formation of community-based organisations (CBO) in future years. Citizen groups learned about governmental activities and operations, as well as to navigate to acquire public aid. Their participation brought them a number of benefits besides employment, such as new skills and experience. They also acquired knowledge about their communities and local politics, which gave them influence and status in their communities. Perhaps, one of the participation challenges experienced during the programmes, especially the Model Cities Program, was in planning for urban and housing renewal and development. Planning required expertise, resources, and time for project development, and citizen groups were not always able to participate, they would see planning as a long term process and would rather focus on organising and action (Strange, 1972).

The War on Poverty may have been a lost battle, however the failure of the programmes cannot be associated with the ability or disability of citizen participation to achieve change but with the government’s insufficient resources and commitment to sustain the projects and agencies required to accomplish the ultimate goals. Programmes might not have achieved significant physical, social, and economic improvement but undoubtedly they did influence future public programmes and policies. Certainly, citizen participation is now emphasised and widespread since the initial housing and urban policy and local initiatives. This period influenced the politics and power structures of urban restructuring and planning process in low-income neighbourhoods, as it will be explained in the following sections.
Decentralisation instruments and local agency

In 1950 the City Planning Commission (CPC) proposed the creation of 66 local planning districts. One year later, President Robert F. Wagner, of the Manhattan Borough, established the first 12 experimental Community Planning Councils. The councils were organized to get advice on planning and budgetary issues and to respond to the increasing authoritarian planning system and lack of control inhabitants had over their communities (Forman, 2000). During the following decade, community-based planning was boosted alongside the rise of a number of tenant and community movements, advocacy planning practices, graduate programmes in community planning, and Jane Jacob's critique of rational-comprehensive planning in the United States.

Jacobs critique underscored the way the 'government had lost the power to comprehend, handle and value an infinity of vital, unique, intricate and interlocked details' in neighbourhoods with the increasing dimension of America’s cities (Jacobs 1961, p. 408). Besides a critique, she offered a series of principles for understanding, preserving and developing inner city neighbourhoods. Her concept of 'integrated diversity' reflected a comprehensive appreciation for the complexity and increasing tensions in cities. She claimed that local governments should 'understand thoroughly specific places', and that such an endeavour could only be achieved by learning from people who lived there. Jacobs recommended the creation of ‘administrative districts’ as the primary subdivision of city agencies, these would be managed by a district administrator (Forman, 2000).

The previous recommendations, alongside citizen’s demand for participation and decentralisation of big city government, were taken into account in the 1963 New York City Charter revision under Wagner’s mayorship. The City Planning Commission instructed the extension of the Community Planning Councils to other boroughs in New York City, each one governed by an advisory Community Planning Board. The boards would advise the borough president in matters related to development or welfare of its district. The next year, President Johnson declared War on Poverty and two years later the Model Cities Program started running in a number of impoverished areas in the city (see previous section). In order to improve communication between the city planning’s central office and community planning groups, the City Planning Commission established borough offices. The staff of these offices served as liaison to community boards.

Mayor Lindsay declares 1970 ‘the year of the neighbourhood’ and creates the Office of Neighborhood Government (ONG). The ONG was an experimental effort aimed to reduce the lack of coordination among city agencies and improving city services. It encouraged planning at the community level with the creation of ‘Little City Halls’ in
a number of demonstration districts. District managers were appointed to supervise the delivery of city services. ‘Service cabinets’ were created by members of different city agencies in order to encourage better local inter-agency coordination (Forman, 2000). The ONG legitimised decentralisation with the concepts of district manager and service cabinets, notions that were taken into account in the community boards established a few years later by voter referendum. ‘Lindsay administration viewed decentralisation not only as an executive branch reorganisation strategy, but also as a way to build political constituency for a Mayor who had weak ties to political parties in the city’ (Berg, 2007). According to some scholars, as it was illustrated above, none of the decentralisation strategies, nor the approaches to achieve a degree of community control over the services were achieved, the decentralisation strategy was more administrative than political (Berg, 2007). Furthermore, a report released by the city comptroller Abe Beame exposed a misuse of funds by the ONG. Soon after he was elected Mayor, and the ONG as well as the model neighbourhoods were dissolved.

One year before the Model Cities Program terminated, the 1975 City Charter revision established the current community board system. The city was divided into fifty-nine districts, each represented by a community board with broad-based responsibilities in city governance. The 1975 City Charter delegated three main tasks to the community boards; the improvement of the delivery of city services; planning and reviewing land use in the community; and making recommendations on the city’s budget (Forman, 2000). In addition, the law required consulting community boards on the placement of city facilities within their jurisdictions. Community boards were aimed to encourage decentralisation of big city government and planning, however they were established as advisory entities with limited power. It has been recognised that community boards have never had sufficient autonomy on decision making or played a significant role in community service delivery or city politics. However, residents have voted to strengthen the boards’ advisory powers in their delegated tasks.

The most significant effort has been a zoning and planning procedure introduced by the 1975 City Charter revision, the Uniform Land Use Review Process (ULURP). The ULURP emerged out of the environmental movements of the 1970s authorising community boards to review and vote on all land use applications, including zoning actions, special permits, acquisition and disposition of city property, as well as urban renewal plans (Forman, 2000). This procedure implied that all land-use applications would require a detailed statement describing negative environmental impacts. City Environmental Quality Review regulations pushed developers to develop draft environmental impact statements (DEISs) and propose measures to ameliorate negative impacts. Those statements would assist locals to oppose or support projects (Angotti, 2008). The ULURP meant to bring more importance to the function of Community Boards by empowering the community to gain greater control over land-use decisions and
planning (However, as it will be examined in Chapter 5, the advisory powers of community boards and local corruption have prevented locals to democratically decide about land-use changes and local development. In many cases decisions are taken prior to the process). According to Angotti (2010), the charter provisions on land use were intended to create a transparent process for reviewing land use changes. He argues, the ULURP process was established with a particular time frame to prevent endless postponements and delays and structured in a way that ‘the CPC, borough presidents, community boards and city council would have enough time to receive input from the public at formal hearings, time for internal deliberations, and time for decision making’ (2010, p. 5).

‘The Department of City Planning (DCP), a mayoral agency, provides staff support for the CPC. DCP is responsible for the certification that applications are complete. The application then goes to the affected Community Board(s) for a period of up to 60 days. The community board may hold a public hearing and submit written recommendations to the CPC. The proposed action then moves on to the affected borough president for a period of up to 30 days; the borough president may hold a public hearing and issue recommendations to the CPC. The proposed action then moves to the CPC for a period of up to 60 days, wherein the CPC must hold a public hearing and subsequently vote to approve, approve with modifications, or disapprove the application. A simple majority of seven votes is required to render the CPC’s binding decision on the application. If approved by the CPC, the proposed action then moves on to the City Council for a period of up to 50 days, during which time the Council must hold a public hearing and subsequently vote to approve, approve with modifications, or disapprove. If the Council wants to approve with modifications, they must file the modification for review by the CPC first, which will then evaluate whether the proposed modifications need additional environmental review and write an advisory recommendation. Like the CPC’s vote, the Council’s vote requires only a simple majority and is binding. As a final step, the Mayor can choose to veto a proposed action within five days of the Council’s vote, although the Council may override the Mayor’s veto with a two-thirds vote in favour’ (Angotti, 2010, p. 4-5).

In the 1989 City Charter revision, the City Planning Commission enabled the city’s 59 Community Boards to draft and submit local plans for adoption. The section 197-a process, which was proposed in the previous revision but with some limitations, was pushed forward as a response to community initiated plans already taking place in
different districts of the city. There was a lack of citizen involvement from affected communities in urban renewal plans created by the Department of City Planning and approved by the City Planning Commission. The so-called ‘197-a plans’ aimed to facilitate and giving power to Community Boards to develop plans and submit them to the City Planning Commission and City Council for approval. One of the constraints Community Boards previously faced to develop community initiated local plans was the required environmental reviews. Those statements were expensive and required expertise. After the Charter revision, the Department of City Planning removed such responsibility from Community Boards implying that they would be in charge of those reviews.

In the 1990s successive budget cuts reduced the number of liaison planners in the borough offices of the Department of City Planning. The department’s support to community initiated plans has since diminished. Today, Community Boards are formed by fifty unsalaried members appointed each year by the Borough President to ensure adequate representation from different neighbourhoods in the districts. One half of the unsalaried members are nominated by the Community Board and community groups, and the other half by City Council representatives. Each Community Board has a district manager elected by residents. Board members must be residents or work in the district, and have a significant interest in the community.

As it was illustrated before, Community Boards have limited resources and power. Their decisions are advisory. However, many have achieved the prevention of unwanted developments while promoting 197-a plans rooted in the history and necessities of the community (see next section). ‘People debate how successful the system of community boards has been, but through them, many neighbourhoods have gain a voice in the decisions that affect them’ (Forman, 2000). In some cases, Community Boards have found themselves with more power over zoning and policy-making than anyone had ever anticipated. However, in other cases, corruption and local politics have concentrated decision making in a few hands while taken away the power of most community members. In any case, Community Boards have represented the city’s longest running effort to involve local communities directly in city government.

Community initiated plans and ‘197-a plans’

Urban struggles have been the drive of community initiated action local plans. These struggles include government sponsored urban renewal programmes and express way projects in the 1950s and 1960s, public and landlord abandonment during the city crisis of the 1970s and 1980s, and luxury housing developments and large scale urban
projects, mostly in waterfront and new high-end service districts, which have assisted in the decline of low-income housing and encouraged gentrification.

In New York City, after a couple of decades of urban renewal, following authoritarian and participatory approaches (see above Model Cities Program), citizens felt once again hopeless during the city’s nadir of the late 1970s and the years that followed. The city’s fiscal crisis manifested throughout the five boroughs. Unemployment, neighbourhood decline, crime, drug dealing and abuse inundated numerous districts citywide. The South Bronx and Central Brooklyn (today recognised as North Brooklyn) were particularly hit during this period. In these areas the cease of public services, such those provided by the police and fire department, led to the abandonment of large communities of colour who were living in poor housing conditions. Tenants had to survive living in neglected and tax delinquent properties left behind by landlords and surrounded by a large amount of vacant and burned out properties. The fire epidemic of the time terminated with the few local economies left, large percentages of affordable housing stock, and the reputation of the affected neighbourhoods. The unprecedented amount of fires was provoked in many cases by residents desperation and dissent (see Chapter 5). However, and despite the hopeless feeling across neighbourhoods, discontent gradually found avenues to fight against such abandonment. Tenants began acknowledging their condition while finding ways of organising and mobilising.

The 1989 Charter revision responded to the pressure from local groups and citizens to simplify and assist community initiated local plans. It authorised Community Boards and groups to have a proactive role in planning and land use decisions and submit official plans for approval by the City Planning Commission and City Council. Soon after, in 1990 the latest Charter revision under a new administration issued some rules for the 197-a process. The rules implied a traditional rational-comprehensive planning process including setting goals and objectives, analysing problems and proposing recommendations. In addition, as mentioned above, it gave the Department of City Planning responsibility to conduct the required environmental review. Although this was shortly enquired assuming that it wouldn't be needed since the 197-a plans wouldn't lead to any physical or social transformation (Angotti, 2008). In any case, even though community advocates were concerned about the rules processing plans under Charter Section 197-a (they worried they would stimulate powerless 197-a plans), 197-a plans hold promise as the only community-based plans officially recognised by city government (Municipal Art Society, 1998). Since then local planning achievements started to be carried out by a cohort of residents, community organisers, community boards, government planners and pro-bono planners. Historically, community plans have been sponsored and/or supported by Community Boards and Borough Presidents, and assisted by the City Planning Commission, the Department of City Planning, and the Mayor. The driving force of the plans started being, for the most part, rooted in
neighbourhood and community’s needs and visions, but the motives interests and actors involved have changed in recent years.

In 1992, the City Council approved the plan Partnership for the Future by CB 3 in the South Bronx, making it the first such plan to go through the entire process. Later, the city approved the Chelsea Plan in CB 4 in Manhattan (1996); the Red Hook Plan CB 6 in Brooklyn (1996); the Stuyvesant Cove Plan in CB6 in Manhattan (1997); and 7 more up to 2010. During the first decade, 197-a plans — in process, approved or adopted—counted 18 in total\(^\text{13}\), five were officially approved and adopted as city policy (Angotti, 1997; Municipal Art Society, 1998). Today over 87 community initiated plans have been officially identified throughout New York City. However the number of officially recognised 197-a plans remains the same and out of this number 13 plans have been adopted, mainly in Manhattan and Brooklyn (see Table 3.1 and 3.2). Some initial 197-a plans never progressed or withdrawn, and a few were drafted and approved in recent years (Department of City Planning, 2010a; Municipal Art Society, 2008). The most striking is the large amount of community initiated plans not following the 197-a process. In addition, it is important to note that approximately 80% of the community plans were developed during the last decade. Apparently, community planning has revived its force as profit development expands and citizens feel increasingly excluded.

The same year of the 1989 City Charter revision the Municipal Art Society (MAS), a non-profit organisation advocating for intelligent urban planning, design and preservation, was created. The Municipal Art Society Planning Center, through the establishment of a Community-Based Planning Task Force, began an ambitious work focused on assisting and supporting local planning efforts in year 2000. After a series of workshops, initiatives, seminars, conferences and articles, a comprehensive study, which examined and mapped the 197-a plans, was drafted in a report and disseminated widely through a virtual tool to reach communities. Planning for All New Yorkers: An Atlas of Community-Based Plans in New York City (Municipal Art Society, 2008) illustrates the nature of each community plan, process and status, and organises the diverse plans into 11 categories; 197-a plans (18); brownfield redevelopment (1); community revitalisation (8); comprehensive community planning (8); comprehensive site planning (1); economic and commercial revitalisation (7); housing revitalisation (5); open space and recreation (14); rezoning (14); transportation (10); and waterfront revitalisation and access (15). The plans converge addressing the

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\(^{13}\) This number excludes two plans that may not be considered as 197-a plans, however they are recognised as such by the Department of City Planning (DCP). One is an comprehensive plan for Manhattan’s Waterfront sponsored by the Borough President and approved in 1999. The other one is a waterfront revitalisation programme sponsored by the DCP.
main following issues; open space and greening (50), the creation/preservation of affordable housing (32), art and cultural enrichment (7), brown-fields (2), energy efficiency (5), environmental justice (10), historic preservation (26), improved mobility (34), improved education opportunities (13), public health (4), local employment (11), manufacturing (11), public safety (7), waterfront access (23), strengthening neighbourhood retail (30), watershed protection (6), and traffic safety (21). Some plans fall into a number of categories and address diverse issues.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BOROUGH</th>
<th>COMMUNITY PLANS</th>
<th>197-A PLANS OUT OF COMMUNITY PLANS</th>
<th>ADOPTED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manhattan</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brooklyn</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronx</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queens</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staten Island</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MAS (2008), Department of City Planning (2010).

According to the report (Municipal Art Society, 2008) the most active boroughs in community planning are Bronx, Manhattan and Brooklyn. These three boroughs have a long history of urban struggle, protest, community organising and community planning. But certainly, the last two boroughs are the ones with most of the 197-a developed and approved plans (see Figure 3.1). In the case of Manhattan, the Borough President’s Office developed a 197-a plan for Manhattan’s waterfront, which covers the whole coast, while proving technical assistance to a number of community boards and plans. Some planning initiatives have connected and benefited from this ambitious plan. Most of the 197-a plans in this borough address waterfront access and development, and a comprehensive planning for future development. In the case of the Bronx, the two approved initiatives differ in focus and context. One was initiated in an extremely poor neighbourhood addressing affordable housing, while the other was developed in a wealthy area pushing for a comprehensive plan.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>APPROVED PLANS (APPROVAL YEAR)</th>
<th>NEIGHBOURHOOD</th>
<th>SPONSOR</th>
<th>AIM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partnership for the Future (1992)</td>
<td>South Bronx</td>
<td>BX CB3</td>
<td>Housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stuyvesant Cove Plan (1997)</td>
<td>Stuyvesant Cove</td>
<td>MH CB6</td>
<td>Waterfront</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive Manhattan Waterfront Plan (1997)*</td>
<td>Manhattan Waterfront</td>
<td>BP</td>
<td>Waterfront</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Waterfront Revitalisation Program (1999)**</td>
<td>All Boroughs</td>
<td>DCP</td>
<td>Waterfront</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Williamsburg Waterfront Plan (2002)</td>
<td></td>
<td>BK CB1</td>
<td>Waterfront/Comprehensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greenpoint Plan (2002)</td>
<td>Greenpoint</td>
<td>BK CB1</td>
<td>Comprehensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>River to Reservoir Preservation Strategy (2003)</td>
<td></td>
<td>BX CB8</td>
<td>Comprehensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queensboro Bridge Area (2006)</td>
<td>Queensboro Area</td>
<td>MN CB8</td>
<td>Waterfront</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Easter Section of Community District 6 (2008)</td>
<td>Eastern Section CD6</td>
<td>MN CB6</td>
<td>Comprehensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Connections/New Opportunities (2009)</td>
<td>Sunset Park</td>
<td>BK CB7</td>
<td>Comprehensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRAFTED PLANS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunts Point</td>
<td>Hunts Point</td>
<td>BX CB2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old Brooklyn District Brooklyn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bedford-Stuyvesant</td>
<td>Bedford Stuyvesant</td>
<td>BK CB3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Direction: East Harlem Triangle, Randall’s Island and Ward’s Island</td>
<td></td>
<td>MN CB11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Village of Harlem</td>
<td>Harlem</td>
<td>MN CB10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queens</td>
<td></td>
<td>QN CB11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Greenwich Village Hudson River District</td>
<td>West Village</td>
<td>MN CB2</td>
<td>Land Use/Zonning</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Angotti (1997) and Municipal Art Society (2008) * Initiated by the Borough President in Manhattan’s Waterfront, ** Initiated by Department of City Planning in all the boroughs.

In the case of Brooklyn, the focus of the initiatives has shifted slightly from housing and comprehensive planning to waterfront development in recent years. Tom Angotti, director of the Center for Community Planning and Development at Hunter Collage, has studied community initiated plans over the last decades and worked with and for communities in some of these efforts. Angotti illustrates in his compressive study,
New York City’s 197-a Community Planning Experience (1997), four community-led initiatives addressing housing and comprehensive planning at the end of the 1990s in Brooklyn. The initiatives took place in low-income neighbourhoods and areas experiencing disinvestment at that time: Vinegar Hill, East New York, Crown Heights and Coney Island. At the end none of them succeeded to be officially approved and eventually lost force. What is clear in Angotti’s study is that the focus and location of such efforts shifted from affordable and quality housing in low-income communities to waterfront access and development in post industrial areas with strategic locations attracting high-end development and moderate and high-income populations.

It is important to note that a significant number of the 197-a plans drafted are in close proximity to waterfronts and industrial sites (see Figure 3.1). In general, a significant number of the 87 community plans identified address rezoning, waterfront revitalisation and comprehensive community planning in areas where deindustrialization has taken place and where under-utilised and vacant sites are common. Another noticeable fact is that successful 197-a plans have been mostly located in moderate and high income neighbourhoods while unsuccessful 197-a plans and community initiated local plans without following the 197-a process have been formulated in low-income ones. Apparently, communities with scarce resources have struggled to draft plans and to get them through the 197-a process. The initiatives are extremely diverse so are the types of local efforts carried out in the different localities and the benefits communities have gained from these plans. It is possible to find detailed information about the nature and status of each plan through The Planning for All New Yorkers: An Atlas of Community-Based Plans in New York City (Municipal Art Society, 2008).

The Department of City Planning (DCP) has the responsibility of providing assistance to help 197-a plans’ sponsors meet the process requirements and rules through a number of documents and services. The role of the DCP is providing technical assistance and information on land use and the district’s statistics; reviewing community-based planning options to decide if the plan could be implemented; providing guidance on review process and plan content to address issues identified; and reviewing draft plans before submission to advise on possible issues and policy concerns.
1. Partnership for the Future BX CB8
2. Chelsea Plan MN CB4
3. Red Hook BK CB6
4. Stuyvesant Cove Plan MH CB6
5. Williamsburg Waterfront Plan BK CB1
6. Greenpoint Plan BK CB1
7. River to Reservoir Preservation Strategy BX CB8
8. Queensboro Bridge Area MN CB8
9. Sharing Diversity Through Community Action MNCB9
10. Easter Section of Community District 6 MN CB6
11. New Connections/New Opportunities BK CB7

FIGURE 3.1 New York City’s 147-a plans approved from 1998 to 2010
The review of 197-a plans takes place in two phases. The first one, the threshold review, is conducted by the DCP and the City Planning Commission to guarantee that a plan is complete, coherent and properly documented before it is reviewed. The second phase, substantive review, allows for Community Board, Borough President, City Planning Commission and City Council consideration of the plan’s objectives, policies and proposals. The process may culminate in approval of the plan as submitted, approval as modified by the City Planning Commission and/or the City Council, or disapproval.

Drafting and preparing 197-a plans for submission is not an easy task for Community Boards, community organisers and locals involved, especially for those with scarce resources and planning expertise. Angotti and the Municipal Art Society Planning Center (Angotti 1997, 2010; Municipal Art Society, 1998) have identified some constrains and therefore limitations that could illustrate the reason many community initiated plans have not been able to succeed and some others have opted not follow the process. Firstly, the 197-a process requires support and expertise from planners. Many community boards are not well equipped to undertake and promote these plans. They lack staff or partners with planning skills, and are limited to a handful of professionals and a small group of staff and volunteers. The charter revision under section 197-a promised to remove obstacles, such as the environmental review, and to provide each community board a professional planner and consultants. However, this last promise was never fulfilled. Administrators implied that the borough offices of the Department of City Planning already provided such experts even when staff had been recently cut. Public institutions, even when claiming to provide considerable assistance did not promote or assist communities (Angotti, 1997).

Secondly, the development, review and approval of 197-a plans could be a long process without any guarantee to be adopted. The drafting could take two years; some have taken nearly a decade. Once the proposal is submitted, it requires negotiations, amendments and supporting documentation, approval could take one to two years. In addition, 197-a plans do not have a strong legal effect and can be revoked or altered as any other plan. The City Planning Commission and City Council are required to consult approved 197-a plans when making land-use and planning decisions, but have the capacity to partially or totally modify plans. Thus, even when a plan is adopted, that does not mean it is going to be implemented as such. Community boards have no sufficient power to enforce their plans, and unforeseen changes require commitment and willingness to adapt and move on. These facts may discourage communities drafting and submitting 197-a plans. However, this has not been the only case since communities have initiated ambitious plans that could generate significant impact even though they have no official recognition.
Thirdly, 197-a plans are not integrated into the plans and actions of city agencies, apart from the City Planning Commission. This issue is connected to the previous point, the Planning Commission reviews if the 197-a plans affect city agencies before approving the plan but it does not integrate the different visions for implementation. City agencies may not be aware of the development and status of community plans. On the other hand, Community Boards and groups involved do not reach city agencies at the early stage of the planning process, and they see their plans as an opportunity to confront or oppose city policies and plans, this may reduce potential integration of proposed alternatives (Municipal Art Society, 1998). City agencies, community organisers and planners must consult each other’s initiatives and find ways to integrate and implement visions.

Finally, uneven power structures and insufficient funding limit 197-a plans. According to Angotti (2008) even when 197-plans are conceived as instruments to delegate greater representation to minority communities, power tends to be centralised to a Mayor’s decisions. Boroughs’ Presidents have lost power over the years, their limited power is unfortunate for communities since they are who appoint community board members, have an advisory vote in ULURP, prepare a budget for local projects and are in charge of mediating between the Mayor and Community Boards. Boroughs President’s have the responsibility of assisting marginalised communities and Community Boards neglected by the mayor’s office. However, Angotti agrees, this assistance is not always distributed in the same way. The engagement and support of Boroughs President’s offices has been uneven. For instance, the Manhattan’s office has provided greater assistance to community boards with different actions. This support has been rare in other boroughs.

Despite the fact that the Mayor, borough presidents, borough boards, Community Boards, the City Planning Commission, and the Department of City Planning, should sponsor the 197-a plans, the procedures are often sponsored by community boards without significant financial support. Community Board’s budgets and personnel have declined since 1989 (Municipal Art Society, 1998). Powerful structures above Community Boards could bring support with their resources. Communities depend on funding from elected officials, private corporations and non-profit organisations. Thus, undeserved communities must find the way to find financial support many times with unsuccessful outcomes.

New efforts to develop 197-a plans have arisen in a number of community districts in the last few years. Most of them address or propose rezoning changes and/or the affordable housing (since they are in the making they are not included in this study). It is important to acknowledge that regardless of its limits and challenges, the 197-a process is one of the most high profile avenues for community planning in New York
City, as it was illustrated previously. Other required and complementary avenues for community planning, not only to 197-a plans, but also to any community-initiated plan, include public grants and programmes supporting the community visions. In the following section, the role of policy and financial instruments for neighbourhood restructuring will be presented. In addition, the change in urban governance in the last decades will be addressed illustrating the significance of community based organisations initiating, leading, and leveraging public and private funds to realise local plans, as well as the citizens capacity and challenges to engage in such endeavours.

§ 3.3 Public grants and programmes assisting in the implementation of local plans and the formation of new neighbourhood-based power structures

In New York City, despite the dissolution of the War on Poverty programmes and the forced withdrawal of Mayor Lindsay, alongside his support to low-income and minority groups, ideals and mechanisms of citizen participation were widespread and taken into account in public policy in the coming years (N. Fainstein & S. Fainstein, 1998). As it was illustrated previously, community initiated plans developed during and after these programmes and continued growing. However, without the funds and support provided directly by HUD low-income communities struggled while adjusting to new forms of public aid and programmes. Centralised funding from the Community Action Program and Model Cities Program, which assisted in the improvement of impoverished communities, was replaced by the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG), which originally aimed to assist low- and moderate-income groups in a less targeted manner, and eventually ‘became a conduit for aid to those who need it least’ (Angotti, 2008, p. 200).

Centralised categorical programmes gave way to block grants encouraging lower government levels to formulate their own policies and programmes. This shift promoted decentralisation of resources and responsibilities to states and local governments, thereby a decrease in federal involvement. There have been a number of block grants, each one providing funding in different policy areas. The CDBG is the one assisting mostly in community and urban development. It has been the longest continuously run programme at HUD.

The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 established the CDBG programme authorising entitlement communities (metropolitan cities and urban counties) and states grants to be awarded by HUD. The allocation process has changed
over the years. Today grantees may use a variety of processes to determine individual projects and to distribute funds for eligible activities. HUD determines the amount of each grant by using a formula composed of several measures of community needs, not less than 70% of funds must be used for activities that benefit low- and moderate-income persons. The grantee must develop a detailed plan providing for and encouraging citizen participation, and must meet one of the following national objectives of the programme; benefit low- and moderate-income persons, prevention or elimination of slums or blight, or address community development needs prioritising conditions that imply a serious and immediate threat to the community.

According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (2010) ‘entitlement communities are subject to very few requirements relating to distribution of their CDBG funds...as long as they meet a national objective’ (p. 5), whereas the ‘states must distribute funds directly to recipients, which... are local units of government’ (p. 5). This agency notes that ‘the states responsibilities are to (1) formulate community development objectives, (2) decide how to distribute funds among non-entitlement communities, and (3) ensure that recipient communities comply with applicable state and federal laws and requirements’ (2010, p. 5). Grant recipients are limited to activities, which are classified into eight broad categories: acquisition, administration and planning, economic development, housing, public improvements, public services, repayments of section 108 loans, and ‘other activities’ which include non-profit organisation capacity building (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2010). To receive its annual CDBG a recipient must submit a 3 to 5 year consolidated plan and application for funding to HUD for approval. The consolidated plan must include a citizen participation plan defining activities to meet the goals and objectives. They must submit each year an action plan defining the activities, goals and objectives addressed in the consolidated plan, as well as an assessment of the past performance and summary of citizen participation process. In the case of the states, they must submit the consolidated plans, annual action plans and assessment reports. In addition the methods for distributing funds to local governments to meet the goals and objectives in their plans.

HUD’s Office of Community Planning and Development (CDP) is in charge of the CDBG programme through a number of programme offices at HUD headquarters. Entitlement communities and states can have more than one agency to administer the CDBG programme. New York State Homes and Community Renewal oversees the distribution of state CDBG funds, while the New York City receives a direct allocation from HUD. The city divides its CDBG award across several departments, including Housing Preservation and Development, Sanitation, City Planning, Education and Youth and Community Development. New York City is the largest recipient of the CDBG funds nationally. The New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD) use about
60% of the allocation for rehabilitation and maintenance of housing (NYC Independent Budget Office, 2012).

Entitlement communities use a number of methods to distribute their funds, most of the medium and large communities use competitive processes for a portion of their CDBG funds. To have public input and communicate processes and award decisions, the entitlement communities hold public hearings, organise community meetings, form citizen advisory committees, and conduct surveys (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2010). According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (2010), New York City works closely with Community Boards and community development organisations to obtain input on the necessities and priorities of the districts. The CDBG funding processes is integrated with the local budget processes. Thus spending priorities are often aligned with Mayoral and city council priorities.

The U.S. Government Accountability Office (2010) conducted an investigation during 2009 and 2010 to determine the distribution of funds. They found out that ‘New York directed the largest portion of its funds to housing preservation activities, in addition to neighbourhood economic development, public services, and other eligible activities. New York published the anticipated CDBG spending in its action plan and then allocated funding to various city agencies through the annual city budget process. Approximately 20 city agencies received funds, some of which they used to carry out activities internally and some of which they awarded to subrecipients. In the latter cases, agencies used a competitive process and established staff review panels that evaluated applications. The city contract office reviewed all contracts proposed for CDBG funding. In the case of neighbourhood economic development, the city gave funds to the local development corporations with responsibility for the retail strips in specific areas’ (p. 34). According to the investigation, usually funds go to the same subrecipients due to capacity considerations. Subrecipients include governmental agencies, private non-profits, private for-profits and Community Development Corporations (CDC). This means that for developing community based organisations or small non-profits involved in activities benefiting directly and involving residents (for instance in community-based practices related with urban and housing planning, rehabilitation, and management) the chances for getting this type for grants are little.

A number of issues have been found regarding citizen participation in low-income areas. Firstly, the selection formula used by HUD many times overlooks areas with the greatest needs. According to the New York Stimulus Alliance (2012), a cohort of six grassroots organising groups in New York State, even though the law requires at least 70% of a jurisdiction’s CDBG funds to benefit low-income communities, funds do not always flow to these communities. HUD uses the ‘area median income’ (AMI) statistical measure to determine how much funding is allocated. Income levels for low-
and moderate-income households are determined as follows: low income 58-80% of AMI and moderate income 80-120% of AMI. Thus, ‘while AMI is supposed to ensure that CDBG funds flow where they are needed the most, low-income communities and communities of colour often lose out because of the way the AMI is measured—that is using an entire county or metropolitan area’ (New York Stimulus Alliance, 2012, p. 9). In New York City the AMI formula does not reflect the local median income because it includes wealthy areas outside the city’s boroughs. Thus, very low- and low-income areas are usually counted as moderate areas and receive less aid. The New York Stimulus Alliance (2012) provides some suggestions to ensure funds are reaching impoverished communities, such as having local jurisdictions select and prioritise the lowest-income areas without any additional guidance from HUD, among others.

Secondly, the funding process is long, complex and includes planning skills. As it was mentioned previously, a consolidated plan must be developed and identify the local housing and development needs, and then come up with a long-term strategy for meeting those needs. ‘Consolidated plans must be submitted to HUD every five years. Then, each year, recipient jurisdictions identify which activities they will carry out and how much money will be spent on each programme, including CDBG — which is typically the largest pot of funds — and submit an annual action plan’ (New York Stimulus Alliance, 2012, p.13). The development of a consolidated plan comprises 5 stages: (1) Identify community development needs, (2) Propose the annual action plan, (3) Final annual action plan, (4) Substantial changes to the action plan, and (5) Consolidated annual performance evaluation report. In addition, a formal ‘citizen participation’ plan must be developed describing how the residents would be involved and cooperate in the decision making process. Two reports developed by the Center for Community Change could serve as a guide to learn more about the process and for community engagement, CDBG: An Action Guide to the Community Development Block Grant (Gramlich, 1998a); and HUD’s Consolidation Plan: An Action Guide for Involving Low-Income Communities (Gramlich, 1998b). Public participation, in theory, must be allowed during each step of the consolidated plan. Citizens must be granted access to information, reasonable and timely access to local meetings, opportunity for review and comment, a clearly defined ‘complaint process’ and public hearings (New York Stimulus Alliance, 2012).

Thirdly, even when there is a process set up for citizen participation as part of the consolidated plans, the inclusion of the citizens demands depend on local officials or community leaders in charge of the planning process. Even if the consolidated plan process seems accessible and inclusionary, this is not always the case. A number of governmental agencies, private non-profits, private for-profits and CDCs do not open the planning process to people. They set their own agenda and priorities, which does not always generate a local impact. In some cases, grants are directed to projects
following the interest of local leaders or politicians or addressing the interests of high-income residents and business (Angotti, 2008; New York Stimulus Alliance, 2012). Local pressures have promoted city officials to divert grants to neighbourhoods and programmes within their jurisdictions. Projects that have been funded were sufficient in political support; this has diverted funds from communities with the greatest need (Kettl, 1979; Rich, 1989). Local influences have misguided funds from their intended uses.

Fourthly, questions arise about the distribution of benefits. The CDBG was envisioned to function as an instrument for devolution and to provide an oversight for local governments as they took responsibility for providing services to their constituents. However, in the years following the implementation of the CDBG programme some administrative problems evolved raising some questions around who benefits? A number of studies have noticed issues of targeting grant funds (Rosenfeld, 1979; Kettl, 1979; Rich, 1989). Eligible activities have not been followed accordingly.

The CDBG programme initially allowed communities to grant funds to public or private non-profit entities for the alleviation of physical, social or economic distress in specific areas. Most recently, it has been allowed more aggressive economic development programmes assisting private for-profit entities. In the same fashion, other programmes related to CDBG that require a process allowing citizen participation, such as the Section 108 Loan Program and Section 3 Program, have faced similar challenges regarding public input and benefit. Section 108 loans, which are federally guaranteed loans enabling private sector investors to provide financing for community development projects eligible under CDBG without risk, are most often used to fund large-scale economic development projects without generating a direct benefit to low-income communities (New York Stimulus Alliance, 2012). Whereas, the Section 3 Program, which provides job training, employment and contracting opportunities to low-income residents and businesses, have experienced lack of monitoring and compliance, grantees are often unaware of their obligations (National Housing Law Project, 2009).

**Housing as an urban revitalisation strategy**

Abraham Beame, who succeeded Lindsay as mayor in 1974, began a long-term trend away from a focus on impoverished and minority areas (Fainstein, 2010). Its administration faced the worst fiscal crisis and urban decline in the history of New York City. During this period, the New York’s housing commissioner Roger Starr proposed a controversial policy to deliberately withdraw city services in troubled neighbourhoods
as a means of facing the decrease of tax revenues. The so called ‘planned shrinkage’ policy aimed to stop investing in declining neighbourhoods while diverting funds to areas that could be rescued. Subway stations, firehouses, schools and police stations were closed in selected neighbourhoods, including South Bronx, Harlem, Lower East Side, Brownsville, Bedford-Stuyvesant and Bushwick, among others. Urban decay, crime, poverty and the fire epidemic of the time intensified in these areas provoking a decrease in the population. The residents not able to move, mainly Hispanics and African-Americans, went through an unprecedented urban devastation with the decrease of police patrols, garbage removal, street repairs, and fire protection.

During the fiscal crisis the new mayor and its successor, Edward Koch, focused mostly on economic development even though previous commitments were mostly related to welfare and aiding impoverished communities (Fainstein, 2010). Edward Koch was elected in 1978 with a business oriented approach that gave little room to the formation of progressive community movements. However, the change of leadership took place right in the midst of the New York City fiscal crisis, which was manifested by urban violence, arson and decay in many low-income neighbourhoods. As a result of political and community pressure — South Bronx and North Brooklyn were on fire and riots were rising — new public and housing programmes were pushed and eventually considered.

In 1985, Mayor Koch towards the end of its administration — he was elected three times from 1978 to 1989 — announced a Ten-Year Housing Plan in which the city’s capital budget complemented other sources of funds to support non-profit community development corporations and for-profit builders in the construction of affordable units (Schill, Gould, Schwartz & Voicu, 2002). One of the main purposes of the plan was to respond to the affordable housing crisis. Firstly, the city population was growing and rental units and housing for the lower end of the scale had shrunk significantly. Secondly, by the mid 1980s the city had accumulated over 110,000 in rem properties (tax foreclosed properties) due to a sustained period of private landlord disinvestment and abandonment in low-cost rental buildings; of these, 64,000 were vacant (Willis, 1987, p.17). Furthermore, it came about as a result of President Carter’s refusing to keep a commitment he had made in 1978 to reconstruct the South Bronx, and to the increasing cuts in housing expenditures by the new Reagan administration. The second focus of the plan was neighbourhood preservation and revitalisation.

‘The ten-year program was the nation’s largest locally funded housing initiative, totalling $5.1 billion, $4.4 billion of which were city-generated funds’ (Koch, 2006). It preserved and upgraded a total of 253,000 units for low, moderate and middle-income families (Schill et al., 2002). Koch’s Ten-Year Plan embraced a wide range of programmes for housing development and rehabilitation including homeownership
and rental programmes. The homeownership programmes provided about 20% (34,720 units) of the total housing units developed during the programme, whereas the rental programmes about 80% (148,000 units) (Schill et al., 2002). Homeownership and rental programmes included (1) new construction of homes (2) rehabilitation of private owner occupied units, (3) rehabilitation of vacant buildings, and (4) rehabilitation of in rem occupied units. The following are the largest programmes implemented during the Ten-Year Housing Plan:

1. **New construction for homeownership and rental housing.** New homes were produced mainly under the New Homes Program of the New York City Housing Partnership, a programme that generates modest projects (on infill sites) with the assistance of the city (it contributes with vacant land and a loan subsidy) and the state (it contributes with funding). The construction of rental units was the smallest component of the programme. Mainly developers of low- and moderate-income housing built these new rentals homes with the assistance of the city. Developers got certificates from the city that entitled the holders to a property tax exemption.

2. **Rehabilitation of private owner occupied units for homeownership and rental housing.** The largest programme for the rehabilitation of these properties for homeownership was the Housing Improvement Program (HIP). Over 6,000 units were rehabilitated. Whereas the largest programmes for rehabilitation of private owner occupied rental housing were the Article 8-A Loan Program, for relative modest scope of work, and the Participation Loan Program (PLP), for more extensive work.

3. **Rehabilitation of vacant buildings for homeownership and rental housing.** Vacant in rem properties underwent gut rehabilitations under different programmes involving non-profit, for-profit sponsors and tenants with the assistance of HPD and its Division of Alternative Management Programs (DAMP). One of the first initiatives of DAMP was the Sweat Equity Program (1976-1980). In exchange for labor performed by prospective tenants, the city would provide one percent interest rates on 30-year mortgages for gut rehabilitation of city-owned abandoned buildings. The Urban Homesteading Program (1980-1989) followed this initiative. It granted up to $10,000 per unit to tenants willing to inhabit and simultaneously renovate the vacant city owned buildings. After renovation, the buildings were sold to tenants for $250 per apartment. Both tenant-led programmes for homeownership rehabilitated over 2,000 units. When the Urban Homesteading Program ended other type of programmes were put in place without the sweat equity component. CityHome (1993-2000) encouraged also homeownership originally managed by HPD, but eventually administered by the Enterprise Foundation and the Community Preservation Corporation. Around 2, 800 units were rehabilitated. Besides the provision of homeownership in rehabilitated vacant buildings, there were other programmes providing rental housing, such as the
Vacant Building Program (1988-1996). It allowed the city to transfer the title of vacant buildings in clusters to private developers. Developers received construction financing and loan commitments primarily from the CPC. Other initiatives were used also for housing that was transferred and rehabilitated by non-profit community development organisations. New York City sold properties for $1. Projects were subject to 30-year regulatory agreement, which regulated the unit’s affordability. Around 41,500 units in vacant city-owned rental buildings were rehabilitated.

Rehabilitation of in rem occupied units for homeownership and rental housing. Occupied in rem buildings have been rehabilitated directly by HPD and its DAMP. The DAMP utilised different types of initiatives, including the Community Management Program (1979-1994) that allowed locally based non-profit groups to manage and upgrade occupied city-owned buildings in their neighbourhoods. Another initiative is the Tenant Interim Lease Program (1978-Present), which requires renters of city-own buildings to participate in the programme attending to building management education programmes to later own their units as limited-equity cooperatives. HDP funds the rehabilitation of these buildings. The units have been transferred for $250 per apartment. Over 15,000 units of in rem occupied units have been renovated.

Regarding rental housing, in the early programmes such as the Capital Improvement Program (CIP), the city itself contacted and oversaw rehabilitations. Later on buildings were transferred to either for-profit or non-profit corporations through the Neighbourhood Entrepreneurs Program (NEP) and the Neighbourhood Redevelopment Program (NRP). Around 28,000 units were rehabilitated and transferred to a number of private owners.

Housing units built or rehabilitated during Koch’s Ten-Year Plan were located in only 10 of the 59 community districts of New York City (the case study area, Bushwick CD4, is included), most of them were low-income districts with minorities and people of colour. The four mayors who succeed him followed similar initiatives. Mayor Bloomberg housing initiative, the New Market Place Housing Plan, launched in 2002 has been perhaps one of the most ambitious and controversial. This initiative committed to meet the affordable housing needs by creating and preserving 165,000 units of city-subsidised affordable housing. When it was launched it was recognised as the largest municipal affordable housing plan in the nation. However, an analysis conducted by the Association for Neighborhood and Housing Development Inc. (2013), a local grassroots group advocate for low-income housing, confirmed that the plan reached its numbers but not all of its goals at the end of the Mayor’s administration. They found that the new units, which are mostly located in low-income neighbourhoods (including Bushwick), did not meet the affordability needs and that the city could lose the affordability of most of the units built in the programme by year 2037. The new developments targeted moderate-income households rather than low- and very-low
income ones. The following and current administration, although promising to focus on vulnerable populations, has followed a similar approach (this period is not part of this study). Regarding old housing programmes, some remain in place and some have evolved alongside public subsidies and grants. However, most of the community and tenant-led programmes have dissolved and gave way to programmes mostly lead by powerful public-private partnerships using complex funding models. It is important to note that more than half of the funds used to finance the New York City housing programmes come from the city’s capital budget, the rest from federal block grants and other sources (Schwartz, 2006).

**Origins and implications of community- and tenant-led programmes**

Community and tenant-led housing programmes for the rehabilitation of *in rem* occupied and vacant city-owned buildings emerged as a response of squatting and other type of self-management practices taking place during the 1970s. The striking landscape of properties in decay throughout the city incited low-income groups to take over those spaces, and rehabilitate them through organised efforts. Sweat equity and mutual aid were at the center of their strategies. These practices evolved into federal and local community and tenant-led programmes addressing the thousands of buildings held in rem and vacant, the alarmed deficit of public housing provision for impoverished households, and the ongoing decline of inner city neighbourhoods and communities of colour.

As it was noted above, the Division of Alternative Management Programs was established within the New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD) to be in charge of sweat equity programmes, or tenant-led programmes. It supervised a number of programmes in which non-profit community-based organisations, tenants organisations, and, at times, private landlords and management companies, oversaw moderate rehabilitation (Schwartz & Vidal, 1999). The DAMP, which is still running, encourages community growth by transferring city-owned buildings to responsible private owners, including non profits and limited-equity cooperatives, at a nominal price. A portion of the properties sold through DAMP receives property tax reductions. Benefits can last up to forty years. This HPD division oversaw the Community Management, Sweet Equity, Urban Homesteading, and Tenant Interim Lease programmes, but only the largest programme, the Tenant Interim Lease Program, continues running in a marginal way today.

- The Sweat Equity Program (SEP) was one of the first of its kind in the city. It emerged in 1976 responding to the ongoing resident-led initiatives to rehabilitate the massive in rem abandoned buildings that resulted from the New York City’s fiscal crisis. The scale
of the programme was small. As it was explained above, prospective tenants would get one percent of interest on 30-year mortgages for the gut rehabilitation of city-own abandoned buildings in exchange of their work.

- The Urban Homesteading Program (UHP) was rooted in the squatting movement, which involved the occupation of vacant buildings not only in New York City but also in many cities across the country. In fact, the UHP was first of all a federal initiative effective from 1974 to 1991. It attempted to provide public grants and loans to tenants aiming to renovate existing city-owned vacant dwellings and simultaneously provide affordable housing to low-income families and individuals. Once homesteaders rehabilitated (foreclosed or tax-delinquent) dwellings fulfilling the requirements of HUD, they would receive title of the property. By 1983, 110 cities were participating in the programme including New York City. This city, as many others, had also its own local initiatives (1980-1989), which rehabilitated far more housing units than did the federal programme. A number of aspects of urban homesteading seemed to be effective for those advocating housing justice. However, there were also numerous problems with the programme’s management, including its inaccessibility to poor demographics and its short term affordability. New homeowners were required to live in the property for only 3 or 5 years, after that period they were free to sell at market value, which some of them did raising the dwellings and neighbourhood value. During the decade of urban homesteading practices in New York City over one thousand units were rehabilitated and inhabited by low-income citizens. However, federal, state and city support ceased and local efforts gradually lost force.

- The Tenant Interim Lease Program (TIL) has provided tenants that live in city-own buildings the opportunity to manage and own those units as limited-equity cooperatives since it was launched in 1978, Tenants took the initiative to be part of this programme both with and without the help of sponsoring neighbourhood organisations. This programme has grown by far the most rapidly since it implies limited rehabilitation and less costs. The TIL Program was the most viable venue taken by tenants who were already in de facto control of their buildings as a result of spending their collectively held rent monies.

- The Community Management Program (CMP), launched in 1979, was a medium scale programme targeting occupied city-owned buildings for rehabilitation, mostly multi-family buildings. It aimed the sale of the properties after moderate rehabilitation to tenants or community groups, which would get involved in the maintenance and management of buildings in declining neighbourhoods. In New York City, a number of locally based non-profits were contracted and eventually grew into community development corporations.
These programmes have been key for community and tenant control over land. Most of the buildings rehabilitated during this period were transferred to tenants, community management organisations or became limited-equity coops — housing cooperatives in which low-income eligible members have a share (below market prices) and are subject to limitations on the amount of profit they can receive on the re-sale of the units. These coops have become important assets for low-income groups, unfortunately not all the rehabilitated properties have kept their affordability, some units have been sold over the years to existing tenants or to better off households and some buildings have been acquired by private entities. Thanks to these programmes, a significant amount of grassroots groups, tenants associations, and community development corporations were born to keep control and affordability of the in rem and vacant buildings in the 1970s and 1980s. During this time, the Urban Homesteading Assistance Board (UHAB), an advocate for low-income housing cooperatives, was key for residents of city owned buildings who wanted to own and run their buildings as limited-equity coops. Since 1973 UHAB has assisted in the preservation of over 1,700 buildings and the creation of limited-equity coops for 30,000 households in New York City. It is important to note that many CDCs were set up as non-profit development corporations with a handful of members and later evolved into large non-profit entities during this period. Most of them began addressing issues of neighbourhood decline and providing a number of social and housing services with the assistance of public programmes (community and tenant-lead programmes were funded by HPD with CDBG monies). In recent years, many of them started partnering institutions and foundations with access to capital and in turn diversified their interests and targets.

§ 3.4 Changes in neighbourhood governance and participation

As it was illustrated in the previous sections, highly centralised categorical programmes have given way to block grants encouraging states and localities to formulate their own housing programmes. This shift in policy promoted decentralisation of resources and responsibilities to lower government levels, thereby reducing federal involvement. Since the 1980s federal government is not longer the dominant player in housing policy. State and local governments alongside non-profits and for profit corporations have a central role in policy development and implementation. It is important to mention that even when state and local governments formulate housing programmes and provide funding, public agencies rarely build or renovate low-income housing or provide housing services to residents. Most of the time these provisions come from
the non-profit sector. Thus, the rise of such programmes cannot be seen without the simultaneous growth of the non-profit housing sector (Schwartz, 2006).

A number of community agencies supported by Federal government (e.g. Community Action Agencies), neighbourhood entities instituted by local government (e.g. Office for Neighbourhood Government) and other local grassroots groups (e.g. neighbourhood housing groups), which formed to supervise and implement antipoverty programmes, evolved over time into non-profit community based organisations. These organisations emerged providing a variety of activities, including community organising, social services, economic development, education, workforce development and real estate development. The most progressive ones, as it was illustrated previously, were born having as a central mission to reverse neighbourhood decline while taking control over land (by rehabilitating and getting ownership of in rem and abandoned properties). Most of them were set as Community Development Corporations (CDC). These non-profits were everything but passive, they worked with residents drafting local plans and formulating strategies to tackle urban decay and poverty in their jurisdictions. They were active in politics addressing pressing local issues. Thus, since they represented a certain threat to the city, these non-profit corporations were eventually seen as allies. CDCs became strategic partners for the implementation of the policies of ‘devolution’. Since public and private institutions had little interest in impoverished neighbourhoods, the city transferred most of the responsibility to these non-profits. These corporations found an open turf and flourished assisting neglected neighbourhoods with public assistance from the city, state and federal governments. Later, many of them established partnerships with foundations, financial institutions and other powerful partners, and eventually outgrown with complex financial models for housing and social development. Today CDCs constitute the largest segment of the non-profit housing sector (Schwartz, 2006).

According to Felice Michetti, a former HPD commissioner, ‘when the Ten-Year Plan began, there were about twelve not-for profits in the City of New York that were actively involved in housing...By the time I left HPD, there were over a hundred not-for-profits involved in the Ten-Year Plan, and involved not in the traditional federal role of sponsorship projects, but actively involved [in development]’ (NYC Department of Housing Preservation and Development, 2000, p. 25). However, it is important to note that ‘community development corporations (CDCs) were by no means alone in building and rehabilitating housing. Profit-motivated developers of affordable housing were attracted to a number of development programmes either by the promise of long-term appreciation in property values or by development fees’ (Schill et al., 2002).

Besides housing development and rehabilitation, community based organisations carry out a number of housing-related activities including homeowner counselling,
tenant counselling, homeless services, legal assistance, home repair, and housing organising. In addition, they often offer volunteer work or paid jobs to local residents which eventually gain skills that assist them to deal with the bureaucracies of housing, court, public benefits, and personal finance (Marwell, 2007). The size of these non-profits ranges form a handful to hundreds of workers. In some jurisdictions community based organisations represent an important source of job creations. Some non-profits are still invested in their original mission, tackling poverty and housing decline, while others have changed their interests and are currently also involved in market oriented practices, such as economic and commercial real estate development. Besides the diversity in terms of size and activities, these entities also differ in resources, leadership, organisation and political power. These variables, which affect directly their jurisdiction and residents involvement, are conditioned by external agents affecting in a more systemic way the housing and social services provided by these non-profit corporations.

Certainly, the devolution of power and resources from federal to lower government levels has stimulated competitive policy-making process in many jurisdictions. This competition has become also apparent at the local level in the involvement of CDCs and other community based organisations. Benefits at the local level may be affected by the competitive political process of the programme, as well as the non-profit leader’s political influences or lack there of, in the city. Thus, non-profits with political support may get more funds, and therefore administrative resources, than those with less influence in city politics to benefit their jurisdictions and residents with public programmes and participation opportunities. In addition, rivalry may become an issue between non-profits serving the same jurisdiction. This may prevent collaboration and openness between non-profits addressing similar issues.

The distribution of funds is critical to CDCs, as well as to other non-profit community based organisations, since federal programmes heavily fund them. Most of the urban and housing restructuring plans require assembling several sources of financing in order to guarantee their implementation (e.g. block grants, equity capital, mortgage financing, low-interest loans and other public grants). The average project receives an average of eight separate resources (Hebert, Heintz, Baron, Kay & Wallace, 1993). The complexity of pulling together the financing requires extensive amounts of staff time and expertise. There is usually scarce predevelopment financing in CDCs to cover urban research and analysis, planning, feasibility studies, acquisition of development rights, and so forth (Schwartz, 2006). In addition, not all the grants offer long-term operating support. Some non-profit corporations depend on short-term grants in the absence of multilayer operating support (Schwartz, 2006). These non-profits may compromise their planning processes, staff and services since they must make enormous efforts to keep their administration and projects running. As it was illustrated previously (see
section 3.2), usually the same subrecipients receive block grants. Thus there is little opportunity for new or small community based organisations to grow, unless they receive support from other sources such as philanthropy and other aid systems, such as national intermediaries.

The non-profit sector is not only central in the formulation and implementation of affordable housing and community development programmes in distressed areas, it is also key in allowing residents to be participants of planning processes related to social and spatial improvement of their jurisdiction. The lower level of governance, and therefore of the devolution programmes, happens in community organisations, which are understood as a part of the process of trust formation within urban districts where residents can collectively discuss local needs, draft local plans and enforce local policy. However, even when there are institutionalised avenues of citizen participation (e.g. community boards, 197-a plans, consolidated plans for CDBG, etc) and such organisations as mediators, it does not mean that residents’ involvement is always granted in the lower levels.

According to a study conducted in Brooklyn by Marwell (2007), community based organisations have moved into a unique position between social movement orientations and state obligations. In some cases these organisations have become indistinguishable from public agencies while others refuse to give up their grassroots practices. Some stay somewhere in the middle. Marvell agrees that each organisation makes its own choices about how to deal with the conflicting challenges of meeting local residents’ needs while conforming to contract demands and negotiating with political obstacles. Some times such choices end up prioritising local initiatives, projects, campaigns or plans with limited scope and unsatisfactory local impact but with potential to increase funding avenues or form new and powerful public-private partnerships.

While low-income housing programmes and block grants have encouraged participatory procedures they have assisted in the formation of public-private partnerships. Thus sponsorship and leaderships of local plans have shifted from local alliances between public institutions, community based organisations and residents, to public-private partnerships with numerous and powerful allies. Community initiated plans addressing urban and housing revitalisation and grounded in community needs and visions have widened their scope. Some have become profit-oriented large-scale plans addressing economic growth and residential and commercial real estate development. Certainly, community and tenant-led programmes have been increasingly replaced by local initiatives benefiting well-established community development corporations; profit developers, investors and financial institutions rather than grassroots organisations and low-income residents. Some Community
Development Corporations have become real estate enterprises, despite their non-profit nature.

§ 3.5 Conclusion

Urban restructuring of low-income districts, including housing rehabilitation and construction along with economic and community development, has evolved over the years in New York City with the assistance of public policy, federal funds, and a large number of stakeholders and public institutions. In this section the programmes, instruments, grants and plans assisting or being assisted by citizens — residents and local groups — have been examined to disclose the relevance and limitations of participatory processes in the improvement of impoverished districts. Looking closely to the role of citizens in such urban endeavours, we can identify a key factor that have affected the peoples capacity and agency to be part of envisioning, drafting, submitting and implementing local plans and programmes to improve their own living and working spaces; the limited devolution of power and funds beyond the lower governance levels.

Regarding the distribution of power to the people, it is critical to acknowledge that the restructuring of the welfare state has led to an erosion of the power-based of federal government increasing regional and local governance authority (Korthals Altes, 2002). The hierarchic state structure has changed resulting in new ways of governance with a new articulation between states, local governments, and private non-profit and for-profit corporations. Such a trend has described a shift from government to governance, where the involvement of the federal government becomes less hierarchical and more facilitating. Unfortunately, and despite this model, it seems to delegate power beyond the lower governance levels (non-profit sector), decision-making is not always granted to people, and even less to marginalised groups.

As it was illustrated in this section, policy has devolved authority for the distribution of federal dollars, block grants, to lower government levels including states and entitled communities, which have directed such aid to their own priorities. In the case of New York City, local governments are increasingly directing attention and funds to projects which benefits don’t cover groups in need. In fact, better off groups (moderate- and high-income citizens), private corporations and developers with significant assets are increasingly targeted for the distribution of grants to develop projects putting their interest first and eventually getting most of the benefits.
Certainly, local urban politics are increasingly organised in partnership with an extended range of non-governmental actors holding relevant resources of their own. These public-private partnerships have replaced local alliances (between public institutions, community organisations, residents and community boards) and disregard the use of participatory approaches required to integrate the needs and visions of residents for future plans affecting their neighbourhoods. Residents and local groups have lost track of housing initiatives and public programmes for community and urban development while community development corporations and other non-profit and for profit organisations take full advantage of public programmes, grants, loans, tax abatements and other benefits without taking into account the community and their priorities. It is important to note that even when public-private partnerships may include community development corporations and other sort of community-based organisations, it does not guarantee the inclusion of citizens in decision making processes. Non profits have increasingly been busy developing programmes and projects to continue the flow of funding or trying to get into the city politics (there are exceptions), many times forgetting their core objectives and overlooking the serving community (this would be explained further in Chapter 5).

Looking at the instruments of participation available to citizens to shape the fait of their own neighbourhoods and communities, it is clear that Community Boards are one of the few spaces residents and communities have to make their voice be heard and keep communication with city officials and local representatives. These local bodies are responsible, among many other things, in providing information, advice and assistance to residents on new plans and land use changes taking place in their districts. Moreover, they are accountable of conducting the first step of the Uniform Land Use Review Process (ULURP), a process where residents can vote for and against rezoning proposals generating some significant impacts in their jurisdictions before these plans are approved in upper governance levels. In theory, Community Boards’ must assist residents to make informed decisions and consider local resolutions before approving plans and rezoning proposals in their jurisdiction. However, in practice, not all the Community Boards have the sufficient skills, staff and resources needed to properly assist residents and local groups, nor do all the community boards take into account the residents needs, concerns and visions (this will be elaborated in Chapter 5). In addition, as it was explained in this section, the Community Boards’ powers, and therefore peoples’ powers, are advisory. Thus, directions and considerations proposed by the community in regard to urban transformations (including facilities, rezoning, housing, services, etc.) are not always considered.

On the other hand, the 197-a plans are considered an effective instrument to exert power when representatives from the different local groups, community-based organisations and residents are involved. Even when these plans are (similar to the
ULURP directions) advisory, they may provide a collective account of community demands, goals, priorities, and development directions. Once submitted to the City Planning Commission and approved, they can affect future proposals in the projected area. New development proposals may consider community initiated plans, official and unofficial ones, if they want to prevent community opposition. The 197-a plans can exert community control over local development when used as a tool of negotiation, between the community and developers, in future projects. Furthermore, the development of these plans, if drafted collectively, can produce significant local knowledge. Knowledge is power, and one of the unrecognised assets communities has. We have to acknowledge that uncovering and recognising local knowledge within communities can exert power. Unfortunately, residents, local groups and even community-based organisations have struggled to draft such plans having far less from the resources developers and public-private partnerships have.

In conclusion, institutionalised forms of citizen participation in urban policy, programmes and public grants have encouraged residents involvement but have failed to provide sufficient resources for technical assistance. It is possible to track correspondences among the different forms of institutionalised participation from the 1960s until today in this regard. Firstly, the anti-poverty programmes that sought to bypass entrenched local bureaucracies to provide funding and technical assistance to the neighbourhoods and communities in need fell short in both endeavours. As it was illustrated in this chapter, funding was insufficient for the development of the programmes, and therefore, providing the required technical assistance to disadvantaged and minority communities. We must acknowledge that planning and organising require resources, expertise, and long-term engagement to follow up plan proposals and implementation processes.

Secondly, similar issues can be tracked in the funding process of the CDBG. Planning skills and resources are needed for the development of the consolidated plan, which includes the yearly citizen participation plan—both plans are required for granting CDBGs. These plans require expertise of planners, community organisers and other experts to develop participatory processes integrating the visions and needs of residents and different local groups. As it was illustrated in this section, local entities drafting consolidated plans must hold public hearings, organise community meetings, form citizen advisory committees, and conduct surveys in their jurisdiction. In theory, these leading entities should make low-income and minority community groups visible in urban areas through these processes, which provides vehicles for these groups to gain leverage in the policy arena. However, many times these entities find themselves short of expertise to undertake such participatory processes since they involve task forces involving research, analysis and strategic planning, along with months of preparation. Furthermore, the plans’ modifications and the consolidated
annual performance evaluation report — steps part of the grant process — implies not only planning but also managerial and administration skills. The CDBG’s consolidated plans are an important avenue for projects dealing with housing rehabilitation and construction, community development, and other initiatives assisting in the improvement of low-income districts. They are able to aggregate aid for community initiated plans or 197-a plans, which many times deal with large urban rehabilitation projects integrating a number of projects and programmes. In other words, these plans are able to generate an important impact. However, these achievements may not happen if technical assistance falls short and local entities are not able to follow up the required steps for grant applications.

Thirdly, the lack of local resources — including funding and technical skills—is also a constant challenge for residents, local groups, and Community Boards while drafting and submitting 197-a plans. As it was described in this section, most of them are sponsored by Community Boards, which have insufficient resources and none or limited technical assistance (these arguments would be examined in Chapter 5). They are limited to a handful of professionals and staff, usually lacking planning skills. Community Boards mostly depend on a small group of volunteers. Drafting local plans is not an easy task for community boards, local groups, community organisers and residents involved. Preparing plans for submission either to the City Planning Commission or for the implementation of public programmes and initiatives require research, organising and planning skills. These capacities can only be built with resources, training and experience. According to Angotti’s (1997) study on community initiated plans, even when public institutions claim to provide considerable assistance, they do not promote or assist communities. For the most part, as Angotti notes (1997), advocacy planners, urban and community planning graduate programmes, non-profit organisations, grassroots groups and volunteers with expertise have provided planning and organising advise to communities. These endeavours reflect the lack of support of public institutions and the demand of participatory planning. However, as it was explained in this section, community initiated plans have increasingly opted not to follow through the 197-a plans’ procedure due to the bureaucracy, time and expertise that this process requires. Nevertheless, as previously mentioned, community initiated plans have promoted inclusionary plans and are used as an instrument to fight against for profit and disruptive developments.

Acknowledging some of the challenges faced by the institutionalised forms of citizen participation, we can agree that grants do not always flow to the lower levels of governance (non profits, community boards, grassroots groups, etc) to assist drafting inclusionary local plans, writing grant applications, and developing local programmes. In addition, targeted groups — by policy and block grants — are not always the ones who directly get benefits, especially when they are not involved in planning and decision
making. Without knowledge there is not political power. Certainly, citizens are able to participate in urban restructuring processes only when they are informed, and many times they are far from knowing urban plans and rezoning proposals in their jurisdiction, as well as available housing programmes and CDBG’s plan proposals where they can have a voice regarding needs and priorities.

Lastly, having sufficient support is key for local involvement and to generate the desired impact by public policy, grants and programmes. Resources can facilitate designing and following up participatory processes where residents, local groups, community board members, and other local partners could exchange local knowledge while acknowledging the social, economic and spatial intricacies of their jurisdiction. These participatory processes would eventually help to make informed decisions and take action addressing local priorities. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that the lack of public support and resources is not the only issue. Political influence has also played an important role in directing funds and priorities from one to another district. A number of districts have experience abandonment while others receive most of the attention (housing programmes, rezoning and tax abatements; and rehabilitation of streets, schools, metro stations, etc.). In New York City, political influences in other localities and Mayor’s priorities overshadow the vision, demand, and lower governance levels (citizens and non profit sector respectively) in some districts.
Cities for or against citizens?
Public efforts promoting citizen participation and integration in the Randstad Holland: Socio-spatial restructuring of low-income neighbourhoods

§ 4.1 Introduction

Urban policy promoting the restructuring of cities has been widely documented since post-war years in the Netherlands. Through urban policy and public instruments this country has responded to war and urban destruction, modernisation and industrialisation, worldwide recessions and urban crisis, deindustrialization and globalisation, just to mention a few. Many of these policies have called for and encouraged the participation of those living in the areas in question. Sometimes influenced by worldwide movements and trends, and in other instances urged by the need to create endogenous to respond to the local challenges of the time. In any case, citizen participation has been present and institutionalised at all scales. From the opbouwwerk movement of the post-war years focused on individual social and economic assistance, to the politicised community organisation driven by the Building for the Neighbourhood motto in the 1970s and 1980s, to the first district approaches of the 1990s targeting ‘problem accumulation areas’, to implementing social renewal programmes, and the most recent comprehensive area-based approaches implemented to turn ‘priority districts’ into ‘empowered districts’. What is interesting is that the urgency of involving citizens in urban restructuring policies, programmes and plans has repeated over the years, particularly in periods of urban crisis not only in the Netherlands, but also in Western Europe, America and beyond.

This chapter aims to provide an overview of the evolution and trends of public policies and programmes envisioned and implemented over the last decades to tackle urban decline while improving the social, economic, and physical conditions of low-income districts in the Netherlands. Special attention is given to those approaches
recognising the involvement of residents, civic associations, and local stakeholders as key actors in the restructuring of their own living environment. Additionally, the way decentralisation in policy making and implementation has impacted the objects/subjects targeted by those policies and programmes has been enquired, as well as the role of citizens in local politics with the proposed shift from government to governance in recent policies. Finally, challenges and limitations citizens faced in recent urban restructuring approaches are touched upon, especially citizens’ drawbacks defining their own local problems, priorities and visions, as well as in drafting local policy, and controlling public funds.

§ 4.2 Urban policy, programmes and approaches facilitating citizen participation: From community organisation to empowerment

Opbouwwerk, or what is translated to English as community organisation, developed with the rise of community initiatives and community centres providing social support to stimulate economic development in post war years. Community organisation was initiated mainly by progressive religious and socio-cultural organisations in the 1950s in the Netherlands. It was initially focused on individual assistance and counselling (satisfaction of social needs) via the allocation of funds for social-cultural provisions in a context of industrial development and agricultural reconstruction in some predominantly agrarian regions of the Netherlands (Peper, 1972). Community organisation gradually shifted to a more action-oriented approach and emancipatory activities. Nevertheless, socio-cultural and recreational activities continued as part of the service programmes offered by community centres, in Dutch called buurthuizen. Community work gradually merged with the goals of broader welfare policy. Community centres eventually expanded their activities to include daycare services, literacy courses, education for newcomers, and integration courses. Different approaches were used to deal with the structural poverty of the time and new social challenges, such as the growing immigration. With these changes neighbourhood workers became more professional, and eventually the state took a central role.

Johanna Boer, in the northeastern province of Drenthe, initiated community organisation in the 1950s. Boer was trained at the School tot Opleiding van Leerkrachten Kinderverzorging en Opvoeding in Rotterdam and became involved in youth development work in the northeastern area of the country. She was invited by Jaap Cramer to work at De Centrale Vereeniging voor den Opbouw van Drenthe, and after World War II became director of this organization, at which time the name shifted
to Stichting Opbouw Drenthe. This was a provincial building body initiated in the context of reconstruction and the dreaded consequences of a rapid industrialisation. It dealt with the planning of community facilities, the study of antisocial behavior, the establishment of job training, and professional services.

Boer was a pioneer in the terrain of community organisation in the Netherlands. Marie Kamphuis, one of the founders of post-war modern social work, introduced her to community organisation and work developed in America. After a study trip to the United States Boer’s interest expanded. The Canadian sociologist Murray Ross published a book in 1955 titled Community Organisation: Theory and Principles. The methods proposed in this publication, which was translated to Dutch in 1957, focused on ways to organise a community to be able to identify and solve their own problems (for more information see Murray G. Ross, 1955). Boer found these methods useful for the situation of the country at the time and put some of these ideas into practice. Her publications on community organisation obtained attention nationwide in the late 1950s. Her seminal book Social Community Work: Explorations in the Field of ‘Community Organisation’ in Dutch Relations [Maatschappelijk opbouwwerk: verkenningen op het gebied van ‘Community Organisation’ in Nederlandse verhoudingen] published in 1960 was very influential in the formation of welfare policy in the country. Furthermore, this publication introduced community organisation for the first time at academies in the Netherlands. In the following years vocational training for the youth arose, as well as at the level of higher vocational education. The study of socio-cultural work was offered eventually in colleges. According to Boer (1960), community organisation is a process by which a community establishes its needs, objectives and priorities, as well as the trust to work on its own, to find resources (internal and/or external), and pursues its goals by cultivating cooperative and collaborative practices in the community to grow.

A more action-oriented approach of community organisation influenced by the publications of Piet Reckman was introduced in the 1970s in the Netherlands. Piet Reckman, like Jo Boer, worked with youth groups as a teacher, social worker and welfare inspector. He was involved in a number of initiatives dealing with poverty and social justice. However, unlike Boer, he was a political activist. Social Action: Towards a Methodology and Strategy for Social Action [Sociale Aktie: Naar een Strategie en Methodiek - methodes en technieken maatschappelijke veranderingen] published in 1971 and Social Action: Reconsidered [Sociale Aktie: Opnieuw Bekeken] published in 1974 were some of his most influential writings. The methods he proposed were influenced by publications of Saul Alinsky, Paulo Freire, Herman Milikowsky, and others. Community organisation workshops, where attention was paid to the development of methodologies for social action became popular at this time in the Netherlands. Additionally, according to Simonse (1997), community development,
which was facilitated in community centres, became stronger and stronger under the influence of the back then political climate in training ‘encased in Marxist terms’. Thus, the often impartial and neutral character of community organisation gradually became politicised. In this politicising process mainly problems related to social justice and urban deprivation were addressed. Community workers were increasingly involved in new social movements, such as feminism, environmentalism, and the squatter movement. Most importantly, the massive urban renewal taking place in prewar residential areas became the highlight of the history of community organisation. Community organisers were key to encourage residents to have a say in large-scale demolition plans across the country. The increasing participation of citizens eventually influenced planning policy. These efforts would later be materialised into the nationwide movement of Building for the Neighbourhood [Bouwen voor de Buurt], which will be described below. Unfortunately, this period of activist politicisation did not last for long. The Marxist tone disappeared quickly in the years that followed. With the onset of neoliberal policies and policy approaches community work almost disappeared and eventually was absorbed by large welfare institutions.

Bram Peper\textsuperscript{14} evaluated the evolution of community organisation in the country in the 1970s. He asserted back then that community organisation does not come down to a commitment to strengthen democracy. He rather stated that it involves strengthening a commitment to the community. In the book The Making of a Welfare Policy (1972), he identifies two different doctrines and approaches of community organisation. In terms of policy, he notes, community organisation is inspired by two points of view: the doctrine of adaptation and the doctrine of participation. It is worthwhile to delve into his study in order to have a comprehensive understanding of the influence of community work in Dutch urban policy before the 1970s. In summary, in the doctrine of adaptation policy addressing community organisation mostly deals with areas or groups falling behind the ever changing technical-economic changes of society. In this perspective, community organisations assist groups and areas that are heavily deprived or represent a unique dimension enabling a connection to the ‘normal’ society. Usually this work facilitates participation through facilities and promotion of specific activities. It mostly commits to community development of a given area. One example is emancipation as a purpose of community work in backward rural areas and disadvantaged urban areas targeting specific groups. This could be seen in the Netherlands, in the so-called regional welfare organisations (regional development agencies), as a form of territorial or area development work. According to Peper, this

\textsuperscript{14}Bram Peper is a sociologist and former politician. He was Mayor of Rotterdam in the 1980s and was involved in the rebuilding of the city. He later became minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and is currently member of the Dutch Labour Party.
variant of the community work operates greatly from the doctrine of the adjustment. In this doctrine, lag in the overall development of society, not only culturally, but also in social and economic fields, should be lifted. Adaptation and emancipation are central here. In the doctrine of participation, policy promotes the civic participation and leadership of initiatives by citizens. Participatory democracy, which is a precondition for a satisfactory functioning of society, seems to be the official goal. However, rather than promoting participation and the provision entailed by this effort, this form of participation constituted as a response to the democratisation movements of the time (1960s and 1970s) in Western Europe and America. From this perspective, community organisation tries to facilitate an active participation of people in all matters concerning the total population. Thus the entire population appeals to community interests and issues. This means that the general function of community work would encourage the population to generate change according to their needs, priorities and views. Education to citizens to generate an 'active society' is central. The principle of community organisation lies in encouraging people to help themselves. The greatest needs are solved, and the challenge is to counteract new challenges that are constantly emerging.

Peper (1972) stated that in the first perspective the goal is increasing prosperity or economic development. In this case, the population is more an instrument or object than an end in itself. The purposes are mostly determined elsewhere, usually by the government and social workers working for public institutions. In the second perspective, according to Peper (1972), the perception of democracy is central. The population shifts from an object to a subject. The participation is encouraged to stimulate people to look for an optimal wellness experience on their own. In the latest perspective, even when citizens desire to take the initiative, it may be taken elsewhere. Either way, community organisation aims in both cases to promote collaboration between groups having common issues to be addressed. Translated into terms of action, community organisation efforts in this context are meant, with the greatest possible involvement of the population and usually commanded by any government, to guide, plan and introduce social change.

According to this study the need to engage in community organisation practices results directly from awareness of a crisis, especially in government circles, which requires democracy and participation at the grassroots level to be strengthened. The attempt to involve citizens in situations of crisis can be seen over and over in welfare policy and public programmes, in Western Europe and America, as it is illustrated in this study. However, as Peper stated there is always governmental control and the methodological points of departure (democracy, participation, etc), in many instances, are abandoned or become a delusion.
Another interesting fact illustrated in this study is that around 80% of public expenditures were directed to programmes following the doctrine of adaptation during this period. Policies in this doctrine mostly dealt with deprived areas and groups; social work within private associations; coordination of regional welfare institutions; provisions for aliens; welfare inspections; and building for reconstruction and renewal efforts. Apparently, the doctrine of adaptation has ruled in urban policy and programmes dealing with districts and groups in 'crisis' since this period, with the exception of a few instances.

Before the mid 1980s the central government was the main financial supporter of community organisation in the Netherlands, even though community organisation was essentially a municipal affair in terms of management since the mid 1960s (Peper, 1972). However, after the introduction of the Welfare Law in 1987, municipalities and on some occasions local welfare organisations took responsibility for the financing of community work. Community work moved from provincial and regional levels to town and council levels. Additionally, the organisational and advisory support by community workers has increasingly focused on the living quality in neighbourhoods and districts (area-based) and in specific groups (categorical), including quality of services and relationships between citizens, local stakeholders, and public institutions. The main areas in which community organisation has encouraged self-motivation and participation in recent years ranges from housing, sustainability and the environment, to community health, education and social services. Unfortunately, there has been a significant decrease of community centres across the country due to public cuts after the 2008 global financial crisis (Dirks & Huisman, 2013). In fact, a number of municipalities decided to close some facilities, and as in previous crises, there was a civic response. According to the Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau (2013), the work of community workers was taken over by a number of volunteers. Mostly residents and neighbourhoods are managing community centres nowadays.

The district as the unit of the city: Reconstruction and modernisation

The post-war period was marked by a recovery and reconstruction from the war. Central government sought both, to provide full jobs after years of unemployment and to tackle the housing shortage of the time. In order to satisfy the demands of the population growth, massive development of housing in peripheral areas and large-scale traffic infrastructure took place, as well as reconstruction plans of urban areas and slum clearance in pre-war residential districts. Central government had no option but to take responsibility to guarantee social security, including housing. During this time the welfare state came to fruition and, as it was previously discussed, community
organisation was central for the provision of social assistance and well being of citizens. Additionally, new urban visions and planning approaches assisted in the organisation of post war cities, such as the so called ‘wijkgedachte’ in the late 1940s.

The conceptualisation of the wijkgedachte was influenced by the garden city movement originated in the United Kingdom by urban planner Ebenezer Howard and his influential book To-Morrow: a Peaceful Path to Real Reform (1898) (which was reissued as Garden Cities of To-morrow in 1902), and derivative schemes developed in post war years in the United States. In fact, Clarence Arthur Perry coined the concept of the ‘neighbourhood unit’ in the publication The Neighbourhood Unit: a Scheme for Arrangement for the Family-Life Community15 (1929). This American planner and sociologist envisioned this model mostly for residential development in metropolitan areas while working for the New York Regional Plan and the City Recreation Committee. In America, as in many European cities that followed the garden movement, progressive schemes gradually turned into garden suburbs without Howard’s progressive ideals.

Howard’s garden city scheme responded to the ongoing overcrowding and decline of cities with a model of self-sufficient satellite communities surrounded by green belts and planned with equitable residential, industrial and agricultural areas. This highly planned scheme aimed combining town and country for the working class with ideals of social justice. According to Bookchin, this scheme was an alternative to ‘enhance social solidarity as well as intimacy between people and land’ (Biehl, 2015, p. 71). However, breaking up large urban areas into ‘small, highly-integrated, free communities of [people] whose social relations are blemished neither by property nor production for exchange’ certainly meant further decentralisation (Biehl, 2015, p. 71). In fact, this model, which limited the amount of residents to about thirty thousand, had little to offer to ameliorate urban degradation. On the contrary, Howard’s proposal of planned urban decentralisation eventually intensified the crisis of the inner city, and despite he was strongly influenced by socialist ideals, particularly by Edward Bellamy’s Looking Backwards book and work by Peter Kropotkin, he gradually divested those ideas for his town and country arranged marriage which neglected old cities and city life with pragmatic planning in rural areas (Bookchin, 1974). In terms of civic involvement, the garden city initially included provision for community participation in its direction and equity (Ward, 1992). For instance, the first garden city conceived and implemented the establishment of a trustee body to administer the estate on behalf of the community. A sort of community land trust (way before this model was used in Europe and

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15 This publication was based on a speech entitled “A Community Unit in City Planning and Development”, which Perry delivered at a conference organized in 1923 in Washington by the National Community Center Association and the American Sociological Society.
America) was envisioned providing long-term renewable contracts to keep residential, commercial and workspaces affordable. However, since the first investors saw this scheme of community government as ‘dangerous irrelevancies’ and as the board of directors of the second garden city found themselves impelled towards commercial property logic to get revenues from site acquisition and infrastructure costs, this progressive instrument of community control disappeared and was never replicated (Ward, 1992). Thus, Howard’s social scheme was eventually limited to scaled human dimensions, open land for recreation and easy access to work, commercial and service facilities. As Bookchin (1974) stated in his book The Limits of the City, he did not define the nature of human contiguity and community, and in his vision, local affairs were dealt by a proposed central council based on elections rather than by face-to-face democracy, and labor was mostly decided by the needs of capital (Bookchin, 1974).

In America, the ‘neighbourhood unit’ was even more limited in terms of social justice and community participation. It provided both, a diagrammatic model of the ideal layout for a neighbourhood, and the guidelines for the spatial distribution of houses, community services, streets and business (Banerjee, 1984). The ‘neighbourhood unit’ was also planned in terms of size and density, and when private developers and investors embraced it, it ran into other regulations, such as social and economic composition. Thus, despite its ideals advocating for community spaces, community inclusion and political agency, like most garden cities, the perceptions of the ‘neighbourhood unit’ shifted dramatically throughout the years. This model which was envisioned by planners as a unit in the social and political structure of the city in the 1910s, was mostly employed by private developers as an instrument for the segregation of racial, ethnic, religious and economic groups in the late 1940s. Some of the features of the physical design of the neighbourhood unit, such as the gated-community aspect, were employed for this purpose (Banerjee, 1984).

In the Netherlands, small garden villages developed in a number of cities for workers in pre-war years. In Rotterdam, Vreewijk was one of the most representatives of the time, and some of the ideals of the movement evolved into the so called wijkgedachte in post war years. The Studiegroup Bos, an urban development and socio-cultural research group, set up during the war under the leadership of Ir. A. Bos, then director of the Rotterdam Housing Services [Rotterdamse Dienst Volkshuisvesting], and Van Tijen an architect and urban planner —who profiled the standards of social housing after the WWII—articulated similar ideals in their study The City of the Future, The Future of the City [De stad der toekomst, de toekomst der stad] published in 1946. This idea of the ‘wijkgedachte’ came about enquiring one single question in a time of rapid urban changes and modernisation. Are our large cities still living communities? This district approach emerged as the social foundation of the postwar city in the Netherlands. It envisioned a share to the citizenry to arrange their own affairs as a way to create
decentralised districts (Bos, 1946). This model in the peripheries of existing cities proposed a network of neighbourhoods forming districts that together would form the city. In this system the district would be perceived as a small town and would consist of neighbourhoods of approximately 20,000 people, each one with a community centre [buurthuizen] and other public facilities. The purpose was to generate a spatial unit in the city where people could relate to each other and citizen participation could be facilitated. In the Dutch model, housing blocks were laid down surrounded by greenery, just like in other garden cities. The main difference was the scaling up of buildings and public spaces. Functionalist gallery flats predominated over single-family houses. Like in the garden city movement, the ‘wijkgedachte’ saw living in large cities and urban life as something threatening. The Netherlands was shifting at that time from agricultural to an industrial society, and the welfare state was becoming more powerful and controlling.

Divergent and conflicting ideas about the wijkgedachte were evident back then in the 1950s. On one hand the image of the metropolitan citizen became popular, eroding little by little the idea of the citizen as an integral part of a small-scale community. On the other hand, large housing developments and urban plans of the time were totally opposite to the small independent communities conceived with integrated services and facilities. The central ideas dominating urban planning at this time were based on the development of modern city centres and new residential areas in urban peripheries, following functionalist trends. In both cases, new urban areas were produced with no history, nor identity. Sociologist and columnist Jacques van Doorn made the first criticism of the wijkgedachte in 1955. In his essay District and City: Full integration Frameworks? [Wijk en stad: reële integratiekaders?], he enquires how realistic it is to envision the district independently from the rest of the city and urban life. Furthermore, he questioned the proposition based on the creation of communities through the design of neighborhoods as units. Van Doorn stated that there was a narrow view in this approach since there could be other possibilities to integrate people into society. He agreed that the lives of city dwellers should not be restricted to their own neighbourhood but extend across the city.

In Rotterdam, as a response to the housing deficit of the postwar years, a number of districts were developed in the city boundaries considering the principles of the wijkgedachte (see Figure 4.1). In Rotterdam South, the Expansion Plan of 1949 was the responsible for three new residential areas collectively called the southern garden cities: Zuidwijk (1951-1959), Pendrecht (1949-1952) and Lombardijen (1960s). These districts comprised of small neighborhoods which included residential, commercial, recreational, cultural and educational facilities did ameliorate the housing shortage of the time. However, it is questionable if the desired goals and ideals of this model were achieved in these gardens cities. For instance, the industrialisation of
housing with low production cost gave way to housing and urban visions unfamiliar to citizens. Planning became an experts field were citizens had no voice. Thus, in terms of new social relations, civic participation and social justice, we can argue that this highly planned model did not manage to generate a socially engaged and integrated community over the years.

FIGURE 4.1 Rotterdam’s urban growth

Source: A/I, Het Architectuurncentrum van Rotterdam
Zuidwijk and Pendrecht, designed by architects and urban planners Willem Van Tijen and Lotte Stam-Beese respectively, were developed in the sub-municipality of Charlois (area where the case study is located) following the ideals of the wijkgedachte. These representative districts, despite being conceived for different household types, and with better housing opportunities of those prewar districts, showed the first symptoms of urban and housing decline in the 1980s, which intensified by the late 1990s. As many inner city districts, these garden cities did not escape the decline of public spaces, housing stock, jobs and educational opportunities. A number of urban visions, renewal plans and planning approaches have taken place in these garden cities since the 1990s, like in many impoverished inner city districts (See Chapter 6). Housing stock has been demolished and constructed, and social exclusion related to low levels of education and poverty has reached national attention. In 2009, both districts districts were ranked as ‘priority districts’ along with other 22 districts, including the old city districts of Oud-Charlois, Carnisse, Zuidplein, and Tarwewijk (case study district), located in the same Municipality. These facts may answer some of the questions Van Doorn had back in the 1950s in terms of social integration. Additionally, the current condition confirms that the adaptation of the garden city model without its original progressive ideals and with highly planned functionalist urban and housing proposals did not manage to build communities, just like in the garden suburbs of America.

In any case, while new residential areas grew under the principles of the wijkgedachte during the 1950s and 1960s, urban decline intensified in inner city neighborhoods. During this period, community organisation was taking place in buurthuizen and began influencing neighbourhood community work in localities experiencing social and economic problems as well as physical transformations. On one hand, neighborhoods were increasingly more heterogeneous, so were the needs of the different community groups in terms of social and economic assistance. Thus, the focus of youth work gradually shifted to serve targeted groups. On the other hand, with the modernisation of cities pre-war urban districts plans were being restructured and residents began organising against forced displacements. Thus, socio-cultural centres, which offered cultural, leisure and educational activities shifted gradually to multifunctional community centres holding emancipatory activities with diverse scopes. Action-oriented approaches in organising and advocating for socially responsible urban renewal became popular. They offered active participation of citizens in the quest of power in decision making. Residents became active, directly or through their local associations and groups, in the restructuring of their neighborhoods. This gave way to policies facilitating the participation of residents in urban renewal projects in the mid 1970s. A different approach considering the local needs and priorities was needed for the development and restructuring of urban districts.
Building for the Neighbourhood: Socialisation and democratisation of housing and planning

In post-war years, industrialisation and urbanisation, alongside a boom in household formation and influx of population from colonies, intensified the housing deficit and the pressure for a major government intervention in the provision of housing. From the 1940s to the 1970s the housing shortage fluctuated significantly. The deficit decreased from 318,000 in 1947 to 49,000 in 1970 (Priemus, 1981, p. 302), and increased again to 146,000 in 1974 to later intensify when housing production collapsed as the economic crisis took effect (Priemus, 1981, pp. 302, 344). The economic downturn caused by the two oil crises (1973 and 1979) gave way to a deep recession, which halted suburban development. Thus, housing development gradually shifted from new residential districts and new towns in the peripheries, which offered mass-produced housing, to the solid working class, often with public subsidies (Van Vliet et al., 1985), to inner city districts by the 1970s. However, by this time, the decline of inner city districts had intensified with the flight of middle class families and the influx of immigrants from Turkey, Morocco, and the Netherlands Antilles. About half a million people left big cities between 1964-1985 (Fels, 2007).

The first planning tool attempting to control suburban sprawl was the Second Report on Spatial Planning [Tweede Nota Rumtelijke Ordening] enacted by the national government in 1966. It proposed a ‘concentrated deconcentration’ in strategic areas, mostly in city boundaries. However, and despite this approach was followed by the Third Report on Spatial Planning in 1974, growth outside urban areas continued. As part of this approach, the locations of new towns were selected by the national government rather than provincial and local authorities, which had previously taken decisions without rigorous control (Geurs, 2006). Besides this new planning rationale, growth of city centres in large urban areas was addressed to increase economic development and attract new inhabitants. Strengthening the social fabric to halt the ongoing population decline was part of the agenda. Thus plans aimed to increase housing, public and economic activities in city centres. This required the improvement of accessibility by car and public transportation, and therefore space for these new traffic systems. City plans targeting old residential areas for urban renewal and the restructuring of city centres, with often bureaucratic and authoritarian approaches, increased insecurity among residents, which questioned ongoing plans and made pressure to consider more democratic approaches of redevelopment (Stouten, 2010).

According to Stouten (2010), the first urban renewal approaches in Rotterdam’s inner city districts were supported by project developers and business stakeholders using mainly technical arguments to prove the deterioration of housing and living conditions.
Their main interest was to guarantee the continuity of their economic activity with the assistance of urban renewal plans. However, these urban renewal approaches eventually focused on tackling the deficit of housing of the time considering residents demands, which became loud in a time of political change and urban movements. Urban renewal in the Netherlands, as in many other West European and American cities, became the drive of urban mobilisations aiming to prevent the disruption of communities and the displacement of vulnerable populations. In the case of Rotterdam, a number of neighbourhood-based organisations were able to influence the local city council thanks to changes in local politics. Urban renewal had been one of the key priorities during the election campaign of the Dutch Labour Party (PVdA). A new policy at the municipal and national level was proposed aiming to preserve and improve old city areas with the active participation of residents. According to some studies (Priemus, 1988, 2004; Stouten, 2010), this new policy responded to the following aspects taking place at that time:

1. Discontent from residents located in areas experiencing housing decline and high rents, as well as demolitions to allow for new housing and traffic systems. Inner districts with a large share of private rental housing owned by landlords that were not willing or able to renovate their properties became the main target of the mainstream urban renewal programmes. ‘At many places demolition plans were dawn up for whole residential areas’ (Priemus, 1988, p. 62).

2. Housing provision was mainly focused on tackling the housing deficit without looking at social and political issues. Old city districts had become more heterogenous as well as their needs. New housing choices were needed.

3. The increasing active role of tenants in housing rehabilitation and development processes. The housing sector does not have clients any more but residents. Agreements were increasingly made between residents, housing associations and local authorities.

4. The bureaucratic urban renewal approaches were mostly technical and based on physical outcomes. As housing development in new districts and peripheries declined with the collapse of the construction market, and residents and tenants organisations increasingly opposed demolition in inner city areas, other approaches were call for the improvement of these areas. The provision of social housing continued to be pursued but with a human scope considering the abandonment and social disintegration of old districts.

The new policy took effect after the city council elections and victory of the Labour Party in 1974. For the first time a separate state secretary for urban renewal was appointed, and the Urban Renewal Organisation Regulations [Verordening Organisatie Stadsvernieuwing], were introduced (Stouten, 2010). According to Stouten (2010) the main task of the last one was setting up project groups with a wide range of
local stakeholders in each urban renewal area. These groups would be comprised by representatives of the residents’ organisations and authorised civil servants, which were often former activists, with direct access to the city council in charge of urban renewal. Additionally, this organisation had to follow up with the progress exercised by a council committee.

![Map of Rotterdam urban renewal from 1974 to 1985](image)

**FIGURE 4.2** Urban renewal in Rotterdam from 1974 to 1985

The gradual politicisation of community organisation in urban neighborhoods paved the way to the first district approach ‘based on a coalition between local authorities,
tenants’ organisations and housing associations’ (Stouten, 1995, p. 23). Thanks to organising efforts, residents became aware of the effects of drastic measures taken by urban renewal programmes and called for a programme where residents’ interests were given priority over other groups. Their desire to keep living in old inner city neighborhoods was expressed in the motto *Building for the Neighbourhood* [Bouwen voor de Buurt], which became the popular name of the newly introduced urban renewal policy in 1975 (which lasted until 1990). The new approach was oriented towards housing improvement by shifting a proportion of the districts’ private rental stock to the social housing sector. The policy mainly targeted pre-war inner city areas holding low-income households that were not able to afford moving to districts with higher rents (see Figure 4.2). These were tenants called for better housing conditions but were not willing to leave their neighborhoods. The programme offered participation of tenants in decision making and the right of resettlement, which required state funds to cover the expenses. Housing was often improved without changing the social composition of the area (Hulsbergen & Stouten, 2001).

The programme was one of a kind. Vulnerable tenants instead of being displaced did organise and mobilise to have a voice in the urban renewal processes taking place in their neighborhoods. They were able to discuss their needs and priorities, as well as to keep their social relations. The scope was quite opposite to those implemented in many urban renewal programmes in America and other cities in Western Europe, which sought besides housing renewal the disruption of long standing communities, especially low-income and communities of colour. In this case tenants were part of the process. Rotterdam became the vanguard of this urban renewal programme, and eventually spread to other large cities. There was political will as well as public funds supporting this initiative. In general, the main objectives and achievements of the *Building for the Neighbourhood* approach are the following:

1. Integrating a wide range of local stakeholders in the development of urban renewal plans. These plans aimed to prioritise local needs and to prevent forced removal or displacement of long standing residents.

2. Socialisation of housing. The programme aimed to detain property abandonment and decline by transferring housing from the private to the public sector. Entire buildings were transferred from dubious to responsible landlords, mostly new area-based housing associations. These housing associations acquired the properties and took full responsibility of the management of the units with the financial assistance of the government.

3. Preservation and improvement of the housing stock. Properties were often selected with the participation of residents for major improvement. Demolition was sometimes inevitably, due to the quality of the building, but they were always replaced by new
social housing. Properties were constructed or rehabilitated considering tenants and local needs. For instance, larger homes were provided to attract families.

4 Keep affordability in inner city districts. Neighborhoods would be kept affordable to long standing residents and newcomers. Lease agreements were determined before any rehabilitation or even demolition guaranteeing affordability. This assistance was critical since unemployment kept rising and the living cost was high.

5 Decentralisation and democratisation of urban renewal processes (Stouten, 2010). Decision-making in the planing process, which was usually made at the municipal level was open to residents at the neighbourhood level. Unlike previous urban renewal programmes tenants had a voice and were part of newly formed project groups.

During this period government set annual targets for housing output, social housing, as well as subsidised private housing quotas. In order to achieve the goals and to control housing development, large-scale municipal ownership of land was sought. According to Harloe (1995), municipal land ownership enabled the local government to cross-subsidised land for social housing and other purposes from profits obtained from sales or leasing to private builders. The government took a greater role of the provision of housing through different ways; the acquisition of land and properties for development, a rent control system, the local authority of housing allocation, and the approval of state loan funds for housing associations. The role of municipal development corporations was greater than the role of private corporations by this time (Fels, 2007). The private corporations owned housing stock mostly in the new residential districts. It was only after the mid 1970s that these corporations started gradually acquiring and purchasing properties. Government played a significant role in setting new housing standards and promoting non-traditional forms of building (Harloe, 1995). Social housing not only acted as a pioneer for the new developments in building technology, design and organisation, but also in setting forth a new approach of participatory planning.

The housing quality standard was outlined in the Regulations and Hints [Voorschriften en Wenken] from 1973, which was amended with the introduction of the Building Decree in 1992. The units developed during the urban renewal period have similar typologies and sizes. The great majority of buildings consist of five story porch flats with HAT units on the top floor. HAT-Units were required in the Housing Memorandum for Young People [Nota Huisvesting poor Jongeren] in 1975. These units were smaller units for singles or double households and were tied to specific subsidies. In fact, there was a large amount of subsidy schemes to accommodate diverse households. One of the objectives was to keep and attract families in the urban renewal areas, but also keep current households. Thus, besides focusing on diversifying the social composition, the programmes pursued also through the differentiation in age distribution (Stouten, 2010). In terms of design, most of the plans were developed in consultation with
residents and due to the budget limitation the architecture of the buildings can be criticised (Fels, 2007). For instance, new social housing buildings were often unfamiliar to the local architecture and disconnected to the sidewalks and public spaces of the old inner city districts. Nevertheless, social housing, including those in attractive locations, gave low-income and minority ethnic groups the opportunity to improve their housing situation (Stouten, 2010).

Building for the Neighbourhood succeeded in many ways but it was criticised for different reasons. Firstly, it provided a narrow housing scope, mostly social housing (Koffijberg, 2005). Secondly, urban renewal for the provision of social housing in existing neighborhoods was much more complex than in expansion areas. Land acquisition costs and demolitions were expensive. The government had to force commercial landlords (often slum landlords) to maintain or sell their properties. Furthermore, the programme required sitting tenants to be resettled in their own neighbourhood, which was an expensive operation. Thirdly, it improved mostly housing and neglected the improvement of public spaces, community facilities, and socio-economic problems. Families saw no future to make roots in these districts, which became heterogenous districts composed by a collection of low-income and minority groups. This last issue was perhaps the most significant and criticised, and the one changing ‘urban renewal’ to ‘urban regeneration’ in the coming years. Although a lot on money was invested in low-income districts for the provision and rehabilitation of housing, no upgrading in social and economic aspects was achieved. Poverty, unemployment and related social problems remained and intensified. Thus urban restructuring addressing the strengthening of the economy was sought after in the coming years.

In term of participation, natives were usually more involved in the planning process than immigrants. The different minority groups of the urban renewal areas did not always represent project groups. The programme did not assist building up the social structure of inner city districts (van der Cammen & Klerksdorp, 2003). Additionally, participation was limited. There was a high degree of government control. Building for the Neighbourhood was a progressive programme but tenants did not achieve the autonomy through self-management and property titles that for instance squatters and urban homesteaders achieved with the assistance of progressive sweat equity and tenant-based housing programmes in America at the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s (see Chapter 3 and 5). In the Netherlands, housing was improved and tenants gradually got rid of slum landlords but did not have the agency to transform and take control of their own homes and neighborhoods. Properties were transferred to housing associations to be managed and maintained by these entities. Tenants had limited responsibilities and lack of any sort of ownership over the properties.
In 1985, the Town and Village Renewal Act [Nota Stads- en Dorpsvernieuwing] called for doubling the efforts and subsidies to close the housing deficit gap. In order to achieve this, new financial, organisational and legal measures had to be considered. The Urban Renewal Fund [Stadsvernieuwingsfonds] was an important breakthrough in the financial relations between central and local government. It facilitated the decentralisation and collection of resources for urban renewal (Korthals Altes, 2000). Municipalities were given a wide discretion in the use of resources. Additionally, other instruments to carry out local policies were introduced, often with requirements related to citizen participation (Stouten, 2010).

City restructuring strengthening the economy: The rise of problem accumulation areas and district management programmes

During the post-war years, as it was illustrated before, Dutch policy involved building high-quality housing and high-cost accommodation, including in the social rental sector for a wide range of households, from low- to middle-income ones (van der Schaar, 1982). However, this condition shifted gradually when allowances were granted and home ownership began gradually expanding. Better off households began moving to private rental and owner occupied housing in the peripheries and low-income households remained in old pre-war housing or social housing, which gradually became occupied by low-income groups and those with special needs. Mostly young people, students, immigrants, the unemployed and low-income residents remained in old inner city districts. When Suriname gained independence in 1975 nearly one-third of the population immigrated to the Netherlands. This population was absorbed in many of these districts. The fading of long standing residents, mostly property owners, gave room to a different type of landlords. As the value of properties declined, slum landlords took over the properties mostly for profit making in these impoverished areas. In hands of dubious landlords, pre-war buildings were barely maintained and neighbourhoods eventually declined.

The clearance of slums and the decline of private rental housing opportunities (private dwellings were demolished or rehabilitated for the provision of social housing) resulting in a flow of low-income households into social housing, often in the less popular estates (de Jonge, 1985). According to van der Schaar (1982), even housing associations were not willing to rehouse ‘problematic’, low-income and minority, tenants such as Surinamese and guest workers from Eastern Europe and North Africa (these two groups are currently the target of a number of housing and urban policies), neither tenants from urban renewal areas or with medical conditions. These tenants were often housed in the less desirable properties which were the ones owned by
municipalities with poor quality and smaller units. Thus, even stratification within the social rental housing stock gradually took place (van Kempen & Priemus, 2002).

At the end to the 1990s urban renewal [stadsvernieuwing], which focused on the improvement of low-income neighborhoods through the socialisation of housing for the urban poor, shifted to urban regeneration [stedelijke vernieuwing] with a focus on strengthening the city economy. This new policy aimed to address the ongoing social problems, mostly related to poverty and unemployment, by giving priority to economic development. Developing ‘a promising arena for the international economic competition, where city marketing would persuade multinationals to engage in public-private partnerships bringing new economic growth to the city or the city region’ became the focus (Musterd & Osterdorf, 2008). This new approach questioned the way and pace to tackle the deficit of housing of the time. Thus, the energy and capital supporting local coalitions involved in the socialisation of housing were gradually directed to public-private partnerships that, in reality, had different interests. Urban renewal processes led by residents, housing associations and local stakeholders had to be completed in other ways for rapid results. Time and economic efficiency was sought after. It was desired to give a more prominent role to the private market, so citizen participation in urban renewal processes weakened.

The Fourth Memorandum on Physical Planning [Vierde Nota Ruimtelijke Ordening] and the Fourth Memorandum on Physical Planning Plus [Vierde Nota Ruimtelijke Ordening Extra] were elaborated soon after, in 1988 and 1989 respectively. They supported the privatisation, deregulation, and decentralisation of housing and urban renewal. These documents marked a shift of power from central government to local government and housing associations. Additionally, these memorandums called for residential growth, once again, in the peripheries and the influx of middle-income households to those areas (VINEX locations). Soon after, in 1989, the memorandum Housing in the Nineties [Volkshuisvesting in de Jaren Negentig] was laid down emphasising the importance of decentralisation and hiving off policy to the municipalities and housing associations (Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening [VROM], 2001).

These policies gradually increased the poverty gap and stratification in the social housing sector that had begun years back. While some areas developed in the peripheries and specific central city areas with large investments and financing, old inner city districts declined further. By the end of the 1980s it was evident that the newly neoliberal approaches were generating negative social and physical conditions in large cities. Urban planning and development became a task for experts, developers, housing associations and municipalities. Priority was given to public-private partnerships’ interests over the needs, priorities and visions of low-income groups and minorities. They became voiceless and their living environments burdened with new
challenges. During this period of changes—in urban policy, housing provision and local governance—urban decline intensified in pre-war and post-war districts (such as Rotterdam South’s garden cities), with a concentration of vacancies, population turnovers (concentration of immigrants), degradation of housing and public spaces, as well as unemployment, vandalism and petty crime (Priemus, 1988). New programmes were proposed looking for alternative approaches to respond to the emerging urban conditions. The Problem Accumulation Areas Policy [Problem Cumulatie Gebiden], or so called Disadvantaged Areas Policy [Achterstandsgebiedenbeleid], was launched in 1986 and the Social Renewal Policy [Soziale Vernieuwening] a few years later. The improvements of housing and residential environments, as well as the mitigation of unemployment, crime, and vandalism, were among the main goals of the programmes (Hulsbergen & Stouten, 2001; Stouten, 2010). The first one required the cooperation and coordination between municipalities, governmental institutions, civic organisations and residents. According to an evaluation (de Haan, 1997), the programme accomplished many of its objectives, but tuned out to be quite challenging. Apparently, the main reason was the lack of coordination between the public departments involved and public funding flows. Local public services such as those focused on administrative prevention (Justice en Binnenlandse Zaken), social development (WVC) and social management in neighbourhoods (VROM) most of the time only sought their own policy goals. Policies and instruments administered by these entities were hardly aligned (de Haan, 1997). Additionally, co-operation was mainly between social and governmental institutions; local organisations had a minor role and individuals were sometimes excluded (Stouten, 2010).

In 1989, after this attempt, the Social Renewal Policy was launched aiming for the prevention of crime in big cities through the development of new administrative frameworks. Again, the co-operation between public authorities, civil society, local businesses and residents, as well as cross-sector collaboration of municipal services was required. This policy opened up new possibilities at the local level to address the ongoing social problems, especially through administrative reforms that encouraged decentralisation, deregulation and decompartmentalization. These reforms were needed to bring a cultural change leading to a coherent and integrated approach to problems in the sphere of education and labour, care and services, and the environment (de Haan, 1997). The Social Renewal Policy considered the neighbourhood to be an important medium to activate the civic society and to increase participation via the labour market and social relations (Musterd & Osterdof, 2008). This approach promoted opportunities for the long-term unemployed and low educated, improving at the same time quality of housing and living conditions and ameliorating crime and other social problems (Hulsbergen & Stouten, 2001). In fact, some of the approaches of this new policy resemble policies and initiatives of post-war years. Activities facilitating community organisation [opbouwwerk], community
development [samenlevingsopbouw], and other sorts of participatory activities were considered, especially for the development of neighbourhood covenants, and the implementation of the so-called neighbourhood and district management [wijk- en buurtheer]. The term district and neighbourhood management was coined with the inception of the Social Renewal Policy. It proposed a range of activities to prevent environment degradation and crime. Under the heading of ‘integrated neighbourhood management’ [integraal buurtheer] many projects developed following a number of conditions and recommendations (Wine, 1991, p. 25):

1. A neighbourhood management project needs a coherent package of measures, which are based on a thorough analysis of the local conditions and crime problems;
2. The measures must have sufficient and broad support of the local community;
3. Residents should be involved in the design and implementation of the measures from the beginning;
4. And, the measures should focus on the issues experienced by the residents involved.

Participation of residents was central to the integrated neighbourhood management approach. As in previous urban crisis, local expertise was key for the improvement of their own living environment. Residents were able to identify problems, find solutions and get actively involved. However, citizen involvement was not enough. According to an evaluation undertaken by the Social Renewal Programme (Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, 1994), there was an administrative impact. Some barriers between the municipalities and civic organisations were removed, as well as in cross-sectoral and community work services. However, policy coordination between municipal and social organisations barely occurred. They found that the district managers had to bridge the gap between administrative and implementing organisations, which were usually churches or community organisations. They found out also that assigning a budget for the neighbourhood that could be used to address the problems identified by residents and/or local groups could increase interaction between citizens and local governments. Additionally, they found, that the transfer of power from municipal services to community organisations could give residents a greater say in the planning and implementation of district policy. This way, control from below could be stimulated. An initial evaluation found out that management of the living environment (cleaning, street beautification, etc.) was effective when the bottom-up approach was applied. However, in most of the other areas of interest, problems were defined by municipalities and therefore approached from above.

The Social Renewal Policy was first tested in Rotterdam (in Spangen and Tarwewijk) and in Amsterdam through the development of local actions plans, and in other cities subsequently. A reduction of crime and fear of crime, as well as an increase in the quality of life was shown in these two cities (Van Overbeeke & Van Soomeren, 1994).
Similar results were found in an evaluation of 18 neighbourhood management projects in 12 municipalities (van Overbeeke & van Soomeren, 1994): an improvement in the physical quality of life but in a less extent for the social viability. The perception of safety increased mostly in terms of petty crime but drug crime seemed difficult to grasp. The first results were encouraging, crime prevention and management got support. However, there were also other points of view. Van der Zwan and Entzinger (1994) agreed that most of the time the high expectations were not reached, and that the continued attention of government for policy innovation was necessary, especially in municipalities with a great accumulation of ‘problematic’ areas, such as in the case of Rotterdam. This city faced other challenges which included drug related crime, unemployment and social inequality. Chapter 6 outlines the measures and outcomes of this policy, as well as the residents’ role in the district of Tarwewijk, Rotterdam. It illustrates what other studies also noted (Musterd & Ostendorf, 2008), that when policy targets areas with multiple problems it was not very broad and did not fully succeeded. However, it paved the way for new initiatives addressing low-income neighborhoods in the coming decade.

The initial plans of the Social Renewal Policy acted as catalyst in the formulation of the Delta Plan for Big Cities [Deltaplan voor de Grote Steden], which was drafted by the mayors of the largest cities in the Netherlands at the beginning of the 1990s. This plan focused on safety and crime prevention. It aimed providing assistance and resources to vulnerable neighborhoods to address issues around unemployment, safety, quality of life and care. The plan focused on specific problematic districts located in the largest cities: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Den Haag and Utrecht. It paved the way for some of the initiatives drafted in the Big Cities Policy [Grote Steden Beleid], which later on expanded its efforts to smaller cities. Most of these initiatives were area-based; a district approach was looked into as a way to tackle the complex urban problems of districts such as Tarwewijk.

**The integrated approach: From focus areas to empowered districts**

By the 1990s both national and local governments coincided with the opinion that in a number of urban neighbourhoods there was too great a concentration of ethnic minorities, and low-income groups and unemployed. A differentiation of the housing stock was necessary to bring about a more balanced population (Priemus, 2004). Although this notion seemed once again oriented towards housing it was clear that the physical approach would not be able to tackle the complexity of urban problems. A more integrated and coordinated area-based approach was needed, as well as a new urban renewal strategy (Priemus, 2004). In 1994 the Big Cities Policy was created
focusing in the largest cities and combining a number of ministries, and around 42 subsidy schemes (see Figure 4.3). It was based in three priority pillars — physical, economic and social — that were meant to work in a correlated way.

FIGURE 4.3 Cities addressed by the Big City Policy in 1994
At the local level, a district approach was encouraged to lead to long-term improvements (van Kempen, 2000). The Big Cities Policy was enacted in four different stages. The first stage, from 1994 to 1999, addressed the existence of homogenous neighborhoods mostly by demolition and new construction in order to promote a social mix in neighborhoods (Musterd & Ostendorf, 2008). The physical pillar, which meant to work in coordination with social and economic pillars, mainly addressed urban renewal in inner city districts, post-war neighborhoods, and former industrial areas and harbours (VROM, 2007). Out of this pillar the new Urban Regeneration Policy [Stedelijke Vernieuwing] was created in 1997 dealing with the rehabilitation of declining urban districts and the amelioration of social and spatial segregation. This was aimed through the diversification of housing stock; therefore the development of more expensive housing (mostly owner occupied housing) in deprived neighborhoods and the stimulation of changes in the social composing of particular areas (Kruythoff, 2003; Musterd & Ostendorf, 2008). This policy addressed, besides housing the improvement of the urban environment, car facilities, and public spaces, as well as economic, social and cultural amenities strengthening neighborhoods (Priemus, 2004). Improving the social climate was meant to increase the attractiveness or ‘liveability’ of disadvantaged areas (Kruythoff, 2003). However, this first stage was criticised since in order to develop more expensive housing and bringing better off families, old housing structures had to be demolished and long standing residents had to be displaced. Interestingly, middle class families were not willing to move and grow roots in these neighborhoods. Additionally, it was acknowledged that ‘poor people were not necessarily helped by being given new neighbours’ (Musterd & Ostendorf, 2008).

During the second stage, from 2000 to 2004, the main aim was to prevent downgrading of neighborhoods through outmigration of successful residents (Musterd & Ostendorf, 2008). This was planned by offering current residents housing opportunities in their own neighborhoods. During this stage of the Big Cities Policy many budgets available were brought together in three big funds, one for each pillar (Musterd & Ostendorf, 2008). In the year 2000 new agreements were set in the new Urban Regeneration Policy for the next years where ‘separate projects are not longer financed and agreements are reached on the targets on the basis of multilayer development plans in each city’ (Priemus, 2004). This time, the number of the cities increased from four to thirty large and medium size cities, and the task was mainly for local actors and municipalities. Additionally, in 2003, a fourth pillar was added: safety. Safety became a major issue that was not addressed in former renewal plans (see Aalbers, Beckhoven, van Kempen, Musterd & Osterndorf, 2004). Moreover, municipalities obtained financial support from the newly Investment Budget for Urban Regeneration [Investeringsbudget Stedelijke Vernieuwing]. The new funds allowed Municipalities to apply for money and create their own plans according to their local needs and interests. Once again, a district approach was sought with the aim of
ensuring market demands for housing in the long term; stimulating heterogeneous populations; reducing the social rental housing; and increasing homeowner occupied housing with middle and high income families. Under the lineaments of the previous laws, memorandums and programmes, an area-based initiative called the 56-District Approach [56-Wijkenaanpak] was set in action addressing specific priority districts in 2003. The districts were selected from the thirty cities targeted in the second reform of the Big Cities Policy, including Rotterdam with a number of neighborhoods (see Figure 4.4). The initiative aimed to accelerate urban renewal and achieve the goals and agreements set under the coordination of councils and local partners.

The third phase, which was conceived for the period 2005-2009, had as central goal and motto ‘cooperating towards strong cities’ (VROM, 2006). It sought to reduce bureaucracy, increase transparency and create tailor-made solutions with integrated approaches. For instance, the 40-Empowered Districts [40-Krachtwijken] action programme followed the 56-District Approach in 2007. For this effort the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment [Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieu or VROM] established a policy agreement addressing housing, communities, and integration for deprived neighborhoods. In such statement it was set as an aim to work with residents, civic organisations and institutions to locally activate and create the conditions required to revitalise ‘problematic neighborhoods’. In addition, a long-term, intensive, cohesive and broad approach was envisioned to tackle problems such as high unemployment rates and scarcity of jobs, homogeneous populations, housing decline, public spaces deterioration, drug nuisance, crime and antisocial behaviour. The main focus of this programme was turn districts of attention into districts of empowerment [van aandachtswijk naar krachtwijk] (VROM, 2007a).

In Rotterdam 23 neighbourhoods, concentrated in 7 districts, were targeted in such programme setting Rotterdam as the city with the most deprived districts in the country (see Figure 5.10). Eventually, the 40+Districts [40+Wijken] initiative was launched to expand the number of districts with a serious accumulation of problems that were not part of the previous initiative (40-Empowered Districts) earmarked by former Minister Vogelaar16 (VROM, 2009). The physical pillar, according to VROM (2006), included environmental quality, improving cultural-historic features, housing for specific groups and the improvement of spatial conditions for the creation of an ‘attractive social and safe’ environment. This pillar aimed working in coordination with the social and economic pillars, which addressed citizenship and integration, social care, safety, participation, and the stimulation of new means of production with

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16 The districts involved in both programmes, the 40-Empowered Districts and the 40+Districts, were designated by Ella Vogelaar, Minister of Housing, Communities and Integration in the Four Balkenende Cabinet for PvdA (Labour Party).
innovative and entrepreneurial approaches. Startlingly, it is important to note that besides these goals the restructuring of neighbourhoods through social mix continued.

During the last phase, from 2010–2014, the Big Cities Policy pursued social cohesion, security and economic vitality in cities through the active participation of residents as well as greater integration and emancipation of ethnic groups. Certainly, an emphasis in the neighbourhood approach continued (EUKN, 2008). However, even
when the restructuring of post-war neighborhoods and other urban districts with one-sided housing was desired to stimulate a larger differentiation of housing stock across cities, plans eventually shifted. The intention was to carry out housing and urban restructuring experiments with the assistance of the Innovation Programme for Urban Regeneration [Innovatieprogramma Stedelijke Vernieuwing], just like in the previous phases of the Big Cities Policy, but financial aid was cut before the end of this phase. The 2008 economic crisis brought about public cuts and a decline in private investment from corporations and developers, and in turn changes to Big Cites Policy’s neighbourhood approach. The state retreated from urban renewal as part of a wider decentralisation trend. Less intervention from the government and more decentralisation through public-private partnerships was encouraged. However, since vulnerable areas represented a particular risk for any sort of investment, other sort of approaches involving more local stakeholders began to be envisioned by municipalities. The outline of the Big Cities Policy drafted above mostly describes the government aims and visions. The implementation and outcomes of most of these phases are illustrated in detail in Chapter 6, which depicts the case study of Tarwewijk in Rotterdam.

§ 4.3 Decentralisation and action plans

Decentralisation in planning and urban restructuring processes gradually unfolded while the Big Cities Policy sought out the ‘integrated approach’ and, more specifically, the area-based policies implemented in the so-called Vogelaarwijken, which are translated to English as Vogelaar Districts. During this time, local policy-makers began developing multi-year development programmes with measurable goals, which function as targets within contracts and between municipalities and ministries (Aalbers & van Beckhoven, 2010). Cities were asked to formulate their strategies and plans according to their needs and priorities, and encourage boroughs, city districts and even neighborhoods to develop their own visions and action plans. Most importantly, in most of the action plans developed by cities, districts, and neighborhoods, or at least in those developed in the City of Rotterdam (study area), one requisite has been constant; the involvement of local residents. The question is why citizen participation has been called for —again, after a series of unsuccessful participatory approaches—and how power in decision making has been granted to people, especially to those ethnic minorities and low-income households that have been ‘targeted’ in the integrated approach. If the aim of the Big Cities Policy has been the social, economic, and physical improvement of disadvantaged districts, it is expected that residents should be leading, more than just being ‘integrated’ in the restructuring of their own
living environment. They should be key actors identifying local needs and priorities and setting up visions and policies. In order to answer this question, research on the Big Cities Policy should be conducted at the city, district, and neighbourhood level, as well as on the local instruments available to ensure citizens have a direct voice in public decisions (see Chapter 6).

Previous studies on area-based restructuring approaches supported by the Big Cities Policy offer several points of critique and provide an insight of the challenges citizens face to participate in local restructuring processes (Aalbers & van Beckhoven, 2010; Uitermark, 2003). Firstly, the Big Cities Policy was not regarded as a fully integrated policy but as an uncoordinated (and bureaucratic) structure with a wide spectrum of policies channeled through separate funds (Aalbers & van Beckhoven, 2010). The Urban Regeneration policy implied a new organisation and operation in the new institutions of urban and regional governance where the transfer of responsibilities is not only from national scale to a variety of other spatial scales but also from the public to the private sector, especially for the execution, and sometimes formulation, of policies (Uitermark, 2003). As Uitermark (2003, p. 535) argues, ‘the restructuring policy is supposed to improve the functioning of neighbourhood governance networks that have become more salient as a result of recent processes or rescaling’. However, as he notes, in order to prove that it is necessary to map the interdependencies within the governance structures to understand the way the state facilitates the political strategies of some actors instead of the others. It is important to acknowledge, as he states, that the capacity of some actors to command that government policies may be significant when these entities occupy a central position within national governance networks. Uitermark (2003) also argues that shifts in the configuration of interdependencies do not simultaneously lead to a change in policy measures (as it can be illustrated in Chapter 6). He states that in order to study changes in power relationships it is critical ‘to pay attention to the way in which problems are constructed and the way in which actors (re)define their own interests’ (Uitermark, 2003, p. 536). Furthermore, he adds, there is often an issue in the reaction and response to the local conditions by powerful actors. Therefore, it has to be enquired how actors identify problems and the way (policies and measures) they addressed these problems.

According to Aalbers and van Beckhoven (2010), the programme was co-ordinated by the department of Managerial, International and Funding Affairs, although a large part of the money came from other Ministries. It is important to mention that the Urban Regeneration Policy was in practice not integrated neither administered by this entity but by the Ministry of Housing Spatial Planning and Environment. The department of Managerial, International and Funding Affairs was responsible for setting up the objectives, and ensuring accountability to the national and local government. Coordinators and project managers from different local departments,
who were responsible for developing the Big Cities Policy plans, carried out the actual programme. In order to do this, they had to work in close cooperation with local partners. These partners were crucial for the successful progress of the plans since as ‘specialists in the field’ they had to implement large parts of the programme (Aalbers & van Beckhoven, 2010). The objective was to work in an integrated way. However, direct lines of communication and money were not fully implemented. Since national budgets are allocated to the different departments this presents a challenge. Moreover, local stakeholders, officials, and local governments involved in the development of neighbourhood-plans often had limited knowledge about the Big Cities Policy’s objectives at the neighbourhood level (Aalbers & van Beckhoven, 2010). Aalbers and van Beckhoven (2010) argue that the bureaucracy of the Big Cities Policy resulted in an increase of government layers, longer lines of communication and more meetings and reports. This was translated to longer times for plans to be developed, communicated and implemented at the neighbourhood level. Additionally, the governance structure here outlined seems quite hierarchical and uncoordinated, which represents a challenge for residents and minority groups regarding representation and decision making. Consequently, Uitermark’s enquiries are absolutely relevant to understand the power structures and the role of citizens.

Secondly, there is an evident fragmentation and asymmetrical emphasis in the policy’s social, economic, physical and safety ‘pillars’. VROM-Raad, the Advisory Council of the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment, acknowledged these facts. Considering the insights of VROM-Raad (2001), we could argue that the social pillar focused more on integration than poverty and exclusion, while the physical pillar focused more on differentiation of the housing stock than improving the workplace and living environment of low-income neighbourhoods. Most importantly, physical solutions were often used to mitigate social problems (see Chapter 6). The Big Cities Policy unfolded a number of urban initiatives and planning approaches aiming to arrest urban decline in disadvantaged districts and increase their liveability\(^\text{17}\) at all costs since the 1990s. Moreover, as it was illustrated above, such urban decline was associated with the existence of interrelated social problems (such as poverty, unemployment, crime, and so on) and, most importantly, with the concentration of low-income minorities in specific urban areas, which were designated as ‘priority districts’ and eventually ‘empowered districts’. In any case, the main measure to achieve the desired liveability was the improvement of the living environment by a strategic housing and social upgrading (housing upgrading leading to social upgrading). This improvement

\(^{17}\) Let’s don’t forget that the term ‘liveability’ has been used extensily in neoliberal discourses related to economic development —and by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)—to rank cities and promote urban competition across the globe.
or upgrading meant, in practical terms, the replacement of social housing by owner occupied housing, and therefore the replacement of low-income and ethnic groups by native or better off households. This does not mean that Dutch policy was focused solely on this measure. In fact, it promoted and aligned a number of policies and funds to achieve the economic, social, and physical improvement of disadvantaged districts. However, it is relevant to address this specific measure while looking at the role of citizens in urban restructuring process of their own districts for two reasons. Firstly, because the involvement of residents and local stakeholders is an essential part of the rhetoric used in the different ‘district approaches’ envisioned by this policy. Secondly, because by implementing this measure (replacement of housing stock and social composition) with highly planned instruments used by highly complex governance structures, long standing residents were either forced to leave or encouraged to engage in action plans and covenants that were already drafted and signed by higher governance levels. In any case, something key that Aalbers and van Beckhoven (2010) also question is, weather urban restructuring focuses on present residents or on attracting new residents, such as households with stronger socio-economic position. Apparently, as they argue, physical and social interventions seemed to focus on attracting new residents rather than in existing residents. This paradox raises similar questions. Whose needs, interests and objectives are addressed in the restructuring of disadvantaged districts? Who is integrated and participating in local action plans?

Thirdly, considering the previous developments, we can discern that integrated policies did not resulted in endogenous and sustainable area-based initiatives in the designated districts. Aalbers and van Beckhoven (2010) in their study in Amsterdam and Utrecht concluded that local needs and problems as well as strengths and opportunities were often overlooked in the localised plans. On the other hand, the VROM-Raad (2001) acknowledged in a study developed during the first stages of the Big City Policy that local policies and plans seemed to share more similarities than differences in designated districts across the county. In the case of the physical pillar, the study showed that even when the government aimed to provide municipalities discretion to choose a tailored approach according to its needs and priorities, it kept holding control through a series of performance requirements. Consultation with civic organisations and private parties as well as with the region and the province proved to be limited. Especially because at the first stages the policy had very tight deadlines to close covenants, developed policy frameworks, and written multi-annual development programmes. This pushed things forward in order to get things done. As the study states, with more time, any proposal has a plurality of objections. Thus, centralism rather than decentralisation tends to be encouraged. For instance, according to the report, in some cases, evaluation criteria did not develop until municipal plans were made and there was already money distributed before the legal framework was developed. Municipalities were in a way forced to comply with the policy framework and
associate their intentions to the wishes of central government, although addressing the local and regional situation may have led to a much more localised and community-based policy.

§ 4.4 Conclusion

This chapter illustrates the evolution of urban restructuring policies, instruments, and programmes, and examines the numerous public efforts to engage citizens, civic associations and other local stakeholders in urban transformative process in low-income districts in the Netherlands. Citizen participation, as it was illustrated in this chapter, has been encouraged in public policy for more than fifty years. A large amount of public money has been invested in public programmes. However, what kind of power do citizens have over the reconstruction, renewal and restructuring of Dutch cities? The challenges and limitations of citizens, as well as the state, in such processes have been numerous. It is possible to claim that there are neither successes nor failures. State approaches and citizen endeavours have profited from and been influenced by the local opportunities and the status quo of the time — community organising, advocacy planning, activism, technological advances, state welfare, decentralisation and political changes coming from the left and the right — while facing challenges rising from the regional and global context and trends of the time — worldwide recessions, immigration, neoliberalisation, urban competition and financialisation of housing. In summary, we can identify a number of key aspects answering the main question of this study: Are cities for citizens, or, are cities against citizens?

Firstly, the involvement of citizens in the transformation of impoverished districts has been highly institutionalised rather than a grassroots movement leading to the direction and operation of urban processes. Of course, there are some exceptions where urban processes were politicised and citizens were instrumental in the provision and allocation of housing. For instance, the Building for the Neighbourhood initiative radicalised urban processes in a time of worldwide urban mobilisations and advocacy planning. With an alarming housing deficit and urban decline, and without private investment on sight, the state had no option but to partner with those invested in the urban renewal districts, local residents, and civic associations. Citizen participation in this initiative was certainly institutionalised but residents built an agency that transformed them while transforming their own living environment. In a time of massive demolitions and displacement, this movement demanded the involvement of tenants in the decision making processes. The movement demanded
a set of rights: the right to adequate housing, the right to stay, and the right to the city. Unfortunately, the following policies and approaches, even when claimed the acknowledgement of citizen participation as a catalyst for urban change, mostly attempted —sometimes without success—to integrate locals in the old and perhaps evolving governance structures. The most compelling initiative was perhaps the Social Renewal Policy since it represented a shift in the scope of urban programmes. Unlike previous approaches, which focused exclusively on physical renewal, there was a strong emphasis on community development and also local autonomy in policy making and implementation. Local stakeholders had a say in shaping local policy and initiatives, while central government provided funds and guidelines. Additionally, cooperation between government agencies was required and the integration of citizens and civic associations in the newly established governance structures (Uitermark, 2003). The scope of this policy—which addressed social, economic and safety issues of concern identified by local actors—continued to be present in some of the initiatives of the Big Cities Policy. Social and economic measures to revitalise cities and disadvantaged neighborhoods were considered as important as physical transformations. However, citizens claiming participation or empowerment did not drive this shift nor did the growing concern for the fate of the urban poor, it was rather galvanised by the institutions that operated in disadvantaged neighbourhoods (Uitermark, 2003). Those institutions were the ones putting ‘urban problems’ on the political agenda. In fact, the mayors of the four largest cities called the Big Cities Policy for assistance and demanded the strengthening of relatively poor cities and neighbourhoods (Uitermark, 2003). However, it is important to note, local institutions and mayors did not mobilised for a truly empowerment of disadvantaged groups, neither these groups demanded through direct action participation in urban affairs. The formulation of neighbourhood, district, and city action plans made this fact even more evident in the following years. As it was illustrated above, citizens had a marginal representation in the decision-making. The governance structure of the decentralised and integrated approaches continued to be quite hierarchical, uncoordinated and, most importantly, with numerous partners, public and private (Aalbers & van Beekhoven, 2010). Thus, the evolution of institutionalised participation in this direction represents a challenge for the urban poor and minority groups since old public-social partnerships with city agencies, civic associations, and citizens have moved to public-private partnerships with interests overlooking community development. These public-private partnerships are composed of numerous city agencies working at different levels and with different powers and the private sector, including housing associations, development companies, and financial institutions.

Secondly, integration and decentralisation in urban restructuring policy and implementation approaches did not take place as envisioned and claimed in urban policy. Therefore neither the cooperation with, nor the delegation of power to citizens
and civic associations asserted by the Big Cities Policy. The Big Cities Policy recognised that cities have a say in the whole policy process, from setting goals to formulating policy, and from implementing programmes to self-evaluating those measures. This move represented a deregulation and decentralisation of power and resources, a shift from government to governance. In other words, it implied the delegation of responsibilities from central government to municipalities and new local public-private partnerships assuming that those entities, usually with different interests and visions, will form alliances to collaboratively identify local problems and assets, and cooperate between each other and with local residents to mitigate those conditions and use local resources to catalyse change. Essentially, the so-called integrated approach was documented in paper, in both legislation and action plans (different levels), but in practice sectorial programmes were still embedded in the government’s organisation and old actors continued to have a stake in the programme while new actors struggle to be included (Aalbers & van Beckhoven, 2010). As Aalbers and van Beckhoven assert (2010) ‘despite the overall rhetoric of joined-up government, administrative cultures and organisational divisions and practices tend toward the maintenance of a sectoral status quo and in many cases the retention of authority at central government level; existing policy-actor networks use their possibilities to restrain from ‘real’ changes, and adopt discourse changes into existing practices. It appears that some area-based initiatives claiming to be using integrated methods are not, and ‘integration’ is a term not implemented, but only used by policy-makers’ (p. 10).

In terms of financing and decision making, as Aalbers and van Beckhoven (2010) illustrate, the national government allocated most of the funding while city mayors decided where and how to distribute the funds. Certainly, middle management in local agencies often added an extra layer of bureaucracy and regulations, which was usually obscure and inflexible. In the case of the integrated approach, it sought to build an additional layer of policy rather than localised policies, programmes and instruments at the local level. In praxis, the decentralisation and the rise of governance — horizontal, flexible, cooperative and participatory — sought did not fully took place since the government — vertical, rigid, authoritarian and bureaucratic — remained quite strong. Despite the increasing role of housing associations and development corporations, the state orchestrated most of the social and urban affairs. However this does not mean that those entities did not have a role. The paternalistic approach of national social and urban programmes was actually handed to housing associations, which now act as foster parents, state-certified caregivers, of neighborhoods and districts. Undoubtedly, these entities have a greater role in local politics than civic associations and residents. Therefore nonhierarchical-participatory governance at the local level is often not existent. Residents and civic associations are usually limited to public hearings and to apply for short term participatory projects, that usually involves sanitation, surveillance, beautification of their own living environments, and in some cases community
development. Local concerns, demands and initiatives coming from citizens are hardly leading the direction of local action plans. Government agencies at the municipal, regional and national level usually frame problems, solutions and policies. Eventually, the integration of citizens in policy implementation was carried out under a doctrine of adaptation rather than a truly democratic participation implying a political and life-changing commitment. Apparently, this has been the norm since the 1960s. Urban restructuring policies, programmes and plans have targeted the urban poor and the socially, culturally and politically marginalised aiming for an integration and adaptation of those in the structure and politics of the city rather than facilitating the transformation of the city by its citizens. A local diagnosis produced by residents and community stakeholders to define local needs, priorities and visions entails months of community organising and mobilisation as well as the provision of pedagogical tools to make public policy public and public funds accessible to stakeholders living in designated areas. Thus, despite programmes that have been designed to induce a sense of shared responsibility among the inhabitants of disadvantaged neighbourhoods, these instruments have not been considered, or at least are not visible and put in practice, in current policies. Thus there is a disconnection in governance structures not only at higher levels but, most importantly, between top down (national, regional and municipal) and bottom up (district, neighbourhood and residents) efforts to produce transformative programmes to improve the social, economic and physical conditions of todays and future generations. Public tools and instruments facilitating informed decisions for the creation of local plans and policies as well as cooperation and training to implement and self-manage those are needed at the neighbourhood level. And most importantly, trained city planners, community leaders and organisers invested in building local solidarity and cooperation networks that could serve as tools for political leverage.

Thirdly, housing has been the common denominator of most of the urban restructuring programmes, including those advocating for citizen involvement and localised policies. However, and despite the questionable outcomes of a series of policies tackling social issues with housing, this fact has not been fully acknowledged by planners, city officials and the state. Since post war years housing is seen as the solution to social crises and a way to stabilise the urban society using, besides housing reform, social engineering and policies of adaptation. From the ‘garden city’ experiment and its spatial determinism aiming social reform and healthier urban life to the functionalist city and its mass-produced housing with improved floor plans designed to cultivate dwelling’s habits. And more recently, from the VINEX housing developments conceived as an option to isolate and privatise the lives of the better off to the social mix policy aiming to lighten and enlighten ‘dark’ districts with ‘white’ educated inhabitants. The Urban Regeneration Policy initiated in the 1990s [Nota Stedelijke Vernieuwing], which is central for this study, served mostly three main goals: managing the housing
stock, strengthening the economic base of big cities, and promoting social mixed neighbourhoods (Priemus & van Kempen, 1998, 1999). According to Priemus and van Kempen (1998, 1999), and as it is illustrated in Chapter 6, the first goal required the involvement of other parties besides the government, such as private corporations (public-private partnerships) and housing associations, who in some districts are the largest landlords. As Chapter 6 illustrates, in designated areas the built environment was improved, the housing stock was renovated and is currently effectively managed, and public spaces feel safe and clean. The second goal was sought through the transformation of deprived neighbourhoods into attractive and ‘liveable’ ones to activate the housing market, promote private investment and attract middle-income households. This was achieved by fulfilling the first goal and through the construction of new housing types, mostly owner-occupied housing often at the expense of social housing. Lastly, implementing the first two objectives carried out the promotion of socially mixed districts. Generally speaking, the housing and urban condition of priority districts was improved (see Chapter 6). However, these goals have put in question if urban restructuring policies and action plans aimed to benefit residents of designated districts as they claimed. It is unclear, as Aalbers and van Beckhoven (2010) note, if urban restructuring policies and programmes focused on existing residents. What is clear is that urban restructuring policies aimed ‘to stabilise the socioeconomic status of the designated neighbourhoods by ensuring the presence of a minimum number of affluent households’ (Uitermark, 2003). However, this strategy was not successful in some of the designated areas. As it is illustrated in Chapter 6, housing renewal has promoted the displacement of the urban poor but not always its replacement by better off households.

The social mixing policy promoted since the early 1990s is certainly controversial, particularly in a context of urban and housing policies calling for citizen participation. ‘It is frequently suggested, by planners and politicians alike, that a policy that promotes ‘social mixing’ could strengthen the social tissue of a disadvantaged neighbourhood, thus saving its inhabitants from living in an environment that allegedly inhibits social and economic integration’ (Uitermark, 2003, p. 531). However, this discourse has served to veil a deliberate state-led gentrification in areas with weak housing markets and entangled urban problems. The way housing improvement was undertaken certainly promoted the replacement of low-income rental housing by owner-occupied housing and, in turn, the replacement of ethnic and low-income households by native and middle income households. This, by all means, can be called a conscious gentrification envisioned, funded, and supported by the state at different levels. And as in any other gentrification endeavours, poverty, unemployment, crime and other social and economic problems have not been mitigated but deconcentrated.
PART 4  Socio-spatial restructuring in low-income districts in New York City and the Randstad Holland
5 Housing as an urban restructuring strategy in Brooklyn: The case of Bushwick

§ 5.1 Introduction

Urban restructuring has transformed the landscape of New York City’s boroughs over the last few decades. In Brooklyn large urban projects have taken place in different locations, especially at water fronts, post industrial and historic districts, and increasingly at ethnic and working class neighbourhoods with strategic locations and vibrant communities. Brooklyn has turned into a hot bed for both global investment and community housing struggles. This section does not aim to address the politics and practices behind large urban revitalisation plans in core real-state areas. Instead, it attempts to illustrate the unfolding of urban restructuring processes in marginal inner city neighbourhoods looking at three important developments intimately related to the policies of devolution above examined (see Chapter 3). First, there is a change of focus, scale, and leadership in urban revitalisation. Community-initiated housing plans once funded and subsidised by the state, and led by community organisations have turned into ambitious plans supported by public and private investment and led by much more complex public-private entities. Second, the take over of real-state development, housing financing and profit-driven practices, which have gradually stimulated rent increases and displacement of long term residents. Lastly, the changing role of the non-profit sector and current practices of resistance groups, which despite lacking economic and human resources have worked diligently to improve the housing conditions of low-income neighbourhoods, and to maintain the affordability and well being of its residents.

Looking at the evolution of housing rehabilitation and development in one specific district of North Brooklyn, this section explores and exposes the politics, instruments, and agents of socio-spatial restructuring by looking into the shift from low-income housing rehabilitation and development projects for and by the community, to profit driven development projects targeting middle-class households from outside the community. Bushwick, a dynamic and resilient working class district, went...
through an alarming urban decline, arson and riots during the 1970s; a strenuous revitalisation during the 1980s and 1990s that was led by non profit corporations, community-based organisations and residents; and most recently, an increasing market-driven development bringing unprecedented changes. Unlike many inner city neighbourhoods, which have achieved neighbourhood improvement mostly through state and market-driven planning, this district has accomplished an organic social, economic and spatial development assisted by the government, but led by community based organisations, local grassroots groups and active residents. Unfortunately, the long term housing rehabilitation and redevelopment efforts in this district have not only promoted benefits for the community, but also unanticipated outcomes. Most recently, an unprecedented activation of the housing market and in turn, a wave of gentrification and massive displacements.

§ 5.2 Bushwick decline: Fires and redlining

Bushwick, a thriving working class district located in North Brooklyn (see Figure 5.1), experienced significant economic and social changes at the beginning of the 20th century. Three developments can be associated with the downturn of the economic, social, and physical conditions of the district. These developments were: the decline of the industrial base, financial and social exclusion, and city policies responding to the economic recession of the 1970s. The gradual decline of manufacturing industries in North Brooklyn and the industrial base in Bushwick assisted in the economic decline of the district. Numerous knitting mills located in the Wyckoff Avenue and Flushing Avenue vicinity as well as local breweries situated in northwest Bushwick decreased in numbers (Dereszewski, 2007). Local breweries, run by German families who settled in the area since 1840s, were heavily affected by Prohibition, the Depression, and a long strike ignited by brewery workers affecting also other immigrants workers, such as English, Irish, Polish, Russians and Italians who had subsequently settled in the area. Most of the 14 breweries located in Bushwick were gone by the 1960s. The decline concluded when the Rheingold Brewery, the last brewery in the area, closed down in 1976 and poverty and despair reached its limit. By this time socio-economic changes were quite evident. The white population rate decrease from 100% in 1950 to 38% in 1970. Their flight was evident in commercial streets, which had lost dynamism with the decline of sales and the increasing number of stores going out of business.
During the 1930s and 1940s Italian Americans moved in, joining the German community and became part of the local labour force. By the 1950 the district had the greatest concentration of Italians in Brooklyn (Jackson & Manbeck, 1998). However, this population significantly decreased due to the district decline during the following decades. For instance, Italian Americans, which used to have a strong presence in central areas of the district were mostly present in a small area north of Knickerbocker and Myrtle Avenues by the 1970s (Dereszewski, 2007). The central area of the district experienced a notorious population change with the flight of the solid working class and the decline of the housing stock. An impoverished population, of mostly Hispanic ethnicity, gradually replaced the middle-class communities who had lived in the vicinity of the St. Barbara Church. South of this area, in the vicinity of Bushwick Avenue (one of the most striking avenues of the district because of its architecture), and
the southeastern part of Bushwick, Hispanics and African-Americans replaced the German and Italian populations, who lived there for a long time, as they left the city (Dereszewski, 2007).

According to a study of slum and ghetto formation in Brooklyn (Connolly, 1977), African-Americans migrated from southern to northern states after World War II due to the economic revitalisation occurring in the northern cities. In Brooklyn, this population increased from 108,263 to 208,478 during the 1940s and 1950s, while its white population declined, with some 50,000 white residents leaving the area (Connolly, 1977). The greatest concentration of African-Americans in the borough occurred in Bedford-Stuyvesant, Bushwicks’ southern neighbour. Around 61% of the African-American population in Brooklyn lived in this neighbourhood. During the 1950s, Bedford-Stuyvesant forged as a black ghetto with approximately 80% of its population being African-American. In the coming decades, African-Americans expanded to adjacent districts of Bedford-Stuyvesant, such as Brownsville, Crown Heights, East New York, and further to East Flatbush and Bushwick (see Figure 5.2). However, African-Americans were not the only minority growing in Brooklyn. Puerto Ricans were also increasing in numbers, particularly during their largest wave of migration in the 1950s, know as ‘The Great Migration’. Consequently, by the 1960s these two groups represented over one-fifth of the population of Brooklyn in contrast to less than one in ten only a decade before. By that time these populations had a small presence in Bushwick but their numbers rose fivefold by the 1970s (see Table 5.1).

TABLE 5.1 Demographic changes in Bushwick.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>WHITE NON HISPANIC (%)</th>
<th>AFRICAN-AMERICAN (%)</th>
<th>HISPANIC (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>123,000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>124,800</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>137,895</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>93,497</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>102,572</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>65.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>104,358</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>67.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>112,634</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>65.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>136,730</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>62.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The flight of the middle class did not take place entirely because of the economic decline of the district but there were other factors. The Federal Housing Administration (FHA), established in 1934 insured private mortgage loans, and set new standards and
practices that promoted, concurrently, suburbanisation and the financial exclusion of inner low-income districts. With collaterals of 93%, down-payments of less than 10% and repayment periods of 25 and 30 years, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) made easier and less risky to buy a home (Aalbers, 2011). The FHA assisted urban middle-class families to leave behind their homes and neighbourhoods for the suburbs while withholding mortgage capital and making it difficult for inner city areas to retain or attract families able to purchase their own home (Wilson, 1996). Urban neighbourhoods, especially those with African-American and Hispanic populations, were considered risk areas for lenders and in turn were redlined. Redlining, ‘the financial and social exclusion of urban neighbourhoods from the mortgage market’ (Aalbers 2011, p. 79), clearly affected districts as Bushwick. This district was not able to neither retain nor attract working class families. On top of that, the withdrawal of financing prevented owners from the ability to rehabilitate or sell their properties. Thus many owners ended up keeping their properties vacant or abandoning them. Additionally, new working class homeowners who were actively involved in block associations and up-keeping the district were the prey of the so-called ‘FHA housing scandal’, which resulted in the abandonment of a significant number of properties where poorly financed loans had been provided (Dereszewski, 2007). The scandal, which also affected cities like Newark, Philadelphia and Detroit, consisted in illicit practices by real-estate agents who used ‘payoffs, ruses and fraudulent statements to secure inflated amounts of FHA mortgage insurance for hundreds of clients, overwhelmingly lower-income members of minority groups who stood little chance of meeting mortgage payments on their often dilapidated houses. In many cases, prosecutors charged, the clients were fictitious’ (Gottlieb, 1986, para 5). The defaults allowed real-estate agents to collect millions of dollars in insurance payments from the Federal Government, while families lost their homes, and neighbourhoods kept declining. In Bushwick, many of the new homeowners held on their houses for only 5-10 years, losing them as their incomes declined and foreclosures set in (Sanchez, 1988). These properties were eventually boarded up and abandoned for years, attracting illegal practices and degrading even more the physical condition of the district. According to the Deputy Director of the Bushwick Office of the Department of Housing and Neighbourhood Preservation at the time, David Feingold, 500 of the 12,000 buildings in the area were affected by the scandal (Gottlieb, 1986).

Blockbusting also assisted in the deterioration of the district. Real-estate agents would use different tactics to push long-term residents to sell their properties at fire prices. Real-estate companies would acquire and sell them at higher value to working-class families or, in their absence, to inexperienced and sometimes unscrupulous landlords (Perine, 2005). Many properties, which used to be occupied by owners turned into rental housing run by non-residents owners who let the properties deteriorate further
by milking them. Without the appropriate maintenance of buildings and the area in general Bushwick was notoriously in decay by the 1970s (Dereszewski, 2007).

Another factor that contributed to Bushwick decline was New York City’s financial crisis of the 1970s. The economic stagnation of the 1970s was affected by the massive departure of a significant portion of the urban middle-class to the suburbs that led to a significant loss of city tax revenues. By the mid 1970s measures to deal with the nearly bankruptcy of the city, such as planned shrinkage, further deteriorated the condition and reputation of impoverished districts such as Bushwick. The city deliberately stopped investing in troubled neighbourhoods while diverting funds to other areas. Police protection, sanitation, fire and other services gradually ceased while residents faced waves of crime and fires devastating Bushwick. The already alarming condition of the district exasperated the public and received major attention the summer of 1977, when a series of events intensified the urban deterioration of the district. During the course of one night, a city wide electrical blackout followed by fires and looting, caused severe damage. In particular, the commercial corridor of Broadway Avenue suffered. A total of 134 stores were affected in Bushwick, 44 of which were set on fire and destroyed (Malanga, 2008). Ten days later, another fire incident in the heart of Bushwick ended up affecting the commercial corridor of Knickerbocker Avenue and destroying the district’s public perception. Fires destroyed 20% of Bushwick housing stock, or one out of every five apartments (Perine, 2005).

### Table 5.2. Arson and fires in Bushwick.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>STRUCTURAL FIRES</th>
<th>SUSPICIOUS FIRES</th>
<th>ARSONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>932</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>807</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>811</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NYC Arson Strike Force (1986); NYC Department of City Planning (1969); and NY Daily News (1977).

The fire epidemic caused irreparable damage to hundreds of properties for nearly two decades (see Table 5.2). Some fires were recorded as suspicious since residents and owners would torch vacant properties to clear those areas from crime and drug related practices and in some cases to collect insurance money. The central area of the district was particularly hit with arson and abandonment. According to Dereszewki (2007), the former District Manager of Bushwick, entire areas were vacant but not demolished, for example, the blocks on Himrod Street and Greene Avenue between Central and Wilson Avenues. The lack of public interest and funds left part of the district looking like war
zones. This lack of attention and hope pushed some of the long-term residents who still lived in the district to move (Dereszewki, 2007).

Lastly, another factor that assisted in the socio-economic shift of the district was Mayor Lindsay’s decision to increase rental subsidies for welfare recipients and to encourage landlords to infill vacant units with subsidised tenants. By the beginning of the 1980s, Bushwick had the lowest median income in Brooklyn— with 80% of its population on public assistance—and had lost nearly 45,000 residents, approximately one-third of its population (Sanchez, 1988; Meisler, 2011). The total population declined from 137,895 in 1970 to 93,497 in 1980 (see Table 5.1). Those who remained, mostly African-Americans (26%) and Hispanics (56%), had no option but to live among vacated, burnt-out and dilapidated houses. Puerto Ricans were the largest Hispanic group at the time, followed by Mexicans as the second largest group, and other smaller Hispanic populations in the following years. Today, around 62% of the population is of Hispanic origin, 19.5% Puerto Rican and 12.6% Mexican, although as Figure 5.10 shows, the Spanish speakers are gradually decreasing due to the current wave of gentrification (American Community Survey, 2015).

§ 5.3 War on poverty

The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 signed by President Lyndon B. Johnson was central to the War on Poverty programmes, particularly to the Community Action Program and the Model Cities Program. The objectives and outcomes of these programmes were examined in Chapter 3. As it was previously illustrated, despite the urban decay Bushwick experienced during this period, the district was not designated for assistance by neither of these city programmes. In Brooklyn, six neighbourhoods were selected by HUD for the first programme: Fort Greene, Williamsburg, South Brooklyn, Bedford Stuyvesant, Brownsville, and East New York. For the second program, the last three neighbourhoods were also selected. As for Bushwick, which was bordering some of these neighbourhoods and experiencing similar conditions (see Figure 5.2), it was officially designated as a poverty area and included among the neighbourhoods’ expansion of the Community Action Program and its Community Action Agencies in 1966 (Marwell, 2007). However, it was not until the institution of the 1969 City Master Plan that Bushwick received funding. And, soon after, the anti-poverty Bushwick Community Corporation was established with an ethnically balanced board of directors to address local urban and social problems. However, significant achievements were hard to accomplish in the short life of the organisation. The
inefficiency of its operations, low engagement of residents and expiration of funding lead to its closure in 1978, right in the midst of the worst days of arson and decay in Bushwick (Friedman, Bloom & Marks, 1974; Dereszewki, 2007). What is important to note is that despite the fact that these public policies and programmes did not create a direct impact in the district, they generated administrative and organisational changes, which in turn assisted in the restructuring of Bushwick.

![Map of Brooklyn's Community Districts and areas selected for the Model Cities Program](image)

**FIGURE 5.2** Brooklyn’s Community Districts and areas selected for the Model Cities Program

The Office of Neighborhood Government (ONG) was created sponsoring ‘Little City Halls’. This was seen as an experimental effort to provide residents of neighbourhoods such as Bushwick, mainly African-Americans and Puerto Ricans, easy access to
city services and agencies. Subsequently, local law through the 1975 City Charter established Community Districts. As explained in Chapter 3, the City Charter delegated the Community Boards three main tasks; the improvement of the delivery of city services, planning and reviewing land use in the community, and making recommendations on the city’s budget. Out of the 1975 charter revision the Uniform Land Use Review Procedure (ULURP) was established requiring a community board review and vote on all land use actions, including acquisition and disposition of city properties and urban renewal plans. A later revision in 1990 instituted today’s 197-a plans, giving the Community Boards the authority to formulate and submit plans to the City Planning Commission and City Council (Forman, 2000) (For more information about Community Boards see Chapter 3). The previous measures had a significant impact on Bushwick, now recognised as Community District 4 (see Figure 5.2). A Neighborhood Preservation Office and an Office of Neighborhood Government were established in the area, and a District Manager position was created as an extension of the Mayor’s Office (Dereszewki, 2007). These developments created a strong relationship with city government in the coming years, and facilitated local, state and federal aid.

§ 5.4 Housing as an urban revitalisation strategy

Housing has been the common ground for urban and community improvement in Bushwick, but also a ground of conflict and struggle for impoverished populations. Economic, social, and physical improvement has taken place around the development of living spaces in the last three decades. These changes were achieved through the tremendous effort of residents, non-profit community-based organisations, public-private partnerships, the local government, and city, state, and federal aid. Housing development and rehabilitation in Bushwick could be categorised — taking into account urban policy, implementation approaches, financial aid, planning and decision-making processes — in three different phases:

– public housing for people: housing renewal by the state.
– affordable housing for and by people: housing rehabilitation and development by community members, non-profit organizations and the state.
– rezoning and housing for profit: housing development by investors and speculators.
Public housing for people: Housing renewal by the state

Unlike many districts, Bushwick was not targeted for large urban renewal plans in post war years, and its proposed designation for the Model Cities Program was rejected in late 1960s preventing significant housing development. The only large development envisioned at that time involved the construction of a school and a high-density housing development in the current site of Hope Gardens I (Dereszewski, 2007). According to Dereszewski (2007), the political leadership of Bushwick, which was led by the Italian community even when Italians became the minority, was barely interested in the entangled issues of the district and therefore gave little attention to this development. However, he notes, this site got more attention when the funding agency of the high density housing development collapsed. The Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD) became involved since the land had already been acquired and cleared by the city, and solutions had to be found for the future development of the site. HPD became in charge of this new Urban Renewal Plan, and later on the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) became a partner.

In 1975 the provisions of the City Charter Revision ‘strengthen the powers and resources available to CB4 by giving it a formal role in the land use planning process and providing funding that in May 1977, enabled it to open a local office and hire a small staff’ (Dereszewski, 2007, p. 4). Soon after, Elliot Yablon and David Feingold from the Department of HPD’s Bushwick Office along with John Dereszewski, District Manager of Bushwick’s Community Board (CB4), and Roy Pingel a full-time planner assigned by the Department of City Planning drafted the Bushwick Action Plan. The plan aimed to rehabilitate and rebuild housing for the community and to improve public spaces. Therefore the inclusion of existing community organisations engaged in housing development was crucial. However, according to the then District Manger (Dereszewski, 2007), there were only a few of these organisations and most of them were poorly organised.

Housing rehabilitation for low-income families was sought mostly in properties acquired by the city through various federal and HPD programmes while housing construction on city owned land by NYCHA. HPD promoted the formulation of a locally based development plan in collaboration with Community Board 4. However there was no urgency and the plans moved slowly. It was until the blackout and the looting and fires in Bushwick took place when the Bushwick Action Plan received full attention and was prioritised. A demolition programme to clear the burnt-out, ruined and vacant properties began to provide space for the new housing while the public housing project that was in the early stages was rapidly approved, Hope Gardens I.
This development involved a 14 stories building for the elderly. The previous plan, which had envisioned the construction of a massive high-rise structure in this site was heavily contested and subsequently rejected by the community. Possibly, this proposal recalled Bushwick Houses, a massive public housing project completed in 1960 in the western border of the district, which comprises eight 13-and 20-story buildings. Contrary to this solution, which followed the ideals of public housing of the time (tower in the park), residents demanded a more humanistic approach for the following phases of the project, Hope Gardens II and III, which took place in the following years in blocks affected by urban decline and fires. The overall project, when finished included the 14-story tower, three seven-story apartment buildings, community centres, public spaces and a large number of townhouse-like three-story buildings, which were scaled to follow the structure and density of the neighbourhood. Hope Gardens provided housing for 3,586 residents making it one of the largest housing projects in America. Despite the large size and design austerity of the project, it represented a dramatic shift in typology of large public housing projects.
Figure 5.4 Bushwick’s housing structures by year of construction.
It is important to note that the Urban Renewal Plan (in the existing Hope Gardens I site) began being drafted before the infamous blackout and looting, and it wasn’t until the district got attention city wide when the Bushwick Action Plan moved forward. In a context of urban decline, poverty and public neglect, the explosion of rage evidenced in the urban riots of the summer of 1977 was the manifestation of a community fed up of failing policies and government inaction. In an effort to change the district fate, residents, community leaders and those involved in the plan took advantage of the election year by calling for meetings, disseminating the district’s devastation in the local news, and urging both Mayoral candidates to commit to implement the Bushwick Action Plan. Candidate Edward Koch won the election and pledged to rebuild Bushwick.

Besides engaged city officials, residents and members of CB4 played an important role in keeping pressure on the city to implement the Bushwick Action Plan. In regard to the Urban Renewal Plan, they demanded consideration of community needs, and priorities and the community approval before its implementation. As part of their priorities, residents advocated for keeping the existing scale and structure of the blocks. In regard to the rehabilitation of other blocks in the district, they demanded the prevention of residents’ displacement. Between 1977 and 1987 thousands of low-income units were constructed and hundreds rehabilitated for existing residents and senior citizens (see Figure 5.4). New low-income housing was mostly sponsored by the city, and public housing by NYCHA since the urban complexities of the time and financial exclusion discouraged private investment (see Figure 5.4 and 5.5).

Community development was also a central aspect for the restructuring and rehabilitation of the district during this period. After the formation and dismantling of the Bushwick Community Corporation, members of the community mobilised to apply for different government funding programmes. The Federal Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) of 1973, which supported employment programmes in impoverished neighbourhoods, facilitated the rise of the Ridgewood-Bushwick Senior Citizens Council\(^{18}\) (RBSCC), a community-based organization which has been actively involved in the community since then. Today, it is the largest service provider, one of the greatest employers in the district and the leading provider of affordable housing in North Brooklyn. Other entities also played key roles in district improvement during those times, including Better Living Ecumenical Realty, the Bushwick Information and Coordinating Committee, the Bushwick Community Service Society, and Santa Barbara’s Catholic Church. In addition, a number of block

\(^{18}\) Ridgewood Bushwick Senior Citizen Council changed its name to RiseBoro Community Partnership in year 2017. Since this research was completed before that year, I will use its original name throughout this study.
associations, tenant associations and community leaders assisted and facilitated the gradual restructuring of the district.

Affordable Housing for and by people: Housing rehabilitation and development sponsored by residents, non-profit community based organisations, city authorities and external partners

In 1986 Mayor Koch launched a ten-year housing programme using the city’s capital budget to supplement other funds and renovate and construct low and moderate-income housing in declining neighbourhoods. This programme aimed to stabilise neighbourhoods that President Reagan’s abolition of federal subsidies would have further decayed. As it was illustrated in Chapter 3, Koch’s housing programme focused on four main goals; total rehabilitation of all suitable city-owned vacant buildings; moderate rehabilitation of all occupied city-owned buildings; promotion of below-market-rate loans; tax breaks to encourage owners of low- and moderate-income housing to rehabilitate their properties; and construction of new homes for owner occupants (Soffer, 2010). The programme did not sufficiently address the needs of low-income households during the first period. It rather focused on attracting middle class households to declining districts to rehabilitate properties and in turn bring economic stability through property taxes. However, soon after his administration realised the challenges of this approach and the need to continue facilitating some of the self-help programmes of housing that were initiated by low-income households in the midst of the city’s economic crisis.

In the mid 1970s, as it was illustrated in Chapter 3, tenants living in derelict buildings abandoned by landlords and foreclosed by the city started organising and advocating for progressive policies to rehabilitate those properties in impoverished and declining neighbourhoods. The Department of Housing Preservation and Development without resources and clear plans to rehabilitate the thousands of abandoned properties across the city turned some of the grassroots demands into programmes within the newly formed Department of Alternative Management Programs (see Chapter 3). The Community Management, the Sweat Equity, the Urban Homesteading, and the Tenant Interim Lease programmes, which were grounded in the ideas of the squatter movement, were the initiators of a city wide community-led housing rehabilitation processes in a context of scarce public funds and public investment. The Sweat Equity and the Urban Homesteading programmes granted titles to community members in exchange of their work and commitment to rehabilitate and maintain abandoned city owned properties. On the other hand, the Tenant Interim Lease Program (which still operates today) was set in motion particularly to renovate the thousands of occupied
properties owned by the city. The programme trained organised tenants to run and keep their buildings as limited-equity cooperatives and officially transfer the units to the new shareholders for a symbolic amount of money ($250). Buildings rehabilitated through these programmes stabilised entire blocks in a number of low-income districts across the city, including Bushwick. However, more scalable and profitable housing programmes started being promoted by the mid 1980s.

During the 1980s non-profit community organisations grew along with the expansion of these new housing programmes. In Bushwick, the RBSCC, positioned as a key entity for housing provision by engaging in housing rehabilitation and partnering with the Community Management Program, which was another community-led initiative supported by HPD’s Department of Alternative Management Programs. The programme was set up to renovate large derelict in rem properties to relieve the city’s central property management system on one hand. Non-profits would be in charge of the rehabilitation and management of the properties, mostly providing rental and cooperative housing. And on the other hand, to respond to tenant associations and community groups pushing for the management of city-owned properties. Pressure emanated from city wide neighbourhood movements, mainly led by African-American and Puerto Ricans claiming the right of self-management housing and tenant control over basic policy and budget matters. Koch particularly supported the creation and expansion of non-profit community development corporations, and eventually assisted for-profit developers to rehabilitate and construct affordable housing (Schill, Gould, Schwarz & Voicu, 2002).

During this period, the RBSCC along with CB4 stressed the urgency of providing affordable housing for the community. This non-profit drafted a Comprehensive Housing Plan following the principles of the Bushwick Action Plan: preserving the district’s character, keeping the existing residents, and maintaining housing affordability. Consequently, hundreds of small multifamily buildings, and two-family homes were rehabilitated. This organic process was critical in the improvement of streets that were focal points of crime in previous decades, but still vacant buildings and lots plagued the neighbourhood. According to Whitted (2002), District Manager of CB4, while low-income rental housing was vital and desired, the community needed also homeowners with a stake in Bushwick. Both, private and public investment was needed for new housing development on city owned vacant land. The NYC Housing Partnership, a non-profit intermediary organisation, joined the ongoing efforts. Working with the city, state, private developers, banks, community groups, local non-profit organisations, and businesses, this initiative would contribute enormously to the development of the Comprehensive Housing Plan, following the Infill Housing Approach, a cost-effective and efficient model geared towards the development of small city-owned sites to provide affordable housing. Housing development through
this approach added on and blended in with the existing housing stock without the need for demolition and displacement. The NYC Housing Partnership began serving families with an annual income of 50% of the Area Median Income (AMI) with rental housing, and households earning between 80% and 130% of AMI with private own housing opportunities. Unfortunately, developments increasingly focused more on attracting middle- and high-income households.

The involvement of NYC Housing Partnership in the Comprehensive Housing Plan was key not only for the development of the district but also the growth of RBSCC, which is today one the largest not-for-profit developers of affordable housing in Brooklyn. Over the last three decades this non-profit has developed thousands of units utilising diverse local, state, and federal public subsidies and programmes, including the Neighborhood Redevelopment Program, Neighborhood Entrepreneurs Program, and Neighborhood Homes Program. RBSCC’s projects range from 1-6 family home renovations to new multi-family complexes. Its largest development is the Rheingold Brewery Revitalization Plan in the northwestern corner of Bushwick.

After the Rheingold Brewery closed in 1976, the buildings were demolished and the 6.7 acre site was eventually acquired by the city. The polluted brownfield left behind was recognised as one of the most dilapidated and forsaken areas of the neighbourhood for decades. An open space for illegal dumping and drug abuse, the site became a contested piece of property when a shopping centre was envisioned on the site. Community members showed strong opposition and halted the plan. It threatened the further extinction of local shops in the neighbourhood. Subsequently, the city acquired the site through condemnation as part of the West Bushwick Urban Renewal Area. The new vision for the site was around housing. Rezoning through the city’s ULURP was crucial transforming the abandoned site from industrial to residential use.

The RBSCC, Housing Partnership, and HPD joined forces to transform this area in year 2000. Project partners sought incentive programmes to keep housing below market prices. The team secured funding from a vast range of sources, including bank financing; private equity; federal HOME funds; along with local programmatic support from the NYC Department of Housing Preservation and Development, the NYC Housing Development Corporation, the New York State Affordable Housing Corporation, the New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal; the syndication of Low-Income Housing Tax Credits; and an Environmental Protection Agency Brownfield and Land Revitalization Pilot Grant (Bloomberg, 2006).

The Reingold Brewery Revitalization Plan was regarded as an exemplary brownfield redevelopment project in New York City. Its success has been attributed to its complex financial model and planning process. An international brownfield exchange brought
together architects, urban planners, local community leaders, elected officials, city staff, and specialists in brownfield redevelopment to draft the first vision of the site (Municipal Art Society, 2008). The Federal Environmental Protection Administration sponsored this programme (Hevesi, 2003). According to Jerilyn Perine (2005), the HPD urban planner then appointed, a three-day workshop that provided the opportunity for the participants to study community needs, formulate the objectives, develop an integrated plan and propose an implementation schedule. After the participants’ approval the renewal plan was prepared and approved through the required public process in less than twelve months.

The initial proposal comprised four phases which included homeownership of two- and three-family homes, condominiums, low-income rental apartments, retail space, and a day-care and community centre (see Table 5.3). After the completion of these phases, two extra housing projects were included. Among the objectives of the revitalisation plan was the goal to provide a space for a revitalised community and become a central point for the residents of Bushwick (Municipal Art Society, 2008). This goal was somehow achieved since 50% of the housing units were reserved for community members, and long-term residents occupied over 70% at the completion of the project (S. Short, personal communication, September, 24, 2012).

The Rheingold Brewery Revitalization Plan added over 520 housing units to the district. However, not all of them were affordable to community members. Less than 50% of those units targeted low-income households (earning between 50-60% of the AMI). However, it is important to highlight that very-low income families, which represent the majority of families of the district back then and still today, had not had access to those homes (these families earn less than the 50% of the AMI). Also, we have to note that city programmes have struggled to enforce affordability for future generations and this is a clear example of the short views and impact of such programmes. According to the director of housing services of the RBSCC (S. Short, personal communication, September, 24, 2012), new homeowners were not conditioned to guarantee the affordability of those units in the long term, which means that they are able to cast their units into the open market in the coming years. This is a constant concern for residents and local groups advocating for affordable housing, affordable for whom? And, for how long?

Despite the paradox around affordable housing, RBSCC has kept developing projects as Knickerbocker Commons targeting Bushwick’s long-term community and low-income citizens. This project was designated as an Urban Development Action Area Project (UDAAP) on city-own land, and developed under the New York State Housing Trust Fund Program. The project provided 24 dwelling units for low-income households earning between 30 to 60% of the AMI and 4,957 square feet for community facilities.
### TABLE 5.3 Rheingold Revitalization Plan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PHASE 1: RHEINGOLD GARDEN PARTNERSHIP HOMES</th>
<th>SPONSOR / PARTNERSHIP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNITS</strong></td>
<td><strong>HOUSING TYPE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family homes</td>
<td>RBSCC, New York Housing Partnership, Housing Trust Fund, NYC Department of Housing Preservation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>two-family homes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>three-family homes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ten-story condo apartments</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>two-bedroom condominium apartment for households earning up to 130% AMI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>one-bedroom condominium apartment for households earning up to 130% AMI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHASE 2: RHEINGOLD GARDEN HOUSING TRUST</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Two six-story apartment buildings</strong></td>
<td>RBSCC, Housing Trust Fund, NYC Department of Housing Preservation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>rental units for households earning between 50-60% of AMI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>special set for deaf families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHASE 3: RENAISSANCE ESTATES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Six-story apartment building</strong></td>
<td>RBSCC, Housing Trust Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>rental units for households earning between 50-60% of AMI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>special set for physically disable households and day care center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHASE 4: BUSHWICK GARDENS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Seven-story cooperative housing building</strong></td>
<td>RBSCC, Housing Partnership, NYC Housing Development Corporation, NYC Department of Housing Preservation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>units for households earning between 80-250% AMI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>units for households earning up to 250% AMI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>superintendent unit</td>
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<td>PHASE 5: RHEINGOLD HEIGHTS I AND II</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Seven-story apartment building with community and commercial space</strong></td>
<td>RBSCC, NYC Department of Housing Preservation and Development, Trust Fund Corporation of the New York State, Division of Housing and Community Renewal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rheingold Heights I</td>
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<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>rental units for households earning between 50-60% AMI</td>
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<td>special set for veterans</td>
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<td>Rheingold Heights II</td>
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<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>rental units for households earning between 50-60% AMI</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>special set aside for homeless families</td>
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It included a senior citizen centre, recreation space, and seven parking spaces. The building complied with the ‘passive house’ design standards promoting energy efficient development. The units were assigned through an HPD-sponsored lottery process, with 50% preference given to Bushwick residents.

The Rheingold Brewery Revitalization Plan was perhaps one of the pioneer projects attracting moderate- and high-income households and other developments of this kind to Bushwick. Certainly, some housing projects that succeeded this development have been quite controversial, particularly the Broadway Triangle Renewal Plan and The Rheingold Development Rezoning Plan (which is part of the second section of The West Bushwick Urban Renewal Area). This last one was projected to be developed on the northeastern side of the Rheingold Brewery Revitalization Plan (see Figure 5.5). Interestingly, both plans have been disputed by residents and local groups due to issues related to affordability and undemocratic planning processes. It is important to note that the Broadway Triangle Renewal Plan was sponsored by community based organisations rooted in the area, while the Rheingold Development Rezoning Plan is a private development sponsored by developers and investors without roots in the district. The first project will be explained below while the second one will be explained in the following section because of its for profit nature.

The so-called Broadway Triangle Renewal Plan was considered for development by the Department of HPD in 2006. The rezoning plan, proposed through the Uniform Land Use Review Process (ULURP), included the provision of a mixed used programme and affordable housing on a 31-acre patch comprised of private and city-owned land. The plan aimed to remove the blighted conditions that inhibited connectivity between its surrounding areas while facilitating the development of 1,851 housing units, of which 905 were projected to be affordable (NYC Department of Housing Preservation and Development, 2009). The rezoning approval was granted in 2009 under some conditions, including the provision of affordable housing, comprehensive measures for relocation, and open space mitigation. The disposition and acquisition of city-owned properties by any non-profit or private entity signaled a real threat to the different communities affected by the development when the rezoning was proposed (Linderman, 2009). In fact, the rezoning process was later revoked due to conflicted interests between non-profit developers and community groups.
Cities for or against citizens?

FIGURE 5.5 Urban and housing renewal areas in Bushwick
The Broadway Triangle Renewal Plan is located between Flushing Avenue, Union Avenue and Broadway, right at the intersection of Williamsburg, Bedford-Stuyvesant and Bushwick. These neighbourhoods are located in a different community districts (CD 1, 3 and 4). The site’s vicinity is characterised by having different population groups. Its northeast side belongs to East Williamsburg, an area with a rooted Hasidic community and an increasing white population, mainly newcomers that have recently arrived from Manhattan. Whereas its south side belongs to North Bedford-Stuyvesant, an African-American neighbourhood, which demographics diverge from East Williamsburg and West Bushwick, the eastern side of the renewal site. West Bushwick has a predominant Hispanic community, which like East Williamsburg has been joined in recent years by a white, non-Hispanic population seeking housing affordability.

The project became quite controversial since the city granted the right to develop part of the site, the city-owned part (without prior public notice) to two non-profit groups; the United Jewish Organization, which serves the Hasidic community of Williamsburg; and the RBSCC, which serves mainly the Hispanic community of Bushwick. This action was highly criticised by the surrounding communities and local organisations, which claimed that the bidding process was not open and fair and that the planning process was exclusionary and discriminatory. The plan included numerous large apartments serving only one demographic group, the Hasidic community, which is recognised as having larger-than-average families, despite the demand for smaller apartments by the African-American and Hispanic residents.

Furthermore, part of the controversies included the city’s attempt to acquire a number of the private properties by eminent domain to open up the site for further development. One of those properties included the Brooklyn plant of Pfizer, one of the world’s largest pharmaceutical companies, which lies on Community Board 3 territory, the southern area of the site. Since there were not sufficient grounds giving guarantee of the provision of affordable housing, the Pfizer property was not seized by the City. Finally, the provision of affordable housing was also a key issue on the dispute. The city claimed to build 900 units of affordable housing, but the rezoning guaranteed only approximately 125 units. This number was mandatory, additional units would have been added only if developers would have gotten public grants or tax incentives.

The Broadway Triangle Community Coalition, a coalition of 40 local organisations affected by the rezoning plans, was formed and soon after demanded the rezoning and planning process be redone and take into account all the affected communities. The coalition filed a lawsuit alleging race discrimination, religious discrimination, land use violations, and environmental review violations under federal, state and city civil rights, fair housing, environmental and rezoning laws (Broadway Triangle Coalition, 2010).

In addition, the coalition argued that the City and HPD was engaged in an exclusionary
bid process giving preference to politically connected community groups (Kelly, 2012). After a couple of years fighting, the coalition won victory (see below), however the project did not move forward with inclusive plans for economic development and affordable housing. According to the chief legal council of the case (Needelman, 2012), the project as originally set forth ‘would have given priority for the housing to people who live in a predominantly white section of Williamsburg to the detriment of a neighbouring community that is overwhelmingly black’.

Pfizer’s plant removed hundreds of jobs from the area when it closed in 2008, two years after the HPD’s initial rezoning proposal. Soon after, Pfizer sought to find a buyer who would keep the commitment to provide affordable housing and economic development in the area. The land was sold eventually to different entities. Acumen Capital Partners bought eight acres including its former eight-story factory in year 2011. Acumen specializes in re-adapting use of industrial properties. Apparently, this company converged with Pfizer’s visions for the site, providing light manufacturing and spaces for local business. The company got $2 million from the Council Small Manufacturing Investment Fund to rehabilitate and subdivide approximately 88,000 square feet of the industrial space into smaller units. This endeavour sought to keep manufacturing jobs in the borough. Some spaces were leased to several local food businesses. The different companies employed around 70 people right after it was open for business (Kaysen, 2012).

The food start-ups began attracting local businesses but also investors to develop under-utilised and vacant surroundings areas. Property values went up in the following years, even when the type of development of the adjacent areas was still uncertain. Part of the remaining land has been bought by different entities, including 306 Rutledge Street II LLC, a newly formed investment group with a background in residential and mixed-use development. This limited liability corporation (LLC) did not make their plans for the site public, but apparently the four acres acquired in 2012 would be rezoned from industrial to residential use. Affordability or/and participatory planning was not discussed at that moment.

One of the alternative plans considering the concerns and priorities of neighbours and local groups was the acquisition of the Pfizer remaining land by local development organisations representing the diverse communities of the area, including St. Nicks Alliance, United Jewish Care and Bedford-Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation. They proposed to build on the land 840 units of below-market-rate housing targeting very-low income households, in other words the development of truly affordable housing. The housing coalition made a $10 million bid for the sites recently acquired by 306 Rutledge Street II LLC. Apparently, the bid was never accepted, Pfizer gave priority to the plans of this limited liability corporation.
Recently, the lawsuit that was filed in 2009 due to the exclusion of minority groups in the rezoning process reached settlement\textsuperscript{19}. The settlement...would result in the creation of around 375 units of affordable housing and include investment in counseling and legal representation for local residents who believe they were discriminated against while seeking housing’ (David Goodman, 2017).

The rezoning and planning process of the Broadway Triangle Renewal Plan reflects the challenges residents, grassroots local groups and community organisations rooted in low-income districts constantly face when private enterprises, non-profits and/or public-private partnerships seek housing and economic development without considering the local needs. The imbalance of economic and political power between stakeholders has tended to generate exclusionary planning processes. Most of the time the affected groups are those living in the improvement area, despite the objectives are supposed to benefit them. Rezoning processes in areas recently discovered for investment, such as Bushwick, are often influenced by local politics leaving little room for democratic decisions in public open processes, such as the Uniform Land Use Review Process. This process is meant to publicly announce rezoning and future plans and, at the same time, provide a space for a consensus deliberation.

Constructing and keeping affordable housing, and any other type of non-speculative living and working spaces, is necessary to benefit long-term residents, preventing displacement, and preserving diverse neighbourhoods. However, affordable housing has been one of the core conflicts in most of the rezoning and development plans proposed in low-income districts in New York City. For instance, the Rheingold Brewery Revitalization Plan (first phase of the West Bushwick Renewal Area) claimed to provide affordable housing for new home owners when less than half of the units were accessible for a small percentage of the long term community (the better off). Similarly, the Broadway Triangle Renewal Plan claimed the provision of a large amount of affordable housing when those units where not suitable for the surrounding communities and were not truly guaranteed in the plans.

The provision of affordable housing has been an issue but not the only one. Non-profit community organisations serving as a housing providers are progressively shifting partners, priorities and tactics. Community alliances leading low-income housing plans (assisted mainly by public programmes) have shifted to public-private partnerships with ambitious mixed housing developments (supported by public funds along with private investment and financing). Residents and local groups have felt excluded and

\textsuperscript{19} This settlement took place after this research was concluded. Thus, for more information see David Goodman (2017).
underrepresented in planning processes. Despite the fact that citizen participation was acknowledged by the ‘197-a plans’, local revitalisation programmes²⁰, and a number of public housing programmes, differences in needs, priorities and interest among residents, local leaders, and community-based organisations that have raised conflicts in urban revitalisation processes in New York City. This exclusion has been even more acute in private developments as it will be explained with the case of the Rheingold Development Rezoning Plan in the following section.

**Rezonings and housing for profit: Market rate housing development by private investors and corporations**

In New York City, over 40% of the land use has been changed to allow for development in districts targeted for growth since 2002 (see Figure 5.6). Rezoning processes have changed the landscape of Brooklyn, especially in Downtown Brooklyn, the waterfront and former industrial districts. Working class neighbourhoods have shifted from industrial to residential ones bringing dramatic changes in demographics, local businesses and housing density. By law zoning changes must go through the ULURP, a procedure starting with the consensus of the residents and concluding with the approval of the mayor (see Chapter 3). Opposition and discontent by residents has taken place in a number of these processes, especially those proposed for the development of luxury apartments and high end retail spaces in low-income areas. Speculation and investment in rezoned areas has unfolded massive displacements of long-term residents and local businesses. Locals have found themselves hopeless due to the advisory nature of the ULURP; after voting against a rezoning it could be approved by higher levels and politicians influenced by powerful players during the decision making process.

The Inclusionary Housing Program (IHP) has been at the core of these zoning changes. This programme claims to provide economic integration in areas of the city undergoing substantial zoning changes and development by offering an additional floor area to developers in exchange for the creation or preservation of affordable housing, on-site or off-site, for low-income households. It requires a percentage of the housing units to be permanent affordable, for rental or ownership, in exchange developers receive bonus space. In some cases it is combined with the 421-a Program, which incentivise development by providing tax exemptions for a specific period of time (10-25 years).

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²⁰ The Brownfield Opportunity Program was passed by the state during the Rheingold Brewery Rehabilitation process aiming to catalyse the revitalisation of distressed areas meeting local needs.

200 Cities for or against citizens?
FIGURE 5.6 Rezoned sites in New York City up to 2015
The Inclusionary Housing Program was originally created in 1987 (R10 Program) for high-density districts, especially in Manhattan. In 2005 it expanded to medium and high-density districts in the other boroughs to create housing opportunities outside Manhattan. Unfortunately, this programme has benefitted, for the most part, middle- and high-income households. In the lifetime of the programme only 7% of the subsidised units have been affordable for low- and moderate-income families (Independent Budget Office, 2003).

Affordable housing has been desired and demanded by residents and local groups in Bushwick and in many low-income districts in the city. It has been central also in the city’s housing plans, and addressed by public policy and programmes, but yet it continues to be a delusion for many. The parameters used for the provision and distribution of affordable housing by the government, community development corporations, non-profit and for profit developers did not always benefit the most impoverished families. The Average Median Income (AMI), a statistical measure calculated annually by the Housing Preservation and Development, is used for housing eligibility. Families and individuals can apply for affordable housing (mostly subsidised low-income housing developments) following specific income guidelines according to the listing of each project, which usually target different type of households. Affordable housing for low-income usually target households earning between 30% and 60% of the AMI (sometimes up to 80% of AMI). However, and even when this range seems to include most of the households in need in inner city areas, this is not always the case, as it was illustrated previously. It is critical to acknowledge that the AMI is calculated taking into account New York City’s boroughs plus a couple of counties north of the Bronx, which have higher median household incomes and therefore make higher the average income for NYC. For instance in 2013 the AMI was $85,900 for a family of four, meaning that in order to be eligible for a very-low income housing a family of four must earn between $25,770 and $51,540 per year (30% and 60% of AMI).

In the case of Bushwick, and many low-income districts in areas designated for the Inclusionary Housing Program, we can agree that current projects providing affordable housing are targeting households earning way more the salaries earned by working-class families and immigrants positioned in the lower end of the economic ladder. The median household income in this district barely reached $38,780 in 2013 having approximately 27% of the households making less than $20,000 per year (Furman Center, 2014). Clearly, there is a significant percentage of the population not included in the equation. In addition, these projects are increasing the housing values in adjacent properties. Newcomers with more economic power are settling in, landlords are discovering economic opportunities increasing theirs rentals, and long-term tenants are feeling the rent pressure. The housing market is becoming dynamic and the economic composition of the neighbourhood is changing. The median household
income per year in the neighbourhood increased from $27,146 in 2002 to $38,780 in 2013 (Furman Center, 2005, 2014).

Over 3,600 housing units were created in new or rehabilitated buildings from 2000 to 2010 in Bushwick (New York City Department of City Planning, 2011b). Non-profit housing developers gave priority to the existing community providing a significant number of these units, as it was shown previously. Private investors and developers developed the rest without roots in the neighbourhood trying to attract moderate-income households. The construction of condominium housing in the district has been in ascendance since year 2000. However, many units constructed or rehabilitated during the nadir of the financial crisis remained unoccupied in the following years. In 2010, the Right to the City Alliance, in collaboration with a number of community-based organisations, including Make the Road New York, a 10,000 member non-profit community organisation concerned with tenants rights and social justice, among many other activities, undertook a count of vacant condos in selected NYC neighbourhoods. The findings were published in a report called People Without Homes & Homes Without People, which asserted that in Bushwick over half of the 90 new condos were still undergoing construction and/or completely or partially vacant. The report identified 20 buildings completely vacant with 115 units and 30 partially vacant with 165 units. These vacancies questioned the speculation and investment going on in the district. Nevertheless, these for-profit developments proved to be successful in recent years as they were occupied and as new residential building permits and rezoning procedures for private developments in the area increased (Furman Center, 2012).

<p>| TABLE 5.4 Housing units authorized by new residential building permits and units issued new certificate of occupancy in Bushwick from 2000 to 2013. |</p>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>138</td>
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<td>2,262</td>
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<td>Units Issued New Certificate of Occupancy</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>331</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>199</td>
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Certainly, housing development slowed down after the global financial crash but picked up again between 2013 and 2014 with more out of context developments (see Table 5.4), such as ‘Colony 1209’, a controversial five-story development which was particularly contested by residents due to its revanchist marketing (see Figure 5.7). Despite tax abatements were granted through the 421-a Program to this development, this 127-unit housing project did not provide any affordable units. Furthermore, its
marketing campaign calling middle-class settlers to colonise the Bushwick lifestyle and community was highly contested. In a protest outside the development, Bruno Daniel a long-term community organiser made clear their home was not the new frontier (for more information see Whitford, 2015).

In any case, the most contested housing development is the one that originated as part of the Rheingold Development Rezoning Plan, which is located in the northern side of the Rheingold Brewery Revitalization Plan. This plan was projected on a number of properties to be rezoned from manufacturing to residential with a commercial overlay. These sites were part of the second development phase of the West Bushwick Urban Renewal Area. The lots had remained partially under-utilised for a number of decades but considered as part of the district’s housing expansion plan. However, unlike the previous projects presented here, this one is a private development, and like
In the Broadway Triangle Urban Renewal Plan, there were controversies regarding the rezoning process. An undemocratic decision prompted the formation of a coalition of local organisations and groups seeking justice and inclusion in local developments impacting directly and indirectly residents, business and public facilities.

§ 5.5 The case of the Rheingold Brewery rezoning

In 2013, a rezoning application was submitted by Forest Lots LLC representing Read Property Group to shift the land use, from heavy to light manufacturing and residential, of six lots located in the north end of the West Bushwick Urban Renewal Area (see Figure 5.8). The development plan projected 1,080 residential units, of which 215 would be affordable, plus 74,000 square feet (aprox. 6,800 square meters) of retail space. This would be only possible after the approval of the required ULURP at different government levels, starting with the Community Board 4.

In June 19th, the first public hearing for the rezoning took place at one of the last community meetings hold by Community Board 4 (CB4) before the summer. During the meeting members of the CB4 decided to delay their vote until having more information from city planners. Apparently community members were not well informed about the development. Later on, in July 29th a second meeting took place. This time outside the regular schedule of the monthly community meeting and without giving previous public notice (usually there are no community meetings during the month of July). The scarce publicity given to the meeting attracted just a few residents and stakeholders (approximately 4 persons). Only CB4 members, elected officials, representatives of the Brooklyn Borough President’s Office, the NYC Department of City Planning, and the developer (Read Property Group), were part of the private meeting. After a presentation, CB4 voted and approved the rezoning with some recommendations (Hybenova, 2013).

The approval of the rezoning by a few community members was acknowledged in September by a large amount of residents and local groups when the ULURP process had already passed through the Borough President and was being revised by the City Planning Commission. Robert Freeman, Executive Director of NYS Committee on Open Government, declared in a local newspaper ‘every meeting of Community Board has to be public, regardless if it’s a vote or further deliberations’ (Hybenova, 2013). He continued, ‘it is essential to the maintenance of a democratic society that the public business be performed in an open and public manner and that the citizens ... be fully
aware of and able to observe the performance of public officials and attend and listen to the deliberations and decisions that go into the making of public policy.’ After the acknowledgement of the illegality of the rezoning procedures, local grassroots groups and residents living in the vicinity of the renewal area began making the case public through a series of meetings, events and workshops.

A young woman, resident in the vicinity of the rezoning, acted as a catalyst of residents’ mobilisation. She started reaching out residents and key people in the district making public the undemocratic decision taken by CB4. The document of the rezoning application and the CB4 decision was spread soon after in local newspapers and social media causing discontent and mobilising locals. Community meetings began on mid-September 2013. Renters, homeowners, owners of local businesses and some representatives of local organisations and groups started getting together every Monday to discuss the rezoning application and the impact assessment developed by representatives of the applicant. These documents were difficult to read by some community members; nevertheless they joined efforts and capacities to have a better understanding of the implications.

By the time of the rezoning application, I had already worked doing research in the district for over three years and I had conducted a studio for students from The New School[21]. I was in contact with the leaders of some local non-profit organisations and some residents' groups. Thus, during the first phases of the mobilisation the initiator of what was already a movement contacted me as well as some local groups concerned with the rezoning implications and the exclusion of residents in the decision process. On October 6th, I co-organized along with two local grassroots groups and graduate students from the MS Design and Urban Ecologies programme[22] a workshop called ‘Development without Displacement’ to delve with residents and local groups into the rezoning process and its implications. A number of people with expertise in the field joined the session including community members and experts, leaders of non-profit organisations advocating for affordable housing and representatives of the office of the district’s City Council. Tom Angotti, a Brooklyn-based planner with extensive

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22 The MS Design and Urban Ecologies programme is one of the urban graduate programmes at Parsons School of Design, The New School. The students who co-coordinated the workshop had participated in a 15-week studio which I co-instructed with activist Frank Morales in Bushwick. They were quite knowledgeable about housing condition in the district. The names of the students who co-coordinated and co-led the workshop are: Joshua Brandt, Braden Crooks, Charles Chawalko, April De Simone, Charles Wirene, Shirley Bucknor and Anze Zadel.
experience in community planning and rezoning processes in NYC attended to support the community, as well as the executive and communication directors of the Right to the City Alliance. The full-day workshop assisted in the acknowledgement of the different opinions, concerns and thoughts related with the rezoning and the rapid changes taking place in the neighbourhood. Some of the observations discussed include: (1) the alarming rise in rezoning processes in the last years in the district bringing an increment of property prices and indirect impact in local economies and low-income families (living for decades in the area); (2) the decrease in manufacturing spaces and rise of unaffordable working spaces in the district; (3) the exclusion of residents and locals in the development and rehabilitation processes of the district; (4) the lack of knowledge of the implications of such rezoning processes by Community Board members and residents; (5) the benefits of the developer vis-a-vis the benefits of the community; (6) the misconception of the term of affordable housing and eligibility criteria to rent out those units; and (7) the need to form a coalition and envision a short and long term plan to prevent development with displacement.

By the time of the community workshop, Diana Reyna, the Councilwoman of the district where the rezoning site application was taking place, had already begun to talk with the developer and a number of community-based organisations including Churches United for Fair Housing (CUFFH), Los Sures, St. Nick’s Alliance, and the East Williamsburg Valley Industrial Development Corporation (EWVIDCO). In order to support the organising efforts of these local groups and community members (present in the workshop), the representatives of the City Council’s district office proposed the formation of an Advisory Committee at the end of the workshop. This Advisory Committee would give recommendations to the Councilwoman regarding the Rheingold Brewery Rezoning and would be composed of the community-based organisations that were already working with the Councilwoman and residents and local stakeholders. During the workshop, staff from the Councilwomen office offered five to six seats to spokeswomen/men representing the diversity of the district and aiming to share their insight and concerns about the Rheingold Brewery Rezoning.

In the following community meeting six persons were nominated and the following week five devoted residents and stakeholders of the district were ready to lead the Advisory Committee. The seats represented the voice of local parents (since public schools were at risk of being affected), homeowners, renters, local businesses, environmental and affordable housing advocates. The advisor selected representing parents was the director of a Parent Teacher Association of a public school in the district, a mother involved not only in her children’s school but also in after school activities for young kids. The advisors representing neighbours, renters and homeowners, lived a few blocks from the site and were already organising meetings with other neighbours (the one representing renters was the initiator of the
movement). Regarding the representative of local businesses, a person working in the district for over 10 years took this task, while two residents involved in environmental justice in the district for the last five years took the role of representing those residents and groups promoting sustainable development and redevelopment. Last but not least, without residents with expertise in housing, I was asked to sit in the committee as an external expert in housing affairs. Residents were engaged during the selection of the Advisory Committee but hesitant to take such responsibility. In fact the advisor representing parents gave up the following week.

The number of people attending to the weekly meetings fluctuated between 15 and 30. Outreach was a task in itself. Besides the social media and voice-to-voice efforts, bilingual flyers were the main source of communication. Mondays continued to be the meeting day. The group became nomadic as part of the strategy of reaching out more people but also due to the lack of a proper meeting space. Locals involved in the art scene of Bushwick offered most of the meeting spaces. These were alternative spaces were long-term residents, Hispanic and African American residents, were hesitant to go. Later on the meetings were organised in a space owned by long term residents quite engaged in the community. From October 14 to November 25, about ten meetings took place while the ULURP process continued running. The Advisory Committee worked in the following tasks: (1) Studied all the documents related with the rezoning; (2) Addressed the most pressing issues impacting the social and the physical structure of the district; (3) Communicated those points to the attendees of the community meetings; (4) Listened to the demands and priorities of neighbours and owners of local business; (5) Attend to meetings with the developer, the city council of the district and leaders of local non profits organisations; (6) Reached out locals organisations not involved in the process; and (7) Structured a series of demands to negotiate with the developer through a potential Community Benefit Agreement. Since the rezoning was likely to be approved there were not much options but bargaining.

Meetings with the developer took place in two occasions. In October 29th the first meeting came about at the City Council’s District 34th office. Twenty participants were part of the meeting including: Robert Wolf and four representatives of Read Property Group; representatives of the different non-profit community-based organisations already taking part of the development process; the principals of two schools that would be impacted directly by the rezoning; the Councilwoman and her representatives; and the Advisory Committee. During this first meeting only half of the concerns were addressed including the negative implications of rezoning the manufacturing sites from heavy to light industry, the already schools overcrowding in the local schools, and the urgency to increase the affordable housing units and make them truly affordable for the existing community. Most of the community members and leaders converged with the same concerns, demands and priorities. The developer
did not officially commit to address any of those concerns but agreed to make such considerations. Another meeting was scheduled for November 18th. In this meeting most of the previous participants attended. The conversation of the first meeting was picked up but again no official commitments were done.

The ULURP process continued its official calendar while community meetings were taking place. The City Planning Commission approved the rezoning on October 23rd. The only space where residents, local groups and non-profit community based organisations could be heard was at the City Council rezoning public hearing, which took place on November 12th. Residents and representatives of most of the community-based organisations involved in the negotiations attended. Concerned residents, local grassroots groups and members of the Advisory Board gave public testimonies during the hearing.

The Advisory Board was meant to be composed of spoken men/women from the community plus leaders of local non-profit community-based organisations. However, the non-profits were not always willing to work with the active residents. In fact, they had been in talks and negotiations with the developer quietly. For instance, Churches United for Fair Housing, who since very early in the negotiations demanded at least 30% of the new units to be affordable, and the marketing of those units to assure preference to local residents, had negotiated a piece of land to construct the affordable units that Read Property Group was not willing to provide. St. Nicks Alliance negotiated with the developer $75,000 of funding to train and staff 60 construction positions on the site for those community members unemployed or under-employed. The public school principals were in talks with Read Property Group to get some funds for the improvement of the classrooms. Other organisations, as Make the Road New York and the newly formed North West Bushwick Community Group were totally opposed to the development and did not make any individual deals with the developers. However, considering the timing of the rezoning process openly demanded even a larger number of affordable housing units for households with earnings below the median household income of Bushwick.

A Community Benefit Agreement (CBA) was suggested by representatives of the Councilwoman as an instrument to negotiate with the developer the demands made by local residents, groups and non-profits. The Advisory Committee had already studied the positive and negative implications of CBAs and even when it seemed to be a difficult task to achieve (due to the limited amount of time left), moved forward reaching out local groups and community-based organisations not involved in this process on one hand, and on the other hand urging those already involved to collectively draft the document. The battle was already kind of lost but at least the community could bargain for some benefits. The Bushwick Housing Independence Project, one of the few local
non-profits providing legal assistance to tenants facing illegal evictions, decided not to get involved, while Make the Road New York, the most active non-profit in the area also dealing with legal assistance and anti-displacement campaigns (besides many other issues), joined but in a marginal way (besides a larger percentage of affordable housing, they demanded job opportunities for locals). A number of local grassroots groups became active, especially the Bushwick Eco Action Network and the newly formed North West Bushwick Community Group. The community-based organisations involved from the beginning in the negotiations showed interest in such agreement but only attended to one of the Advisory Committee meetings, which took place on November 22nd. Despite this fact, they did share their individuals concerns and demands to the Advisory Committee to be included in the CBA draft being developed with the assistance of a lawyer with expertise in CBAs. The lawyer was the executive director of Brooklyn Legal Services Corporation A, the same lawyer office that won the case of the Broadway Triangle and other community fights in the Borough, and member of the Center for Justice. The lack of interest was probably due to the fact that most of the community-based organisations’ had already made individual agreements with Read Property Group. A day before the verdict of the rezoning, Read Property Group signed a non binding agreement with residents and local officials committing to fulfill some of their demands.

The rezoning application by investor Robert Wolf of Read Property Group was approved in December 2013 and the following year Joseph Tabak of Princeton Holdings bought a large property connected to the rezoned site. Wolf and Tabak became partners by owning 62.5 and 37.7% stake, respectively, of the portfolio of this development area (Bockmann, 2014). By August 2014 private developer Simon Dushinsky of the Rabsky Group had paid $53 million for part of the site, the parcels at 10 Monieth Street, 501 Bushwick Avenue and 79-115 Stanwix Street (see Figure 5.8). It was unclear at that time if the 30% of affordable units negotiated between Read Property Group and the community and public officials during the rezoning process would be provided. However the following year it was clear that Dushinsky was not willing to commit to such agreement. When the first renders of the 500-unit rental project were public and he was called for a meeting to talk about the affordable units he refused talking to community members and Councilman Antonio Reynoso’s office (Dai, 2015). Antonio Reynoso succeeded Councilwoman Diana Reyna right after the rezoning. Members of the community task force Rheingold Construction Committee started petitions demanding Rabsky Group to commit to the same terms as Read Property Group (Dai, 2015). This committee was formed once the rezoning was approved to enforce the agreements negotiated during the ULURP process by residents, community organisations and local elected officials. Some members of the Advisory Committee became members of the Rheingold Construction Committee.
Housing as an urban restructuring strategy in Brooklyn: The case of Bushwick

FIGURE 5.8 New housing developed in the Rheingold Brewery Rezoning site in 2017
In October 2015 Yoel Goldman of All Year Management closed on another piece of the site for $68.5 million (Mashayekhi, 2015). Additionally, he bought two more parcels at 123 Melrose Street and at 28 Stanwix Street for $140.7 million (Gourarie & Maurer, 2016). Goldman is projecting to develop an 800 to 900-unit rental complex on the Rheingold Brewery site. The following year he ‘secured $215 million in new construction financing from Madison Realty Capital... in addition to an earlier $70 million first mortgage provided by Madison...bringing a total to $235 million (Gourarie & Maurer, 2016). Madison Realty Capital is a real estate management firm based in New York specialising in real estate debt and equity transactions (financing) in the multifamily, retail, office and industrial sectors. Also in 2016, Rabsky Group pulled off $93 million in new construction financing from Israeli Bank Leumi for its 400,000-square-foot-rental project. This group has received in total $132 millions in loans (Bockmaan, 2016).

After the Rheingold Brewery Rezoning was approved in 2013, portions of the site started being bought by global investors and the scale of the projected rental complexes were public in local media, a new movement emerged in response to the ongoing developments. The Bushwick Community Plan began as a planning collaborative effort of residents, local stakeholders, city agencies and City Council Members Antonio Reynoso and Rafael Espinal. The plan aims to: be a participatory rezoning plan, to provide new rezoning codes, to preserve the neighbourhood’s character, to give the responsibility of construction restrictions to developers, and generate affordable housing opportunities. Reynoso and Espinal who are Council members for the 34th and 37th Districts of the New York City Council, which encompass the Community District of Bushwick, have joined forces since the rezoning to protect community members from gentrification. They became leaders of this effort by organising workshops, town halls, issue-specific meetings and other events to engage residents to create a vision for Bushwick. The plan has identified the following priority issues: affordable housing, transportation, infrastructure, parks, neighbourhood character, economic development, and public health and safety. A Steering Committee of local stakeholders was formed to lead the planning process. Most of the grassroots groups and community-based organisations that were involved in the Advisory Committee formed during the ULURP of the Rheingold Brewery Rezoning are part of the Steering Committee and continue fighting for a better Bushwick.
§ 5.6 The impact of urban restructuring trends in Bushwick

Looking at the different periods of urban restructuring in Bushwick it is possible to identify important shifts in urban renewal policy and programmes, local urban governance, neighbourhood leadership, sponsorship and integration and participation of the local community as well as current urban and housing development trends. The most significant shifts and trends are the following. First, urban renewal plans have changed in focus, leadership and sponsorship. As it was illustrated in this chapter, large scale urban renewal plans subsidised by the state for the provision of low-income housing shifted at the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s when residents pressured the local government to follow local needs and priorities and facilitate residents and local stakeholders’ participation in decision making. Fuelled by the War on Poverty programmes’ citizens’ activation, community-initiated plans led by community-based organisations and residents supported by the state became the manifestation of dissent but also hope in impoverished communities. However, with the decentralisation of power and resources, or better said the shift from government to governance, urban renewal approaches shifted. For instance, while in the first urban renewal wave, the state was the one sponsoring and leading public housing programmes with the assistance of public subsidies, loans and grants to stimulate social, physical, and economic improvement; in contrast, in the following waves the state would act more as facilitator. The delegation of responsibilities in regard to the provision of housing and social services was first granted to local community-based organisations and eventually to private partners with sophisticated planning and financing strategies. Thus, leadership at the neighbourhood level also shifted from collaborations between the city and local stakeholders to public-private partnerships. Most recently, urban revitalisation plans have been in the hands of local, national, and global private development, and investment and management corporations. However this does not mean that the state is out of the equation. The new housing development complexes have been facilitated by the state with tax abatements and other creative incentives. However the community benefits have not been clear. Luxurious interventions in low-income districts have provided for the most part housing for middle- and high-income households.

Second, area-based plans and interventions have been central in the revitalisation of disinvested and impoverished districts. Historically blighted areas were targeted and acquired by the city for urban renewal plans sponsored by the state and eventually transformed through the construction of affordable housing. Consequently, abandoned or under-utilised industrial areas became the focus of these transformations; one example is the Rheingold Brewery Revitalization Plan. The city would acquire and designate the site as urban renewal area and work in collaboration with local
stakeholders and non-profit housing development corporations to ensure affordable housing is provided. Most recently, large industrial sites in urban areas with strategic locations (such as waterfronts and well-connected low-income districts) have been acquired by private investors and corporations and in turn rezoned to develop luxury apartments. Due to the effects of these usually undemocratic zoning changes (gentrification and displacement) they have increasingly faced opposition from locals. However, and regardless the impact, zoning changes have been used as the main instrument of the state and its corporate partners to bring about urban change in recent years. As it was illustrated above, over 40% of the city has been rezoned since 2002 (see Figure 5.6). Area-based programmes, sponsored and subsidised by the state, such as the Inclusionary Housing Program, have been at the core of recent area-based transformations without providing sufficient and long-term benefits to the local community. These programmes have brought about more burdens than benefits.

| TABLE 5.5. Social, economic and housing changes in Bushwick from 2000 to 2015. |
|---------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Foreign-born population (%)     | 33.2   | 35.1   | 35.7   | 30.9   |
| Unemployment rate (%)           | 17.2   | 12.7   | 10.2   | 8.5    |
| Poverty rate (%)                | 38.2   | 32.9   | 28.5   | 29.1   |
| Median household income         | 33,860 | 27,852 | 38,104 | 43,660 |
| Home ownership rate (%)         | 13.7   | 13.6   | 15.9   | 12.4   |
| Median sales prices* ($)        | 117,412| 232,927| 180,410| 336,590|
| Median rent** ($)               | 689    | 706    | 1,210  | 1,320  |
| Median asking rent** ($)        | -      | 1,060  | 1,600  | 2,500  |

* 2-4 family building/**Average monthly rent including subsidized housing.

Third, housing has been at the core of urban revitalisation plans in low-income districts but not precisely affordable housing in recent years. The state fiercely pursued the activation of the housing market as a result of tax abatements and other types of incentives for developers and the deregulation of housing and public instruments available preserving affordable housing (see Table 5.5). As it was illustrated in this chapter, the state has delegated the provision of affordable housing from central to local governments and from non-profit community-based organisations and non-profit housing development corporations to local and global private corporations and investors. Clearly, the state is not directly providing affordable housing. On the contrary it is privatising public housing and deregulating affordable housing programmes. What is more alarming is that housing provided by the latest affordable housing programmes
(e.i. Inclusionary Housing Program) in low-income districts is not affordable for existing residents of those districts and in many cases those programmes doesn’t guarantee affordability in perpetuity (because of policy loopholes). Private landlords, corporations and investors transforming low-income districts are taking advantage of the loopholes of affordable housing’s public subsidies and programmes. For instance, illegal rent increases in rent stabilised units offered through different public subsidies and programmes including the Inclusionary Housing Program are common practices among property owners.

According to the NYC Rent Guidelines Board, landlords owning rent controlled\(^{23}\) and rent stabilised\(^{24}\) apartments can increase rent 2% to 4.5% for one-year leases, and 4% to 8.5% for a two-year leases. The only way to raise the rent above these numbers is when an apartment becomes deregulated. The legal rent can increase up to 20% and even more. Additionally, an apartment may become deregulated at the end of a tenant’s last lease commencing during the period of the tax abatement (if it was stabilised as part of a tax benefit programme); when a building is converted to a co-op under an eviction plan; upon vacancy; and if the rent is $2,500 or more, and the household earned $200,000 or more in the two prior consecutive years.

Research on illegal rent increases and the loss of affordable housing in the city was undertaken by Make the Road New York (2011). In 200 randomly selected apartments across New York City, including Bushwick, the researchers found (1) excessive rent increases with no explanation; (2) landlords failing to register rents of their stabilised apartments; and (3) evidence of inflated rents when vacancies occur (over the 20%), upon renewal, or after major repair work in the buildings. Rent overcharges have put tenants in difficult situations. In the worst cases, they don’t have any option but moving. The research also uncovered the difficulties tenants face while preventing eviction, such as tenants lack of knowledge on their rights and rent-regulations; language barriers when they interact with the authorities; inadequacy in DHCR’s complaint-driven enforcement process; and a long backlog of rent overcharge complaints stretching in some cases to over two years.

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\(^{23}\) Rent regulation applies to residential buildings constructed before February 1, 1947 in municipalities for which an end to the postwar rental housing emergency has not been declared. For an apartment to be under rent control, the tenant must generally have been living there continuously since before July 1, 1971 or for less time as a successor to a rent controlled tenant.

\(^{24}\) Rent stabilized apartments are generally in buildings of six or more units built between February 1, 1947 and January 1, 1974. Tenants in buildings built before February 1, 1947, who moved in after June 30, 1971 are also covered by rent stabilization. A third category of rent stabilized apartments covers buildings subject to regulation by virtue of various governmental supervision or tax benefit programmes.
Fourth, urban restructuring strategies are increasingly pursuing the highest profit rates at the expenses of citizens. The privatisation of housing provision, commodification of housing and incorporation of gentrification as policy in urban revitalisation of low-income districts has promoted illegal practices, such as abandonment and milking of...
properties, in the name of development and profit making. For instance, Bushwick had the highest number of serious housing code violations in the city in 2005, ranking second in 2011, perhaps due to housing improvements in units converted into condos. Furthermore, the district was ranked number five on severe overcrowding in the city during the same year. Housing units with serious housing code violations accounted 150.1 per 1,000 rental units in the area in 2011, while the rate of severely crowded households increased from 3.3% in 2005 to 7.7% in 2010 (Furman Center, 2011).

In 2009 MRNY published two reports exposing major environmental health problems caused by bad indoor housing conditions in Bushwick; If Walls Could Talk: How Landlords Fail to Obey Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention Laws in Bushwick (2009a) and Toxic Homes (2009b). The studies exposed the asthma and lead poisoning problems in the neighbourhood, and the way landlords have failed to comply with their obligations and local laws. In 2011, this organisation addressed this problem publishing another report portraying the burdens experienced by tenants at Brooklyn Housing Court, especially tenants facing eviction and seeking necessary repairs in their homes. The report discovered that approximately 85% of landlords are represented in court, while 90-95% of tenants are not (Make the Road New York, 2011). It also exposed the reasons why the Brooklyn Housing Court is not an easy place to find justice, especially for tenants’ non-proficient in English, as is 40% of the Bushwick population, unmasking the existing power inequality between landlords and tenants. According to the report, after pursuing legal procedures without success tenants most often are forced to live in hazardous conditions, and with landlords ceasing to maintain the buildings, they are eventually forced to evacuate their homes. Landlords then reappear once a rent regulated multi-family apartment is vacant which can then be renovated and rented (or sold) at a market price. The illegal tactics underscored above show some of the practices taking place to evict long-term residents and in turn flip the properties and get more profit. However these are not the only ones, there are other ways that must be studied and exposed, such as landlords refusing to accept rent from the tenants, refusing to renew tenant’s rent contracts, offering monetary compensation for leaving, starting court proceedings, and physical intimidation (Bushwick Housing Independence Project, 2011).

Fifth, real-estate speculation and predatory lending for profit making has become common practice in the restructuring of low-income districts. If we examine the case of Bushwick, we can discern that the structural vacancy of the 1970s and 1980s produced by redlining, predatory lending, and city foreclosures has been tackled over time. However in recent years housing units, from the new and old housing stock, have been abandoned due to speculation and foreclosures. In 2011 there were 49,926 housing units in the district and out of this number 4,462 units (8.9%) were identified as vacant in census records (American Community Survey, 2011). The Right to the City
Alliance condo vacancy count showed that vacancies were over this number and many of them were just sitting vacant due to speculation (Right to the City Alliance, 2010). This fact was corroborated through observation. During the time of this investigation a number of vacant buildings have been rehabilitated and turned into luxury apartments.

FIGURE 5.10 Changes in the Hispanic population in Bushwick from 1990 to 2010
On the other hand, foreclosures have affected long term residents in the district. From the 59,000 foreclosure processes initiated during 2006-2010 in New York City, 1,600 occurred in Bushwick (Sanchis, 2010). The 2008 financial crash and predatory lending resulted in the loss of properties to many households leaving behind two and three-family homes vacant. This was most evident in the south of Bushwick affecting mainly Hispanic and African-American families. What is most alarming is that multifamily owners have stopped maintaining their properties and paying taxes due to mortgage arrears. In the worst cases, they have also experienced foreclosures and sent families to the streets. Just as the foreclosure crisis is concentrated in certain city districts, so is federal aid. In Brooklyn, the borough with the largest amount of foreclosed properties in the city, this phenomenon has affected mainly its northeastern area. Bushwick, along with other neighbouring districts, was designated to receive federal stimulus through the Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP). The NSP was established in 2009 to provide grants to states and localities for the redevelopment of foreclosed and abandoned properties. In its second term, the programme extended the grants to non-profits and a consortium of non-profit entities on a competitive basis. In its third term, it returned to the first mode, retaining the Community Development Block Grant’s distinctive requirements and objectives, such as local citizen participation, the provision of decent housing for persons of low and moderate-income, and arresting housing decline (see Chapter 3).

According to research undertaken by the Center for New York City Affairs at The New School (Sanchis, 2010), these stimulus funds were insufficient to stem the epidemic of foreclosures in New York City. The study indicates that additional grants were needed in order to achieve neighbourhood stabilisation. In Bushwick, the study notes, the programme performance was uncertain given the likelihood that the benefits were not reaching the existing residents under duress or the recently displaced. Bushwick families were not able to afford purchasing foreclosed or abandoned houses even with the stimulus funds. The prices of houses were simply too high. According to the research mentioned above, the city proposed an extra stimulus fund known as Housing Asset Renewal Program (HARP) for developers to rehabilitate and convert foreclosed units into affordable housing. Unfortunately, these funds were deemed insufficient. Thus, only moderate and high-income households were able to benefit from initiatives like the NSP, which instead of creating affordable living spaces for low-income families may have attracted private investors, and speculators seeking profit through buying-rehabilitating-selling foreclosed properties. These types of practices may reduce housing vacancies and decline but also initiate and speed up gentrification.

Lastly, the state has transferred responsibility regarding housing and social services to community-based organisations. However power in decision making and resources has been limited. As it was illustrated in this chapter, non-profit community-based
organisations and non-profit housing corporations took an important role in the restructuring of low-income districts in times of crisis, when local governments had not option but to turn grassroots demands into programmes and the private sector was not willing nor able to invest in those areas. This study does not aim to examine all of those community-based organisations or grassroots groups that took ownership and responsibility in the restructuring of Bushwick, but it is relevant to mention those who have without a doubt assisted in the revitalisation of the area, and fought for the welfare of its community, such as Ridgewood Bushwick Senior Citizens Council, Make the Road New York and Bushwick Housing Independence Project (BHIP). These three local entities differ in terms of background, aims, leadership, services, organisation and community development strategies, but all of them have been serving the community since its worst days.

RBSCC is a non-profit housing development corporation whose achievements include decades of affordable housing renewal, development and management, as it was illustrated in the previous sections, as well as the formulation and implementation of urban improvement initiatives, such as the Comprehensive Housing Plan, the Rheinglod Revitalization Plan and the Bushwick Initiative. The two first plans were described widely in the previous sections. The last plan was a two-year multi-sector programme launched in 2005 targeting a 23-block area adjacent to the Maria Hernandez Park in order to tackle neighbourhood problems related to substandard housing conditions, drug dealing and abuse. Besides these three initiatives, the organisation has been also involved in preventing predatory lending, creating anti-harassment programmes and providing home ownership counselling in recent years.

MRNY is non profit community organisation with operation centres in a number of low-income communities in the NYC metropolitan area. For over 20 years it has advocated for housing improvement and tenants rights, as well as drafting and leading coalition efforts to pass legislation to ensure justice for the most vulnerable tenants. The organisation had a key role in passing The Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention Act in 2004, the Safe Housing Act in 2007, and the Tenant Protection Act in 2008. It has been also involved in diverse campaigns, such as the Illegal Rent Overcharge Campaign and the Brooklyn Housing Court Reform Campaign, as well as in publishing a number of valuable reports exposing the condition of housing and tenants in Bushwick, as it was mentioned above. These reports have served as a tool to create awareness among residents and city authorities. Additionally, MRNY has led the Environmental and Housing Justice Project, which address issues such as housing code violations, rodent infestation, sewage seepage and lead poisoning, as well as environmental health, including rampant asthma and lack of open spaces. Through this project the organisation has provided legal services for tenants and organised collective tenant
action against landlords avoiding the law. MRNY strongly believe in the power inherent in organised tenants.

Finally, BHIP is a small local non-profit, which also organised and advocated for the preservation of affordable housing for low and moderate-income families in Bushwick and its surrounding neighbourhoods. BHIP has worked closely with Brooklyn A since 2006, a neighbourhood-based civil legal corporation which provides services to low-income individuals and groups in North and East Brooklyn (the same entity which provided legal support to the Broadway Triangle and the Rheingold Rezoning cases). The relationship between these two local entities strengthened when they were awarded a joint grant from the Independence Community Foundation to hire a full time attorney to deal with tenant displacement and representation of tenants associations in Bushwick. They have collaborated addressing tenants problems in multiple dwellings that exceed the scope of their individual advocacy (Hafetz, 2008). BHIP activities include supporting individuals involved in Housing Court cases; assisting tenants working with court-appointed administrators dealing with building and apartment repairs; and providing training sessions to instruct residents on their rights as tenants, and in housing court procedures. This organisation also deals with organising tenants of rent stabilised and rent controlled buildings to create tenants associations. BHIP represented 38 buildings in the district in 2008 (Hafetz, 2008).

Clearly, the scope and approach each organisation has used to bring about improvement in Bushwick differ in many ways. While RBSSC has acted as a replacement of state in terms of the provision of housing and social services, MRNY has been radicalising locals by exposing urban and social injustices and creating awareness of tenants, workers and immigrants rights. Lastly, BHIP has had a more assistencialist approach by assisting residents already struggling with particular problems. What is important to stress is that all these organisations have been impacted by the institutional and policy changes described in this chapter and are in constant dependency of public grants, even private ones in some cases, for their survival. Additionally there are some instances where attached to some agendas are guidelines different to their own ones. In fact, as it was shown in this chapter, some community-based organisations and local groups have become more distanced from each other regarding objectives and interests, and in some cases have turned into funding competitors. In Bushwick, RBSSC, a community-based organisation that emerged with a strong social drive and, a handful of employees, has turned into a $100 million social and housing enterprise (despite its non-profit nature) with a large amount employees and powerful partners. Meanwhile, other local non-profits, such as MRNY and BHIP, have found alternative ways to organise and mobilise their members to overcome the increasing social and housing shifts with a much narrower and limited funding base.
§ 5.7 Conclusion

Delving into the urban and housing development in Bushwick over the years it is possible to discern the evolution of urban revitalisation in low-income neighbourhoods that have managed to overcome urban decay from the 1970s and 1980s in New York City and the current development trends in these areas. Additionally, some of the enquiries of this study can be clear up and even answered. Certainly, former urban renewal plans that provided public housing and community-based programmes sponsored by the city to rehabilitate and construct low-income housing have been replaced by profit-driven urban revitalisation plans led by public-private partnerships interested in serving middle- and high-income households. As it was illustrated above, new large private developments sponsored by global investment and financing are flourishing while old multifamily buildings are being transformed into condos, sometimes through rent overcharges and the removal of rent controls. The city vision of the former Mayor—a product that must be marketed as a luxury good—has stimulated the displacement of residents from Manhattan to working class districts such as Bushwick (Brash, 2011). Those dwellers have opened new housing markets typified by rent and sale price increments, real state speculation and change in local economies. Public policy, rezoning and tax abatements in some areas have helped in the process benefiting the wealthy at the expense of those in critical need. Public programmes and aid have shifted from assisting the poor to benefiting financial institutions, the real estate industry, and public-private partnerships to stimulate urban and economic development (Angotti, 2008; Feinstein, 2008; Marwell, 2007). Economic development through profit-driven urbanisation has damaged and pushed to extinction a number of working class districts in the city. The degree to which government policies have actively promoted gentrification in order to achieve fiscal and societal goals is a policy calculation that should consider its adverse consequences (Brenner et al., 2009a). The new urban restructuring strategies have managed to promote and in many cases create heterogeneous districts by fracturing and weakening local communities. These disruptions have not been by demolition and new construction or by the engineered insertion of better off social classes but by the domino effect created by area-based urban interventions and the unregulated housing market.

The case of Bushwick sheds light on the way the state has used problematic and contested sites as an instrument to achieve the urban coherence needed to reproduce its self and generate economic growth. Certainly, the historical patterns of investment and disinvestment are clear in the current outward diffusion of urban restructuring process. Formerly redlined and disinvested districts, such as Bushwick, are now being targeted for zoning changes and public and private investments. Housing development in these areas has been promoted though public instruments and incentives, and by
buying out residents. Building coalition politics has been central to public-private partnerships to transform entire sections of districts. As it was illustrated in the case of the Rheingold Brewery Rezoning, public officials, local politicians, and even leaders of community-base organisations have sold themselves to powerful developers and corporations while advocating for the inclusion of residents in decision-making processes. Participatory tools and initiatives involving residents who will be affected by development have, for the most part, been created by public and private entities, including non-profits, to prevent any opposition, safeguard their own interests and achieve their own goals.

What is uplifting is that resistant grassroots and community groups have worked eagerly to save neighbourhoods such as Bushwick. In fact, community development, housing renewal and neighbourhood stabilisation in general has been achieved through their collective effort over the years and therefore they are fighting back to the increasing disruptions. As it was illustrated in this chapter, residents, grassroots groups, and local stakeholders have worked diligently to improve the housing conditions, keep housing affordability, and guarantee the well being of residents in low-income districts. Their endeavours have slowed down and even ceased aggressive profit-driven practices despite their lack of resources. However, as it was illustrated in this chapter, residents and local groups are facing new challenges. Land and housing negotiations are not anymore with the local government and non-profit organisations but with real estate developers and financial institutions. Thus, new strategies and alliances must be formulated by and coordinated between local resistance and advocacy groups with the following aims: preserving and expanding low-income rental housing; protecting undeveloped land and vacant properties from market development and speculation through the formulation of new models of housing accessibility for those who are truly in need; and protecting tenant rights.
Politics, practices and constrains of urban restructuring through citizens active engagement in Rotterdam: The case of Tarwewijk

§ 6.1 Introduction

The intensification and concentration of interrelated urban problems in low-income neighborhoods in Western Europe has been a great concern to local governments in recent decades. In response, urban policy has evolved with a degree of convergence among countries that demonstrate similar trends and features. As it was illustrated in Chapter 4, urban renewal approaches have aimed to move to a more integral and participative approach. For instance, civic participation to mitigate the unprecedented problems of low-income districts was desired and promoted in local, national and West European urban and housing policy. However, more inclusive and democratic planning and development approaches have proven hard to achieve. This chapter examines policy, programmes and instruments proposed to move to more a sustainable and inclusive urban restructuring approach in the Netherlands, while illustrating how citizens’ active engagement has been addressed and to what extent have the deprived, the voiceless, and the marginalised exercised the power to transform their own urban and housing condition. The study focuses on the district of Tarwewijk, one of the most deprived and segregated districts of Rotterdam. This locality was part of several urban restructuring national, and local policies, and initiatives addressing urban improvement, and integration through residents’ engagement in recent years. Urban renewal processes in this working class district looked at four key aspects in this chapter. Firstly, the agents assisting in urban and housing decline and the urban complexities that low-income inner city neighbourhoods face today. Secondly, the policies, programmes, and local initiatives promoting urban renewal and other neighbourhood approaches formulated to improve the social, economic, and physical conditions of those ‘deprived neighbourhoods’. Particular attention is given to those fostering citizen participation. Thirdly, changes in urban governance, and inequalities in power structures at the neighbourhood level are examined. Lastly, the citizens’
transformative power among the instruments, frameworks and platforms for civic engagement is scrutinised, as well as potential tools and approaches to facilitate a greater participation in urban and housing development and management.

§  6.2 From working class to a deprived district

Tarwewijk\textsuperscript{25} developed in the south bank of Rotterdam at the end of the 19th century with the construction of the Maashaven, a large-scale grain industry, the influx of workers, and the first residential area called Tarwebuurt. Tarwebuurt was built in a polder recently incorporated in the borough [deelgemeente] of Charlois, and expanded rapidly with the growth of port activities and large-scale industries (see Figure 6.1). Windmills and rural housing were torn down along the Katendrechtse Lagedijk to give room to new housing and urban infrastructure in the 1930s, such as the tramline and the Maastunnel. Around this time a gradual migration to urban areas from the provincial regions of Brabant, Drenthe and Zeeland took place looking for economic opportunities in districts such as Tarwewijk. Most of the housing stock of this district developed before the 1940s (see Figure 6.5).

In the post war years new residential areas, mostly garden towns and cities, were developed in the peripheries of the city in response to the housing deficit (see Chapter 4). Zuidwijk and Pendrecht were two of the garden cities developed in Charlois in the 1950s. These new residential areas, were like many others that rose up in the south as well as in north side of the city and attracted the solid working class living in old prewar districts such as Tarwewijk. Thus by the 1960s old inner city neighbourhoods began experiencing socioeconomic and physical changes. In the case of Tarwewijk, long-term residents, mostly of Dutch origin, began moving to these new residential areas while newcomers kept arriving. However, this time the newcomers were not only from southern provinces, but also foreign countries, such as Turkey and Morocco, and later on from the Dutch colonies. New residents settled down and became part of the labour force of the port and related industries replacing some of the first inhabitants who gradually left the district looking for better economic opportunities. However, in the coming years the mechanisation of the port started to take place and less working force was needed.

\textsuperscript{25} Tarwewijk translates to 'flour district' in English. The name was given because of the port activities in the district related to grain industries.
By the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, job opportunities and local businesses started declining in Tarwewijk. Local corner stores were affected by Rotterdam’s first large shopping mall, Zuidplein, which was developed in the south end of the district in 1972 serving the surrounding residential areas as well as southern provinces. Despite local shops and businesses were losing business and the oil crises started hitting residents livelihoods many long term residents stayed, mostly in and around the Tarwebuurt (see Figure 6.2), witnessing the influx of worker immigrants settling down in the adjacent neighbourhoods.

During this decade no housing units were added to the district (see Figure 6.5) and old units started deteriorating. However, since most housing stock was in better shape than in other districts located in the so-called second rink, the urban renewal programme took place until the early 1980s (later than in other districts) and in a very small scale (see section below). Thus, economic changes, the lack of public investment, and the flight of working class families invested in the neighbourhood paved the way to the gradual decline of the housing stock, and the district in general, in the following
decade. However, these were not the only agents. Changes in the housing market and exclusionary practices were undertaken by banks and played an important role in the decline of this working class district starting in the 1980s.

Redlining: Becoming a ‘high risk’ district

Rotterdam’s housing market was affected after the oil crises of the 1970s, particularly when unemployment rose and interest rates increased up to 12% for mortgage loans (Aalbers, 2011). The decline of housing prices and the economic hardship of the time lead to high default rates on residential mortgage loans, particularly in working class districts, like Tarwewijk, were economic changes were more evident. Residents had no option but to sell their properties at prices below the ones they had acquired them and move, which led to a general depreciation of the property values. Many districts with high rates of blue-collar workers, which were mostly hit by the economic restructuring and unemployment, soon became ‘high risk’ areas for lenders (Aalbers, 2011). Equity losses for mortgage lenders in these districts gave way to the first traces of redlining, a practice denying or limiting services and/or financial assistance (mortgages) to residents in particular areas (for more information about redlining see Aalbers, 2011).

Aalbers (2011) comprehensive research on redlining in Rotterdam (and other cities) asserts that it is not certain when or where the first practices of redlining took place in Rotterdam, but according to his findings these practices must have been pursued by different lenders in the 1980s in west and south Rotterdam, most certainly in Tarwewijk. What he certainly found is that one of the largest banks and lenders in the country, ABN AMRO, was the first defining particular areas where residential mortgage capital was denied. This bank deliberately implemented this sort of exclusion as a risk avoidance policy. According to Aalbers (2011), in the early 1990s, after being approached by real estate agents active in Rotterdam South, and affected by these practices, ABN AMRO in accordance to the agents acknowledged districts in Rotterdam South were heterogenous and, therefore there were parts of districts suitable and attractive to investment. Redlining practices, which were not fully institutionalised, seemed to vanish in the few coming years. However, as Aalbers notes, in the late 1990s, when economic growth was present in cities, the housing market started to pick up and default rates decrease, ABN AMRO responded to the high demand of residential mortgage loans by making business with the first official ‘colored map’ of Rotterdam (Aalbers, 2011). Using three different colours, this map defined the redlining policies that were soon widely distributed among other lenders and banks. Red designated neighbourhoods where mortgages were not granted or ‘high risk’ areas. While yellow and green delimited neighbourhoods where mortgages were granted up to 70-80%
and 125% of the appraised value, respectively. Certainly, as Aalbers (2011) notes, the redlining policy of the largest lender of Rotterdam, ABN AMRO, was place-based, but lead to race-based illegal practices. His study proves that excluded neighbourhoods had, in most cases, significant concentrations of low-income and minority households. City officials, local real estate agents and academics followed closely lenders practices at that time (for more information see Aalbers, 2011). And in October 1999, Mr. Schrijer, City Councilor for Charlois, exposed these illegal practices in a local newspaper. Mr. Schrijer had followed closely what was then knew as the “Rotterdam Mortgage Scandal”. However, and despite many borrowers and real estate agents exposed their cases and lenders were scrutinised, the damage was done after a decade of redlining in many districts. ABN AMRO, as well as many other lenders, fiercely denied exclusionary practices, particularly those based on place and race. This bank claimed that crime and drug related practices were associated with their selection policies, and continued with redlining policies the following decade (Aalbers, 2011).

Middle-income applicants who applied for mortgage loans in excluded neighbourhoods were denied just because of the location. These types of applications were not even approved in neighbourhoods where the appreciation of the properties was higher or where urban regeneration projects had taken place (see next section). In Tarwewijk, redlining did not only help in the further decline and depreciation of the district but it also affected existing residents who wanted to sell their properties or find better housing opportunities close to their community. Thus, besides obstructing middle-income applicants to get invested in the area, existing residents were not able to neither invest nor transform their own neighbourhood. Of course there were some exceptions. For instance, some immigrants, who had economically prospered in the area managed to buy properties. However, high interest rates were usually granted to applicants with non-Dutch background pursuing to become new homeowners. Additionally, many of these new homeowners, called noodkopers, found themselves facing the decline of property values and financial problems to pay their mortgages (Ham & Stouten, 1987).

Certainly, the changes in economic activities, the 1970s recessions, and the redlining practices of the late 1980s and 1990s impacted Tarwewijk’s physical and social structure. By the beginning of the 1990s an unprecedented decline had manifested in the area. Still we have to acknowledge that this downturn was not only rooted in socio-economic changes and the decline of the housing market. Drug-related crime, real estate speculation and the take over of the district by slum-landlords were also important agents. In 1992 the City of Rotterdam decided to close two of the most popular spaces for drug use in the city centre. As a result, activities related with drug dealing and abuse moved to south and western city districts, such as Spangen and Tarwewijk (De Bruin & Riemersma, 2003; Burgers & Kloosterman, 1996).
The urban structure and location of Tarwewijk helped in the attraction of drug practices. The metro line provided easy access through the Maashaven station to the district southeastern area known as the Millinxbuurt (see Figure 6.2). Most of the illegal practices concentrated in this neighbourhood since landlords began subletting properties at high rents with little supervision of tenants' background and behaviour. This stimulated the arrival of households involved in illicit practices, as well as temporary and undocumented immigrants. These groups found easy access to rental housing (in order to sign a rent contract you must register at the Municipality). Surinamese and other Antillean households increased in numbers and became over-represented in some sections of the district by the 1990s, especially in the...
Millinxbuurt. This neighbourhood got into an alarming state, at the national level, due to its interrelated urban problems by the end of the 1990s.

As it was illustrated above, redlining practices played an important role in the economic stagnation of the district. The outcomes lead to other type of activities, such as property milking and speculation, which in turn assisted in the deterioration of the housing stock and the development of illegal activities (related to drugs) and predatory practices (related to undocumented immigrants). Tarwewijk was recognized as a loss-making area by the mid 1990s (Aalbers, 2006). As it was mentioned above, it was difficult for local homeowners to transfer their properties to families from the district as well as other city districts since mortgages were restricted in the area. Mostly dubious investors — slum landlords — had the capacity to buy those properties, which often were sold at fire-sale prices. On the other hand, reliable landlords with large amounts of housing units started selling their properties to less reliable and smaller landlords as their profits started shrinking (Aalbers, 2011). Slum landlords ‘milked’ their properties by maximising rent income. Subletting overcrowded units, avoiding expenditures of maintenance and utilities, and allowing illegal practices (brothels, drug dealing, etc) were common practices for profit making. In some cases landlords’ lack of maintenance was also associated with speculation. However, not the speculation that usually takes place in low-income districts. Property owners were not neglecting properties while waiting for the housing market to pick up to eventually sell at higher rates, rather they started neglecting intentionally their buildings, especially from the 1990s onwards, expecting to sell the properties to the municipality and socially responsible landlords such as housing associations (Aalbers, 2006).

**From ‘high risk’ to ‘priority district’**

Tarwewijk caught national attention from the late 1980s onwards and the first area-based policies and initiatives took place in the district to deal with the ongoing urban decline and social problems such as the Integral Neighbourhood Management Projects [Integrale Buurtbeheerprojecten], Problem Accumulation Areas [Problem Cumulatie Gebiden], and the Social Renewal Policy [Sociale Vernieuwing]. Tarwewijk was one of the first targeted areas for piloting these policies nation wide. However, as it will be illustrated in this section, these policies were not enough to counteract the entangled urban problems concentrated in this district. Thus, other area-based approaches with more comprehensive and integrated scopes were pursued in the end of the 1990s. The results are rather controversial since the population decreased from 12,640 to 11,306 inhabitants from 1995 to 2000 as a result of those policies, as it will be illustrated in this section. Also, during the same period the percentage of long-term native Dutch
residents declined from 51 to 39.2% and continued dropping in the following years (see Table 6.1).

Economic hardship was present in this district for long time. For instance, despite the implementation of a number of initiatives addressing urban and housing improvement and community development in the 1980s and 1990s the standardised household income was 13,900 euros in year 2003, while the one of the city was 18,200 euros. It is important to mention that this district has one of the lowest household incomes citywide, and the average household income in Rotterdam is usually one of the lowest nationwide. For instance it was 10% below the national average the same year, in 2003 (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2003). Moreover, unemployment has tended to be high, almost double, in comparison with the city average rate during this decade (Deelgemeente Charlois et al., 2008). One of the most vulnerable and overrepresented groups is single-parents, which accounts for over half of the population of Tarwewijk (Nicis Institute, 2007).

Looking at numbers could be deceptive in this district since there are aspects difficult to track. For instance, the number of illegal residents, or those residents not registered in the Municipal Administration, is unknown. However, it is stipulated to be around 25 to 30% of the population of Tarwewijk, and approximately 6% of the population of Rotterdam (Aalbers, 2006; Delgemeente Charlois, 2008). Additionally, the housing condition of this group is usually unknown since they are not visible in the system and most of the time unregistered residents live with relatives or illegally sublet. This led to housing over crowding. There is overpopulation in around 11% of the dwellings of the district. Other aspects, such as ties in the district are difficult to grasp since approximately 25% of the residents move from this ever-changing district every year, without counting the non-registered inhabitants (Centrum voor Onderzoek en Statistiek, 2009). What has been one of the government measures to evaluate if the district has become safer and liveable has been the safety index, which has fluctuated in the district over the years (see Figure 6.11).

Tarwewijk was designated as one of the ‘problematic districts’ nation wide by the 56-District Approach [56-Wijkaanpak] initiative in 2003, which was supported and promoted by one the largest and more ambitious policies the country has ever undertaken, the Big Cities Policy. The integrated measures claimed by this policy continued their efforts the following years and strengthened this initiative with the 40-Empowered Districts [40-Krachwijken] initiative in 2007. Tarwewijk was nominated once again as one of the ‘priority districts’ by this public initiative. From 2000 to 2009 rehabilitation, and new construction of housing took place as part of these initiatives. Housing units that developed during this period almost equal those constructed and rehabilitated throughout the 1980s and 1990s (see Figure 6.5).
What is important to note is that the latest area-based approaches despite aiming to integrate social, economic, physical, and safety measures to tackle the ongoing interrelated urban problems, they tended to promote physical transformations, such as housing renewal, to solve social issues, such as poverty, unemployment and crime. Most importantly, starting in the 1990s the government poured millions of public money in these area-based initiatives while promoting the involvement of residents and local stakeholders for local policy development and implementation. Strategic city plans; district action plans, neighbourhood initiatives and other covenants were envisioned and put in action. However, looking at the numbers and considering the narratives of local residents and stakeholders it is critical to enquire the way those measures were translated locally, and how local agency was used to create local policies and implementation strategies that could benefit current residents and future generations. The coming section will illustrate the different public efforts and approaches aimed to bring about change in Tarwewijk.
§ 6.3 Housing renewal as an urban restructuring strategy to improve ‘problematic’ neighbourhoods

Many working class districts located in Rotterdam and the Randstad, experienced significant changes over the last three decades. The interconnected urban problems that emerged out of those changes prompted shifts in urban renewal policy, and frameworks of implementation keeping most of the time housing at the centre. As it was explained in Chapter 4, theoretically urban renewal shifted to urban regeneration. Urban interventions claimed to move from demolition and construction to a more comprehensive and integrated approaches of urban rehabilitation and development to achieve economic, physical, social, and environmental improvement.
The participation of a large cohort of partners, including residents, tenants groups, and grassroots organisations in those processes was desired by local stakeholders and sought by local and national governments. However, in practice the goals and outcomes of these approaches have been in question. This section aims to illustrate the evolution of urban renewal in low-income districts looking at public policy, local plans, and neighbourhood initiatives, as well as the involvement of local stakeholders in planning processes and in the development and management of housing in the district of Tarwewijk.

**Urban renewal and Building for the Neighbourhood**

The first planning tools attempting to control the sprawl of cities and the deterioration of inner city districts was legislated at the end of the 1960s, but it wasn’t until the 1974 that policy began focusing on strengthening the economy by developing city centres and inner city districts to stop the population decline, and attract new residents to cities. The first urban renewal policy mostly cantered in pre-war neighbourhoods with a large share of private rental housing in bad shape, and where landlords were not willing or able to renovate their properties (Priemus, 2004). The first approach, demolition-construction, provoked tenants discontent in many areas of the city since they were not able to be part of decision-making processes. Residents and local stakeholders claimed a shift in housing planning, rehabilitation, and development processes in a context of strong political agitation in The Netherlands and the rest of Western Europe.

The Urban Renewal Act [Stadsvernieuwing] was formulated at the beginning of the 1970s and demolition was replaced by renovation. *Building for the Neighbourhood* became the slogan of the urban renewal policy introduced in 1974 (which lasted until 1994). As it was illustrated in Chapter 4, it was oriented towards building and renovating affordable housing through shifting commercial rental housing to social rental housing (for more information about Urban Renewal in Rotterdam see Stouten, 2010). In Rotterdam, the policy took place in two stages, targeting the so-called second ring districts (tweede ringsgebiden) which were characterised by having high concentrations of housing stock constructed before the 1940, and low-income and minority households (Afdeling Ruimtelijke Ordening, Stadsvernieuwing en Volkshuisvesting, 1980) (see Figure 4.2 in Chapter 4). As it was illustrated in Chapter 4, the urban renewal programme addressed active participation of tenants allowing residents to be part of the transformation of their own living environment and preventing changes in the social composition of their neighbourhoods (Hulsbergen & Stouten, 2010). Districts were classified in five categories considering the age and
condition of the housing stock. Class I: Slum, Class II: Very Poor, Class III: Poor, Class IV: Moderate, and V: Good. Tarwewijk was not a priority for the programme since 83% of its housing stock was classified as moderate and 6% as good (Afdeling Ruimtelijke Ordening, Stadsvernieuwing en Volkshuisvesting, 1980). The programme focused on the area where most of the old housing stock was concentrated, but it was not during the first phase of the programme but a bit later. New housing was not constructed in the 1970s, it was until the 1980s when following the principles of the Building for the Neighbourhood programme 149 housing units were renewed (see Figure 6.5).

Other city districts received more of the government’s attention, perhaps due to better organisation and mobilisation of tenant groups engaging in urban renewal processes. Adjacent neighbourhoods with similar conditions, such as the Bloemhof and the Oleanderbuurt, got more attention (see Ham & Stouten, 1987 and Stouten, 2010).

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**FIGURE 6.5** Housing developments by year and in relation to urban policy
In Tarwewijk the first official urban renewal programme was implemented in a small scale in the Tarwebuurt (see Figure 6.6). A demolition-reconstruction approach was intended to meet the new housing standards of this old neighbourhood. The small dwellings, mainly single-story units of around 40 m², were totally tore down and rebuilt. The plan provoked discontent among existing tenants first hand since they were afraid of losing their homes after reconstruction. However, through organising efforts residents were housed while the renewal plans took place and claimed priority to move back to those units after renewal. In fact some tenants were able to move back, but others struggled due to rent increases. In the Tarwebuurt, housing did not change in form or size and neither in social composition after the renewal process (Botman & van Kempen, 2001). Nonetheless, most properties shifted from private rental to social rental housing following the Building for the Neighbourhood goals. What is important to note is that after the renewal process the Tarwebuurt became one of the most desirable areas of Tarwewijk (see Figure 6.7). It has been until today, the neighbourhood with the highest concentration of social housing and long term residents, mainly native Dutch households, that stayed in the district despite its economic and social changes (M. Oosterhout, personal communication, October 30, 2009).

The Building for the Neighbourhood programme worked in many inner city areas, mostly in those built between 1888-1920, addressing needs and requirements of vulnerable populations without eviction, and with progressive intentions as the socialisation of housing and democratisation of decision making by involving citizens (Stouten, 2010). Undoubtedly, there were a number of positive outcomes, but also some shortcomings (see Chapter 4). For instance, the housing quality in inner cities improved and affordability remained in low-income districts. However, the subsidies allocated for social housing generated a significant pressure in the public budget, and the narrow approach on physical improvement was criticised (Priemus, 2003). Responding to these shortcomings and the ongoing economic recession of the time, the central government took on new measures in the late 1980s. Urban renewal initiatives in old inner cities with vulnerable populations weakened, and new approaches towards the privatisation of housing and self-reliance in housing associations strengthened in the coming years (Stouten, 2010).
Cities for or against citizens?

1 Gerststraat in the early 1900s

2 Gerststraat corner with the Tarwestraat without low rise buildings at the Katendrechtse Lagedijk (back) in early 1990s

3 Gerststraat corner with the Tarwestraat with four-story buildings at the Katendrechtse Lagedijk (back) in 1979

4 Demolition in Tarwebuurt in the early 1980s

5 Construction in Tarwebuurt in the early 1980s

6 Residents in Tarwebuurt in the early 1980s

FIGURE 6.6 Housing Renewal in Tarwebuurt. Source: Tinus de Does.
The decline of city districts and the rise of urban regeneration: Tarwewijk as a pilot project of the Integrated Area Management Initiative

In 1985, the Town and Village Renewal Act [Nota Stads-en Dorpsvernieuwing] was launched orienting not only towards housing rehabilitation but also urban, environmental and economic improvements supported by the Urban Renewal Fund [Stadsverbouwingenfonds]. Urban Renewal [Stadsvernieuwing] shifted to Urban Regeneration [Stedelijke Vernieuwing] at the end of the 1980s. Policy approaches moved from improving low-income neighbourhoods through the socialisation of housing for the urban poor to strengthening the city economy by giving priority to economic development in central urban areas. Soon after, in 1988, the Fourth Memorandum on Physical Planning [Vierde Nota Ruimtelijke Ordening] was elaborated.
together with an annex the next year towards a market oriented housing provision, deregulation, and a shift of power from central to local government, and housing associations. These documents stimulated the growth of residential areas in city peripheries, and the influx of middle- and high-income households to those areas. Right after, in 1989, the policy document Housing in the Nineties [Volkshuisvesting in de Jaren Negentig] was laid down emphasising once again the importance of decentralisation and diverting policy to the municipalities and housing associations (VROM, 2001). During this period, some residential areas developed in the peripheries with large investments and financing for home ownership, while central areas continued declining without investment, such as Tarwewijk. At the end of the 1980s it was clear that the new strategies focused mostly on economic development were generating negative social and spatial conditions in a number of city districts. In Tarwewijk, as it was illustrated previously, the displacement of economic activities, unemployment, increasing out-migration of natives and the immigration of ethnic minorities, as well as redlining, property milking and speculation lead to urban and housing decline around this time.

In the mid 1980s new programmes were projected looking for alternative approaches to respond to the emerging urban conditions. The Problem Accumulation Area programme was launched in 1986, and the Social Renewal Policy two years later, both fostering the activation of the civic society, and recognising the neighbourhood as an important medium to increase participation via the labour market and social relations (Musterd & Osterdof, 2008). Both programmes aimed to promote opportunities for the long-term unemployed, and low educated, while improving at the same time quality of housing, living conditions and safety (see Chapter 4). The mitigation of crime, vandalism, and other social problems was among the main goals (Hulsbergen & Stouten, 2001). According to an evaluation of the Social Renewal Policy, the programme accomplished many of its objectives (de Haan, 1997). However co-operation was mainly between social and governmental institutions, local organisations had a minor role, and individuals were sometimes excluded (Stouten, 2010).

In Rotterdam, two districts were selected as pilot projects, Spangen and Tarwewijk. The Municipality of Rotterdam submitted to the Ministry of Justice a proposal for the so-called Integral Area Management Projects (Integrale Buurtbeheerprojecten) in the early 1990, which addressed these two districts. A grant was given to both projects soon after the Secretary of the State visited both areas. It is important to note that these two projects took place in Rotterdam prior to other municipalities, and both received greater grants. They were an exception in a series of experiments on crime prevention in the context of neighbourhood and district management (wijk- en buurtbeheer). In the case of Tarwewijk, according to an evaluation report on safety (de Haan, 1997), there were strong feelings of insecurity among the population, which included traffic
safety, drug problems, relatively high victimisation of burglary to homes and cars, urban decline (vacancy and pollution), and lack of integration between different population groups. These symptoms were more common in specific neighbourhoods, such as the Millinxbuurt. In this area the Urban Renewal Programme had been previously projected. However, due to insufficient funds urban renewal plans got delayed and problems intensified (de Haan, 1997). Thus, based on the aforementioned problems the so called Great Action Plan [Groot Aktieplan] was drawn up aiming to reduce feelings of insecurity, promote integration, prevent pollution and impoverishment, while encouraging integration and assistance in job creation.

According to the evaluation (de Haan, 1997), the project planned for Tarwewijk, which was called Tarwewijk Safe [Tarwewijk Veilig], was led by an advisory committee with representatives from the Municipality of Rotterdam, the borough of Charlois, the Tarwewijk’s resident association, Social Cultureel Werk, the office of the Urban Renewal Tarwewijk [Stadsvernieuwing Tarwewijk] project, and the local police. Each of the areas facing difficulties had their own task force. In addition to representatives of these organisations other working groups from the Urban Development Department (ds+v), the Social Renewal Policy’s local office, owners associations, housing associations, playground associations, anti-racism associations, and other local organisations, such as the Turkish and Moroccan associations became involved in the projects. Each working group drew up its own plan and the projects were shared and discussed in regular neighbourhood meetings. According to the same evaluation, most of the projects gained local support and eventually were locally implemented.

Regarding participation of residents, de Haan (1997) notes that the decentralisation of municipalities and the police was a positive aspect. A key factor in the success of the projects, he notes, was the outreach municipal services carried out by residents and project members, as well as the Mayor and the City Council. However, a number of complaints related to the lack of commitment of various municipal services and the police emerged in the post evaluation (de Haan, 1997).

The proposed initiatives were projected based on police numbers and conversations with residents (de Haan, 1997). Thanks to the large budget, most of the proposed initiatives were implemented. In fact, the different initiatives were able to rely on a budget that was available to experiment with different measures and determine the most feasible ones. One of the initiatives was Servicepunt Tarwewijk. It was a service desk strategically located where residents could share their questions, complaints and suggestions regarding safety and management. According to the evaluation report (de Haan, 1997), residents expressed special appreciation for the project Tarwewijk Safe and urged continuation. Apparently, cooperation between management and authorities was successful in the planning and implementation process and, at the end of 1993, the district was prepared to take over the project and required city resources.
After the formulation and implementation of safety plans in Tarwewijk, as well as in Spangen, a number of plans based on neighbourhood management and security were introduced in other city districts. These plans included, just like in Tarwewijk, diverse initiatives (for more information see de Haan, 1997). In fact, the Social Renewal Policy acted as catalyser in the formulation of the Delta Plan for Big Cities [Deltaplan voor de Grote Steden], which was drafted by the mayors of the largest cities in the Netherlands at the beginning of the 1990s. This plan focused on safety and crime prevention. It aimed providing assistance and resources to vulnerable neighbourhoods; to address issues around unemployment, safety, quality of life and care. The plan focused on specific problematic districts located in the largest cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Den Haag and Utrecht) and paved the way for some of the initiatives drafted in the Big Cities Policy [Grotestedenbeleid], which later on expanded their efforts to smaller cities (see Chapter 4). Most of these initiatives were area-based. A district approach continued to be looked after to tackle the complex urban problems of districts as Tarwewijk.

**Strategic district approach**

Despite the concentrated efforts, towards the end of both the Social Renewal Policy and Urban Renewal Policy initiatives urban decline continued to be an issue in the district. As it was mentioned before, redlining and the gradual transfer of properties from homeowners and reliable landlords to dubious landlords stimulated the decline of the housing stock and the value of the housing market in Tarwewijk. Since families were not able to buy properties in the area due to the restriction of loans in this district, landlords and speculators not invested in the district were the only ones able to buy properties without mortgage loans. For these dubious property owners, which were usually hard to track, properties were not seen as homes but as commodities for profit. Slum landlords sought to maximize rent income from properties. However, maximizing profits through disinvestment was not their ultimate goal since many property owners sought to recover their investment when properties where seriously deteriorated by, selling those units to ‘socially responsible owners’ (Aalbers 2006). In fact, urban renewal through the acquisition of neglected and derelict properties was considered as one of the only remedies during the 1990s and 2000s to terminate with the far-reaching interrelated urban problems that had not been fully tackled in previous years. This section will illustrate the shift from Urban Renewal to Urban Regeneration, as well as the new approaches involved and some of the outcomes.

In response to entangled urban problems concentrated in low-income districts the Big Cities Policy was enacted in 1994 (see Chapter 4). This ambitious policy aimed to achieve greater improvement in these districts by combining 42 subsidy schemes, and
promoting cooperation between a number of ministries through three priority pillars; physical, economic, and social. In addition, it sought to delegate greater power to local stakeholders and municipalities through block grants and other decentralisation mechanisms. Soon after, the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment published a new Urban Renewal Memorandum replacing the Urban Renewal Policy with the so-called New Urban Regeneration Policy, which was part of the physical pillar and became a central instrument of the Big Cities Policy.

During the first phase of the Big Cities Policy, from 1995 to 1999, the main objective was to turn homogenous (areas with poor and minority groups) into heterogenous neighbourhoods through the differentiation of the housing stock. Demolition and new construction was the main approach to achieve the desired social mix (Musterd & Ostendorf, 2008). The new approach aimed to increase homeownership opportunities while decreasing rental housing (social and private). In other words, attracting households with economic power aiming to get a stake in such areas was pursued in order to create heterogeneous districts. However, this direction was hard to achieve in redlined districts such as Tarwewijk.

In Tarwewijk, the first public housing rehabilitation and renewal through this approach took place in the most problematic area, the Millinxbuurt. In this neighbourhood private rental housing units decreased from 1,258 to 1,168 from 1991 to 1999 as well as owner-occupied units from 481 to 286 (Aalbers, 2011; Hulsof & van der Torre, 2000). Most of the housing units, which were in bad shape but not demolished were acquired by a housing association. The housing association rehabilitated and eventually managed and rented these properties even though the original plan was to turn these properties into homeownership opportunities (this was the policy objective). In fact, the share of social housing instead of decreasing grew from 176 to 307 during these years (Aalbers, 2006). The transfer of private housing to local housing associations with the assistance of the municipality aimed to put those units into responsible hands, to improve the housing conditions, and to eliminate social problems taking place in specific areas, particularly in the Millinxbuurt. This was only partly achieved. The housing stock was upgraded and management improved in specific blocks. However, problems were displaced to other areas of the district. Slum landlords who sold their derelict properties to the municipality bought properties at fire-prices in near by neighbourhoods (Aalbers, 2006), where milking continued to take place as well as illegal practices related to illegal subletting, drugs and exploitation of immigrants and temporal workers.

The demolition of the ‘most problematic’ dwellings, or hot spots where illegal practices took place, gave room to the Millinxpark, a green space in the middle of the neighbourhood; the redevelopment of the Moerkerkplein, a small square located
north of the park; the creation of the Millinxbuurtpost, a post and policy office; and the implementation of different security and management measures in the area. Despite the fact that the public spaces were meant to be for residents, many tenants were not able to benefit from the new facilities since they were displaced to give room to those public spaces. In addition, these areas were fenced and managed right after by centralised and de-localised entities (P. van Namen, personal communication, October 30, 2009) (the management was transferred to residents years later). Lastly, surveillance was enforced (mainly through surveillance cameras) in public spaces disrupting social life in the streets. The public endeavours following this approach did not succeed as expected. Physical changes were achieved but not social and economic improvements.

In 1998 the Rotterdam Strategic District Approach [Strategische Wijkaanpak Rotterdam] was launched targeting areas with the concentration of problems. It targeted a number of boroughs, including Charlois. The plan acknowledged that previous approaches had not succeeded to solve the growing problems of Tarwewijk, especially in the area of the Millinxbuurt. The different parties involved recognised that only an integral programme would be able to mitigate the physical as well as the social and economic issues present in this area. Thus, the Steering Group Millinxbuurt [Steering Group Millinxbuurt] was created by a number of stakeholders including welfare workers and municipal organisations; leaders of the Department of Urban Planning (ds+V) and Social Renewal; the Mayor; and a number of locals involved in the neighbourhood. The stakeholders mentioned above drafted the Project Plan Millinxbuurt, which was launched in 1998. The Project Bureau Millinxbuurt, one of the initiatives, opened in the area soon after supported by an active group of local residents and organisations. Many participatory activities, usually called opzoomering26, were organised as well as projects to strengthen the involvement of local residents, including Millinx Money Spel, Millinxsoap and Maak Millinx Mooier (De Bruijn & Riemersma, 2003, p. 17). Other initiatives focused on social projects, and measures addressing addiction care and the reduction of drug-related nuisance and crime. Additionally, a Mentor Council Project [Project MentorRaad] was set in motion addressing economic development by offering assistance to new entrepreneurs to plan and implement small businesses (De Raad van de Gemeente Rotterdam, 2002).

Despite the initiatives aimed to improve the district condition by actively involving residents, citizen participation was limited in the processes concerning housing

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26 These activities are organised for and by local stakeholders. They promote safer and cleaner conditions involving neighbours. These activities include block parties, cleaning campaigns, games, street dinners, etc. They usually are supported by the municipality, welfare institutions and housing associations.
rehabilitation and management. Behind all these initiatives the main agenda remained focused on housing renewal with shifts in housing ownership (from private owners to responsible households or entities). Certainly, housing units were rehabilitated, including facades and interior spaces, and an entire housing block was completely demolished and cleansed removing the unprecedented urban problems. However, the desired outcomes were hard to achieve. The housing market continued stagnant due to the district’s financial exclusion, which evidently turned Tarwewijk into an area of ‘last resort’ for those who could access it (Aalbers, 2011). We can discern some failures considering that soon after the completion of the physical, economic and social initiatives, the Millinxbuurt was ranked by city authorities as one of the most alarming ‘hotspots’ of Rotterdam alongside other areas of Tarwewijk; Katendrechtse Lagedijk, Drotselaan and Bas Jungeriusstraat. ‘Hotspots’ were defined as areas with an accumulation of social and economic arrears and urban issues mainly related to crime, environmental pollution, and housing decline.

This period of urban regeneration and ownership changes brought a lot of instability and mobility of residents. For instance, from the 1,177 people who moved to Millinxbuurt in 1993, only 93 remained living there by 1999 (Hulshof & van der Torre, 2000). In 1999, a study shows, 37.4% of the officially registered residents had lived in Tarwewijk for less than 1 year, and 65% had lived there less and 3 years (van der Torre & Hulshof, 2000). Thus, besides opening the door to those with the least possibilities in the housing market, Tarwewijk became a transitory space mostly for immigrants and minority groups arriving to the city. Certainly, the urban interventions aimed to promote social composition changes since particular groups were displaced. However, the profile of the new households was not the one the urban regeneration plans were expecting. Long-term native Dutch residents decreased while residents with non-western background increased during this period (see Table 6.1).

During the second phase, from 2000 to 2004, the Big City Policy aimed to prevent the downgrading of low-income districts, as well as the outmigration of ‘successful residents’ in districts as Tarwewijk (Musterd & Osterndorf, 2008). New agreements were established in the New Urban Regeneration Policy. For instance, separate projects were not longer financed. Multilayer development plans in each city were required to guarantee financing. Additionally, since crime and illegal practices became a major issue during this time, the Big Cities Policy added a fourth pillar in 2003: safety. Lastly, new funds were provided to municipalities to generate their own plans according to local needs and priorities. These funds were mostly directed to area-based initiatives concentrating efforts at different government levels.
TABLE 6.1 Tarwewijk ethnicity (%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Natives (Autochtone)</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Western</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-western (Allochtoon)</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>59.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinamese</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antillean</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccan</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other non-western</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The 56-District Approach was launched targeting 30 cities in 2003. In Rotterdam, 13 districts were selected including Tarwewijk (see Figure 6.8). In Tarwewijk, urban regeneration plans began with the assistance of the Urban Regeneration Innovation Programme [Innovatie Programma Stedelijke Vernieuwing] and the District Development Company Tarwewijk, better known as WOM Tarwewijk [Wijkontwikkelingsmaatschappij Tarwewijk]. The plans targeted the recently identified ‘hot spots’. The first housing renovations plans started focusing on the Katerndrechtsse Lagedijk and the Dordtselaan, and later on the Bass Jungeriusstaat, where approximately 10% of the owners were identified as dubious, and illegal boarding houses were taking place (see Figure 6.9).

WOM Tarwewijk — a local public-private partnership comprised by Woonstad Rotterdam (housing association), AM (real estate developer) and the Municipality of Rotterdam — began using for the improvement of many of the housing units the Purchase, Renovation and Sale Approach [Verwerven, verbeteren en verlopen aanpak]. This approach implies the acquisition of private properties by the municipality, the transfer of those properties to housing associations for renovation, and the marketing of those units for rent or sale targeting usually better off responsible households. This approach was already used in former programmes, as it was illustrated previously.
Politics, practices and constrains of urban restructuring through citizens active engagement in Rotterdam: The case of Tarwewijk
From a ‘priority’ to an ‘empowered’ district

The third phase of the Big Cities Policy, from 2005-2009 had as a motto ‘Cooperating Towards Strong Cities’ (Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieu [VROM], 2006). It aimed to increase transparency and create tailor-made solutions with more comprehensive and integral approaches, as well as to promote more cooperation between the physical pillar and the economic, social and safety pillars. Citizen participation was on the top of the agenda, as well as the stimulation of jobs and economic development through innovative and entrepreneurial approach (see Chapter 4). In 2007, following these objectives, the Minister of Housing, Neighbourhoods and Integration, Ella Vogelaar announced the 40-Empowered Districts [40-Krachtwijken] initiative formalising and strengthening the previous area-based policies and programmes, particularly the 56-District Approach.
In Rotterdam, 23 districts were designated and ranked for the development of the Rotterdam Charter of Empowered Districts [Charter Krachtwijkenaanpak Rotterdam]. These districts were concentrated in 7 of the 14 city boroughs of Rotterdam (see Figure 6.10). They were mostly distributed in the west-central and southern areas of the city. In the South, most of the designated districts concentrated in the borough of Charlois, which included Tarwewijk (see Figure 6.11). The Rotterdam Charter of Empowered Districts proposed a strategy for the next 10 years to close the gap between disadvantaged and privileged areas. In the document the plan projected the improvement of the districts to build a city where everyone counts and participates; where people feel safe; where people enjoy an attractive living environment; and where the economy is strong (VROM, 2007b). The issues addressed included: housing, employment and entrepreneurship, learning and growing, safety and integration. The plan aimed to reduce the accumulation of problems through the elaboration of arrangements known as Action Plans [Plan van Aanpak], besides facilitating and monitoring the existing programmes formulated in previous years by the Big Cities Policy and supported by the Investment Budget for Urban Regeneration (VROM, 2007b). Of the eleven points, one key point addressed in the Action Plan of Rotterdam: People Make the City dealt explicitly with citizens participation, as well as the restoration of social cohesion. It recognised the importance of residents’ engagement in the targeted ‘empowered’ districts. In addition, it committed to put especial efforts in this regard through the following actions: a budget of nearly three million euros for Rotterdam's residents initiatives; regular ‘consultation’ with residents and local organisations about plans and future visions for the districts; and the development of a neighbourhood plan through community meetings. The document addressed local democracy in the city and the importance of citizens in the development of local plans.

After the formulation of this plan, in 2008, the District Action Plan of Charlois [Charlois Wijkactieplan] was drafted addressing the improvement of three districts; Charlois Oud, Carnisse and Tarwewijk. It addressed the following issues; insufficient competition in housing stock; stagnation of urban renewal since the 1980s; attraction of disadvantaged citizens; high rates of mobility making difficult social cohesion; social problems such as unemployment, debt, aid resistance, violence and school dropouts; residents’ stress due to an increase in crime rates, drug nuisance and tension between different ethnic groups; absence of structural fund projects and inadequate recognition of the government addressing social issues with a permanent and solid approach; housing regulations and enforcement behind; and lack of investment from homeowners and housing associations for maintenance. In the case of Tarwewijk the analysis describes key problems related with nuisance behaviour, and anonymity.
It addresses the presence of room rental occupancy (sometimes illegal sublets) by unreliable landlords in and around the Mijnkintbuurt, as well as the existence of some spots with run down streets, and the lack of green and public spaces (Nicis Institute, 2007). This diagnosis was used for the development of the Action Plan for Tarwewijk 2007-2010: Action Plan for a Targeted Regional Approach [Actieplan Tarwewijk 2007-2010: Actieplan voor een gebiedsgerichte aanpak] the same year.
In year 2008, the Vision for the Tarwewijk Area [Gebiedvisie Tarwewijk] called *Growing up in the City: a Child Friendly Tarwewijk* [Opgroei in de Stad: een Kindvriendelijk Tarwewijk] was drafted by Woonstad Rotterdam, the only housing association involved in this district, in collaboration with the City of Rotterdam, the borough of Charlois and the City Marines²⁷ [Stadsmarinier] as part of the aforementioned Action Plan for Tarwewijk (Woonstad, 2008). One of the key focuses of the Vision for the Tarwewijk Area was to continue the efforts of former local initiatives to improve the conditions of areas identified as hotspots, such as the Millinxbuurt (where renewal had started in the 1990s), Bas Jungeriusstraat, and Dordtselaan (where housing renewal had started in 2003). In addition, the plan aimed to expand those endeavours to two additional areas, the Mijnkintbuurt and the Verschoorblok. Concurrently, the plan addressed strengthening loyalty and engagement between residents and local business, and among these stakeholders and the district authorities, as well as improving the image of the district with the assistance of residents and business owners.

In order to achieve the objectives of this vision, which was the physical and social development of Tarwewijk to reach the same conditions of other city areas by year 2020, key initiatives were proposed with different focuses and approaches (for more information see Woonstad Rotterdam, Deelgemeente Charlois, Gemeente Rotterdam, 2008). Some of the central goals included; a child friendly environment; the social emancipation of residents to be self-reliant and self-employed; civil commitment and engagement in everyday life activities; a clean, safe and beautiful district for people to stay, care and invest; and quality in the housing stock. Regarding this last issue, as it was mentioned previously, some interventions already taking place in some of the hot spots were acknowledged and supported and new initiatives were proposed (mostly by the housing association and its partners, for more information see Woonstad, 2008). For instance, in Bas Jungeriusstraat, where crime was a recurrent problem and neglected and vacant buildings were apparent, the plan was to merge housing units to make homes suitable for families with children. WOM Tarwewijk planned to purchase 120 units to merge and rehabilitate them. Initially, the plan was to sale the properties

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²⁷ For the most unsafe neighbourhoods a new instrument has been the appointment of the so-called city marines. This experiment focused on local safety was implemented under the motto of ‘the best people in the poorest neighbourhoods’ in year 2002. City marines are appointed by the City Council to identify and provide additional attention to some issues that are not easily detected by local organisations, policy and municipal services. City marines stimulate local stakeholders to realise local issues and coming together to take action. City marines have authority, and budget to deal with local problems. They operate independently from sub-municipalities, city districts and services and are accountable to the board of Mayor and Alderman and the Security Steering Committee of the Municipality of Rotterdam. In addition, they have direct access to directors of welfare services and local institutions.
FIGURE 6.11  Rank of Rotterdam's 40-Empowered Districts
hotspot that was addressed in previous local plans. In this area WOM Tarwewijk purchased 137 homes and 16 industrial sites and started working, by joining efforts, with the City Marines to improve the physical, economic and social condition of the area. Nevertheless, it was not an easy task. Despite the potential of this boulevard, economic development was difficult to achieve since nearby commercial areas have captivated most of the commercial activity. As a result of the low popularity for sale or rent, the renovated units along this avenue were marketed to students and young professionals, as well as to creative industries and startups. Concerning the Millinxbuurt, plans focused mostly on upgrading the public spaces (see Figure 6.12). Recreation and sports programmes were considered for children and youth New initiatives were proposed mainly on the Verschoorblock and Mijnkintbuurt, where some illegal practices from the aforementioned hotspots have moved and the housing and street conditions were declining. In the Verschoorblok, where buildings were neglected, boarded up, or had vacancies in living and commercial spaces, a number of structures were rehabilitated leading to a more pleasant living climate. The physical interventions were projected once again through the Purchase-Renovation and Sale Approach by Stadsvastgoed, a construction company that aimed to sell the properties to homeowners.

From 2002 to 2009 approximately 675 private homes units were demolished to give way to new housing (sometimes combining two units), and 550 dwellings were rehabilitated (VROM, 2006). Out of the 550 rehabilitated dwellings 270 received funds from the Urban Regeneration Innovation Programme (150 on the Dordstselaan and 120 on the Bass Jungeriussstraat). The desired outcome regarding the physical condition of these areas was achieved. Homes were rehabilitated and the urban condition of the area improved. However properties were hard to sell. In some instances measures as Buy your Rental House [Koop je Huurhuis] and Self-Help Housing [Klshuizen] were promoted to provide affordable homeownership opportunities (see Section 6.4). In any case, despite the Municipality of Rotterdam and Woonstad Rotterdam were committed to occupy the empty homes by 2010, many homes kept empty due to the stagnation of sales in the district. This was nothing new for the public-private partnership since this had already taken place at the Millinxbuurt renewal area years before.

Considering demographic changes we can deduce that the return of the native Dutch middle-class who had left years before did not take place as expected. Dutch citizens with non-western background [allochtonen] and immigrants were the ones moving into the district. From year 2000 to 2010 the percentage of Native Dutch residents [autochtonen] actually decreased from 39.2 to 24.6% and continue decreasing, while the percentage of residents with non western background increased from 52.5 to 62.1%, mostly households of Turkish, Antillean and Moroccan origin (see Table 6.1)
FIGURE 6.12 Moerkerkeplein in Millinxbuurt
This shows that Tarwewijk is meant to be a district of working class minorities, fact that has been overseen by the diverse programmes taking place in the area, which have focused from the most part on physical improvements rather than economic ones.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>LOWEST 40%</th>
<th>MIDDLE 40%</th>
<th>HIGHER 20%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tarwewijk</td>
<td>Charllois</td>
<td>Rotterdam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Rotterdam Buurtmonitor (2010)/ CBS Regional Inkomensonderzoek, Bewerking door OBI (2010).

The average standardised disposable household income barely improved during and after the efforts of the area-based initiatives. It grew from 18,900 euros in 2002 to 22,700 euros in 2010. If we compare the average standardised disposable household income of the borough of Charllois and the City of Rotterdam we can see a similar outcome (see Table 6.2), a small increase in household income. Moreover, in the case of Rotterdam, this change mostly took place in better off districts (see Figure 6.13). The rate of households with the lowest incomes (lowest 40% group) decreased from 70 to 68% from 2002 to 2010 while the percentage of those with middle incomes (middle 40% group) increased from 25 to 27% during the same period, before other initiatives took place. The district kept a five percent of households with higher incomes (higher 20% group) throughout the decade (see Table 6.2). This proves that despite the new supply of housing stock and affordable homeownership opportunities, households with higher socio-economic positions were not willing to take those advantages and settle down in the district. Indeed, around 30% of the newly renovated dwellings kept vacant after renovation. This vacancy rate was greater than the average vacancy rate in the district, 20% of the total dwellings (Woonstad Rotterdam et al., 2008).
Cities for or against citizens?

1 In 2002
FIGURE 6.13 Average standardized household income in Rotterdam and Tarwewijk
In terms of safety, issues related to crime and illegal practices were partially mitigated. Its reduction was mainly due to their de-concentration and displacement to other areas, mostly around and inside the district (e.g. Mijnkintbuurt). During this period the safety index fluctuated dramatically in Tarwewijk. For instance, from 2002 to 2006, it increased from 3.5 to 5.3, and decrease once again to 4.6 in 2007 and continued dropping up to 3.9 in 2009 (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2010). These rates show the inconsistence of safety perceptions in the district (see Table 6.3). The district moved from the category ‘threat’ to ‘problem’ area once again towards the end of these urban regeneration plans (Woonstad Rotterdam et al., 2008).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rotterdam</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charlois</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarwewijk</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Geemente Rotterdam (2015), Leefbaar Rotterdam (2010).*

As it was illustrated previously, the aforementioned urban regeneration interventions were not very different to former urban renewal approaches. Once again residents had none or very limited access to the decision making processes, and their assets, needs, and priorities were overlooked. The marketing of the new and newly renovated units was directed towards young professionals and middle-income families rather than to the local communities. Perhaps the properties would had been occupied immediately by residents willing to invest in the district if they had been part of the planning process, like in the Building for the Neighborhood urban renewal period, especially because redlining practices were not as evident as in previous decades. However, locals were not the target of the programmes, at least not when the plans were formulated. Ownership shifts were pursed to solve conditions deeply rooted in the district. Increasing the share of homeownership and rental housing managed by housing associations was seen as an avenue to control housing accessibility by selecting future tenants to settle in the district. However, since the targeted population was not willing invest and take root in Tarwewijk, most of the units were eventually rented or sold using different marketing campaigns and strategies (see Section 6.4). However, renting properties was also a challenge due to the Rotterdam Law. This law was launched the same year Vogelaar’s district approach took off requiring a housing license to individuals and households pursuing to live (rent) in priority districts like Tarwewijk (see Section 6.4). Thus, local as well as external agents, such as this law and redlining, impacted and slowed down the urban restructuring of the district.
The end of Vogelaar’s districts: Targeting the Mijnkintbuurt

During the last phase of the Big Cities Policy, the 40- Empowered District approach weakens. Vogelaar’s districts were in need of more capital to achieve the desired outcomes and municipalities found themselves struggling to involve even more, with resources and efforts, housing associations and corporations in areas were they had little or not stake at all. Considering the puzzled outcomes of previous years this was hard to achieve. Thus, after a deliberation between all of those involved in this policy, the 40-Empowered District approach came to an end in 2012, only four years after it was lunched. Nevertheless, in many districts efforts continued taking place before funds were cut.

During this period efforts were concentrated mostly in the Mijnkintbuurt in Tarewijk. The plans envisioned in this area (2009-2014) started right in the middle of the global housing crisis and, although it was not implemented, an envisioned comprehensive plan was drafted. The so-called Mijnkintbuurt Intensive Management Programme [Programma Intensief Beheer Mijnkintbuurt] aimed at tackling housing, urban and social issues (especially behind door problems) through what they call intense management. This approach was once again proposed alongside a number of measures to create effective social interventions, stabilise the housing quality, create attractive outdoors and reinforce security (for more information see Gemeente Rotterdam, Deelgemeente Charlois & Woonstad Rotterdam, 2008).

According to a Municipality report (Gemeente Rotterdam et al., 2009), Mijnkintbuurt is comprised of 242 buildings with 712 housing units. Around 62% are owned by landlords (which rent and mange their properties), 27% by private owners living in the units, and 51 homes by Woonstad Rotterdam (housing association). In total there are 97 owners associations. According to the parties involved there is major work needed in most of the properties and in regard to security and social problems (Gemeente Rotterdam et al., 2009). Insecurity in the streets, especially related to drug dealing and abuse, are still a local issue. Additionally, according to the report, many residents are disadvantaged in terms of housing, employment, income, and care. Also, domestic violence is higher (by 50%) than the average in the city, and safety and quality of life are often under pressure. Thus, as the document notes, residents are constantly facing multiple problems that prevent them from participating in society.

The Mijnkintbuurt Intensive Management Programme was projected in different phases: (1) intensive management (2009-2015); (2) plan development including visions and strategic interventions and scenarios for the area (2014-2015); (3) decision-making (during 2015); and (4) implementation of scenarios (2016-2020).
The board of the Mayor and the Alderman, the executive committee of the borough of Charlois, and the board of Woonstad Rotterdam carried out the planning of the first phase, which was focused on intensive management. Among the objectives of this phase, was the purchase of 435 housing units’ hold in the area. Out of those units 105 were planned for demolition. The rest were improved using, once again, the projected Purchase, Renovation and Sale Approach. Additionally, other measures to stabilise the quality of housing was envisioned.

One of the measures proposed to stimulate better management by owners and homeowner associations was following up closely by the management efforts of current owner associations (VVE 10) formed by the Municipality and Housing Associations. The logic of this measure was to stimulate adequate management of properties by providing some grants. Another measure was the provision of legitimate information over sale prices to potential property buyers, including maintenance and codes currently required. Lastly, information-driven enforcement in neglected properties was another measure that was used. This was pursued by the Alija-Approach (Alija-Aanpak), which was introduced in 2007 to tackle property fraud, mainly to identify properties facilitating criminal and illegal activities. It consists of a combination of tax, criminal, and administrative measures. Lastly, besides following up current tenants and owners associations, a rental organisation was proposed to push the owners to keep an adequate maintenance of their properties. Through this measure landlords must make agreements to upgrade housing and keep up the required maintenance. Landlords would get a sort of subsidy to follow up those agreements. This tool would prevent the purchase of properties.

Other sort of proposed initiatives looked at residents needs and profiles of this transitory district, such as Pension Mijnkintbuurt, which was envisioned as a way to provide short term stay to the itinerant population that is attracted to live in Tarwewijk. This initiative was envisioned to keep the management of vacant units while giving temporal accommodation to those seeking to stay for a short time in the area. In addition, Pension Mijnkintbuurt was conceived to provide assistance and keep an eye on guests’ activities. It was a tool to provide decent living to temporal workers, and to mitigate nuisance in the district, rules were established to meet this end. This initiative was projected at a larger scale (district) by a non-profit organization that drafted an alternative plan for the improvement of the district (Rendon, 2010). Unlike Pension Mijnkintburrt, Pension Tarwewijk aimed to be a tenant-led cooperative, run and managed by locals.

Along with the plans proposed to improve the physical conditions of the area, there were also some social initiatives. One of the tools proposed for the social interventions were the so-called street coaches. A street coach is a person in charge of identifying
(behind door) problems and referring those issues to welfare institutions, while proposing solutions according to a residents’ agency. Precarious problems such as domestic violence and social isolation can be reported by the street coach, which has the authority to work with residents under the authority of the project Mijnkintbuurt. The reports on the street coaches are usually based on contacts with residents, observation and interviews. Monthly and quarter meetings are set to measure the performance of the street coaches and their impact (Gemeente Rotterdam et al., 2009). This measure is similar to the City Marines but at the smallest scale. Other social interventions proposed included programmes and activities for people not participating at the regular basis on social life or having arrears with education and employment. Most of these activities aimed to facilitate relationships with welfare institutions, and also with neighbours to build social bonds. Undoubtedly, the programme for the Mijnkintbuurt aimed, for the most part, to keep a quiet, clean and safe neighbourhood. Mitigating the concentration of physical as well as social problems was central. For instance, another concern addressed was the overrepresentation of Polish workers and Antilleans residents which, according to an analysis made by the parties involved in this plan, create disturbance within the district (Gemeente Rotterdam et al., 2008). Polish workers living in the area were associated with illegal boarding houses, while Antillean residents with illegal practices related to drugs and crime. Apparently, the de-concentration of certain groups was projected in previous plans, even when residents were central to the approach.

Certainly, residents’ active involvement was desired and in order to achieve this a management company with expertise in urban renewal projects, Visade, was commissioned as the project manager to strengthen the involvement of residents and other stakeholders. Visade was brought to the table to work as a mediator between residents and the main partners. However, and despite the plan aimed to engage locals, while looking at the programme we can discern that the first phase—which included organisational, programmematic and financial arrangements—was mostly drafted by the public-private partnership. In fact, an additional plan was projected for the participation of residents and the communication process. Apparently, implementing a participatory model was once again desired, and a plan was intended, in agreement with active residents through a platform facilitated by the local residents organisation, OvdB or Organisation for and by the inhabitants of Tarwewijk [Organisatie van en door Bewoners Tarwewijk]. However, such a model was not pursued since the role projected for this organisation was mostly to collect opinions and provide information. ‘Consulting residents’ was key for the programme’s approach (Gemeente Rotterdam et al., 2008; Organisatie van en door Bewoners Tarwewijk, 2008). Still, during interviews it was clear that residents and even members of the OvdB were not aware of the plans projected in the Mijnkintbuurt.
When the first phase took off, involving ‘intensive management’, things were moving forward. However, when the outcomes of the 2008 financial crash began to unfold serious doubts emerged relating to the success of the housing renewal plans proposed in the original plan. The feasibility of selling family homes at market rate after being purchased by the partners for major improvement, or new construction after demolition was questioned. Thus, plans shifted, and focused only on housing management. Starting in September 2010, Woonstad Rotterdam, the borough of Charlois and the City of Rotterdam began working closely with current owners associations (VVE 010) of the Mijnkintbuurt, which were not active due to the lack of sufficient resources for housing maintenance. The partners aimed adopting the properties for a period of 10 years providing temporary management with the assistance of Visade. Acquiring the properties was only considered if this approach would not succeed as expected.
In the Netherlands multifamily housing is administered and maintained by an owners association [Vereniging van Eigenaren or VvE]. New owners are automatically obliged to follow the bylaws of the owners’ housing association and engage in meetings and decision making related to the building’s maintenance as well as contributing to a monthly fee that is collected and saved for future repairs of the building. In the case of Tarwewijk, and many other districts in the borough of Charlois and Rotterdam South, owners associations were never active and some had not even been registered in the Chamber of Commerce. This has resulted in significant decline of the housing stock.

In general, Tarwewijk improved its spatial structure through intense management and other public instruments during the last two decades. The decline seems to be brought to a standstill. Nevertheless there are a few areas, such as the Mijnkintbuurt, that need more time to reach the city standards regarding urban and housing quality (see Figure 6.14). And, as it was illustrated above, social and economic development has not been fully reached. Social problems are far reaching. Initiatives as the ones involving ‘street coaches’, and other social interventions proposed as part of the Mijnkintbuurt Intensive Management Programme (for more information see Gemeente Rotterdam et al., 2008) have facilitated the identification of problems to assist residents facing domestic violence, social isolation and other social issues concentrated in this area. In addition, surveillance and inspections have played an important role in detecting illegal practices and social problems. However, the social and safety index continue fluctuating and tend to be low (see Table 6.3), and the streets have lost their vitality. The stigmatisation of the district is significant despite the efforts of initiatives and agreements implemented fostering citizens involvement, such as those envisioned by Growing up in the City: A Child Friendly Tarwewijk and other area agreements in Tarwewijk [Gebiedsafspaken Tarwewijk]. The plans and efforts to involve citizens in their communities are constant but not suitable for some groups, such as immigrants and disfranchised groups. In the following sections it will be illustrated how the public instruments have worked mainly for middle-income citizens and how long-term residents usually stay powerless at the margins of urban and housing renewal programmes taking place in the district. In addition, it will be portrayed in the uneven distribution of power between local stakeholders, and therefore some constraints regarding citizen participation in the urban restructuring process in low-income districts as Tarwewijk.
§ 6.4 Urban restructuring public instruments

A variety of programmes, initiatives and approaches, were pursued by the state at different government levels to improve the conditions of low-income and minority neighbourhoods. Most of these efforts used specific public instruments to achieve the restructuring of those areas. What is interesting is that such tools have benefited, for the most part, housing associations, municipalities, private corporations, public-private partnerships and in some cases middle income households involved in one way or the other in such districts. However, these tools have given little room to existing residents to improve their homes and to have a say in the transformation of their own living environment. In fact, the de-activation of the vulnerable inhabitants, their eviction and the insertion of alienated social classes has become a policy side by side with the programmes claiming citizen participation. An outline of some of these instruments is presented here.

— Acquisition by Summoning [Aanschrijiving] is a measure enforced by the Article 25 of the Housing Act where municipalities are able to force owners through a legal order to maintain in good condition housing, otherwise the Municipality is allowed to intervene buying the property. ‘Maintain or sell’ is the criteria, a way to improve the physical condition of the housing stock and to halt illegal and abusive practices stimulated by slum landlords. Disinvesting to maximise profits and profiting from undocumented citizens through the subletting of overcrowded and substandard apartments has been common practices in low-income districts, as well as high rental contracts in exchange of allowing illegal practices (see previous section). In Rotterdam illegal practices have diminished through the acquisition of properties owned by dubious landlords. However a considerable amount of innocuous residents have also received legal orders and have been evicted from their homes without justified reason or notice of future plans (RIA, 2012). Acquisition by summoning has been a common practice to reduce urban blight and to assist in neighbourhood stabilisation in the Randstad Holland. Local governments have acquired large numbers of properties —with and without tenants— that otherwise would have been neglected and/or abandoned. Vacant and decayed properties, as well as those with tax arrears, have been usually transferred to socially responsible non-profit entities. In the Netherlands housing associations have played an important role in the renovation and management of these properties. Since the Building for the Neighbourhood times, neglected properties have been transferred using this mechanism to housing associations for the public good. In other words, acquisition by summoning has been used to allocate those units to those in need. However, this trend has shifted in recent years. As it was illustrated before, Municipalities acquired property with the aim to not only to provide subsidised housing for today and coming generations but also sell those properties in the market to better
off households. The socialisation of housing is leaning towards privatisation. This path certainly benefited middle-income households but low-income and minority citizens tend to be out of the equation.

- Purchase-Renovation-Sale Approach [Aankopen-Verbeteren-Verkopen Aanpak or AVV] is an urban renewal strategy that combines legal orders [Aanschrijving] to purchase vacant and neglected housing buildings, funding to renovate those properties (usually public urban renewal funds), and marketing strategies to sale the improved homes. This approach has been central to Municipalities, and most recently public-private partnerships to carry out intense management plans. Properties are purchased when owners are not willing or able to improve them and put in hand of responsible entities, usually housing associations, to renovate the units and allocate them. In some cases homes are demolished and reconstructed to meet the current housing codes, and to eradicate far-reaching social problems. The Purchase-Renovation-Sale Approach has been used as a tool to improve the housing stock while changing the socio-economic composition of impoverished districts. The de-concentration (and cleanse in some cases) of interrelated urban problems by replacing low-income tenants (renters) with middle-income families (homeowners) has been desired and planned accordingly. However, since this approach was taking place mostly in redlined low-income and minority areas, plans did not unfold as originally planned. Thus, housing renewal plans using this approach were limited to the management of the rehabilitated units, and the control of who moves in and out. As it was illustrated in the previous section, these sort of interventions have a high cost, and need concentrated efforts from the public and the private sector. Citizens are usually at the margins. This approach was launched in the 1990s in Tarwewijk, specifically in the Millinxbuurt, to tackle a variety of complex urban problems. As it was illustrated above, physical improvements were achieved but problems were not eradicated but de-concentrated. Regardless of the outcomes and consequences, this approach was considered and implemented in different hotspots in Tarwewijk and other city districts with similar problems.

- Housing License [Huisvestingsvergunning or HVV] was introduced in 2006 through the Law for Special Measures of Metropolitan Problems [Wet Bijzondere Maatregelen Grootstedelijke Problematiek]. It was first launched in Rotterdam to later be introduced nation-wide to deal with the conditions of the so-called ‘priority districts’. The main aim of the law, which is often referred as the Rotterdam Law [Rotterdamwet], is constraining the influx of marginalised groups (newcomers, immigrants and very low-income households) to specific areas of the city. New residents must apply for a license, which is authorised following a number of requirements, including income, criminal records, and time of residency in the city. In Rotterdam, the housing license was implemented in specific streets and districts within the city. In the year 2010 it was limited to five districts, including Tarwewijk. The license is not applicable to
people residing in the city for more than 6 years, to private rental housing, or units with leases above € 647,53 (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2006, 2010a); but what about low-income people who do not fulfil the requirements of the Rotterdam Law? Where would they go if they were not allowed to live in low-income districts? According to an evaluation of the 6,469 applications for private rental housing in the period 2006-2009 in the zones targeted by the Rotterdam Law, including Tarwewijk, the 23% were refused or discouraged to continue with the process (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2009). This percentage accounts for around 1,487 applications and probably more than the double in terms of people if you count one application per family. By considering income (including welfare, subsidies and pensions) as the main criteria for issuing housing permits the weakest social groups are marginalised, and housing allocation (many times affordable) is diverted to better off households. This law was controversial since the concentration of minorities living in a specific neighbourhood was one of the criteria to impose a permit in such area. This law violates basic human rights by promoting place- and race-based exclusion. Thus not only banks have promoted exclusionary practices to protect their own interests but also the state and municipalities.

Buy your Rental House [Koop je Huurhuis] is a local campaign in Rotterdam following a programme launched nation-wide to provide starters with affordable homeowner opportunities (VROM, 2009a). In the case of Rotterdam the idea is to retain recent graduates and middle-income families in the city. The Ministry of Housing, Planning and the Environment began offering subsidies and working with housing associations, banks and mortgage brokers to assist new homeowners. The main idea is to change the rent culture in Rotterdam suggesting that buying is a good and better alternative. This idea has been communicated through different media. The aim of this campaign in Rotterdam was to sell 7,200 homes, which meant turning this amount of rental housing into privately owned housing (VROM, 2009b). According to the Association for Homeownership, in Dutch Vereniging Eigen Huis (2014), housing associations are increasingly selling their rental properties. The prices usually are in the low ranges, often with discount on the market value. This discount could be between 25% and 50%. The purchase processes differ from a regular sale. For instance, the contract may have a special provision, such as paying back the housing association the discount received in a subsequent sale (whole or part of it). The refund scheme depends on the discount given and the years of sale after purchase. This is in order to prevent new homeowners to sell for profit, and to prevent speculation, especially in former social housing units. Rental units —owned by housing associations, small housing corporations or individuals— that have maintenance or tax arrears may be offered to tenants at a greater discount price (for more information see Vereniging Eigen Huis, 2014).
Self-help Housing [Klushuizen] is a programme promoted especially in run down areas of the city where poorly maintained buildings and illegal practices are common (see Figure 6.15). Usually the city purchases a large number of run-down buildings which can not be maintained by their owners and sells them at a bargain price to housing associations or private corporations which in turn rehabilitate the facades and offer them for sale below market price to new households which are obliged to invest in the interior refurbishment of the property. Investment does not mean exclusively financial capital, but also time and commitment. These types of programmes stimulate sweat equity, which is an increased value in a property earned from labor toward upkeep or restoration. The new owner must live in the property for at least three years. Certainly this is the closest instrument for direct participation of residents in the improvement of districts. This approach has its roots in programmes from the 1980s oriented to low income and vulnerable citizens (see Ham & Stouten, 1987). Unfortunately the target of these types of public programmes has changed and other entities and population
groups are the ones benefiting from them. This instrument has been promoted even more in the ‘hot spot’ areas of Rotterdam, including Tarwewijk, with the aim of attracting a new group of people, mainly the ones refereed as creative class (Sour & Reijngoud, 2009).

The previous tactics which are promoted mostly by the local government with the cooperation of housing associations and real estate developers worked to upgrade the physical conditions of low-income and minority neighbourhoods; improve neighbourhood management through ownership shifts; boost the private housing sector; assist to the financialisation of housing in the city; provide affordable homeowner opportunities to the middle class; and comply with the agenda of urban and housing policy advocating for heterogeneous districts to mitigate social problems. However, most of the tactics do not allow all citizens to get involved, make roots or
transform their own districts. Resident involvement can be ‘afforded’ by a share of
the population, mostly those having the right economic and citizen conditions, such
middle income and higher educated groups.

Despite the delegation of power and resources (decision making and funding) has been
gradually transferred from higher to lower government levels, and from the public (local
government) to the private and the non profit sector (housing associations), urban
restructuring of low-income and minority districts has been significantly shaped by
the state through highly engineered policies and programmes. However, we have to
acknowledge that urban governance in priority districts is increasingly organised in
partnerships with an extended range of public and non-governmental actors holding
relevant resources of their own. Also, it is important to note that despite the continued
government presence, residents often remain at the margins of decision making, even
when there is a constant desire to include them in local action plans and urban renewal
initiatives. This section aims to lay out the institutional and power structures governing
priority neighbourhoods and implementing the different programmes that have been
outlined in this chapter to understand the intricacies within the local politics.

§ 6.5 Power structures governing priority districts

The Big Cities Policy’s numerous programmes impacting low-income districts was
formulated by the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment to be
implemented nation wide through the different Municipalities. Municipalities were
then in charge of local implementation of the different programmes devised at the
national level as well as regional and city development visions and strategies. National
public policy and programmes translated into local action plans in close co-operation
with municipalities, districts, public-institutions (social, immigration, youth services,
urban planning and housing, etc), the private sector (public-private partnerships),
housing associations, local stakeholders, and water boards when needed.

In Rotterdam, the Department of Urban Planning and Housing [Dienst Stedenbouw en
Volkshuisvesting or dS+V)] and the Rotterdam Development Corporation [Gemeente
Rotterdam Ontwikkelingsbedrijf or OBR] have played an important role in the
formulation of local visions and plans city-wide. The first one is a public institution in
charge of spatial planning and design, including housing and infrastructure. It oversees
the quality of construction of housing, as well as its allocation. Besides focusing on
psychical aspects it also focuses on social and economic aspects in a large number of
districts and neighborhoods. Certainly, it played an important role in urban renewal plans citywide. For instance, the local district approach [wijkaanpak] was drafted at this public entity, which was also responsible for the allocation and administration of public grants and other services related to spatial plans. On the other hand, the Rotterdam Development Corporation role is building residential areas and strengthening the economy to keep residents in their neighbourhoods and attract people to live and work in the city. This public corporation guides spatial and economic investment working as both public developer and quality controller. Along with public and private partners it became central for the urban development and management of the city, and the implementation of the district approach across the city.

At the district level WOM Tarwewijk (District Development Agency) was the one in charge of urban and housing planning and management. Most of the urban and social restructuring of the area was led by this agency in close collaboration with the borough of Charlois and the Rotterdam Municipality. As it was mentioned before, WOM Tarwewijk is a public-private partnership integrated by three partners with equal shares; AM Grondbevrij (private developer), the Rotterdam Development Corporation (or OBR) and Woonstad Rotterdam (housing association). In year 2007, two housing associations, De Nieuwe Unie and Woningbedrijf Rotterdam, merged to form Woonstad Rotterdam. Since then this housing association has been an important partner for the city and for the rehabilitation of a number of districts in Rotterdam, especially in Rotterdam South. On the other hand there is the Charlois Committee (Charlois commissieleden), which was composed of engaged residents in charge of following up the developments taking place in the different neighbourhoods. The committee members act as contact persons for residents and businesses. They perform different tasks in the district and represent the different neighbourhoods of the area. They are usually present in local activities and events.

Other key actors are the district manager [wijkmanager of Tarwewijk] and the City Marines. There are overlaps in their work since both have problem-oriented tasks. The district manager maintains communication with welfare providers as well as with other public services such as those related with social, economic and spatial development, as well as security. This person is the contact person and the one mediating between the different community-based teams and local initiatives. On the other hand, the City Marines work across sectors and public institutions. They seek for far-reaching problems and have authority to make decisions. They sit high in the organisation of the district and report directly to the Executive Committee of Rotterdam (Board of the Mayor and the Alderman). City Marines are a Rotterdam ‘invention’ focusing primarily on safety. The motto of the initiative is ‘the best people in the poorest neighbourhoods’ (Centrum voor Criminaliteitspreventie en Veiligheid, 2007). As it was illustrated above, the City Marines are a by-pass for malfunctioning civil servants (Centrum boor
Criminaliteitspreventie en Veiligheid, 2007). Last but not least, there are other entities acting such as managers of specific urban renewal projects, such as Visade. Visade has worked advising on internal and external processes of the development of complex urban renewal processes. They are commissioned by the local authorities, housing associations and private corporations to strengthen the involvement of residents and other community stakeholders, as it was explained before.

At the neighbourhood level, the street coaches and other community entities working as mediators between citizens and local authorities are active in the streets. The job of the street coaches is to find issues difficult to identify, such as domestic violence, and other social problems at home or in the streets. Once problems are identified, they are referred to welfare services or the project leaders to eventually work on solutions. The street coaches can be both, part of a Municipal initiative to improve safety in districts or work for a specific urban regeneration plan or project. In the first case, the street coaches are usually volunteer neighbourhood fathers or mothers involved in strengthening social control on their youth groups while assisting them to find recreational or sport activities. The people engaged in these endeavours are mostly of Moroccan, Antillean or other ethnic descent. In the second case, the street coaches are usually appointed community members under the authority of specific projects, such as the Mijnkintbuurt Programme. They are in charge of dealing with a wider spectrum of issues. There is usually a street coach coordinator and an advisory committee composed of local housing associations, welfare institutions, police, local business associations, and the Municipality of Rotterdam.

Lastly, Tarwewijk holds the Organisation for and by the inhabitants of Tarwewijk, which is a local entity in charge of the residents’ affairs. The borough of Charlois, and the Municipality of Rotterdam have regular consultation with this organisation to talk about ongoing and new plans. At the same time they are in constant communication with the steering group of the district, the Stuurgroep Tarwewijk, and diverse steering groups in each neighbourhood. From these steering groups different working groups are organised with different agendas depending on the ongoing plans and initiatives. There are also a number of tenants and religious organisations present in the area. Each of these organisations has their own administrative structure and tends to work independently.
§ 6.6 Urban restructuring trends

Considering the evolution of the public programmes, action plans, and local initiatives illustrated in the previous sections, and the share of power and responsibilities between those governing the so-called priority districts we can argue that urban restructuring trends underscored in the last two decades in Tarwewijk in particular, and in districts facing similar conditions in general, are the following.

First, decentralisation of power and resources was desired by central government and facilitated by public policy and grants supporting urban contracts. The delegation of power and resources (decision making and funding) has been gradually transferred from higher to lower government levels. Whereas decentralisation of decision-making has been mainly promoted by policies encouraging city agreements (Action Plans), district covenants (District Action Plans), localised programmes (Urban Renewal Programmes) and other local initiatives, the decentralisation of resources was mainly supported by block grants assisting in the implementation of those urban plans, programmes and initiatives. Municipalities, city districts, development corporations and housing associations gained greater control over urban restructuring processes since local action plans, programmes and initiatives were mostly drafted and lead by these entities. Urban restructuring processes and its respective politics are increasingly orchestrated in partnership with an extended range of non-governmental actors holding relevant assets on their own. Such a trend has described a shift from government to governance, where the involvement of the state becomes less hierarchical and more moderating and directing (Mayer, 1994; Jessop, 1995). The growing use of local urban contracts as policy regulators has increased awareness of the importance of local stakeholders involvement, including residents, in urban regeneration processes at the local level (Andersen & van Kempen, 2003; Lupton & Turok, 2004). In fact, in most of the local plans and programmes civic participation is addressed. However, in recent programmes power and resources have not been necessarily transferred to residents, grassroots groups and local organisations. Thus, there has been a sort of mismatch between the aims of progressive approaches proposed in policies to shift ‘deprived districts’ into ‘empowered ones’, and the conception and implementation of local action plans, urban regeneration programmes and neighbourhood initiatives. Certainly, neighbourhood visions, plans and initiatives are for the most part produced by experts (planners, city officials, social workers, etc), rather than by residents and local stakeholders.

Second, an increase of area-based approaches was central to achieve social and spatial restructuring of deprived districts. A spatial dimension of deprivation and concentration of complex urban problems was evident changing the perspective of
urban policy, plans, and programmes in the last two decades. Non-spatial approaches with emphasis on the welfare of people rather than places has increasingly shifted to area-based ones targeting circumscribed areas. Terms as ‘deprived districts’, ‘priority districts’, ‘empowered districts’ and ‘hotspots’ have been commonly used to name such areas. Area-based plans and programmes usually aim to integrate a wide range of social, economic and physical initiatives cutting across the functional responsibilities of government in education, social, housing and urban policy. Certainly, as it was illustrated in this chapter, area-based visions, action plans, district approaches and urban renewal programmes were drafted and implemented in coordination with different public institutions, from high to low government levels. The intention of area-based approaches was mostly ‘to change the nature of the place and in the process to involve the resident community and other interest with a stake in its future’ (Lupton & Turok, 2004). However, even when area-based policies and approaches were regarded as potential avenues for democratic urban and housing renewal processes in deprived areas (Carley, Campbell, Kearns, Wood, & Young, 2000), some studies have implied that in practice such approaches have become disconnected from the objectives and ambitions of citizens and have proven to be unsuccessful regarding urban improvement (Andersen & van Kempen, 2003; Musterd and Ostendorf, 2008). Moreover, broader structural social problems, such as unemployment, which underlines some of the problems of these areas has been also difficult to achieve with this approach in the Netherlands and beyond (Robson, Parkinson, Boddy & Maclennon. 2000).

Indeed, area-based policy approaches and frameworks of implementation are widely contested. A number of studies have seen these approaches as undemocratic and repressive (Andersen & van Kempen, 2003; Buck 2001; Lupton, 2003; Smith, Noble & Wright, 2001). Whereas other studies have agreed that those policies may work specifically to achieve physical improvement (Lupton & Tunstall, 2003). As it was illustrated in this chapter, in practice urban renewal and regeneration programmes associated with these policies have resulted mostly in physical renewal (Burgers et al., 2001; Andersen & van Kempen, 2003). Most importantly, they have promoted aggressive strategies often resulting in the eviction of long-term residents. The results were far from the stipulated objectives, especially regarding civic participation. Social and spatial improvements were often achieved but not necessarily through the engagement of residents and other local stakeholders. Participation tends to be marginal due to unbalanced power relations. In the case of Tarwewijk, the spatial conditions improved by using a district approach. Housing, streets and public spaces were successfully upgraded. However, social problems have not been eradicated but displaced over the years to other areas within and around Tarwewijk.
Third, housing renewal with the aim to promote changes in ownership was at the core of urban restructuring processes. The Purchase, Renovation and Sale Approach, used in urban renewal plans and programmes, has taken place to transfer properties owned by dubious landlords to responsible ones. Transferring dilapidated, vacant and derelict buildings to housing associations to house low-income residents used to be the most common practice. However, there is an increasing shift in the objectives of these property transfers. For instance, the Building for the Neighbourhood approach aimed to claim those overlooked homes to provide social housing to deprived households. Unfortunately, the social commitment has gradually changed. Recent urban regeneration approaches have sought to transfer these homes and municipal housing not only to housing associations but also to private corporations and owners pursuing to change the social and economic composition of the district (see Table 6.4). In other words, plans have increasingly focused on improving the housing stock, keeping housing management up to code, and controlling housing accessibility (e.g., transferring properties to better off households). It is important to note that in some cases the transfer of properties to responsible landlords is required, especially when properties have experienced long-term vacancy or neglect, and therefore they are not suitable to be occupied. However, the quality of the housing stock is mostly acceptable in Tarwewijk, especially if compared with other low-income districts in other countries. Thus in some cases the transfer of properties in good condition from deprived to better off households seems unjust and even discriminatory.

In Tarwewijk, the Purchase, Renovation and Sale Approach has ruled in the last two decades with little or no participation from long-standing tenants and private landlords, despite the state’s claim to involve residents in a number of public policy and programmes. Even the central government has stated that urban renewal in this district was openly authoritarian despite the resident’s consultation. This fact was recognised by a study made by the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment regarding citizens’ participation in urban renewal operations part of the Urban Regeneration Innovation Programme [Innovatie Programma Stedelijke Vernieuwing] (VROM, 2005). Plans and outcomes seem quite similar between the urban renewal plans of the 1990s, and the most recent ones. Fortunately, demolition and new construction hasn’t taken place in the last plans due to the global recession. Demolition has shifted gradually to rehabilitation, and the involvement of tenants associations was increasingly encouraged. Apparently, the economic crisis and cuts in public expenditures have forced public-private partnerships to look for alternative approaches promoting greater participation and shared management.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>11,227</td>
<td>11,690</td>
<td>12,072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departure from Tarwewijk (persons)</td>
<td>1,179</td>
<td>1,286</td>
<td>1,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment in Tarwewijk(persons)</td>
<td>1,016</td>
<td>1,554</td>
<td>1,294</td>
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<tr>
<td>Households (total)</td>
<td>5,754</td>
<td>5,898</td>
<td>6,022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– One-person household</td>
<td>2,912</td>
<td>2,901</td>
<td>2,881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– One-parent household</td>
<td>742</td>
<td>788</td>
<td>857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Married couple with children</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>823</td>
<td>852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Married couple without children</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Unmarried couple with children</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Unmarried couple without children</td>
<td>439</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Remaining</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household head Dutch (% of households)</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>26.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Housing Units (total)</td>
<td>6,104</td>
<td>5,954</td>
<td>5,938</td>
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<td>Rental housing</td>
<td>4,660</td>
<td>4,139</td>
<td>4,204</td>
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<td>1,809</td>
<td>1,686</td>
<td>1,825</td>
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<td>101</td>
<td>112</td>
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<tr>
<td>Owned by a particular with up to 100 units</td>
<td>1,061</td>
<td>954</td>
<td>1,065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owned by a particular with more than 100 units</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>392</td>
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<td>Owner resident</td>
<td>1,414</td>
<td>1,712</td>
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<tr>
<td>Housing value (ownership)</td>
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<tr>
<td>– 0 to 50,000</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– 50,000 to 100,000</td>
<td>4,661</td>
<td>3,963</td>
<td>4,510</td>
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<tr>
<td>– 100,000 to 150,000</td>
<td>687</td>
<td>1,371</td>
<td>691</td>
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<tr>
<td>– 150,000 to 200,000</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– 200,000 to 250,000</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>– 250,000 and more</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>– unknown</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Rotterdam Buurtmonitor (2015).*

Fourth, a state-led gentrification has been promoted in low-income and hard-to-manage neighbourhoods like Tarwewijk and other post-industrial districts in Rotterdam (see the case of Nieuw Crosswijk and Katendrecht in Stouten 2016 and 2017). The decentralisation of power and resources leading to new partnerships between policy makers, social housing associations, private investors, and public agencies at all governments levels to generate comprehensive urban regeneration plans in deprived and hard-to-manage neighbourhoods does not indicate that the state is less responsible for the social and spatial restructuring of low-income
neighbourhoods. In fact, the state still has a key role. Through the physical pillar of the Big Cities Policy, the state was the main promoter of the differentiation of the housing stock in these areas and in turn the precursor of ‘social-mixing’ policies leading to the current state-led gentrification across large cities. Certainly, the replacement of low-income households by better off ones was openly desired and promoted, from national to local plans, programmes, and initiatives in order to improve the socio-economic conditions of these areas. Shifts in demographics were coveted and engineered (van Kempen & Priemus, 1999). However, the promoted gentrification was not attainable in all the targeted districts. In Tarwewijk, young professionals, families, students and other ‘educated’ groups were targeted in a number of urban regeneration programmes using marketing strategies such as the Self-help Housing [Klushuizen] and Buy your Rental Housing [Koop je Huurhuis] programmes. However, even when Tarwewijk was marketed as an affordable and up-and-coming area, middle income and highly educated households were reluctant to move to this district (see Table 6.2). The housing stock was upgraded but the desired white middle class did not increase but decreased (see Table 6.1). Thus, at the end, the growing non-western population has benefited from the millions of public money poured in the district and the housing and urban improvements.

Fifth, urban restructuring approaches have tended to be hierarchical and paternalistic. As it was illustrated before, there are too many local committees, managers and couches in ‘priority districts’ with power and resources overseeing local initiatives and the residents’ livelihoods, but there are just a few entities willing to delegate authority to citizens to determine their own needs, priorities and visions. The public perception is that citizens cannot act alone or sustain themselves, and therefore need constant assistance. There is some truth in this argument, there are serious social and economic arrears, but perhaps residents haven’t had the opportunity to be actively involved and increase control of their own living environment since there are strict rules to follow. This includes some on individual behaviour and socialising, and also sanctions when failing to fulfill such requirements. The approaches taken by local initiatives tend to be bureaucratic and based on Dutch idiosyncrasies. For instance, safety and cleaning initiatives tend to be educational but sometimes they fall into mandatory activities. Planning and implementation frameworks have failed to share seats with active neighbours to make more effective and sustainable urban and housing renewal processes. Professional experts (planners, city officials, social workers) have way more power than community experts (residents and local stakeholders). Residents are often seen as objects to take care off rather than subjects to work with (Uitermark, 2014). Residents are constantly disempowered since they are mostly the ‘objects’ to be targeted, inspected, and watched over. District managers, city marines and street coaches have been used as instruments for public-private partnerships to achieve the desired improvement in individuals, housing and urban spaces, especially in specific
city areas; ‘hotspots’. In recent years, city officials and local partnerships have been unable, despite their will, to design participatory frameworks, tools and platforms assisting vulnerable groups to acknowledge local problems and solutions; to facilitate long term residents and landlords to take informed decisions; and to bring assistance to residents to co-produce actionable plans to improve their own living environments. There are not sufficient instruments to delegate authority to local stakeholders in decision making. Urban governance has been dominated by public-private partnerships mostly working for people rather than with people.

Sixth, citizenship and race are an important constraint of participation. The so-called ‘priority districts’ are mostly composed by non-Dutch and Dutch citizens with other backgrounds [allochtonen]. These groups have often struggled to take a significant part of the local politics due to cultural differences and language barriers. Residents that are not able to fluently speak the official language have more difficulties to get a place in the governance structures of the district and to profit from the benefits that some of the public initiatives, plans, and services offered. The lack of knowledge of tenants rights and obligations has made immigrants victims of exploitation by slum landlords and evictions by authoritarian housing and urban renewal plans, respectively. Undocumented immigrants are the most vulnerable since they are not able to contact the local authorities. Usually immigrants have the weakest position in local governance, and the housing market in districts such as Tarwewijk, and are often targeted as part of the problem. Certainly, as it was noted in this chapter, public laws, programmes and initiatives in recent years promoted the de-concentration of non-Dutch and Dutch citizens with other backgrounds [allochtonen]. In Rotterdam, as a response of these practices militant grassroots groups, as Rotterdam in Action for Housing [Rotterdammers in Actie voor Betaalbare Huisvesting], became active during the spike of evictions, in the late 2000s, tracking these practices by following up eviction notices and helping tenants with legal issues in different city districts.

Lastly, citizen participation is limited to consultation due to the lack of public tools and platforms for residents’ involvement. The definition of local problems, needs and priorities came mainly from research undertaken by public institutions and public-private partnerships. The result of such enquiries has led to local visions, plans and initiatives conceptualised by the same parties not by residents (G. de la Vieter, personal communication, October 31, 2009). Local action plans and urban renewal programmes are usually drafted according to statistics, scientific opinions, and expert analysis. Most of the approaches are based on quantitative rather than qualitative observations. These visions and their implementation frameworks have been mostly conceived by public-private partnerships and once approved with the required funds they are introduced to residents to engage them in one way or the other (G. de la Vieter, personal communication, October 31, 2009). Furthermore, the constant transference
of ownership from individuals struggling to keep up to code their homes to responsible entities and owners has revealed that local plans and urban renewal programmes that are not eager to deal with tenants, homeowners, and landlords, to improve the district conditions and keep properties in good shape. Apparently, public-private partnerships have hesitated to provide the technical assistance and skills required for locals and eventually delegate control to citizens to manage and run their homes (there are some exceptions illustrated in this chapter). On the contrary, these actions transfer authority and responsibility from citizens to public-private partnerships. Apparently, social and urban renewal approaches conceptualised to transform deprived districts into empowered ones and have failed to provide the required expertise, tools or platforms to truly engage residents, grassroots groups and community organisations in the urban and housing restructuring of their own living environment and in the mitigation of social and economic problems (although initiatives to improve social and economic conditions have been more participatory).

Fortunately, due to the financial crisis and the acknowledgement of some of the shortcomings of the urban regeneration outcomes, area-based approaches are trying to activate residents more than in previous approaches. However, the harm caused by previous urban renewal and regeneration programmes and interventions have resulted in residents’ lack of trust and disengagement. In Tarwewijk crime has decreased, housing has been renewed, and streets have been sanitised. The outcome has been a sterile and desolated district that instead of being integrated have marginalised more, not only in relation with other districts or the city but within its own neighbourhoods, which have been classified with negative nominations over and over. The simple fact of being targeted as a hotspot is a matter of concern among residents since along with the different approaches [aanpak] implemented usually practices related with harassment, eviction, constant patrol and downturn of real estate values take place.

§ 6.7 Conclusion

Delving into the evolution and implementation of such urban restructuring approaches in Tarwewijk three conflicting claims can be asserted. First, the state has given way to the subordination of the use value of housing to its exchange value by adopting some neoliberal global trends. As it was illustrated in this chapter, the state has had a critical role in the restructuring of low-income districts having housing at the centre of urban restructuring policies and programmes. However, this does not mean that those efforts have a social agenda as in previous decades. In a context of increasing
decentralisation of decision-making and resources and deregulation of the housing market and urban regeneration interventions, the state has taken a managerial and entrepreneurial role. Clearly, public policy and approaches of implementation during this period were influenced by global trends promoting inter-urban competition, the commodification of housing, and economic growth at the expenses of citizens. As city visions, neighbourhood plans and covenants between municipalities and the national government were used as instruments for the distribution of resources and implementation of urban regeneration programmes, competition between cities and neighbourhoods was to a certain extent promoted.

Additionally, the urban regeneration efforts orchestrated by the state, at different government levels, to mitigate concentrated urban problems in specific inner city neighbourhoods used for the most part, physical interventions to mitigate social problems. Housing was used as an instrument to achieve a very ambitious strategy. This strategy involved shifting the socialisation of housing efforts of the 1970s and 1980s upside down by pushing the privatisation of social housing forward. As it was examined in this chapter, ownership shifts were facilitated by the state under an urgent call for the differentiation of the housing stock, which turned into a racial-based ‘social mixing’ policy expediting action to deal with the concentration of affordable private rental housing and social housing providing homes to low-income households, mostly ethnic minorities and vulnerable populations, in specific city areas. This strategy can be easily discerned. In the first place, it intended the activation of the housing market in targeted areas in order to put these territories on the map to attract investment (in this case middle-class homeowners and creative class businesses) and improve the economic conditions. These areas once in transformation were marketed in city visions and real estate strategies (lead in some cases by housing associations) as up-and-coming districts. Certainly, the social value of housing providing shelter for vulnerable populations was under threat by visions prioritising housing’s economic value for the state and its partners’ interests and visions. Additionally, the measures taken were somehow speculative. However, the housing market did not pick up as expected in many of the targeted areas, particularly in transitory and immigrant neighbourhoods such as Tarwewijk. This lead to the second motive of the strategy, while promoting the demolition of old private rental and social housing and the construction of new market rate housing, this strategy concurrently stimulated a socioeconomic restructuring leading, in the state view, to the integration of these areas in the mainstream economy of the city and therefore to economic growth.

28 In the case of Tarwewijk social housing was not privatized but low-income private rental housing was demolished to give way to new, more expensive, market rate rental and private-owned housing managed by housing associations.
An engineered replacement of ethnic minorities by native Dutch residents, or in other words state-led gentrification, was desired but hard to achieve. In summary, institutional governance and policy frameworks despite regulating to a certain extent the housing market, the location of private investment and the financialisation of cities in the Randstad Holland, promoted a state-led restructuring in disinvested and declining neighbourhoods following strategies which the neoliberal project would have brought about if allowed to take place without any regulation. This assertion is connected to my second claim.

Second, low-income and minority neighbourhoods struggling with entangled social and urban problems have been deliberately and continuously recognised by the state, public-private partnerships and banks as ‘hard-to-manage’ and ‘risk areas’. These neighbourhoods became stigmatised after being redlined and leveled with negative terms such as ‘problem accumulation areas’, ‘hot spots’, and ‘priority neighbourhoods’ and ranked according to numerous stats and indexes. Suddenly residents have found themselves leaving in the worst neighbourhood of the city according to public officials. These designations have changed over time, for instance from ‘priority neighbourhoods’ to ‘empowered neighbourhoods’. However, the damage has been done. For instance, residents of these areas, which were immigrants or citizens with non-Dutch background, were seen as poor and dangerous while indigenous Dutch residents increasingly felt less attached to their neighbourhoods and neighbours. Streets became deserted while real estate values dropped. These developments gave way to specific public area-based programmes and measures targeting those areas to, in the state’s view, mitigate and get rid of the ‘problems’. However, looking at the approaches taken in these territories the motives of such area-based programmes can be debatable. As it was outlined above, the agendas of these plans did not particularly focus on the mitigation of poverty, unemployment, crime and getting rid of the long lasting exclusion. The highly planned urban regenerations interventions aimed to activate the housing market and somehow colonise these areas with other type of residents while the social programmes dealt mostly with keeping up safe, civilised, and clean neighbourhoods; goals that would certainly help the state and its partners achieving urban regeneration plans. These two arguments make us question some of the participatory programmes promoted by the state and lead us to my third assertion.

Third, as it was shown in this chapter (and Chapter 4), the state has constantly promoted through public policy and programmes the integration and involvement of vulnerable groups, the non integrated and the non participant, in state-led urban restructuring plans and interventions. Certainly, the activation and empowerment of citizens was desired and instigated in social and urban restructuring programmes, from the social renewal programme and the first urban renewal approaches to the most recent initiatives promoting empowered districts and self-help approaches. However,
considering the previous assertions, we can conclude that such efforts were not precisely to facilitate the social and political transformation of citizens by allowing them to take part in the transformation of their own living environment (see Chapter 2). On the contrary, this study shows participatory programmes during the Big Cities Policy did not aim to grant citizens political power to organise and make informed decisions to gain control over their own homes and sites of social reproduction. Actually, some of the main intentions of such participatory efforts brought about an evident paradox; citizens were concurrently devised as objects and subjects of governance. Considering the previous two claims, we can conclude that one of the main motives of calling for socially interventionist participatory programmes was to ameliorate the impact new urban regeneration strategies were bringing about in cities, particularly the segregation and economic polarisation that was growing as a result of the neoliberal urban trends in cities. Additionally, we can deduce that participatory efforts at the neighbourhood level were in some cases formulated to control and discipline vulnerable and deprived groups victims of the byproducts of contemporary global capitalism (the poor, the unemployed, the immigrant, etc) and who represent a burden or even a threat to the local government. As it was illustrated in this chapter, the control and discipline was pursued through educational and patronising programmes promoting for the most part ‘liveable’ neighbourhoods — meaning, as it was stated above safe, civilised and clean areas— rather than economic and community development.

Lastly, the promotion of citizen participation in social and urban programmes in targeted areas seemed to be part of the state’s strategy of building coalition politics to, in turn, successfully achieve the urban regeneration plans envisioned in those specific areas. As Harvey (1989) notes, local officials tend to work towards the formation of coalition politics to forge a ruling-class alliance through the coordination of actions at different government levels and powerful partners while seeing themselves as symbols of the community to legitimise their powers. In Tarwewijk, these alliances involved a variety of partners with uneven resources and political power. Most importantly, these alliances advocated for the public interest using citizen participation to assert certain control and support to achieve their own plans. Citizen participation in urban regeneration plans was mostly facilitated through one way communication meetings when plans were set up to prevent any opposition from residents and local groups.

29 At least not until the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, when public cuts halted many of the ongoing urban regeneration plans.
Cities for or against citizens?
PART 5  The new state-led urban restructuring strategy: Analysis and alternatives
7 Urban and housing development trends affecting low-income and minority districts

§ 7.1 Introduction

Urban and housing policy and implementation approaches have evolved responding to the ongoing economic restructuring of cities to revitalise and regenerate declining inner city areas, and in turn, boost economic growth in America and Western Europe. The decentralisation of power and resources to lower government levels and the promotion of market driven development using innovative financial tools has been promoted through policy for quite some time in America. Whereas urban policy facilitating decentralisation, deregulation and privatisation of urban restructuring processes has taken place at a different pace across Western Europe (except for the UK). However, as welfare states weaken and policy directions become more and more homogeneous across the European Union and the developed world in general, even the most market regulated countries are becoming highly dependent of global financing and exposed to interurban competition, as it is in the case of the Netherlands.

Certainly, urban policy in these two different territories has been influenced and challenged by the same global agents (neoliberal capitalism, globalisation of the division of labor, etc). However, the responses to deal with the ongoing economic and urban transformations in cities have molded according to national institutional regulatory and governance frameworks, and influenced by previous policies and cycles of public and private investment and disinvestment. But we have to acknowledge that urban policy and approaches of implementation in both territories have historically influenced the propositions, visions and models of one another.

This chapter particularly explores the confluence of trends taking place in urban restructuring of low-income neighbourhoods in both geographical areas. Although facilitated in different ways by both national states, they coincide in terms of outcomes. The assertions included in this chapter are the final analysis of the previous chapters which carefully explore the way urban revitalisation and regeneration of low-income
neighbourhoods developed in America and Western Europe. And how they have evolved into a new urban restructuring strategy with clear objectives, locations, and approaches. The trends outlined in this section clearly depict state-sponsored policies, strategies, tools and measures promoted in disinvested and declining areas to integrate these segregated sites into the new economic function of cities, particularly looking at New York City and the Randstad Holland. The way the state has used such deprived areas as instruments to guarantee its own reproduction and satisfy capitalist interests rather than people needs is reflected across the urban restructuring trends. Finally, this section examines, considering the outlined trends, the way citizens have been concurrently perceived as objects and subjects of governance by policy and public programmes restricting residents ability to achieve community-led and neighbourhood-based transformations.

§ 7.2 Urban restructuring as an instrument of speculation, competitiveness and economic growth

‘Whereas the major territorial axis of economic competition prior to the 1970s pitted regional and national economies against each other, by the 1990s the new geographical axis of competition was pitting cities against cities in the global economy’ (Smith, 2006). In this context, urban renewal and regeneration are seen as an opportunity to change economic functions, create new jobs and strengthen the city’s position in the urban division of labor (Moulaert, Rodriguez, & Swyngedouw 2002). City visions and housing plans have used these urban transformations to attract global investments, developments, and businesses to cities and, in turn, people and visitors (clients), to stimulate economic growth. Certainly, ‘the search for growth turns urban renewal into a mediated objective, a necessary precondition for economic regeneration’ (Moulaert et al., 2002). In this context, planners and local authorities are increasingly adopting a more proactive and entrepreneurial approach aimed at identifying market opportunities and assisting private investors (Moulaert et al., 2002). Undoubtedly, the new urban strategies aim to wave ‘global financial markets together with large- and medium-sized real-estate developers, local merchants, and property agents,...all lubricated by city and local governments for whom beneficent social outcomes are now assumed to derive from the market rather than from its regulation’ (Smith, 2002).

Nowadays cities are competing against each other not only in terms of attracting and keeping industrial production and becoming vibrant service and financial hubs but also becoming residential and tourist destinations using marketing strategies that are often
working concurrently with urban revitalisation plans. Consequently, city visions, public programmes and housing plans are increasingly created with urban imaginaries of those who are instrumental in the formulation, planning and implementation of those visions. Therefore, urban revitalisation and regeneration interventions with strategies marketing competing cities are increasingly catered towards inhabitants that are yet to come as well as their needs and lifestyles rather than towards local residents and local needs (Moulert et al., 2002; Smith, 2006).

New York City has been extremely successful in this competition by facilitating development through tax benefits, public subsidies and zoning changes to private corporations (local, national and global). Since the Bloomberg administration subsidised initiatives have revitalised urban manufacturing with creative industries in declining industrial areas, while large profit-driven urban projects have developed in partnership with city agencies in neglected low-income neighbourhoods across the boroughs (e.i. Barkley Center, Hudson Yards, World Trade Center, Downtown Brooklyn, Brooklyn Waterfront, just to mention a few). The Mayor’s housing plan, alongside the public instruments provided to implement it, spurred an unprecedented development across the city. Over 40,000 new buildings were added to the city igniting growth in diverse working class neighbourhoods including the West Side, Chelsea and Central Harlem in Manhattan; Long Island City and Flushing in Queens; Williamsburg, Bushwick and Bedford Stuyvesant in Brooklyn; and the South Bronx, in the Bronx. Incentives were widely provided for developers and investors, which have moved from local to national and from regional to global. Even in the most modest districts investments came from Europe, Russia, Asia and beyond. The planning issue with this startling development is that it was not planned for New Yorkers; undoubtedly it did not consider middle- and low-income residents. Luxury developments encroaching low-income districts cleared the way for gentrification and its domino effect of evictions displacing families from the last pockets of affordable housing. The Right to the City Alliance’s research and publication People without Homes, and Homes without People: A Count of Vacant Condos in Selected Neighborhoods (2010) made clear the fact (including the neighbourhood of Bushwick) that new housing is not affordable for the regular citizen and still private corporations kept housing units empty waiting for global investors and millionaires to come (see Chapter 5).

In the Randstad Holland urban and economic development in low-income neighbourhoods has been highly planned through comprehensive and ambitious public policies, programmes and instruments (see Chapter 4). In this geography competition between cities has been, more than global, within West European cities. The European Union has been key in setting up urban agendas across its members and enforcing such trends through policy and funds provided on a competitive basis for economic, social and urban development. At the national level, competition has
been also experienced between large cities within the Randstad Holland. The Big Cities Policy, was instrumental in the distribution of funds and therefore development across cities. As illustrated in this study, city plans and covenants between municipalities and the national government were used as tools for the distribution of resources for the implementation of urban regeneration programmes. And area-based approaches were key for decision-making in terms of investment in central city areas as well as in segregated residential districts. Undoubtedly, these orchestrated efforts intended to put large cities on the map, such as the City of Rotterdam, by mitigating the urban problems concentrated in neighbourhoods with a concentration of ethnic minorities and low-income groups. Certainly, city visions have fiercely attempted to market this city as an up-and-coming urban area for the ‘creative class’. The old central train station, the traditional market and old roadways with exotic street flavours (e.i. Nieuwe Binnenweg and West-Kruiskade) have taken part of ambitious urban regeneration plans in recent years often replacing old buildings by ‘spectacular’ architecture. Furthermore, area-based programmes and urban regeneration plans have targeted working class neighbourhoods, many close to the old port with modest housing and scarce amenities. And local actions plans drafted in these neighbourhoods by planners, local authorities, housing associations and private corporations have often involved visions foreign to locals. Urban regeneration plans with the aim to diversify the housing stock have been at the core of such local actions plans to improve the urban and social environment of those neighbourhoods and attract better off residents and creative economies (see Chapter 6).

§ 7.3 Outward diffusion of urban restructuring from central to peripheral areas

After the transformation of urban central areas during the 1980s and 1990s, which resulted in an unprecedented rise of real estate values, districts located further out gradually caught up. Especially those with vibrant communities, historic districts, waterfronts, industrial land and land accessible to public transportation (Smith, 2006). The pattern of diffusion has been variable, and always associated with the historical patterns of capital investment and disinvestment, in each particular urban geography (Smith, 2006). Nevertheless, in both geographical areas, traditional working class and minority neighbourhoods with weak housing markets are being targeted for development and local and global investment.
In New York City this pattern is clear, development is migrating from former low-income immigrant neighbourhoods located in central areas where profit have reached its limits, to low-income African-American and Hispanic neighbourhoods located in less central areas. African-American neighbourhoods such as Harlem, Bedford Stuyvesant, and Crown Heights have been experiencing real estate speculation, expensive housing developments and rise in property values in the last decades. In the same fashion, Hispanic neighbourhoods with high concentrations of immigrants, such as Bushwick and most recently Sunset Park, are currently being assaulted with buyouts, flipping properties and for-profit housing, and commercial developments targeting middle and high income households and tenants. Interestingly enough, these low-income neighbourhoods are far from central city areas and have been historically redlined and neglected. The future of these areas and their communities is now predictable: investment and displacement respectively. The vibrancy and resilience of these neighbourhoods have put them on the ‘greenlining’ map and turned them into a magnet for real estate corporations, financial institutions, and public-private partnerships. However, this does not mean that existing residents will benefit. As it was illustrated in this study, the most vulnerable groups of residents are often put at risk of displacement by the activation of the housing market. As Smith (2006) asserts ‘the less even the initial outward growth of capital investment and the less even the disinvestment in these newer landscapes, the less even will be the diffusion of gentrification’ (p. 203).

In the Randstad Holland, this sort of ‘locational seesaw’ (Smith, 2006) has been also evident. Low-income and immigrant neighbourhoods have been the new frontier of development. In the case of the City of Rotterdam, the third wave or urban renewal, now called urban regeneration, is transforming old prewar neighbourhoods, waterfronts and post industrial areas that were left behind during the urban renewal programme of the 1980s. These peripheral urban areas eventually declined without investment and in turn welcomed most of the influx of immigrant and vulnerable groups that the city received during the following years. With the increasing decline of physical and social conditions these areas became prioritised for social assistance and in turn, due to failures in numerous public policies and programmes, were targeted for more aggressive urban restructuring programmes. In desperate need of more effective ways to deal with such challenges urban regeneration programmes started promoting once again demolition and new construction, the old urban renewal method, to get rid of slums, ghettos and urban malaise. Most recently, peripheral neighbourhoods still dealing with entangled urban problems, mostly immigrant communities with weak housing markets, were designated as ‘priority areas’ by the central government, though the Big Cities Policy, for more comprehensive restructuring approaches. However, those schemes despite aiming to restructure those areas through the ‘integrated’ district approach involved controversial policies promoting homeownership at the expenses of
social housing (replacement) to ‘integrate’ these areas into the city’s economic base. In Rotterdam districts such as Tarwewijk, Katendrecht, Spangen and Delfhaven are some of the new urban development frontiers.

§ 7.4 Rise of area-based policy, investments and urban interventions

The spatial concentration of entangled urban problems has changed the perspective of public policy and programmes from non-spatial, with emphasis on the well being of people, to an area-based ones. Considering the issues and assets of the area, place-based approaches have claimed to integrate a wide range of social, economic, and urban renewal activities cutting across the functional responsibilities of government in education, social, housing and urban policy. In addition, they have often been enforced with the assistance of public money, tax incentives, and other instruments to entice private investment. As it was illustrated in the previous chapters, urban policy has tended to evolve towards the coordination of different policy fields and public institutions that used to work previously on an individual basis, more notorious and structural in Western Europe than in America. However, in both geographical areas, this trend is visible in the urban revitalisation and regeneration programmes targeting disinvested low-income neighbourhoods that were left behind in previous waves of investment and where social and urban problems were traditionally addressed by a number of public institutions holding different fields of expertise. In many cases, as it was shown in previous chapters (Chapters 3 and 4), site-specific approaches intended to change the nature of the place and in the process involve the local community and others with a stake in area’s future, but in practice disinvested low-income neighbourhoods were fully transformed without considering local needs and priorities, even when participatory approaches were used (see Chapters 5 and 6). This study shows that area-based urban interventions have had the following outcomes; (1) to tackle urban decline manifested particularly in housing and urban infrastructures while promoting decline and investment barriers in other areas; (2) displace rather than improve the policy target—issues related to minority, deprived and low income groups—or what urban managers call ‘urban problems’; (3) promote competitiveness since disinvested areas bid against each other for attention, public funds and private investment; (4) be undemocratic because they are often formulated, implemented and controlled by unelected partnerships and local communities play a very small role and often advisory; and lastly, (5) in terms of socio-economic improvements, since vulnerable groups are not fully segregated there is a degree of exclusion for those outside the targeted area. Most importantly, those inside targeted areas are
increasingly overseen and even displaced by urban revitalisation and regeneration interventions.

In America, area-based urban revitalisation projects have developed by aiming to strengthen the city economy and improve physical conditions, but they have rarely claimed to fight segregation. The provision of social benefits for vulnerable groups has also been scarce in these programmes, at least in recent decades. In contrast, large urban projects are increasingly promoting displacement in the name of development. In New York City, area-based approaches have been used to implement ambitious urban restructuring plans through the designation of specific territories. These approaches have changed through time. The area-based approaches of the 1950s and 1960s, including the Urban Renewal and Model Cities programmes, which mostly addressed housing renewal and community development respectively shifted to more entrepreneurial and profit-based programmes also targeting specific areas, such as the Revitalization Areas Program, Brownfield Opportunity Areas Program and most recently the Inclusionary Housing Program. State-sponsored area-based urban renewal programmes targeting slums and deprived areas, traditionally scattered across the city, gradually evolved into more partnership-based and business oriented approaches of development in specific central areas while neglecting less central locations. While aiming to revitalise distressed communities by using public funds and tax incentives, many of these approaches were seen as catalysts for private investment in designated areas. Most recently, revitalisation plans promoted through rezoning and housing development incentives have also had a place-based nature. Particularly, as it was illustrated in Chapter 5, in post industrial sites, waterfronts and working class neighbourhoods. However, the concentration of public assistance and resources was intended for the most part to attract private investment rather than the social and economic improvement of existing low-income communities. While universal welfare programmes and public funding decrease, private capital is increasingly mobilised for the development of projects in city areas targeted for development.

In Western Europe, area-based large urban development projects have been ‘marshaled as panaceas to fight polarisation, to reinvigorate the local economy, and, most importantly—an explicit goal of these projects—to improve the tax basis of the city via a socio-spatial and economic reorganisation of metropolitan space’ (Moulaert et al., 2002). This has taken place in a context ‘of national deregulation, of shrinking of stable social redistributial policies, of the outright exclusion of some groups at the national or EU level (for example, immigrants), and of an often narrowing fiscal basis for local urban intervention’ (Moulaert et al., 2002). In the case of the Randstad Holland, as in many other West European metropolitan areas, the decrease of welfare-state interventionism was followed by ‘policies that direct funds and attention to particular social groups, identified on the basis of their location... and
Undoubtedly, social mixing as policy to fight segregation and promote disaggregation and democratic approaches to any participation shows, in programmes unlike place-based and social in stakeholders lack solutions illustrates, bring what concentrate approaches’ the fighting praxis hands the follower characteristics of their living environment’ (Moulaert et al., p. 569). ‘Integrated approaches’ in urban policy and urban regeneration schemes tended to coordinate and concentrate efforts and resources from all government levels to radically transform, what they call, ‘priority districts’. Programmes such as the 56 District Approach and its follower 40 Empowered Districts were implemented in such ‘priority’ areas to bring about social, economic and physical transformations. However, as this study illustrates, these district-based anti-exclusion programmes mostly offered physical solutions to social problems despite the efforts of their integrated approach (see Chapter 6). This has been the outcome of paternalistic social programmes as well as a lack of coordination and collaboration between ministries, public agencies, and local stakeholders (see Chapter 6). However, we cannot underestimate the efforts. While in the Randstad Holland area-based approaches are implemented with integrated social programmes to ameliorate the impact of uneven investment, in New York City, and other cities with unregulated and profit-based urban development agendas, place-based revitalisation rarely offered a social agenda or anti-shock programmes. Unlike the Randstand Holland, in New York City social and community development programmes are barely coordinated with urban revitalisation plans. They are mostly in hands of the non-profit sector which often lack resources. In any case, as this study shows, area-based urban restructuring approaches have prioritised physical rather than social improvement in both geographies. Furthermore, community-based and participatory programmes promoted as part of area-based plans have aimed for the most part to reduce the impact the physical interventions will bring while preventing any opposition from locals to such transformations and capitalising from local assets to further economic development (see Chapter 5 and 6). While in theory, place-based approaches have been regarded as critical paths for the formulation of localised policy, democratic renewal, and community engagement in low-income neighbourhoods, in praxis such approaches have tended to be disconnected from the objectives and priorities of residents and fail to achieve comprehensive and integral urban improvements (Andersen & van Kempen, 2003).

§ 7.5 Social mixing as policy to fight segregation and promote disaggregation

Policies promoting ‘social mixing’ have been increasingly incorporated in urban restructuring strategies in America and Western Europe alike in recent years. The main motive of policies and programmes promoting heterogeneous neighbourhoods is fighting segregation and promoting economic growth (capital investment). Undoubtedly, the purpose, somehow, has been achieved. Dark neighbourhoods
have become lighter and housing and urban developments have strengthened weak housing markets while creating new economies (e.g. new housing, commercial and business spaces). However, ‘social mixing’ policies have not produced equitable cities and have unfolded impactful agendas. Disaggregation of immigrant and low-income communities has been in place in a systematic way.

In New York City, as it was noted above, place-based development is increasingly moving from central to peripheral areas and being projected in traditionally low-income neighbourhoods, usually African-American and Hispanic, with the capacity to hold new housing for the increasing demand in this growing city. Zoning changes alongside public incentives and instruments, such as the Inclusionary Housing Program and most recently the Mandatory Inclusionary Housing Program, are the major promoters of ‘social mixing’ to revitalise neighbourhoods experiencing disinvestment, weak housing markets, and poverty. These public instruments are central to (the Mayor’s) local housing plans serving as policy regulators of gentrification, from Brooklyn to the Bronx via Queens. Former Mayor Bloomberg’s New Housing Marketplace Plan changed the social composition, average income and housing stock of dozens of neighbourhoods by facilitating zoning changes in 40% of the city land from 2003 to 2013. Large housing developments in former industrial and working class districts popped up one after the other for over a decade. Providing a marginal 20% of affordable housing, the Inclusionary Housing Program, and the 421a Program were championed as the panacea for inclusion and provision of affordable housing during this and the following administration. Bill de Blasio’s Housing New York: A Five-Borough Ten-Year Plan continues pushing the creation of income-diverse neighbourhoods by granting, just like in the previous administration, city dollars, tax exemptions, and public land to real estate corporations with a small portion of affordable housing in return. The new plan is considering new frontiers for development making residents anxious and investors and developers thirsty. The anxiety is produced by the domino effect that new luxury housing developments in rezoned areas are generating; higher property values in adjacent properties and blocks; new economies catered towards new residents; speculation, buyouts and flipping of properties; long term residents being priced out; and displacement of long term residents and business.

In the case of the Randstad Holland, as it was illustrated in Chapters 4 and 6, ‘in the course of the 1990s both national and local governments took the view that, in a number of urban districts, there was ‘too great’ concentration of ethnic minorities, low-income groups and unemployed (these characteristics are frequently combined) and that a re-differentiation of the housing stock was necessary to bring about a ‘more evenly balanced population’ (Priemus, 2004, p. 231). The coordination of social, economic, and housing programmes was seen as the key to achieve such differentiation
and in turn tackle the increasing segregation. The Big Cities Policy was the precursor of coordinated and integrated policies at different levels of government and across diverse ministries. However, as it was shown in this study, housing and physical interventions resulting from urban regeneration plans often overlooked socioeconomic aspects. Social housing was central but not precisely for expansion purposes like in the 1970s and 1980s when the Building for the Neighborhood Programme promoted the socialisation of housing (creation of social housing). On the contrary, the provision of housing was diversified shifting from public and low-income rental housing to private ownership and market rental housing. A so-called ‘social mixing’ policy was pushed to generate the coveted social balance. Unlike in New York City, this ‘social mixing’ policy was enforced by demolishing old housing stock and constructing a new one. This approach, which is closely related to traditional urban renewal operations, getting rid of blight and urban malaise by demolition, has raised some questions in relation to the role of housing associations and municipalities in the agenda of urban regeneration operations in the Netherlands. One of the hidden drivers of the ‘social mixing’ policy was the survival (and corporatization) of housing associations to keep improving the housing stock, activating the housing market, and in turn, strengthening the city economy. Certainly, with the increasing withdrawal of government responsibility in the provision of housing, these entities have expanded their services and the scope of their businesses (Uitermark, 2003). Turning private rental and social housing into homeownership for affluent households was central for these entities. On the other hand, as this study illustrates, ‘social mixing’ was pushed to facilitate municipalities the control of deprived areas with high concentrations of immigrants and ethnic groups that were increasingly hard to manage in the Randstad Holland. This control was masked under the name of ‘integration’. Thus, behind the rhetoric of fighting segregation, policies aimed to restore social order through urban regeneration, some times clearing entire blocks and inhabitants to improve the management of ‘problematic’ neighbourhoods (see Chapter 6). Other studies support this argument (Aalbers & van Beckhoven 2010; Hackworth & Smith, 2001; Lees, 2008; Uitermark, 2014; Uitermark & Duyvendak, 2008), particularly a study conducted by Uitermark, Duyvendak and Kleinhans (2007) and his colleagues in Rotterdam. This study shows that one of the priorities of regeneration actors is to create social order (less crime, more civil obedience) through gentrification, while profit margins were subordinate to this.

While in the Randstad Holland ‘social mixing’ as policy has been openly proclaimed and enforced in urban regeneration plans in low-income neighbourhoods, it has been suppressed in policy discourses and housing and revitalisation plans transforming low-income communities in New York City. However, the effectiveness and scale of this policy strategy has been way greater in New York City. While peripheral low-income neighbourhoods in New York City have the capacity (space) for revitalisation (housing and urban) and therefore barely regulated development is blooming assisted by the
state, Dutch segregated neighbourhoods have little room for large transformations and development is subject to strong policy and planning regulations. Certainly, a few national governments in western societies, such as the Netherlands, intervene so extensively in the planning and housing market (Dieleman & van Weesep, 1986). Thus, in the same fashion ‘social mixing’ has been highly engineered.

The creation of heterogeneous neighbourhoods as a panacea to fight segregation may be the way. However, this strategy pushing for ‘social mixing’ in mostly poor city areas with limited resources must be expanded to wealthy areas with vast public services and facilities. As Smith (2006) states, ‘social balance sounds like a good thing—who could be against social balance?’—until one examines the neighborhoods targeted for regeneration, whereupon it becomes clear that the strategy involves a major colonization by the middle and upper-middle classes’ (p. 206). Neighbourhoods of colour have become pale while white neighbourhoods have not gain colour.

§ 7.6 State-lead gentrification and displacement in the name of development

Three waves of gentrification can be identified in urban contexts in America and Western Europe (Smith, 2006). The first wave, beginning in the 1950s, was associated with the sporadic improvement of modest cottages or townhouses by the new urban ‘gentry’ in working-class quarters (Smith, 2006). ‘The second wave followed in the 1970s and 1980s as gentrification became increasingly entwined with wider processes of urban and economic restructuring’ (Smith, 2006). This wave, which took place later in some countries (such as the Netherlands), was associated with the return of the middle-class (from the suburbs) to the city and the concentration of artists and educated dwellers looking for affordable spaces in specific city areas, mostly cheap run down industrial and disinvested neighbourhoods. Opportunistic investors and speculators in turn made these areas unaffordable for existing residents, including those that made those areas attractive for investment (ei. artist, young professionals, etc). The third wave, which started in the 1990s, was increasingly intertwined with urban restructuring strategies formulated by states and local governments in partnership with private capital in cities across the globe (Smith, 2002). While the first two waves had, for the most part, the middle-class and local developers as agents, the agents of current urban revitalisation and regeneration promoting and speeding gentrification are governmental, corporate (national and global), and corporate-governmental partnerships (Smith, 2002). This evolution has taken place in different
ways across cities and neighbourhoods, as it was shown in the study, following the
different rhythms of capital investment and disinvestment (Smith, 2002). What is
interesting is that gentrification promoted in the name of urban revitalisation and
regeneration, in America and Western Europe respectively, has been deliberately
planned, led and funded by national states.

In New York City, the first ambitious local housing plan to increase low- and moderate-
income housing became a hallmark of the Mayor Koch administration during the
time of the city’s fiscal crisis in the 1980s. This 10-year plan set out to rehabilitate
and build 252,000 housing units using innovative financing (city’s capital budget,
cross subsidies from luxury projects and tax subsidies) and new strategies and public
programmes for maintenance and housing improvements involving mostly non-for-
profit housing corporations and eventually the private sector, as in the case of Bushwick
(see Chapter 5). The programme mostly focused on blighted neighbourhoods, and
although it claimed to favour low-income families and addresses class and racial
integration, it mostly produced middle-income housing. The target of the programme
shifted during the last years from a welfare model to house the poorest, to a more
racially and income diverse affordable model (Soffer, 2010). During this period
disinvested and abandoned neighbourhoods with high amount of vacant properties
were revived. This plan was followed by Mayor Bloomberg’s 10-year housing plan in
the early 2000s, which was committed to preserve and create 165,000 units of city-
subsidised affordable housing. One of the main differences between the programmes is
the shift of public support and subsidies from non-profit community-based developers
to for-profit developers and corporations, as it was illustrated in the case of Bushwick
(see Chapter 5). This affected low-income communities and neighbourhoods. As
Dulchin (2013) notes, ‘a skilled community-based not-for-profit is more likely to build
deeply affordable housing, provide de-facto permanent affordability because they
generally find a way to maintain the low rents even past the expiration of the regulatory
agreement, and strengthen neighbourhood civic infrastructure through the planning
and development process’. Under Bloomberg’s New Housing Marketplace Plan (NHMP)
billions of public monies were poured into neighbourhoods mostly subsidising local
as well as global corporations for the provision of market rate and affordable housing.
Public instruments offered to developers, particularly the Inclusionary Housing
Program (IHP), fell short to satisfy the needs of those struggling with housing. In fact,
the number of households struggling to afford rental housing grew in the duration of
this housing plan. By 2011, half of New York City renters were rent burdened, spending
more than 30% of their gross monthly income in housing (Furman Center, 2013). It
is important to note that the first inclusionary zoning provisions were adopted in the
city in 1987 allowing developers to exceed the maximum building size by up to 20%
in exchange for providing affordable housing in high density districts located mostly
in Manhattan. During the Bloomberg administration the IHP expanded to less dense
districts across the city. Since then thousands of affordable housing units have been provided in new buildings. However, most community members living around the new buildings have not been even able to afford the affordable units30. This mean that public monies have not only benefited for-profit developers but also better-off households coming from other districts, cities and even countries (millionaires).

In the Netherlands, the housing market has been highly regulated due its welfare interventionist policies. Thus gentrification, although existing, has been milder than in countries with more market oriented housing policies like the United States. However, the discourse in policy circles has recently changed influenced by the need of new housing markets and new challenges in the provision and management of social housing (see Chapter 6). Additionally, as it was explained above, the increasing decline of particular neighbourhoods in large cities prompted governments to pursue new regeneration approaches to successfully achieve transformative interventions in low-income and post-industrial districts. With the shrinkage of the welfare state the main direction has been building up new partnerships between policy makers, social housing associations, private investors, and public agencies at all government levels to generate comprehensive urban regeneration in deprived and hard to manage neighbourhoods enforcing 'social mixing' as policy. However, this does not mean that private corporations are fully taking over socio-spatial transformations. The state has been the main precursor of the differentiation of the housing stock in these areas (e.i. through the physical pillar of the Big Cities Policy), and in turn the promoter of gentrification across large cities. What is interesting is that despite the fact that the objectives have been similar to those in American cities the outcomes have been different (see Chapter 6). Most importantly, gentrification has not been pursued exclusively to activate the housing market and revitalise local economies but also as a way to 'micromanage the poor' (Peck, 2001) and to build 'coalition politics' (Harvey, 1989). As Uitermark, Duyvendak and Kleinhans (2007) argue based on their study on urban regeneration study in Hoogvliet (Rotterdam), public agencies and private partners often lure the middle class into disadvantaged areas with the objective of civilising and controlling the lives of their inhabitants. But, as Aalbers (2010) notes in his study on revanchism in Amsterdam, the goals of urban regeneration in many cases go beyond bringing social order. Middle class formation to forge ruling-class alliances (see Chapter 2) and to transform entire city sections is also desired (Aalbers, 2010; Harvey, 1989). In any case, as it was illustrated in this study (see Chapter 6), diversification of the housing stock, replacing rental by privately owned housing, to generate stronger housing markets and increase property taxes and economic growth has been promoted but not fully

30 Please see issues regarding affordable housing in low-income districts in New York City in Chapter 5
achieved. Neither attracting significant private investment has been accomplished. Urban regeneration efforts to replace low-income and ethnic minorities by middle-income households has attracted small-scale private investment (mostly homeowners) using different mechanisms but not at the scale level of American urban revitalisation interventions.

The post-1990s generalisation of gentrification and its integration in the new urban restructuring strategy promoting local as well as global interurban competition for capital investment has been pivotal for national states (Smith, 2002). Under different names, urban revitalisation or regeneration, the new urban restructuring strategy has played a key role in filling ‘the vacuum left by the abandonment of 20th century liberal policy’ and serving ‘real estate markets as burgeoning sectors of productive capital investment’ (Smith, 2002). Of course the incursion and visibility of gentrification in urban revitalisation and regeneration operations has been different across cities and nations. While the class shift involved in urban revitalisation tends to be generalised in America, it is suppressed under integration agendas in the Netherlands (Smith, 2002). According to Smith (2002), ‘regeneration policies are multifaceted and include various efforts that would not normally be included under the label of gentrification’, yet, as he exhorts, it is critical to scrutinise the different urban regeneration reports, public policies and continuous efforts established by the new urban regeneration strategy across Western Europe. Those efforts often show the different attempts to incorporate gentrification into the core of transnational urban policies even when gentrification is not openly recognised. Most importantly, the outcomes of gentrification — people that are being up rooted from their homes and livelihoods — have not been recognised let alone addressed in neither America nor in Western Europe. Certainly, as Smith notes (2006), current urban regeneration strategies, planned and financed by public institutions, with gentrification as part of their hidden agendas represents a victory for neoliberal visions of the city.

§ 7.7 New institutional configurations and regulatory policy

The restructuring of the welfare state and global economic shifts has led to an erosion of the power-based on national governments rising regional and local governance and authority (Korthals Altes, 2002; Jessop, 1994). The hierarchic state structure of the 20th century begun to change resulting in new ways of governance with a new articulation between state-like forms, private market actors and civil society organisations (Brenner & Theodore, 2003). Local urban politics are increasingly
organised in partnership with an extended range of non-governmental actors holding relevant resources of their own. Such trends have described a shift from government to governance, where the involvement of the state becomes less hierarchical and more moderating and directing (Mayer, 1994; Jessop, 1995).

The new form of governance sets as an idealised model for the city where common goals are shared and conjoint action produces collective benefits (Les Gales, 1995). And where institutional arrangements give more power in policy-making, administration and implementation to private economic actors and to the civil society. Nevertheless, as this study shows, these forms of governance, even when promise openness, inclusion and empowerment of excluded or marginalised groups, tend to lead to greater autocratic governance and limited participation of those groups (Swyngedouw, 1996, 2005; Harvey, 2005). Particularly, when those arrangements are created under asymmetrical governance frameworks, for instance having the state and corporations operating strategically interconnected (Swyngedouw, 2005). And in policy implementation frameworks, such as in urban revitalisation and regeneration interventions, where ambiguity and unbalance are found in relation to actors and their economic and political power (Rhodes, 1997; Davies, 2002; Mullins & Rhodes, 2007). Since community partners have often fewer resources and power than state and private institutions (Van Bortel & Mullins, 2009).

Some studies highlight the necessity of interconnected systems of decision making to manage uncertainty, resolve problems, access expertise, and enable citizens engagement with dispersed power and resources, referring to them as governance networks (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). Others studies argue that there are tensions between such networks and democracy, seeing those governance networks as instruments used by dominant partners to strengthen and achieve their interest rather than as processes of agreement with other actors (Davies, 2002; Van Bortel & Mullins, 2009). This study illustrates that indeed new governance structures have led to undemocratic urban restructuring processes where mainly the state, housing associations and corporations, and development corporations obtain benefits. As Harvey (1989) states, those who have the power to command and produce space possess a vital instrumentality for the reproduction and enhancement of their own power.

In the case of New York City, the decentralisation of power and resources from upper to lower government levels that began in the 1970s in response to autocratic planning and urban renewal approaches promoted significant institutional and organisational changes at the city level. Federal as well as local endeavours, such as the City Model Program (federal) and the Community Planning Councils (local), aimed to promote widespread participation of public, private and community interests in a context of
urban decay and capital disinvestment. However, the policies of devolution of the mid 1970s began changing local institutional frameworks in a different direction. Centralised categorical programmes for housing and urban development gave way to block grants encouraging lower government levels to formulate their own policies and programmes. This shift promoted decentralisation of resources and responsibilities to states and local governments, thereby a decrease in federal involvement. In a context of economic urban renewal, local policies and regulatory institutional frameworks involved public instruments and corporate alliances to promote capital investments in central areas. The delegation of responsibilities regarding social services, affordable housing and community development were transferred to the third sector. The welfare of citizens was gradually put in hands of non-for-profit corporations with limited skills, resources and political power satisfying community needs and dealing with urban struggles produced by the increasing for-profit development of the city. By the 1990s non profit community organisations, which for the most part emerged out of the late 1960s and early 1970s urban mobilisations, gave way to the non-profit industrial complex, a body of non-for-profit private corporations, recipients and administrators of public money, managing the lives of millions of deprived citizens. Most recently, powerful public private partnerships involving global financial and real estate corporations are leading urban revitalisation in central as well as peripheral city areas. As it was illustrated above, local governments and public institutions have sponsored and promoted these partnerships by facilitating zoning changes, tax incentives and other public instruments as policy implementation frameworks. This has led to ambitious profit-driven urban revitalisation plans developed without comprehensive environmental assessments and social impact evaluations. Most importantly, as this study shows (Chapter 5), city plans and urban interventions have taken place without considering local needs, priorities and visions. The delegation of the provision of basic services, community facilities and affordable housing to non-profit corporations with narrow views and interests and limited resources and capacities, and most recently to for-profit corporations with none or limited interests in the well being of citizens, have left locals—residents, civic organisations, businesses, and other local stakeholders—out of any decision-making process.

In the Randstad Holland decentralisation of power and resources has been a highly planned process mostly initiated with the incursion of the Big Cities Policy in the early 1990s. This policy aimed redistributing policymaking powers and responsibilities to different public agencies to bring social, economic, physical and safety improvements in large cities. Structured around four priority pillars this policy promoted the coordination of a number of ministries and the combination of several subsidy schemes to improve declining neighbourhoods and to bring economic growth through city agreements (City Action Plans), neighbourhood covenants (Neighbourhood Action Plans), localised urban regeneration programmes and local social development
initiatives. The decentralisation of power to new institutions and the formation of new regulatory configurations are often considered as positive steps towards new forms of urban governance and more transparent relationships between the state and the civil society (Moulaert et al., 2002). However, as this study shows, the Big Cities Policy, despite intending the delegation of power to lower government levels through coordinated efforts, was not fully coordinated and the transfer of responsibilities was not only from national to a variety of other spatial scales but also from the public to the private sector (Uitermark, 2003). Municipalities, development corporations, and housing associations acquired a relevant role over urban restructuring processes through the creation of public-private partnerships during the time of this programme. As illustrated in this study, public-private partnerships were the ones developing and implementing city and neighbourhood plans, and therefore urban regeneration plans considering issues circulating in policy discourses, coming from above, and favouring their own interests. Therefore, the new regulatory policy frameworks and local governance structures were for the most part the ones framing the urban problems addressed in such plans. However, it is important to note, that cooperation between ministries and policy makers and urban managers and their local partners to implement national programmes was a challenge due to uncoordinated lines of communication and funds. Additionally, interdependencies in the new governance structures and actors with uneven powers prevailed. These conditions resulted in bureaucratic and hierarchical governance structures preventing the development of localised policy and neighbourhood-based plans addressing community priorities and visions. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the state was fully involved in plans and programmes taking place at the neighbourhood level. The integrated approach that was pursued as part of the Big City Policy’s urban restructuring policy to improve deprived neighbourhoods was framed and executed for the most part by housing associations and private development corporations with the assistance of local public agencies often without considering residents voices. As illustrated in this study (see Chapter 6), those involved in local urban governance of low-income neighbourhoods did not facilitated residents participation in urban regeneration plans. For the most part, the efforts were limited to assist low-income and minority groups through assistencialists programmes and other initiatives promoting safety and beautification of their own living environment. Like in New York City, civic associations and community organisations have been invited for the most part to contribute with limited advisory powers.
§ 7.8 Waning of housing for the urban poor and the working class

The full withdraw of national states and local governments from direct production and financing of affordable housing for the urban poor and the working class changed the paradigm of urban renewal in cities in the 1980s and 1990s, in America and Western Europe respectively, as full responsibility was transferred to non-for-profit housing development corporations and associations. Influenced by neoliberal economic trends and pushing for greater and more ambitious urban transformations, and in turn economic growth, housing policy eventually moved into a more-market-rate-housing less-affordable-housing approach using urban revitalisation and regeneration as its main instruments. Today, the new urban restructuring strategy, is pushing further this agenda decreasing not only the output of affordable housing but also instigating the loss of existing very-low, low- and moderate-income housing. As policies promote heterogeneous neighbourhoods (pushing social mixing) through the diversification of the housing stock and subsidised affordable housing production is increasingly transferred to for-profit housing corporations, the fate of the most vulnerable urban groups, and most recently also the middle class, is at the mercy of public-private partnerships having divergent interests. Housing has become the most coveted commodity in the 21st century in advanced societies even when it is human right.

In America, the provision of public housing was pursued during the Great Depression, in the late 1930s, responding to the fact that private housing developments had not made significant contributions to relieve the shortages of housing for those in the bottom and lower two-thirds of income in previous years. Consequently, in the late 1940s, this endeavour became a comprehensive federal programme providing public housing to the urban poor in former slum areas and supplying middle-income mortgages to white families encouraging them to move to the suburbs. In the following decade, urban renewal became officially a central part of the housing federal programme scaling up the clearance of slums and the production of public housing to house mostly communities of colour, African-American and Hispanic. Despite the outcomes of the urban renewal programme —racial segregation, concentration of poverty and disruption of communities— it was the only large scale endeavour fully funded by federal government giving roof to the growing urban poor during the War of Poverty in the mid 1960s. However, as federal government gradually attempted to stop financing directly low-income housing, tax breaks, low-cost mortgages, rent subsidies and other incentives were introduced starting in the late 1960s through different programmes to encourage the involvement of private developers and real estate interests in the development of low-income housing. Housing policy continued introducing programmes subsidising private development and moving
from supply-based to demand-based schemes (introducing vouchers) throughout the 1970s. During this period funds were decentralised through different urban programmes, mostly area-based ones, and distributed through a competitive basis to community and private partners. These programmes were the precursors of urban and housing policies promoting privatisation and decentralisation and, in turn, a new paradigm for the provision of housing for the urban poor and consequently new urban renewal strategies and partners. The production of public housing via urban renewal programmes continued to be financed by the federal government up until 1981. However, this does not mean that the involvement of the state in urban renewal and the provision of affordable housing came to an end, but certainly major changes took place affecting the production of low income housing and in turn the wellbeing of vulnerable urban communities.

The policies of devolution of the late 1970s gradually transferred responsibility and resources for the production of affordable housing to non-for-profit organisations and community partners. In New York City, as in many other large cities, the declining of low-income neighbourhoods due to lack of private and public investment and the urgency of housing for the urban poor generated a period of progressive housing programmes and organic revitalisation. Responding to the state withdrawal in direct housing financing and using the scarce available block grants, new forms of community-based entities began the task of stabilising and revitalising dozens of neighbourhoods in the 1980s. Slums clearing and new construction was replaced by an organic approach pushed by residents, civic groups and the newly local non-for-profit organisations. The acquisition and rehabilitation of thousands of vacant and neglected public properties became the target of the endeavours producing not only by affordable homeownership and rental opportunities (during this time thousands of units got rent controlled and stabilised) but also new collective and permanent affordable models of housing, such as limited equity cooperatives, across the city. However, as those community-based organisations grew and transformed into large housing development corporations and the housing market became stronger in such neighbourhoods, urban revitalisation moved to a more ambitious endeavour with the return of the state and the introduction of powerful partners (See Chapter 5).

Working class neighbourhoods that managed to erupt from the ashes of the 1970s and recovered during the 1980s continued developing throughout the 1990s with the production of affordable housing through more ambitious urban revitalisation programmes involving new strategies, public incentives coming from different government levels, and a wide range of powerful partners with diverse resources (see Chapter 5). Among the public incentives to the new partnerships were the facilitation of land acquisition and the transfer of public land for the production of affordable housing. However, as land and property values and taxes in these neighbourhoods
were not affordable anymore and continued rising, a more diversified production of housing was sought after. Large urban revitalisation projects began targeting better off households and reducing housing opportunities for very-low income and low-income households. Consequently, private housing developers, investors and speculators began turning their heads to these rapidly changing areas and taking advantage from public incentives but certainly not for the provision of affordable housing for the existing communities. Housing the urban poor and the working class has become a responsibility of private developers, sometimes global corporations, through deceptive programmes (e.i. Inclusionary Housing Program) while affordable housing losses its protections, and privatise and public housing falls apart without funds from maintenance.

The new urban restructuring strategy was well structured by the onset of the 21st century. In New York City, as each of the trends outlined in this chapter were in motion, this strategy began showing its own contradictions by the end of the 2010s. In terms of housing, this period was epitomised by an unprecedented rise in market rate housing development in low-income and working class neighbourhoods and in turn a decline of affordable housing in these areas. The shift of urban revitalisation from central to peripheral and post-industrial areas promoting larger and more ambitious profit-driven housing developments in search of the highest returns have resulted in a tragic predicament for locals. Gentrification has plagued the last corner of affordable districts, the middle and the working class are increasingly and permanently rent burdened, low-income households are doubled up, and very low-income families and individuals are evicted and uprooted from their neighbourhoods.

In the Netherlands, comprehensive large scale housing programmes sponsored fully by the state took place in post-war years responding to the urgency of reconstructing torn-war cites, tackling the housing shortage, and creating infrastructure for the expansion of cities. Due to the lack of private housing construction most new housing was developed with public aid, direct government subsidies, up to the 1950s. And in the following decade, the private sector contribution was marginal. No more than 35 per cent of housing output (Harloe, 1995). Government control in the production and allocation of social housing was facilitated by large-scale municipal land ownership, particularly in the largest cities (Harloe, 1995). Up to the 1950s local authorities accounted for the largest share of social rented output, but from the early 1960s housing associations became the major builders of social housing and their dominance rapidly increased (Harloe, 1995). Housing associations became responsible for about 85% of output, with public subsidies and loans, by the early 1970s (Harloe, 1995). The orientation of urban development started changing to improve the existing housing stock, which had deteriorated by the rigid rent regulation that was enforced in inner cities during and after the war years. Mostly pre-war urban districts with large
share of commercial rental housing were the target of the first official urban renewal programmes (see Chapter 4). These efforts were largely sponsored and controlled by the State, and demolition was seen as the only remedy in most cases. However, and although massive demolition persisted rising citizen discontent and massive protests, the main approach of urban renewal shifted from redevelopment to rehabilitation by the late 1970s (Stouten, 2010). Responding to the undemocratic urban renewal plans, an ambitious and publicly sponsored programme with the motto Building for the Neighbourhood was set in motion in 1974 (and lasted until 1994!). This progressive programme called for the socialisation and democratisation of housing by shifting commercial to social rental housing through the cooperation of public agencies, advocacy planners, tenants and housing associations. Unlike the American urban renewal programmes, this initiative provided adequate social housing for low- and middle-income households considering their needs and preventing displacement and the uprooting of vulnerable communities living in working class neighborhoods. During the 1980s urban renewal as well as housing supply and allocation continued to be strictly regulated by the state. Affordable housing was guaranteed no only through social housing but also through strict rent and quality regulations using a pragmatic point system, a measure that is still in use today keeping housing affordable. By the late 1980s state sponsored social housing had reached an unprecedented rate of the rental housing stock thorough the urban renewal programme, which was ultimately criticised for its narrow scope (social housing) and the high cost of renewal and relocation processes.

Consequently, and responding to the heavy pressure on public budget, the sponsorship and leadership of urban renewal changed as state involvement in financing low-income housing took important steps. For instance, measures were taken to make financially independent the social-rental sector. Public subsidies shifted from open-ended to fixed ones, and state loans were not provided anymore. To guarantee the private loans housing associations needed the national umbrella of housing associations set up the Social Housing Guarantee Fund in 1983. Since then housing associations borrow on the capital market for housing improvements and from 1988 onwards for new constructions. This structure aimed to mitigate financial risks for the sector in a collective way since the national government was detracting from this responsibility (Ouwehand & van Daalen, 2002).

Influenced by the United Kingdom and American’s trends on housing privatisation, deregulation and decentralisation Dutch legislation began moving towards this direction during the 1990s. Public expenses and subsidies were oriented towards homeownership while urban renewal programmes shifted to large-scale urban improvements on strategic inner city locations to transform old and industrial areas into new vibrant urban districts. Thus, while some areas revitalised with concentrated
public and private investment, others declined further without such attention and resources (see van Kempen et al., 1992). Households evicted or priced out from urban renewal areas began concentrating in inner city districts, where private rental housing was cheap but in bad condition, as well as in post-war housing estates managed by housing associations. Despite the fact that residualisation of social housing was much less evident in the Netherlands than in other West European countries and America, stratification in the Dutch social housing sector began to be visible by the late 1980s (Harloe, 1995). Whereas urban renewal and housing programmes up to the mid-1980s focused mostly on improving the living conditions of working class Dutch natives, which were economically and politically important, the ones developed after this time increasingly focused on housing low-income households, vulnerable groups and immigrants (Harloe, 1995).

A year after the inception of the European Union and influenced by its lineaments, the Big Cities Policy was enacted with three interconnected pillars: social, economic, and physical. Soon after, in 1997, the New Urban Regeneration Policy replaced the current Urban Renewal policy as part of the physical pillar. A number of public subsidies and funds were consolidated and became available for municipalities through multilayer plans and contracts designated for physical intervention in specific target areas. Moreover, as it was outlined above, in a number of urban districts with high concentration of ethnic minorities, low-income groups and unemployed a ‘social mixing’ policy was enforced. Under the premise that differentiation of the housing stock would preserve upwardly mobile individuals and attract middle and higher income groups, the creation of mixed-neighbourhoods was one of the main agendas of the New Urban Regeneration Policy. As this study shows (Chapter 6), the diversification of the housing stock by increasing homeownership was increasingly promoted in urban regeneration interventions to push up the quality and value of the housing stock in and around the targeted areas as well as to improve the social climate to increase the attractiveness or ‘liveability’ of disadvantaged areas (Kruythoff, 2003; Priemus, 2004). Housing associations traditionally in charge of the provision and maintenance of social housing have diversified their activities to survive by focusing on more profitable real estate investments, such as private rental housing, homeownership, and commercial developments. Thanks to the highly regulated housing market Dutch cities still have affordable housing opportunities and homelessness has not represented a pressing issue yet, like in other West European countries and America. However, housing policy is ingrained in the urban regeneration trends and is increasingly prompting the decline of social housing and the deconcentration of low-income and minority groups, putting these groups in a vulnerable position.
Citizens participation as state instrument for the pacification, control and bargaining of low-income neighbourhoods in transformation

For over five decades national governments have tended promoting residents’ ‘integration’ and ‘participation’ in urban restructuring programmes. In some cases it has become a sort of urban obsession (Lefebvre, 2009). Certainly, the activation and involvement of the non-integrated and non-participant citizens has been constantly present in policy discourses, public initiatives, and even as requirement of public subsidies sponsoring urban revitalisation and regeneration interventions in low income neighbourhoods (see Chapter 3, 4, 5 and 6). As it was outlined in this study, progressive urban and housing policies managed to facilitate democratic urban renewal and neighbourhood stabilisation initiatives in the past, particularly in instances when the private sector was not able or willing to partner with the state (due to extreme urban decay, recessions, etc). However, today, in a context of increasing decentralisation, privatisation and deregulation of urban restructuring process, the promotion of citizen participation seem to represent a concealed paradox. As this study (see Chapter 5 and 6) and other studies show (Uitermark, 2014), citizens have been concurrently devised as objects and subjects of governance. The analysis of the case studies (see Chapter 5 and 6) bring to light the way citizen participation has been, in many instances, a state instrument for the ‘pacification’, ‘control’, and ‘bargaining’ of low-income neighbourhoods which are undergoing socio-spatial restructuring. Additionally, it corroborates similar findings and claims brought about in similar studies (Albers & van Beckhoven, 2010; Brenner, Peck, & Theodor 2009; Harvey 1989; Schickel & van der Berg, 2011; Peck & Tickle, 2002; Uitermark, 2014; Uitermark & Duyendak, 2008).

The ‘pacification of space’ has been carried out through socially interventionist public policies and programmes (mostly addressing housing, social services, community development, etc) to ameliorate the impact the neoliberal project has brought about. As it was illustrated in Chapter 2, national states that have unleashed market forces have tended to promote neighbourhood and community development programmes in disadvantaged and disinvested areas, often with weak market positions, to absorb the shocks that will rise from competitive and unregulated market forces (Uitermark, 2014). Whereas development assistance of vulnerable urban citizens have been promoted and provided through initiatives formulated and implemented by non-for-profit housing development corporations and community-based organisations with a hands-off state approach in New York City, socially interventionist public programmes have been carefully devised by the coordinated efforts of numerous public agencies from different government levels and implemented mostly by the state’s local social partners (housing associations and public agencies) in the Randstad Holland. What is interesting is that in both geographical areas those facilitating such local programmes
have taken a paternalistic and assistencialist approach (in the NL mostly from the 1990s). Citizens have been treated as passive recipients of aid (objects) rather than active participants (subjects) of decision making processes leading to transformative changes of their own communities and neighbourhoods.

The ‘control of space’ has been devised when socio-spatial restructuring is promoted by the state to oversee and discipline vulnerable and deprived groups that are victims of the byproducts of the current urban neoliberal agendas (e.g. poverty, urban decline, crime and segregation) and which represent a threat and/or a burden to the local government (Uitermark et al., 2007). Neighbourhoods targeted for urban revitalisation and regeneration have become, in many instances, spaces for experimentation of new models of planning and social innovation as well as advanced schemes of repression and surveillance (Moulaert et al., 2002; Schinkel & Van der Berg, 2011). In New York City as well as in the Randstad Holland, new housing markets, public facilities, local economies and urban infrastructures have been deliberately planned to achieve specific goals in areas targeted for development as well as to attract and serve particular urban groups to harmonise and civilise existing residents (Uitermark et al., 2007; Smith, 2002). In New York City, the unregulated and profit-driven real estate industry and housing market have been in charge of overtaking low-income and segregated neighbourhoods and turning them into new spaces following their own rationality in recent years. Public programmes have not pursued neither residents’ participation nor integration. The coherence gained in those spaces to advance development (and profit) was achieved at the expenses of the existing communities in many cases, as it was described in Chapter 5, with the assistance of the state. In the Randstad Holland, as it was illustrated in Chapter 6, neighbourhood-based programmes were envisioned to achieve a certain coherence and control in ‘priority areas’ while urban regeneration programmes took place. Housing associations acted as foster parents adopting areas that are facing entangled urban and social problems to implement urban and social programmes promoted at the national level. Policy makers felt that residents in hard-to-manage neighbourhoods lack the competence or will to contribute to and participate in public agendas, including urban restructuring plans. Therefore, social renewal programmes to educate, discipline, and supervising residents were enforced as well social composition changes (social mixing) through urban regeneration interventions. What is interesting is that with or without neighbourhood programmes social control was achieved through urban restructuring interventions.

The ‘bargaining of space’ has been pursued in the newly urban governance structures to achieve new spatial and political configurations serving and advancing the neoliberal agenda ingrained in the new urban restructuring strategy. Public officials are increasingly coordinating actions with powerful partners and higher government levels, while working concurrently and strategically with community organisations,
non-profit housing corporations, civic associations and residents. Agreements settling what each group shall give and take—benefits versus impacts—are increasingly used in urban revitalisation and regeneration interventions in New York City and the Randstad Holland, respectively. As Harvey (1989) states, politicians and urban managers tend to enact practices of ‘coalition politics’ in the search of building ruling class alliances with similar interests while seeing themselves as symbols of the community to legitimise their powers (see Chapter 2). Local officials and urban administrators, as he notes, usually speak in the ‘public interest’ and strategically find ways to assert control or mass support to fulfill ongoing plans while taming any opposition (from the civil society). In New York City, as this study shows, public officials are progressively acting as facilitators of large urban revitalisation projects taking place in disinvested and low-income neighbourhoods by mediating between interests of investors and developers on one hand, and non-for-profit organisations, community leaders and residents on the other. In most of the cases, those with more power and resources get most of the benefits while those with less barely get what they were promised. In fact, as this study shows (see Chapter 5), local settlements that in theory tend to consider the voices and interests of locals, such as Community Benefit Agreements, tend to be opaque and even illegitimate. The few instruments communities have to lead the fate of their own living environments are limited to advisory powers. In the case of the Randstad Holland, local covenants also became popular to implement urban regeneration plans. However these agreements tend to be more official and overreaching. Local covenants, which translated in city and neighbourhood action plans, were devised to implement social and physical renewal programmes coming from upper government levels in the so-called ‘priority districts’. Unlike the American case, coordination and negotiations take place across public agencies and local governance actors, including housing associations and other local partners. However, in most instances just like in America, civic associations and residents voices are barely heard even though covenants and local actions plans officially require civic participation. Just like in America, active participation was promoted, for the most part, as a bargaining tool.

§ 7.10 Conclusion

The urban restructuring trends identified in this section provide a clear view of the way inner city areas with concentrations of deprived citizens—mostly low-income, disfranchised and minority urban groups—continue to be the target of urban policies, plans, and programmes at different government levels. These urban habitats, just like in previous urban renewal periods, continue to be projected for new waves of
investment and economic growth as central areas become not profitable. However, the benefits are not precisely catered towards the residents of such areas. Low-income working class neighbourhoods are increasingly being put in a map for competitive investment. As it was outlined above, a sort of reversed redlining or ‘greenlining’ has been pushed delineating disinvested, segregated and outermost areas bringing shifts in local economies and services while disrupting traditional social infrastructures and the livelihoods of the local communities (way more in Brooklyn than in Rotterdam). Additionally, in an attempt to eradicate ongoing urban issues (e.i. poverty, segregation, etc), area-based approaches promoting urban revitalisation and regeneration have been put at the centre of urban agendas aiming to change the physical condition of such areas with localised urban plans and policies, in many cases promoting citizen involvement. However, these approaches have been projected side-by-side with mixed income developments and ‘social mixing’ policies formulated and implemented by national states with conflicting agendas. These types of restructuring strategies have spurred in many cases a state-led gentrification and, contrary to promoting neighbourhood-based development, tended to displace urban issues and unwanted urban groups while furthering uneven development and segregation in other city areas.

It is important to note that these urban restructuring trends have manifested differently in New York City and the Randstad Holland because of the different policy contexts. Some of the differences identified are the following. First, urban restructuring has been used as an instrument for speculation, competitiveness and economic growth without planning neither regulation in New York City. Above all, urban and housing development has been provoked by the state in low-income districts without providing welfare or social programs to ameliorate the impact inflicted on those with less economic and political power. The lack of regulation and social programmes have left vulnerable families and individuals living in substandard conditions (e.i. basements, apartments illegally subdivided, etc) and even in the streets (the homeless population has increased in the last decade). On the other hand, in the Randstad Holland urban restructuring has been highly planned and regulated by the state (e.g. Big Cities Policy). Thus speculation, competitiveness and economic growth has been in some way promoted but by coordinated efforts of public agencies following highly planned strategies (e.g. city, district and neighbourhood plans) to bring about change in ‘priority areas’ and cities in general. Most importantly, as policy tends to decentralize and slowly deregulate urban and housing development, the state continues enforcing tenants rights and instruments to regulate the housing market while providing social programs to ameliorate any impact coming from market forces.

Second, the outward diffusion of urban restructuring from central to peripheral areas, which has been promoted mostly through area-based policies, programmes and investments in low-income and minority communities, has been seen in both
geographical areas but the scale and leadership have differed. In New York City, the state has joined forces with powerful partners to transform disinvested districts. Land rezonings and housing programs providing incentives to developers and investors have been the main instruments used by the state to transform these districts. The scale of the transformations has been in many cases unprecedented considering the indirect effects of urban revitalisation including the activation of the housing market; attraction of local, national and global investors; changes in the function and meaning of districts; gentrification and displacement of long term residents, etc. Opened up to global market forces, former working class and post-industrial districts have been, in many cases, taken over by global corporations (as it is the case of the west end of Bushiwick). On the other hand, in the Randstad Holland, the state has deliberately defined where, how and when development should take place in low-income and segregated districts and worked in a coordinated way with social entities and private developers. Because of the nature of the partners and the regulation of the housing market, urban regeneration interventions have for the most part transformed districts without spurring further development or speculation in adjacent areas. Rehabilitated housing units usually end up being owned and managed by local housing associations rather than by for-profit housing corporations. Thus, even when local plans and programmes aim to improve housing conditions, attract investment and increase housing values in impoverished districts (like Tarwewijk), urban regeneration continue providing housing opportunities for existing residents. Certainly, the degree of exposure to market forces, promoted or limited by policies — particularly those directing the (de)regulation of the housing market — and the leadership of urban revitalisation and regeneration mark significant differences in both geographical areas.

Third, differences can be traced between the reasoning behind mixed-income housing developments and 'social mixing' in New York City and the Randstad Holland, respectively. As mentioned in this chapter, both have been promoted leading to a sort of state-led gentrification by prioritizing market rate housing over public and subsidized housing. This trend has put at risk housing for low- and moderate-income communities in both regions. However, different racial and economic drivers can be seen in both areas of study. In New York City mixed-income housing has been sponsored through specific housing programs (e.g. Inclusionary Housing and Mixed-Income Programs) to revitalise city areas, activate the housing market and transfer the responsibility of providing affordable housing to private developers. On the other hand, in the Netherlands 'social mixing' has been promoted in specific districts to differentiate the housing stock, change the social composition and mitigate social segregation in specific city areas. Replacing social housing by homeownership opportunities has been the main strategy. In both cases housing has been at the centre. However, the main difference is that economic rather than social mixing has been mostly the aim of New York City's policies and programmes while social rather
economic mixing has been promoted in the Randstad Holland. As previous chapters illustrate, social segregation hasn't been openly addressed in urban revitalisation plans transforming districts in New York City but it has certainly been voiced in policy circles and action plans involving urban regeneration in the Randstad Holland.

Lastly, citizen participation, as asserted in this chapter, has been mostly promoted for the pacification, control and bargaining of low-income neighbourhoods in both geographical areas. Certainly, paternalistic local initiatives promoting participation and integration led by community-based organizations and housing corporations have emerged sponsored by the state to mitigate the outcomes of economic and urban restructuring in both areas of study. The main difference is that while such initiatives are usually disconnected from public agencies and urban revitalisation plans in New York City, they work in coordination with numerous public agencies and local city, district and neighbourhood action plans in the Randstad Holland. This difference has lead to two divergent outcomes. In New York City, residents of targeted areas for development depend on how informed, prepared, resourceful and politically connected their local community-based organizations are to endure unregulated urban restructuring. With limited resources, knowledge and power in decision-making and without any support from public agencies the fate of vulnerables residents can be clear. On the other hand, in the Randstad Holland, residents of designated areas for urban regeneration are considered by public agencies and local housing associations. This does not mean that they do participate in decision-making processes since socio-spatial transformations are usually promoted and implemented by highly planned action plans involving different government levels. However, public officials and housing associations usually assist, through public agencies and local programmes, existing residents and work with local organizations and individuals if relocation is needed.

Another difference related to the previous point is the degree of control the state has over urban restructuring and its outcomes. In New York City, entrepreneurial urban and housing policies have drawn the state to take a hands-off approach for the provision and management of housing—from luxury condos to low-income housing. Thus after giving incentives and green light to developers and investors the state has limited control over the fate of the areas in transformation. Also, since programmes and instruments promoting participation and integration of long term residents and local stakeholders are non-existent in private developments, once an area draws attention to non-local market forces residents have no voice neither power (these facts are illustrated in the case of Bushwick). In short, the state can hardly have control on who is included and excluded from the benefits of such transformations and most importantly, if those benefits will serve future generations (e.g. keeping housing affordable). In most of the cases the benefits are disproportionate (e.g. developers/newcomers vs. locals nonprofits/existing residents). Contrastingly, in the Randstad
Holland, policies promoting urban regeneration have been envisioned in coordination with numerous government agencies at different levels and private partners bringing about highly engineered instruments and programmes to stimulate urban and social improvement. City planners, officials, developers and leaders of local housing associations carefully calculate urban regeneration interventions and define who stays, leaves and settle in a district, and most importantly who owns and manages the housing stock. Despite, this has lead to highly autocratic interventions with little room for residents and stakeholders to participate in decision-making processes, the state is able to oversee how public investment and efforts are employed for the benefit of this and future generations.

Lastly, there are sharp differences in regard to local responses. Urban revitalisation and regeneration programmes and plans have taken place facilitated by the state and approved, in one way or another, by local stakeholders through negotiations and convenants. In the case of Bushwick, since most channels of participation are advisory and agreements between city officials and their powerful partners usually take place under the table, opposition from community members and leaders of local community organisations has been present and persistent. In the case of Tarwewijk objections have been reduced if not eliminated by the rigid and highly regulated Dutch institutional and policy frameworks. However, it is important to note that even when city, district and neighbourhood action plans seem to follow democratic and integrated approaches they haven't been fully opened to the public and local stakeholders neither defined in full concensus.
Cities for or against citizens?
8 Alternatives to the new urban restructuring strategy: Reflections

§ 8.1 Introduction

The research and the trends outlined in the previous sections bring to light the fate of low-income communities and neighbourhoods. Clearly, the right to the city has become one of the most coveted but unattainable people's rights as capitalism expands across cities and nations seeking economic growth through development with creative financial tools at the expenses of not only the most vulnerable groups but increasingly, the working class. Fortunately, and despite the challenges, citizens continue fighting for this right across neighbourhoods, towns, cities and large metropolises. Alternative ways of producing cities that call for social and spatial justice continue to be envisioned and developed. Driven by the struggles and challenges communities and individuals face as cities become territories for global capital accumulation, and as governments withdraw from social responsibilities and the welfare of people is handed to private corporations. However, the process involved in these efforts has become a thousand times more arduous, exhausting and confronting.

Community-based and resident-led transformations in cities have been recognised as paramount to fight against inequality, poverty, crime and segregation. As this study shows, historically progressive policies have promoted and, in many cases managed to create, democratic tools and processes of planning and development, particularly in times of crisis and when the private sector had no interest or resources to intervene (see Chapter 3 and 4). Such policies and their outcomes have proven, even with their shortcomings, that cities for citizens can be produced with the fair distribution of political power, resources and benefits. However, as national states turn their backs on citizens by dispossessing them of any power, resources and benefits, they may have had left and opened their arms to capitalist interests by providing unconditional power and support; governments are increasingly turning against citizens.

How can cities for citizens be created? Interestingly, as noted in Chapter 2, this has been a recurrent question asked by academics, grassroots groups, community leaders, non-profit organisations and many public officials who had advocated for social and
spatial justice in the last decades. As illustrated in this study, numerous collective visions, community-plans and neighbourhood-based initiatives have been proposed and aimed for. In New York City, these efforts involve the preservation of low-income housing, including public housing, rent regulated units and limited equity housing cooperatives, as well as the creation of Mutual Housing Associations and Community Land Trusts. In this city, as it was illustrated in this study, the creation of alternative models of planning, management and ownership has been in most of the cases supported and financed by public programmes that were created responding to the pressure coming from communities, activists, and elected officials advocating for just cities. Despite the struggles many victories are seen up to today. Certainly, the current development trends outlined in the previous chapter have driven advocates of these approaches to diligently and fiercely work towards legislation and community programmes involving educational initiatives sharing knowledge and skills to protect their homes and communities.

In the Randstad Holland, the housing system has been engineered, for the most part, to benefit those who live in housing rather than those who exploit housing for profit. The large share of social housing and the enforcement of tenants rights in this country has allowed residents to live in their homes some times even in perpetuity. Progressive tenant-led initiatives ingrained in the urban renewal programme democratised housing (turning it from private to social) at unprecedented rates in large cities. They prioritised residents’ needs and priorities rather than the needs and priorities of experts and bureaucrats. At large, housing has been seen as a human right but unfortunately this perception is changing. The recent infiltration of neoliberal agendas in housing provision and management as well as in urban restructuring approaches have represented a threat to the welfare of citizens. This study illustrated that tenants rights and permanent affordable housing opportunities, particularly for low-income and immigrant populations, are at risk. The undesirable but predictable outcomes of neoliberal housing and urban development, economic and social polarisation, have pushed the state to enforce numerous urban and social policies, programmes and initiatives at the neighbourhood level which have certainly improved the local physical conditions, although often at the expenses of the most vulnerable groups. These public efforts have mostly cast citizens as recipients of aid rather than active agents of change. Thus, considering the valuable housing and planning legacy of this country, a call for alternative initiatives is crucial.

I would like to conclude this study by reflecting on alternatives forms and models of housing development which have been devised, for the most part, by people responding to the urgency of both creating housing according to their own needs and priorities and producing less alienated dwelling environments. Many of these models, as this study shows, were created in periods of economic and social challenges in both
geographical areas. Interestingly, as with the policy and planning approaches presented in this study, the principles and purpose of these models converge in many ways in both countries but manifest differently due to the differences in institutional policy and government frameworks in each geographical area. These schemes were presented throughout this study but they require special attention since they offer a valuable insight on alternative ways of restructuring low-income neighbourhoods, and urban districts in general, to produce more equitable cities, in other words: cities for citizens.

§ 8.2 Housing cooperatives, mutual housing associations and community land trusts as an alternative to gain control over land and community livelihoods

If we wish to create equitable neighbourhoods, it is compulsory to learn from New York City’s valuable legacy of self-help housing and other emancipatory forms of dwelling. Some of these forms of housing have been addressed in this study. This research mostly examines many of the programmes and planning approaches, which fomented the mobilisation and organisational efforts, either by responding to or by following them, to create a different housing paradigm. As this study shows, politicised mobilisations coming from the grassroots often turned protests into programmes. After all these years of work, I truly believe it is critical to learn from the struggles and achievements of past urban movements led by working-class and immigrant communities to survive today’s urban crisis. The context is certainly different but the struggles are quite similar. Thus, I would encourage urbanists, planners, academics and activist to examine further the instances below. Undoubtedly, the self-management housing and cooperative movements offer us an array of possibilities that are already being taken and re-envisioned, as I conclude this thesis, for the creation of socially and economically just cities.

A hundred years ago, as a product of labor movements and the ‘radical culture that grew up within New York City’s working-class immigrant neighborhoods’ (Madden and Marcuse, 2016, p. 115), the first non-profit self-managed housing cooperative in the United States was created in Brooklyn’s Sunset Park neighbourhood. The Finnish Home Building Association created it in 1916. Soon after, there were 25 housing co-ops throughout the neighbourhood established by Finnish immigrants and in the coming years, hundreds of buildings were created following the principles of cooperative housing across Brooklyn and New York City. Labour unions and cooperative
associations built or sponsored about 40,000 housing units between the 1920s and 1970s (Madden and Marcuse, 2016).

Half a century after the creation of the first housing co-ops in the city, in the mid-1950s, another type of housing cooperative, rentals and collectively owned, was sponsored under a large housing programme by the New York State. Responding to the inability of the private sector to build housing for low-moderate and middle-income populations, the Mitchell-Lama Program supported the creation of 105,000 affordable units citywide from 1955 to 1978, 18,000 of which were located in Brooklyn. It provided financial assistance to developers in the form of land, low cost mortgages, and tax abatements to build affordable housing and cooperative buildings. This programme is recognised as one of the largest and most successful public housing programme in the United States.

During the peak of the Urban Renewal Program, many groups rose up to fight against massive displacements and demolitions and envisioned alternative ways of development. In New York City, one of the most well known efforts is that of Cooper Square. In 1959, the Cooper Square Committee (CSC) was formed to oppose the City of New York’s Slum Clearance Plan. By building coalitions, holding demonstrations and speaking out at public hearings against Robert Moses Urban Renewal Plan, the committee built power by creating an Alternative Plan for the Cooper Square Urban Renewal Area. This area was composed of six-blocks between East 5th Street and Stanton Street and between the Bowery and 2nd Avenue in Manhattan. The plan, which was officially adopted by the City of New York in 1970, achieved the preservation of over 300 buildings in the area prevented the displacement of thousands of residents. A Revised Plan was drafted in 1989 proposing the renovation of city-owned tenement buildings in the area, the preservation of affordable housing and new construction of mixed income housing. Home ownership opportunities were in turn pursued through the creation of limited-equity cooperatives or what is now by state law as Housing Development Fund Corporations (HDFCs). In 1991 the Cooper Square Mutual Housing Association was incorporated as a Housing Development Fund Corporation (HDCF) and the Cooper Square Community Land Trust (CLT) was established. This CLT was the first in the city and as in most CLTs, it has since offered a different tenure and governance structure. The ownership of the property and the ownership of the land are separated. Since then the MHA has managed 356 low-income units in 22 buildings previously owned by the city on the CLT land (it took a long time for the State to officially approve this model). In recent years the Cooper Square Committee has been busy developing new mixed apartments, most of them low-income units (about 61%), and opening up community, cultural and recreational spaces, often by the acquisition of public land. The Cooper Square Urban Renewal Area was for the most part completed in 2008, almost 50 years after its initial plan (for more information see Weinberg, 2009 and Angotti, 2007).
Throughout the most difficult time of New York City, when the city was at the brink of bankruptcy and housing decay and abandonment plagued many declining working class neighbourhoods, collective efforts took place across the city to save old vacant and occupied derelict properties that had been recently acquired by the city (foreclosed). As illustrated in this study (see Chapter 3 and 5), a number of tenant-led public programmes rooted in the squatter movement — such as the Urban Homesteading, Sweat Equity, Community Management and Tenant Interim Lease Program— rehabilitated entire multi-family buildings and turned them into limited-equity housing cooperatives. Cooperative buildings were legally incorporated as Housing Development Fund Corporations (HDFCs) with sale restrictions to guarantee affordable housing opportunities for low-income populations in perpetuity. Since then housing co-ops have stabilised dozens of neighbourhoods across the city and today most of them continue to be run by the shareholders that created them.

The Urban Homesteading Assistance Board (UHAB), a non-profit organisation I have collaborated with during the last few years, has been a strong advocate for community control over neighbourhoods through share ownership and self-management housing. This organisation, which is rooted in homesteading movement of the 1970s, has assisted in the creation and preservation of over 30,000 units by organising and training tenants to run HDFCs across the city. In recent years, HDFCs have served as defense zones to keep affordable housing in neighbourhoods currently gentrifying. In this context, UHAB continues developing new housing schemes providing long-term affordability and searching for new avenues of public assistance and new training and education programmes for co-op shareholders across the city.

In Bushwick, about 40 limited-equity cooperatives were established through the tenant-led programmes during the 1970s and 1980s and efforts continue today. One of the UHAB’s ongoing projects is the creation of a Community of Housing Cooperatives composed of 17 buildings. Tenants living in these buildings managed to take the properties from the hands of an abusive landlord and organised, with the assistance of Ridgewood Bushwick Senior Citizen Council (RBSCC), a local non-profit (see Chapter 5) and UHAB to rehabilitate and run the buildings. RBSCC and UHAB are working towards the creation of a community land trust (CLT) to preserve the affordability on this community of housing cooperatives in perpetuity. This project, along with many other grassroots and community-led initiatives in the city, is pushing for community control to guarantee permanent affordable housing and prevent gentrification.

Another grassroots effort advocating for shared ownership and permanent affordable housing is the one currently undertaken by the New York City Community Land Initiative (NYCCLI). This alliance of social justice and affordable housing organisations and academics has committed to win housing for all New Yorkers with meaningful
actions including new legislation proposals for the creation and support of community land trusts across the city. Community land trusts assists communities to access land and to maintain security of tenure. In this model, land is held in trust by a non-for-profit corporation (could be also by a government agency) on behalf of a community. A board composed of community-based organisations, local stakeholders, residents and even public officials often govern this entity. Affordable rental units, housing cooperatives, privately owned housing and even commercial and working spaces could be developed in the land. CLTs offer affordable long-term leases to tenants with certain restrictions to guarantee permanent affordability. NYCCLI leaders along with other CLT advocates recently urged the Department of Housing, Preservation and Development (HPD) to release a Request for Expression of Interest (RFEI) for groups working towards the creation of CLTs using public land. De Blasio’s administration gave groups the opportunity to submit proposals for the development and management of CLTs (Savitch-Lew, 2017). This action led to the selection of three organisations — Interboro CLT, Cooper Square CLT and EastHarlem/El Barrio CLT— working towards the creation and expansion of CLTs seeking the provision of affordable housing and neighbourhood revitalisation in New York City to be sponsored by a partnership between HPD and Enterprise Community Partners. A total of US$1.6 million will be granted to these three groups and to the NYCCLI, who will administer a CLT Learning Exchange, through the Enterprises’s new Community Land Trusts Capacity Building Initiative. What is quite interesting is that funding for these projects comes from settlements with large financial institutions negotiated by New York State Attorney ‘to address the bank’s misconduct that contributed to the current housing crisis’ (Enterprise 2017). This tells us a lot about the ‘pacification’, ‘control’, and ‘bargaining’ of spaces taking place in low-income neighbourhoods (see below).

Interestingly, most of the CLT organising efforts have been in neighbourhoods threaten by rezoning processes and profit orientated development. In Bushwick, as illustrated in Chapter 5, the model of shared ownership offered by CLTs was also conceived for the land granted by developers to non profit organisations as part of the negotiations of the Rheingold Rezoning Plan for the provision of permanent affordable housing. However, even when the community put pressure on the new owners —two local non-profits—to share ownership of the land and decision making on what would be erected on that land, they were not willing to grant any power and control to community members. After three years, the land continues to be vacant without serving the community. This shows the intricate relationships taking place at the local level, which often represent a challenge to alternative ways of organising, planning and development.

This is an extremely short outline of community-led efforts gaining control over land, homes and community lives. What is important to note is that there are paths to have citizens in control of the fate of their neighbourhoods and cities as well as housing...
schemes offering de-commodified housing beyond public housing and rent controls, which lamentably offer little room to tenants to get involved in the management and control of their dwellings. Luckily, and without doubt, there are more ownership options available. Limited equity and shared ownership schemes are the most secure and promising, such as co-housing, mutual housing associations, non-equity and limited-equity housing cooperatives as well as community land trusts. However, we should not be limited to these models. There is an urgent need to envision and provide other hybrid forms of ownership (see Rendón and Robles-Durán, 2017). Undoubtedly, it is critical to scrutinise existing models since most of these efforts have involved long term collective struggles and commotions and, as in any other urban process and transformation, entangled interests, politics, and conflicts are at play even between local residents, grassroots groups, and community organisations pushing for change. The struggle to access and control land is not limited to public and private land. Conflicts between non-profit groups have also put barriers to alternative ways of development.

§ 8.3 Distributing power from housing associations to owners associations, housing cooperatives and other alternative forms of housing providing democratic participation in the transformation of neighbourhoods

The Netherlands is widely know for its efforts of both building up such a large amount of social housing for low-moderate and middle-income populations and preserving (through planning and policy) 19th and 20th century buildings and neighbourhoods in such pristine condition. The long-term partnership between the state and housing associations has played an important role, as well as all those progressive urban and housing programmes, which have created, transformed, and reinvented urban neighbourhoods again and again. This study is mostly about the evolution of those programmes yet at the end of this study, I believe it is also critical to reflect on the social housing legacy of this country. Particularly on the roots and the future of housing associations considering the most recent changes in urban and housing policy as well as global agents influencing such processes. Also, I would argue, it is crucial to delve into other forms of dwellings promoting more emancipatory forms of housing. Share ownership and self-management housing do exist in this country but due to the fact that housing associations have mostly provided adequate housing for a large segment of the population, these models are scarce yet interesting to scrutinise.
In the Netherlands, housing associations are rooted in both philanthropic endeavours and workers movements. Born in 1852, the Association for the Working Class or Vereeniging ten Behoeve der Arbeidende Klasse (VAK) was the predecessor of municipal and private housing associations. It is important to note that, although established responding to workers unrest due to the poor living conditions of the time and aiming to provide workers and their families with adequate and healthy housing, this association was never led or managed by workers or common citizens. It was envisioned, created and controlled by merchants and industrialists aware of the relationship between living environment and health, and the connection of these two with morality, productivity and economic growth. Concepts of cleanliness, sinlessness, homeliness and morality were central to the model (Bekkers, 2012). For instance, the housing units were designed to educate the workers to live in good living standards by promoting separate dwellings and preventing common working and dining spaces. The first VAK project was built in Amsterdam and represented the first example of philanthropic housing. Other projects followed providing about 780 homes in the city before the turn of the century.

The Housing Act of 1901 promoted the second generation of housing for workers. By enabling new private entities to build housing with state aid, this act promoted the establishment of a large number of housing associations in Amsterdam and beyond. Interestingly, the city leased out large parts of public land to these associations for about 75 years. This practice of holding land in trust for social good has been part of the state’s instrument to control and regulate development since then. Most interestingly, a couple of decades after the VAK was established but many decades before the first housing cooperatives in America were born, Dutch workers started self-organising and forming their own cooperative housing associations. One of the most well known and perhaps the first, was the Construction Company for the Establishment of Privately Owned Homes or Bouwmaatschappij ter Verkrijging van Eigen Woningen (BVEW), which was established in 1868 by workers and clerks following the workers movement. Its goal was providing tenants individual home ownership but it changed over time and mostly pursued collective ownership. Unfortunately, the state was not fully supportive of this model and although this model did not prove to be as successful as the VAK, the hundreds of cooperatives established by BVEW certainly assisted in paving the way to 20th century social housing.

A number of housing associations developed in other Dutch industrial cities following the philanthropic and workers models. In Rotterdam, the oldest housing association was the First Citizens’ Housing Association, which was founded in 1867 with the aim to provide housing for port workers. The Feyenoord Association followed in 1895, The Association for Workmen’s Housing in 1899 and the Rotterdam Cooperative Housing Association in 1901 by public school teachers. The first associations that benefited
from the Housing Law of 1901 were the Association from Housing for People, and the Cooperative Association for Municipal Employees, both of whom were established in 1909. In the same year the Association for the Construction of Popular Houses was founded with the objective of constructing about 50 family homes and years after, it partnered with the municipality to build 500 one-family rental houses on a large piece of land following the garden city movement (Massachusetts Homestead Commission, 1914, p. 272). This required major planning support provided by the municipal council, which at that time had full power in city planning, and of policy and regulations provided by the state.

After the Housing Act of 1901, financial aid from the state was still limited. Developer withdrawals from construction activities during the First World War forced the state to make larger contributions in order to increase the construction of social housing in the following years. From 1914 to 1922, the number of housing associations (most of them small) increased from 300 to 1350 (Owehand and van Daalen, 2002). By 1920, the share of housing commissioned by local authorities increased 30%, while also increasing the influence of local authorities. The rest of the story of housing and planning in post war years is illustrated in this study (see Chapters 4 and 6). What is interesting about the origins of housing associations is the fact that since the very beginning, philanthropic endeavours were a sort of social enterprise promoting assistencialism rather than emancipation (see Chapter 4). Additionally, the state and its corporate partners had a common interest, sustaining and somehow regulating workers lives and in turn, the order and economy of cities. In other words to bolster capitalism, but as soon as developers were not able, or willing, to continue housing construction, the state took over. Lastly, the philanthropic endeavours for the most part provided innovative financial and design models rather than self-management schemes, as was the case of the worker cooperatives. Of course this must be investigated further as well as the evolution and impact of worker housing cooperatives and other tenant-led movements. For instance, as illustrated in Chapter 4 and 6, initiatives that arose responding to top-down autocratic and rational planning approaches while advocating for more democratic ways of producing cities, as the Building for the Neighbourhood Program, represent a break in the development approaches of housing associations. Thus, it is also critical to examine the roots and drivers of collective housing efforts as well as the most recent cooperative housing models and other grassroots endeavours.

The Netherlands has a long and valuable history of squatting beginning in the 1970s, when housing shortages and unemployment were acute and many properties were empty due to decay. As in America, squatting in this country is seen as a radical act as well as an act of survival as there remain illegal and legal squats in this country. While the latter have permission from authorities and owners to inhabit those places, the
former do not have official authorisation for occupation from the landlord. The Dutch squatter movement did not evolve into scalable public programmes as in New York City, which produced thousands of housing cooperatives, but legal squats have in many cases moved from temporal occupations to permanent collective living and cultural spaces. Many of them have even acquired legal ownership. On the other hand, illegal squats have been increasingly criminalised. For instance, the enforcement of the Squatting and Vacancy Act of October 2010 resulted in the arrest of hundreds of people (Squatters’ Action for Secure Homes, 2016).

In the 1990s, Antikraak (anti-squatting) practices started taking place in large cities that sought economic revitalisation and where affordable housing opportunities were scarce. Antikraak became particularly popular in cities where the waiting list for affordable housing was long, as in the city of Amsterdam where it can take as long as 15 years to get access to a social housing. Since then, this initiative has aimed to provide temporal tenure while protecting vacant and under-utilised buildings until the fate of the property is determined. To prevent decay, illegal practices and squatting in vacant properties, owners hire an anti-squatting agency that would be in charge of seeking temporary live-in-guardians. Today occupants must get a municipal permit and sign a use/loan agreement, with more tenant restrictions and less tenant protections than a rental contract, to be able to occupy an apartment or a working space. Also, although agreements can last up to 5 years, occupants can be asked only 3 to 4 weeks in advance to leave the space they have been ‘guarding’.

In Rotterdam, as in most large cities in the Randstäd Holland, squatting and anti-squatting practices have been quite common. In Tarwewijk, as illustrated in this study, properties owned by the local housing association and by the municipality have been granted as temporary spaces to tenants willing to become invested in the neighbourhood, including artists, activists, young professionals, and other well educated groups for quite some time. Most recently small creative industries have also been lured to the area with cheap rentals, with a wide variety of outcomes. For instance, a long term tenant of a municipal building (a known artist) who legally squatted and took care of the space for decades negotiated the acquisition of the property when a local Turkish organisation backed by Turkish financial institutions was offering a considerable price for the space. After a long battle she won the case and gained ownership of the property (Feestra, personal communication, May 30, 2016). It would be interesting to learn more about the decision taken by the municipality, with respect to the choice of a Dutch long term resident over the Turkish community. In any case, it was a battle won in terms of common people gaining control over their homes, but this is not always the case. For instance, not far from Tarwewijk a legal squat located in the core of a highly desirable investment area did not follow the same fate. Het Poortgebouw, which has been home of 30 people who have taken care of the
building and paid rent for 30 years was sold recently to a developer. An agreement with the municipality was signed in 1984 allowing the tenants to stay in the property and form a housing association. Regardless of the agreement, the municipality sold the property in 2001 to Woning Bedrijf Rotterdam, the same semi-private development company responsible of most urban regeneration interventions in Tarwewijk. Since 2004 the Poortgebouw Housing Association has been fighting in court to keep its rental agreement. The association was able to stay put but the future is still uncertain.

The above cases represent independent struggles that indeed can be found in many sites across cities and which have perhaps paved the way to most permanent public initiatives and approaches dealing with vacancies and housing rehabilitation. For instance, as illustrated in Chapter 6, self-management programmes have been officially promoted in low-income districts. Programmes such as Klushuizen, a sort of homesteading programme for moderate-income households, have been launched to rehabilitate old housing structures hard to sale in ‘priority districts’ and, in turn, activate the local housing market. This model provides homeownership opportunities at a very low price in exchange for the full rehabilitation of the housing unit interior. The Klushuizen model can be controversial due to the social changes it entails. It has been pursued to attract young professionals looking for affordable opportunities to become homeowners in low-income and working class districts. However, this model also provided housing opportunities to local young families and residents invested in their neighbourhood as well as to new residents moving to the city from abroad and other Dutch cities (Keizer, personal communication, May 30, 2016).

Furthermore, as described in Chapter 6, other type of self-management initiatives such as VVE010 Rotterdam have emerged to activate and assist owner associations by providing educational and training sessions. Owner associations of derelict and rundown buildings used to be constantly under pressure from housing associations; particularly those who have adopted areas where housing maintenance had become a burden to local authorities. As illustrated in Chapter 6, traditionally hard-to-manage blocks were targeted for urban regeneration using a demolition and new construction approach. Due to the recession and the failure of many of these approaches, a more organic approach (less authoritarian and more participative) of housing rehabilitation has taken place in collaboration with owners associations. Apparently, residents are progressively taking business into their own hands but still are assisted by governmental or para-governmental organisations.

Grassroots organisation to create a political space, and in turn to promote change, has not been fiercely pursued as in New York City where groups driven by the outcomes of state withdraw and profit driven development have no option but to fight back and create spaces for survival. In the Netherlands, due to the strong presence of the state,
the evolution of urban restructuring and ongoing housing and development trends in low-income districts outlined in this study, it is critical to envision new ownership and management models for a more democratic and people-based development of cities. Cooperative and collective housing has already been present in the Netherlands and sought as a way of emancipation. For instance, collective housing or Centraal Wonen, as it is called in the Netherlands, has been popular since the 1970s. It emerged as an emancipatory call. With origins in co-housing and cooperative housing, groups have self-organised and produced diverse housing schemes guided by their own political structures, interests and ways of living. Today, being on the brink of radical changes in social housing and the restructuring of cities (less regulated more privatised), it is imperative to envision more cooperatively driven models of housing and neighbourhood planning. Most importantly, it is crucial to look at threats such as the commodification and financialisation of housing that has taken place in other countries and cities alienating citizens from the production of cities. Thus, moving ahead it is urgent to look for alternatives to the ongoing privatisation of social housing. What about new policies and programmes shifting the ongoing privatisation into cooperativism?
§ 8.4 Conclusion: Counteracting the pacification, control, and bargaining of low-income neighbourhoods

If we connect the previous reflections with the outcomes of this investigation, it is possible to discern there are alternative models of housing ownership and management as well as emancipatory forms of neighbourhood organisation and planning that lead to more equitable cities and communities. Unfortunately, without the will and aid of the state or policies enforcing and funding these endeavours at different scales, these efforts tend to be exceptional rather than transformative in a sea of profit-driven development. This study has shown that when power and resources are distributed, transformative processes take place providing shared benefits (i.e. public programmes delegating decision making to people) and when power and resources are in the hands of a few, neighbourhood transformations take place fulfilling only the interest of those in control; usually urban managers, urban experts, public officials, investors, speculators, financiers and private development corporations (i.e. public programmes sponsoring powerful public-private partnerships). Above all, this investigation has illustrated that citizen participation has often been co-opted and used as an instrument of those with power and resources for the ‘pacification’, ‘control’ and ‘bargaining’ of low-income neighbourhoods to achieve their own interests. Lastly, this study has shown through two particular case studies, that recent urban restructuring strategies have indeed brought about physical and economic changes to low-income and minority neighbourhoods. However, in most cases, these changes have taken place at the expenses of existing residents, particularly the most vulnerable ones (see Chapter 5, 6 and 7). Certainly public and private investment and development in these urban areas has often resulted in the dispossession and the alienation of existing residents from their homes and neighbourhoods.

At the end of this academic journey, I can assert that one of the overarching goals of the new state-led urban restructuring strategy is the plundering of social property by commodifying and financialising housing and neighbourhoods. By disfranchising and disabling individuals and communities with respect to their control over the space they have produced and cared for, this process is increasingly alienating residents from the fate of their homes and communities. Undoubtedly, as Madden and Marcuse (2007, p. 203) assert, ‘currently many governments are actively working to undermine rent controls, sell of public residential assets, cut fund for public housing and homeless services, outsource local housing functions, and encourage speculation’. In New York City, public housing ownership and management is being privatised, public land is falling into the hands of private developers, affordable housing is becoming more scarce, and rent regulated units are being illegally put on the market, while in
the Randstad Holland, social housing is increasingly at risk of being demolished or privatised and housing for the middle class has been increasingly prioritised by the state over social and low-income housing.

Thus, if the eradication and control of social property has become the target of current urban restructuring strategies aiming to revitalise or regenerate disinvested low-income neighbourhoods, the preservation and expansion of social property should be the ultimate goal of both grassroots and community-based neighbourhood mobilisations as well as of progressive local governments invested in, and advocating for, their low-income neighbourhoods and communities across cities. This leads us to consider ways to counteract deceiving participatory practices ingrained in urban revitalisation and regeneration plans, such as the ones examined in this study that, despite calling for the welfare of residents, have for the most part assisted in the loss of individual and community control over their neighbourhoods, homes and lives. But first, let us revisit the practices undertaken by the state along with its corporate and social partners for the ‘pacification’, ‘control’ and ‘bargaining’ of low-income neighbourhoods.

The ‘pacification of space’, as it was described in Chapter 7, has manifested in the numerous paternalistic public policies and programmes implemented in low-income and segregated neighborhoods to amend the damage caused by the neoliberal project and its tactics of ‘creative destruction’, including the new state-led urban restructuring strategies described in Chapter 7 aiming at the transformation of low-income urban residential areas. As this study shows, while states are busy implementing new policies, programmes and creative instruments to transform areas that declined due to development barriers imposed in previous investment cycles and which represent sites of opportunity for economic growth, they are concurrently devising community-led and neighborhood-based initiatives to mitigate the damage produced, or about to be produced, by those transformations and letting residents know that the state is present and is assisting. Generally speaking we can deduce that most of these local efforts are currently dealing with the outcomes of the commodification and financialization of housing and neighborhoods. And, in most cases, residents have been devised as passive recipients of aid. What is most concerning is that most of these local assistencialist initiatives offer temporary aid and solutions since they usually deal with the shocks produced by market forces at a specific space and moment. There is always a new frontier where this process begins anew. The result is the pacification of poor, minority and vulnerable groups while urban transformations, many times highly planned, take place.

On the other hand, the ‘control of space’ as depicted in Chapter 7, has been pursued by the state through area-based urban and housing programmes lead by social
partners (i.e. non-profit groups and housing associations) to achieve social control and economic processes associated with capitalist development to achieve a temporal stability or what Harvey defines as 'structured coherence' (1985, 1996). As illustrated in this study, such social and economic processes produce different forms of space according to the local development and restructuring models as well as to the different degrees of state regulation through policy. At the local level, such processes have manifested in urban revitalisation and regeneration plans, which have increasingly prescribed new social relations and behaviors, modes of consumption, standards of living, lifestyles, and even new housing markets in hard-to-manage and segregated neighborhoods. This has taken place with the incursion of new models of planning and social innovation devised to bring about stability (Moulaert, Rodriguez and Swyngedouw, 2002). The question is stability for whom? Certainly, the stability is usually not pursued for the welfare of the local communities. As this study shows, these sort of area-based interventions have changed the physical and economic composition of neighborhoods at the expense of those who have been victims of the by-product of ongoing economic and urban neoliberal agendas and who represent a burden, and even a threat, to local governments and public officials. In most of the cases, having gentrification as a policy to colonize and civilize the local communities with the assistance of some public tools —such as the inclusionary housing programme in New York City and the social mixing policy in the Randstad Holland— brings about a sense of estrangement, uncertainty and anxiety to locals instead of bringing economic and housing opportunities.

Lastly and as proved in Chapters 5 and 6, the ‘bargaining of space’ has been widely pursued by the new urban governance structures to achieve new spatial, economic, social and political configurations in new spaces of opportunity (disinvested low-income inner city areas). As these new frontiers become contested spaces, in other words areas where the public and private interests collide with community interests, practices of ‘coalition politics’ (see Chapter 2) have been enacted by public officials and urban managers to build ruling class alliances with powerful partners while seeing themselves as symbols of the community to legitimise their powers (Harvey 1989). As this study shows, local agreements and covenants established what developers, municipalities and communities should give and take in neighbourhood revitalisation and restructuring plans are increasingly being used to negotiate the benefits versus the impacts of the commodification and financialisation of housing and neighbourhoods. Without enough assets, knowledge and public instruments, communities have no option but to lose out in these negotiations. Their neighbourhoods have increasingly become bargained commodities.

Considering the findings of this study and once again examining the outcomes of these practices which clearly regard citizens as objects and subjects or governance, it
is explicit that assisting individuals and communities to improve, preserve and expand the spaces they have created for their own social reproduction (even if they have been granted or acquired) is not the overreaching goal of the state and its partners today. It is apparent that most of the programmes have avoided emancipatory practices let alone the provision of community resources, knowledge and public instruments to enable and empower communities to self-organise, plan and manage their own living environments. Community assets to achieve this may include land, housing, and common spaces controlled by residents (not necessarily owned by residents), while community knowledge may encompass expertise on neighbourhood planning, housing affairs, and tenant rights. Of course, public instruments available to the community to build the necessary shared knowledge to preserve those community assets as well as the funds to expand them is ultimately as important as the two first provisions. Unfortunately, programmes and local initiatives pursuing ‘pacification’, ‘control’ and ‘bargaining’ practices as part of ambitious urban restructuring programmes and plans tend to draw attention from individuals and communities experiencing one of the most detrimental outcomes of current urban restructuring affecting residents, disproportionately low-income populations: alienation.

The increasing sense of alienation the new state-led urban restructuring strategy has inflicted in low-income and minority individuals and communities, is a critical aspect to examine further including its roots and means to reduce this. This should be a particular imperative for those advocating for participatory, democratic and equitable urban and housing restructuring processes. Historically land was at the heart of enclosure and colonial practices which have grabbed, organised, privatised and commodified properties for capital accumulation while displacing the cultural notions attached to common property that served for the social reproduction of people (Harvey, 2014). Once land was objectified and separated from its embedded caretakers and cultural meaning, it became part of the principle of individual rights to private property guaranteed by the state (Harvey 2014). What is interesting, as Harvey (2014) notes, is the contradictory relationship between the ‘universal legal doctrines of private property rights that supposedly regulated state-individual relations in such a way that coercive disposessions, thievery, robbery and chicanery ought to have no place’ and the ongoing ‘appropriation and accumulation by dispossession’ (p. 60) which embodied all of these practices. Clearly, not even this type of individual right is now secured.

Undoubtedly, the assault of universal peoples rights dedicated to the production of value as part of the social reproduction of individuals and communities has been at the core of alienation (Harvey, 2014). Individuals and communities who produce work to transform their own living environments and determine their own fate feel alienated when such work is objectified, traded and exploited by others to fulfil their own needs and interests. People feel alienated from urban processes they once were part of and
now are unable to control, including those who are vital to an individual for their own social reproduction such as making a home and a neighbourhood. Since alienation is rooted in property law, as something alienated is exchangeable, alienation is not only a precondition of land but also of anything created, organised, and transformed on such land which can be commodified. The question is, since large parts of cities are being commodified and financialised, how much alienation can people endure? Harvey (2014, p. 276) argues, ‘the economic engine that is capital circulation and accumulation gobbles up whole cities only to spit out new urban forms in spite of the resistance of people who feels alienated entirely from the processes that not only reshape the environments in which they live but also redefine the kind of person they must become in order to survive. Processes of social reproduction get re-engineered by capital form without’. This is certainly a detrimental condition. Fortunately, it is not created by natural laws but by creative political-economic creations, which can be modified (Madden & Marcuse, 2017).

Therefore, if residential alienation is a product of the commodification and financialisation of housing, and a by-product of rising inequality, the casualisation of employment, and the decline of welfare benefits, as Madden and Marcuse (2007) argue. And, considering that residential alienation happens when the ruling class captures the housing process and exploits it for its own ends (Madden and Marcuse, 2017), then it is implicit that it is also a product of urban regeneration and revitalisation programmes, plans and instruments having commodified housing at the core. Undoubtedly, a way to counteract the exploitation of housing and urban processes for profit and to guarantee The Right to the City for our future generations, is through the cease of housing and neighbourhood commodification and alienation. I am suggesting extenuation rather than eradication since the complete elimination of these two ongoing conditions is unlikely to happen in today’s neoliberal environment.

Thus, this is certainly the answer to the main question of this investigation, and with longstanding collective efforts it is attainable. As proved in this study, there are alternative forms of housing and neighbourhood development. The urban restructuring programmes and housing initiatives which had been led by residents and managed to keep low-income and minority communities, even those in districts with strong housing markets, have promoted for the most part a sort of hybrid or shared ownership and advocate for self-management and control of land. These diverse models have come about in response to urban struggles in similar times of crisis. Most importantly, even when these forms have manifested differently across cities and countries according to their own development models, government regimes and local responses, they have gained and expand precisely what we are loosing today: social property. In other words, de commodified dwelling spaces composed by many variations of tenure and reserved in perpetuity for the use and enjoyment of all citizens alike. Variations
of cooperative housing, intentional co-housing communities, mutual housing associations, public and permanent affordable housing, community land trusts and other hybrid ownership models promoting cooperation between the state and the civil society can be included as part of social property.

Thus, if social property is the countermeasure to extenuate housing and neighbourhood commodification and alienation, our task as citizens, activists, academics, planners, and public officials advocating for the production of just cities and the guarantee the most basic human rights, is to diligently and strategically mobilise, organise and infiltrate policy and governance structures to enact policies promoting and sponsoring urban revitalisation and regeneration processes that preserve and expand public, limited-equity and shared ownership models providing affordable housing in perpetuity. This requires investing in long term initiatives and prioritising residents needs and interests rather than capitalist ones; changing the power relations between government agencies and residents to form coalitions leading and regulating local development; and lastly, by pursuing all these paths, having residents driving rather than participating in the creation and transformation of their own living environments. Residents should not be consulted on, or involved in, ongoing negations related to urban and housing transformations led by experts and bureaucrats. They should be part of the leadership cohort from the beginning to the end of any local plan and housing policy should be democratised by downsizing the power of experts and bureaucrats.
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Cities for or against citizens?


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Bushwick Housing Independence Project (2011, Summer 2011). Success by Perseverance. BHIP Newsletter. 3(3).


Howard, Hevesi, Hebert, Harvey, Harvey, Harvey, Harvey, Ham, Hafetz, Gramlich, Government, Goodman, Goodman, Gibson, Gemeente, Gemeente, identifying needs, setting priorities, monitoring your government's performance

Displacement in Bushwick


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### New York City

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<tr>
<td>April 25, 2012</td>
<td>Raquel Namuche, Make the Road New York</td>
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<td>September 24, 2012</td>
<td>Scott Short, Ridgewood Bushwick Senior Citizen Council</td>
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<td>August 14, 2013</td>
<td>Katy Maire, Bushwick Housing Independence Project</td>
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<td>June 28, 2013</td>
<td>Arturo Alonzo, Bushwick Resident</td>
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<td>September 18, 2013</td>
<td>Angel Vera, Make the Road New York</td>
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<td>July 24, 2017</td>
<td>Brigette Blood, Ridgewood Bushwick Senior Citizen Council</td>
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### Randstad Holland

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<tr>
<td>May 26, 2016</td>
<td>Justus Uitermark, University of Amsterdam</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 27, 2016</td>
<td>Aetzel Griffon, Tarwewijk Teacher</td>
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<td>Eric Dullaert, CultureelDenkWerk</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Jo Anne Frisland, Algemeen Bestuurslid, OVDB Tarwewijk</td>
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<td>Agnes Verwijk, Independent Journalist</td>
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<td>May 30, 2016</td>
<td>Wepke Feestra, Artist and Tarwewijk Resident</td>
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<td>Alexander Keizer, Urbanerda</td>
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<td>Burgit, Rotterdam Tenants Coalition</td>
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<td>June 1, 2016</td>
<td>Marriette van Jeuvelen, Woonstad Rotterdam Zuid</td>
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<td>Martin Kreft, Advisor, VVE010 Rotterdam Zuid</td>
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<td>June 2, 2016</td>
<td>Frank Peteres, Director, VVE010 Rotterdam Zuid</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ben Heezen, Inspecteur Toezicht Gebouwen Tarwewijk, Gemeente Rotterdam</td>
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<td>Mark Sutherland, Gebiedsontwikkeling, Gebiedsaccountmanager Charlois and IJsselmonde</td>
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Curriculum Vitae

Gabriela Pérez Rendón was born in Monterrey Mexico in 1976. She received a BS in Architecture from the Monterrey Institute of Technology and Higher Education in 1999. Right after she opened her own architecture office in the city of Tijuana and practiced along the northwest border region for over five years. Rendón’s architectural and design practice was highly influenced by the social and spatial dynamics on both sides of the border, the developing and the developed one. Working across the continuous urbanization of Tijuana/San Diego (Mexico/United States), divided by the border wall, was her inspiration to get involved in the urban practice. Driven by the uneven development and the socioeconomic contrasts of the territory, Rendón pursued graduate urban studies at Delft University of Technology in the Netherlands. She was sponsored by the Mexican government through the National Council of Science and Technology and by the European Commission through the Programme Alban. Rendón concluded her thesis *Between Walls and Informal Settlements: Affordable Housing as an Urban Regeneration Strategy in the North-West Mexican Border and graduated with honors (Cum Laude) in 2006.*

In the Netherlands, Rendón co-founded Cohabitation Strategies and began working mostly in marginal spaces while creating a hybrid urban practice combining action-research, planning, design, art, and activism. Cohabitation Strategies, a non-profit organization, has been involved in projects of diverse scales and complexities commissioned by art, cultural, and academic institutions, as well as municipalities and government agencies in diverse countries, including the Netherlands, Italy, France, Germany, Venezuela, Ecuador, Canada, and the United States. Rendón’s work has been exhibited at the Museum of Contemporary Art San Diego (MCASD), the 4th International Architecture Biennale Rotterdam, the Istanbul Design Biennial 2012, the Vienna Biennale 2015, the Portugal Triennial 2016, and the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA).

Rendón is currently an Assistant Professor of Urban Planning at Parsons School of Design, The New School, in New York City. She co-chairs the MS Design and Urban Ecologies and the MA Theories of Urban Practice programmes. Her research interests include neighborhood decline and restructuring, community planning and practice, as well as collective and non-speculative housing models providing equitable development in profit-driven urban environments. She is the author and co-editor of a number of publications, including: *Social Property and the Need for a New Urban Practice* (book chapter, Taylor & Francis) *Cohabitation Strategies: Socio-Spatial Approaches, Practices and Pedagogies with a Dialectical Perspective* (book chapter, Routledge), and *Cooperative Cities* (book co-editor, Journal of Design Strategies).
Selected Publications


Cities for or against citizens?