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SPACES OF CONFLICT

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Introduction

Conflict, Space and Architecture

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> The world is at war again.
> (Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Multitude*)[1]

While starting to formulate the first ideas for this *Footprint* issue on the 'Spaces of Conflict', moments of crisis and emergent realities of conflict in the world were already catching up with us with great intensity and diversity. But when writing this introduction, we were, and still are witnessing an additional rapid escalation in violence, transitions in world powers, and sequences of unprecedented global shocks. The continuous wars in the Middle East and Africa, combined with the collisions of climate change, deforestation, extraction and inequitable financial systems result in a record-breaking numbers of displaced populations, spilling over through regions and continents. This reality is mirrored in the political and spatial structures in the US, South America and Europe, such as the rising popular support in the Alt-Right, and the erection of walls between the wealthy and the poor. As our world becomes increasingly divided into polar and non-symmetrical realities – shrinking groups of the wealthy and expanding groups of the poor; the ruthlessly exploiting versus those who are exploited and expelled – so do the physical apparatuses of separation evolve. These trends of violence and segregation evidently manifest themselves in the way we organise and design, but also think and theorise, our surroundings.

Clearly, the terrorist attacks at the start of the twenty-first century had already catapulted the issue of space and conflict into the city and to the forefront of architectural debates. As a result, existing and newly emerging national, religious and ethnic conflicts and their relation to urban space and the built environment became a focus of attention in architecture. While military thinking already had a long-standing tradition in architectural history, the sudden emergence of new spaces of conflict considerably altered architectural discourse as extreme conditions of war, militarisation, climate change as well as the economic crisis were (and still are) threatening to structurally reconfigure our living environments. More than a decade later, these urban intrusions seem to have produced a diversified field of both thinking and action in architecture, as the theories of spatial conflicts have started to incorporate a wide variety of reflections from other disciplines while architectural practices have shown a remarkable adequacy in addressing spaces of conflict, crisis, and disaster.

This issue of *Footprint* intends to report on this state of perpetual global unrest in architecture through a series of academic articles and case studies that highlight the consequences of conflicts in the places and spaces that we inhabit. In this introduction, we wish to look at these issues as an interlinked global reality rather than as isolated incidents. In doing so, we seek to position 'Spaces of Conflict' in the context of emerging global trends, conditions, and discourses in the attempt to address their indicative symptoms while reflecting on their underlying causes.

Militarised cities

The direct, consequential result of the emergence of global terrorism has undoubtedly been the militarisation of space. Founded on the conviction that increased security is to the benefit of all citizens, public, semi-public as well as private space have become increasingly scanned, controlled and subject to other forms of surveillance that intrude visibly and mostly invisibly in the lives and homes of just about everyone. The city being 'under siege' can thus be interpreted in more than one way: the constant threat of terrorist attacks, the presence of these threats through counter-terrorist measures, but the result of these developments is also that the city has become the potential battleground for political violence, as the democratic nature of urban space has decreased, and the control of citizens has unprecedentedly increased.[2] The architecture of security renders space defensible but also global,[3] as the 'violent geographies' can nowadays be traced at any place on the globe.[4] As this new reality rapidly unfolded, initiatives to resolve conflicts or to establish peace have resulted in spatial processes of transformation that have affected the urban fabric profoundly. While the legacies of older wars are yet to be resolved, the physical manifestations of the twenty-first century conflicts are becoming part of everyday life in cities all over the world and turning the urban space into the new theatre of war.

The Berlin Wall, for instance, which constituted the emblematic reminiscence of the Cold War and of the diminishing conflicts of the twentieth century, has been physically removed almost overnight, but its non-physical traces have remained traceable to this very day. Similarly in Belfast, the peace process has started a process of reconciliation, but the physical remains are disappearing only slowly, producing rather idiosyncratic spatial conditions. Reflecting on the intended policy to remove all 'interface barriers' in Northern Ireland, James O'Leary presents in this issue an enumeration of possible understandings of the term 'interface', which allows for a gathering of all barriers constructed in Belfast to secure separation and the spatial limitation of conflict as one complete and indiscriminate system. Treating the Belfast Peace Walls and other obstacles as interfaces in the urban fabric, O'Leary suggests that the nature of the interface system is all-encompassing and thus moves architecture beyond the realm of the strictly spatial and the material, and into the realm of the psychological and virtual. In eight photographs, the intrinsic characteristics of these interfaces are made explicit, via a wide variety of colour palettes, messages inscribed and iconographic information and references depicted.

Referring to a similarly 'old' and lingering conflict in her contribution, Yael Allweil discusses the transition in Israeli settler policies from a movement that intended to secure an extended territorial 'home' into a movement that used housing for military purposes, a 'violence by the home'. Offering an historical account of the origins of the settler movement of the West Bank, Allweil shows how initial settlements were still intrinsically tied to the Israeli Defence Force military camps that controlled the newly occupied territory, while later on, i.e. after Begin won the elections in 1977, the settlement of the West Bank became government policy. Since Begin restricted this development as a strictly military, rather than a civilian settlement, all settlements were always intended to be temporary in nature. Allweil argues that the settler movement initially was a civilian occupation movement directed against the State and the military seeking permanent settlement of the 'historical homeland', and only later became a movement of military occupation directed against the Palestinians. The examples of Sebastia, Kedum, Elon-More and Gush Emunim are used to substantiate this claim: these kibbutz-type settlements were all originally constructed with mobile homes. The early 1990s are indicated by Allweil as the historical turning point with respect to settlement

as an internal civilian claim on military land, towards a military strategy to claim occupied land. The option of the 'Two-State Solution', in which the West Bank would no longer be part of Israel, transformed the purpose of the settlements to a military strategy to create as much 'facts on the ground' as possible, thus rendering the two-state option a 'solution' beyond factual reach. Mizpe-Yishai is but one example of the more recent settlements that were used as civilian occupation and as an obstruction to the Oslo peace agreements. Allweil additionally argues that the original state policy to provide housing as shelter has been transferred to the occupied territories with the opening up of the housing market to neo-liberal strategies. Also within this strange turn of policies, where only on the West Bank one would nowadays be able to obtain (affordable) housing provided by the government, the housing policy has been compromised into a violent act aimed at increasing the conflict.

The post-colonial condition, migration and refugees

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, and increasingly after the terrorist attacks of the beginning of the twenty-first century, we have witnessed the emergence of a new world order.[5] The international boundaries and the legacy of state formation of the twentieth century were challenged by processes of globalisation, but also by internal divides. Wars between nations turned into internationalised internal conflicts and sectarian violence that ravaged cities and amplified national divides. These trends resulted in the emergence of ethno-territorial boundaries inside countries, cities and residential areas.[6] Furthermore, in recent years, we have witnessed the collapse of nation states in the Middle East and Africa. The atrocities of the civil war in Syria have caused millions of Syrians to seek shelter in other countries. In 2015, about one million people tried to cross the Mediterranean Sea crossing from North Africa to Italy and from Syria to Greece.[7] But one must not uncritically assess these recent dramatic developments, as they undoubtedly have been a long time in the making. As in previous cases, this crisis too has had a longer history than is often acknowledged. Several scholars have pointed out what they consider to be at least one of the origins of contemporary conflicts, namely in the colonial histories and subsequent post-colonial formation of nation-states, which were often organised without any specific attention to tribal histories, established rights, ethnic and religious diversity and other crucial distinctions between the groups that were to form the very constituencies of these states.[8] At least part of the current spaces of conflict have come out of these forced and not very well elaborated national constitutions, which in a lot of cases have been shattered by cultivated and equally forced strategies of hatred and segregation.

In this light, the argument Samia Henni presents in this issue warrants attention, as she discusses the principles of the 'guerre moderne' (modern war) as it was enacted by the French army in Algeria between 1954 and 1962. After declaring a 'state of emergency' (Algeria was, after-all, a French colony), the Algerian uprising was initially met with great aggression by the French authorities, though its actions were formulated and employed with the specific restriction that the establishment of detention camps would not be allowed. In effect, the French authorities counter-acted the Algerian revolution with an attempt to pacify the local population, rather than to establish a peaceful society. The state of emergency was intended to somehow involve the Algerian population in a process of social (re-) building through humanitarian, constructive and protective actions, but also caused a rather far-reaching reorganisation of the Algerian territory. As it turns out, the Algerian war, as it is now commonly understood, is an example of the shift between conventional and unconventional warfare, absorbing the post-colonial and post-second-World-War

realities into a contemporary strategy of warfare. In Algeria, the entire population became suspect and the object of security and surveillance measures. The actions of the French military thus marked the first time that systematic torture and total warfare on local populations were developed, implemented and employed. Rather than detaining people, the French started a massive operation of resettlement that completely transformed the Algerian landscape. Henni shows how in the end the relocation settlements simply turned out to be camps, though the French army itself considered this resettlement the 'masterpiece' in its entire pacification process. After De Gaulle reclaimed power in France in 1959 and reports in the French press about the appalling living conditions in the camps caused a scandal, the settlements became part of a more socially oriented plan. They were re-assessed as rural settlements, though their military strategic nature seldomly subsided. But even in this period, according to Henni, the modern warfare conducted by the French army in Algeria remains one of the most violent of recent, 'modern' wars.

Displacement, relocation and camps have become intrinsically part of any contemporary conflict, though the treatment of displacement and the design of camps are constantly reconsidered and reassessed. As war increasingly becomes a general and perpetual phenomenon, so are spaces of conflict and spaces of exception.[9] The Zaatari refugee camp in Jordan is one of these phenomenal sites. Nada Maani discusses this refugee camp, which houses 80,000 displaced persons, here. In its scale and socio-economic complexity, the Zaatari camp operates more like a spontaneous urban space than a camp. Maani offers an intervention proposal for the Zaatari refugee camp in Jordan and argues that it is much more appropriate to provide a sense of belonging in these situations of displacement. The fact that a refugee camp tends to remain in place longer than initially anticipated, should lead to a policy, Maani contends, that turns them into more permanent settings as opposed to temporary ones from the start. The research and proposed intervention proposal by Maani takes the specifics of the current situation of the camp as well as the cultural background of its users into consideration. The stratification of public space, needed to ensure the proper presence of women and children, make up the basic ideas for the proposal.

The Anthropocene and the planetary condition

The combination of war and terrorism as well as global economical asymmetries have indeed led to an unprecedented number of displaced persons around the world in this decade, but our claim is (unfortunately) not limited to these developments. Transformations within the earth's ecological system have recently started to constitute a genuine crisis of its own, including the consequential forms of displacement with the first acknowledged groups of 'ecological refugees' having fallen victim to the results of climate change and the industrialised process of natural extractions. Last year, UNHCR recorded over 65 million forced displaced persons due to war and violent conflicts, but the additional number of global migratory movements due to industrialisation, drought, deforestation, famine and simply flooding have remained rather mute. Processes of land acquisition and catastrophic shocks due to climate change continue to hit the poorest areas in the Global South and result in over 800 million undocumented displaced persons. These are mostly rural migrants who are moving to slums, while their villages are left destroyed behind.[10] These new trends of displacement increase the pressure on cities, not only in the Global South but also form one of the reasons migratory movements have started to continuously pressure the north.

The impact of globalisation on people's lives, be it in Africa, Asia, the US, or Europe, have reached a point of no return, such is the scale and speed of exploitation of all land resources and extraction of all material resources that are inevitably

exhausting the planet and already disrupting the lives of millions.[11] This has, by now, been commonly understood as the dawn of the human-influenced age, the Anthropocene. This 'new age' of human-influenced geology has been dated to the 1950s: after 12,000 years of a reasonably stable ecological and natural global system, scientists have started to claim that since the mid-twentieth century the earth is so profoundly changed due to human intervention and cultivation that the transformation of land by deforestation and industrial development, with its negative effects in terms of carbon dioxide emissions, sea level rise, and the global mass extinction of species, mark the end of the previous part of geological time. Thus, the Holocene has given way to the Anthropocene,[12] but the consequences of this human era of geological time, and whether the end of the world is inevitable or not, have yet to be spelled out.[13] As it turns out, global, regional and local conflicts, which are, among others, the result of a failing system of governance, a lack of equity and equality, seem to be amplified by climate change. The growing divide between socio-economic and cultural groups in society has an immense impact on the shaping of the built environment.

Dead Land and extrastatecraft

The issues thus far discussed, i.e. conflict, militarised space, migration, post-colonialism and the ecological crisis, can be considered to belong to the more 'obvious' examples, however contemporary, of spaces of conflict. Though important and even essential to mention and discuss, our initial aim for this *Footprint* issue was to focus on these examples but to incorporate the more recent roles of architecture in the contemporary spaces of conflict as well. More ambitiously, we had hoped for a trajectory in this debate that was unexpected and, perhaps, capable of opening new and even hopeful perspectives, ones that would lead to a new theorisation of the space of conflict that would not necessarily confirm the current status quo but open the debate to some fundamentally different takes on the very need for this kind of space in contemporary discourse. Therefore, within this issue and departing from a spatial understanding of geopolitical, climatological and economical conflicts, we sought to introduce and add to the professional discourse new conditions, experimental spaces and innovative practices that could be theorised accordingly. Focusing on 'conflict', we were additionally interested in contributions that highlight the large scale and phenomenal transitions in the physical world and in society by extrapolating, through examples, the abundance of relations that can be traced between conflict, territory and architecture. The ensuing discussion in this introduction, including the adjacent articles published in this issue, will focus on these more recent roles of architecture in contemporary spaces of conflict.

Several recent discussions in architectural discourse can be linked to these important issues. Saskia Sassen, for instance, has shown that, from 2006 to 2011, more than 200 million hectares of land have been bought by foreign governments and private firms in Africa and South America, investing in mining and industrialised crops and food production. Sassen introduced the term 'Dead Land' to describe the ground that is left behind by these mega global operations. Large stretches of land and water are left, overwhelmed by relentless use of chemicals, lack of oxygen and pollution. Many of these destructions have increasingly been hitting poor communities recently, but in fact nobody seems to be able to escape the consequences of climate change on the environment.[14] Comparably, Keller Easterling has argued for the emergence of an infrastructure space based on the economical politics of the extrastate, where content is no longer made but made possible, dictated by the logic of information technology and the financial models of neo-liberalism.[15] The cartographic gaze, another crucial tool brought to full potential in European colonialism, has been the pre-emptive instrument with which the global order has been laid out,

anticipated and ultimately controlled from the outset in its mapping practices.[16]

Spaces of post-conflict

The European response to the two crises hitting its territory over the last two decades, namely the threat of global terrorism and the influx of refugees, might have presented a unique chance to come to terms with its own colonial past. Its response, however, has been caught between the extremes that must have come out of its historical legacy and its subsequent suppressed guilt: the humanitarian side of the age of Enlightenment and Humanism; the historical 'confessions' of its atrocities committed in the name of Christianity and Colonialism; and the insight that the continent had seen the emergence of pogroms, nationalism, fascism and Nazism. But instead of seeing the refugee crisis as a challenge at redefining itself, the European reflex has been to simply consider the insurgence of refugee masses as a threat (of its wealth, security, stability, what have you).[17] Instead of taking as its basis the shared substance of our social being, Europe is doing the opposite (with the somewhat ironical but genuine exception of Merkel's Germany).[18] It has thus used multiple measures to fortify its borders, with financial and political actions being followed by the erection of physical walls, the militarisation of borders, and the introduction of global high-tech surveillance systems that target both the displaced and its own citizens (Hungary and, more recently, Poland). By doing so, Europe diverts much of this accumulating pressure to third party countries that have no choice but contain the forced displaced population (Turkey, Jordan and Greece) and increases the stress on their own population.

Where should we position architecture in all this? As stated, our original intent was to additionally focus on the spatial consequences of conflict, interested as we were in clarifying the intrinsic relationships that can be traced between theory and practice. Conflict areas often prove to be fertile grounds for innovation and for the emergence of new spatial forms. In their extremity, conflicts often serve as an intensified example for spatial processes that happen elsewhere, both in our cities, territories and landscapes. The ongoing condition of crisis has allowed for the emergence of all sorts of speculative scenarios, and simultaneously given rise to the emergence of new discursive takes on spaces of resilience and new understandings of space. The contemporary spaces emerging out of post-conflict situations were therefore part of this intent. Daniel Tan's case study in this issue falls within this scope. He investigates Vatican City as a space of increased control and the contradictive tensions that have emerged as a result of this. The spectacle, which initiates and creates mass gatherings, has become a perfect target for terrorism, especially when the spectacle is enacted within the condensed spaces of the contemporary city. Originally intended as a space of gathering, with open borders, St. Peter's square of Vatican City has become an increasingly securitised space where the role of architecture is increasingly diminished in favour of the important role security experts play in the spatial lay-out of public space. Tan raises the rather important question how architecture can ensure that fear does not entirely overtake the nature of public urban spaces due to restrictive security measures.

Fabiano Micocci presents another post-conflict example with the 'inclusive urban strategy and action plan' for two neighbourhoods in Tripoli (Lebanon), an exemplary case in which multi-disciplinary post-war regeneration processes have resulted in a more balanced way of urban development after the destruction caused by conflict. Pleading for a two-sided approach, one in which architects do not only address the physical rebuilding of the urban tissue, but also take the traumas and psychological effects into consideration, post-war rebuilding is presented as a holistic process. The author claims

that this approach is a divergence from more classical procedures as it incorporates critical, social, cultural, ethnic, religious, psychological as well as physical aspects of post-conflict regeneration. This new(er) approach is necessary as the nature of the conflicts have changed considerably: often non-state diffused parties are involved and the space in which the conflict was enacted is hardly transparent and mostly urban. The effects for local populations are therefore far-reaching, meaning tangible goals have to be set. Tripoli is a particularly difficult case, if only through the sheer complexity of different forms of post-conflict situations. The more recent influx of refugees from the Syrian war has had serious ramifications on an already delicately (dis-)balanced conflict situation. Given the complexity of the holistic approach, the rebuilding of two neighbourhoods in Tripoli was separated in a diagnostic phase and a phase of strategy planning. The ensuing action plan resulted in a proposal for three levels of intervention through scenarios. Rather than focusing primarily on the economic aspect of rebuilding processes, the scenarios aim to establish community relationships along a broad spectrum of possibilities, namely through the insertion of 'urban armature' to ensure lively urban spaces; economical ('functional') relationships of these public spaces with the local community and participatory engagement of the local community through initiatives and events which were intended as acts of 'placemaking'.

Killian Dohorty, to conclude the post-conflict discussion, offers an insight into the presence of conflict within the landscape of contemporary, post-war Rwanda. In Rwanda, both power and social rank have traditionally been territorially determined, as the agronomists were able to secure access to resources, while the hunter-gatherer communities were less able to do so. Dohorty sketches strategies that can start addressing the current suppression enacted upon the Twa minority. This strategy aims at taking, on the one hand, the non-economic aspects of the Twa's ongoing discrimination into account while, on the other, allowing for the dual understanding of dwelling for the Twa, namely one that fluctuates between the contested and restricted boundaries of suppressed dwelling and a habitation that is based on the borderless space of the stretched-out forested territory.

The agonistic model

Recent discussions in philosophy and political theory have also been highly influenced by the emergence of conflict in everyday space(s). The treatment of 'otherness'[19] and 'thinking otherwise'[20] had already been introduced in philosophical discourse since the 1970s, but recent debates on 'agonistics'[21] and civility and violence have extended this discussion,[22] based on the incorporation of violence and/or conflict into models of societal development and social exchange.[23] As an example of the incorporation of these philosophical insights into architectural practice, Socratis Stratis and Emre Akbil present 'Hands-on Famagusta', which offers an agonistic model of peace building processes as an alternative to the 'techno-managerial' process that emphasises economic activities. The role creative conflict can play in a regeneration process is exemplified by the authors with three 'commoning practices': namely counter-mapping, which should change one's perspective on the conflict; the creation of thresholds, enabling creative conflict to emerge; and the introduction of urban controversies, thus setting the basic rules for the unfolding of creative conflict. Such practices should lead to the emergence of new institutions and procedures regarding the establishing of peace. This proposed approach is presented as the only true means with which to overcome differences and trauma in a process aimed at peace and reconciliation.

Within this philosophical domain, Sarah Rivière brings forward the notion of 'stasis' and discloses an understanding of the term based on the complicated

meanings it had in ancient Greek philosophy. Contemporary thinkers (Chantal Mouffe and Giorgio Agamben for example) similarly have taken up this understanding of 'stasis' as being the inherent and necessary presence of conflict in society and daily life, as a productive element that increases awareness and nuance, and as a phase that offers both clarification and orientation. Rivière's argument focuses particular attention on five ways of describing stasis, namely, first, as an inherent part of society whose constituent elements are related by kinship, in other words friendly enemies that share a common space. Secondly, stasis can be understood as a charging of energies ready to be released, a distinct moment of pre-kinesis that is necessary for the forces to become fully available. Then, thirdly, as a state of permanent and peaceful equilibrium within a living system, which can actually never be achieved, but rather constitutes the transition to the next phase that is dependent on it. Fourthly, the process and period of adjustment of the living body when confronted with changes as a body that is in stasis is charged as it is readjusting and accumulating energies toward a next phase, a necessary stage therefore, in the process of life. And, lastly, when stasis in society occurs, it becomes imperative that everyone gets engaged and participates in the forming and transformation of society, a process which, as a result, constitutes the very guarantee that war would not break out during the period of stasis. Rivière conclusively claims that to understand public space as a form of stasis means the active participation of the citizen in a kindred yet frictuous moment of development toward growth. This implies restraint and a measured responsive act of force, allowing a society to settle differences, without going to the extent of excluding otherness in its debates as well its (public) spaces.

Additionally, Ayesha Sarfraz and Arsalan Rafique read contemporary Pakistani cities as sites where conflict has been absorbed in the city, its streets and public spaces. They argue that violence has been accepted in these conditions and has started to play a constructive role in the unfolding of everyday life. Sketching out the history of the country as well as the overall developments of Pakistani cities, the authors claim that diversity and heterogeneity had initially been replaced by segregation and homogeneity as a result of the English colonial practice of rule and divide within former India, which ultimately led, in 1947, to 'the partition'. The ethnic migrations and displacements that were a direct result of this partition resulted in a unprecedented (at least in the Asian context) homogenisation of the population, as minorities either decided to leave, were expelled or were extremely marginalised due to government policies and military-based decisions regarding safety, security, control and surveillance. Nowadays, urban areas in which minorities live have shown a tendency to withdraw into self-regulation and self-securitisation, bordering on concretely distancing themselves from overall state control. The role architecture plays in these contexts is complex. Through their symbolic meanings, buildings are perceived as emblems for the nation state, or at least representative of the period in which certain rulers ruled the nation. The violent attack on these architectural targets not only results in a homogenised cityscape, but also increases the presence of security aspects within the architecture, in the attempt to prevent similar acts of violence on the architecture. The relationships between city and violence are both complicated and multiple, but new forms of resilience are created through artistic interventions centring around or even involving migrants, minorities and other displaced persons. These initiatives and interventions constitute an alternative to the design of urban spaces through security measures only as they open up the possibility that violence is countered through engaged participatory acts in the public realm.

The architecture of conflict

To conclude the series of articles and case studies presented in this issue, we considered it important to speculate on the results of incorporating the act of conflict and the aspects of violence into architectural reflection and practice. To this end, Sam Grabowska presents the restless architectures of the US/Mexico borderlands as indicators of the very foundational characteristics of architecture itself. Emerging out of the constraints imposed by US border patrols as well as Mexican human and drug trafficking, the temporary ephemeral pieces of architecture constructed by border-crossers constitute the principles of shelter, firmness and purposefulness considered to be the very origins of architecture as a distinct cultural practice. Grabowska discusses this 'architecture of anxiety' of border-crossings through three modalities that characterise it, namely sleeplessness, insecure identity and fear of death; and substantiates this characterisation with examples from field research done in the Sonoran desert of Arizona. The first modality, sleeplessness, shows how tactics of sleep become part of the architecture, as a full body protector that extends towards a span based on bodily sizes and possible escape routes. Sleepless border-crosser architecture is paradoxical as it provides shelter but at the same time raises awareness of the immediate surroundings, remarkably merging the timelessness of sleep with the timelessness of constant alert. The second modality, insecure identity, links the difficulties of identity in borderlands with architectural structures that express the same insecurity towards identity. Ultimately constructed as temporary, the architectural structures of the no-mans land of the border have to remain without identity and thus without representation. The third modality, fear of death, attributes to borderland architecture the ultimate element of the uncanny to its spaces, namely the constant presence of death as inherent to the architecture. The characteristics of this architecture of anxiety are thus ephemerality, invisibility, impatience, cloaked-ness, readiness to be erased, anonimity and lack of any specific identity. It is architecture that tries to not be: neither 'architecture' nor 'there'. The architecture of border-crossings is non-permanent, it either disappears because of vulnerability and lack of maintenance or because of deliberate destruction in order not to leave traces; it needs to be able to adapt to the circumstances, be flexible for both a great variety of climatological circumstances, manoeuvrability as well as survival. Ultimately however, Grabowska's central thesis is not about the making explicit of these 'anxious' characteristics of architecture. Rather, she ideologically posits that any form of anxiety, which is inherent in any border, will be the very origin of the border's demise and undoing.

Finally, in their case study, Moniek Driesse and Isaac Landeros offer a comparative analysis of Rotterdam and Mexico City, which they use to substantiate their understanding of urban spaces of conflict as Neplantha, meaning 'a state of in-betweenness'. This idea of conflict is situated in the confrontation between the built structures of the city and the appropriation of these by the inhabitants of the city using them. This matter will always be resolved, meaning the urban environment becomes the extension of human activity, but only in so far as to the moment a new conflict arises and the whole process of transformation starts anew. The authors argue for a designerly understanding of this process, in which the space that is practiced is anticipated in the projected depiction of the city.

Afterword: solidarity?

While writing this introduction, our news feed captured streamed video of the atrocities of war in the Syrian city of Aleppo, sent by its citizens. During and after the heavy bombardments of the city, citizens hid in its remains. Their footage was

dominated by ruins, parts of buildings, burnt furniture, perforated walls, and mutilated roads covered by a thick layer of dust and gravel. One video streamed a couple of months ago, at the time of a heat wave. During a short ceasefire, an improvised news camera captured five kids happily splashing in a pond. The pond suddenly appeared in the middle of the neighbourhood, just after it was bombarded from the air. The blast hit an underground water pipe that turned the ground around it into a semi-deep puddle, a pool. This uncanny scene of joy was followed this week by a very different type of eyewitness report. Just before the fall of Aleppo, the besieged area consisted of only two square kilometres of the city. This remaining enclave lacked any route of escape, trapping the rebels and the remaining civilians in desperate circumstances. The dramatic tragedy forced civilians to make a 'final' decision. Some chose suicide, others crouched in bombed-out hallways amid the rubble of their former city and turned to the tiny devices in their hands to share with the world their horror, fear, anguish and rage.[24] Watching a city collapse through a sequence of improvised video streams, must have inflicted immense anxiety, fear and despair on both ends of the line. As we watched the last moments of Aleppo's violent obliteration, three other terror attacks took place simultaneously in a Berlin Christmas market, an Ankara art gallery and a Zurich mosque.

So it seems only reasonable to conclude that, yes, conflict is everywhere. Hopefully, in this issue of *Footprint* we have been able to sketch out that the wars of yesterday are nothing like the wars of today nor that their spatial implications are anything but comparable. By now, the city and all its 'contents' – its inhabitants, buildings, architecture, and culture – are simultaneously militarised and under attack. As we are finalising this issue, a new world order has come into being in front of our very eyes. Confronting this state of violence, we cannot but end with a fervent plea for solidarity and hope. In *Multitude*, Hardt and Negri borrowed the tale of the *Golem* from the Kabbalah to remind us that under the outburst of destruction, there is the promise and wonder of creation, and under the din of our global battlefield, there is not only a lesson about the monstrosity of war, but also about our possible redemption through solidarity,[25] or even love.[26]

Notes

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Biographies

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West Bank Settlement and the Transformation of the Zionist Housing Ethos from Shelter to Act of Violence

Yael Allweil

In March 2011 West Bank settlers of Itamar formed an outpost to the settlement in response to the murder of a settler family in their home. Settlers established this outpost with simple, rectangular, plywood structures as symbols for dwellings, meant as an explicit response to the murder by way of erecting housing. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu responded to the murder with the memorable statement 'the [Palestinians] kill – we build'. Within hours Netanyahu's government announced the construction of 675 new housing units in Itamar, a 675 percent increase. The plan, approved in 2013, includes legalising the 137 housing units built without permit in Itamar since 1984 and issuing permits for 538 more units within a proper plan.[1] While framed to negate 'us' from 'them', Netanyahu's kill-build declaration places citizen housing on a par with violence and transforms violence *in* the home to violence *by* the home. This declaration makes a profound and explicit statement by which citizen housing is a retaliatory act in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, an act of violence rather than shelter.

Netanyahu's statement departs from Israel's Zionist housing project posited on an ethos of shelter. The collective national home was conceived as shelter from Jewish persecution granted to nations and individuals, posited as the raison d'etre of the State of Israel. Zionism's attempt to materialise a national home, where none existed for millennia, involved connecting subjects with a homeland in order to form a sovereign political entity legitimated by these people, and great efforts were invested in forming a state-citizen contract via mass provision of public housing.[2] Providing housing for each citizen fulfills the right of each Jew to the ancestral homeland and serves as the material condition for accumulating future citizens and forming an independent polity. The interrelation of national home and individual house is therefore a central attribute of Zionism as ideology and – since statehood – as a regime.[3]

The historiography of Israel-Palestine is deeply focused on violence and conflict as objects of inquiry, neglecting the relationship between violence and settlement.[4] Historians identify 1929 as 'year zero' for the continuing violent struggle over Palestine, while the two iconic Zionist housing and settlement types – the kibbutz and the Hebrew City – were formed some 20 years earlier in 1909 and 1910.[5] Accounts of Israel-Palestine view architecture and planning as 'the continuation of war by other means,' namely as means exercised after overt violence has receded.[6] Yet the formation of key Zionist settlement frameworks prior to the eruption of violence marks a historiographical gap that necessitates re-evaluation of the conflict and calls into question the taken-for-granted assumption of cause and effect, marking settlement as an act of response and retaliation to violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Meanwhile, significant studies of Israel-Palestine within spatial disciplines have privileged the analysis

of geographies of violence over historical accounts, making a statement on 'the landscape as historical montage' that challenges the historical dictum of chronology-as-causality.[7] Noted is Weizman's argument for the significance of geographical principles – parallels between varieties of historical contexts that differ in many respects but hold similar spatial patterns – as key objects for architectural analysis transcending the historical.[8] Moreover, unlike the underlying assumption in literature on the settlement project, violence was neither the goal nor the practice of early settlers. Findings question the well-accepted argument that settlements were *designed* as military posts in an offensive project of territorial domination,[9] indicating instead that settlers attempted to transform the West Bank from military zone to civilian homeland in defiance of state insistence that only construction for military purposes was justifiable under international law.[10] This dynamic characterised the settlement project, starting with the first civilian resettlement of Gush Etzion, involving two opposing parties – state and settlers – now largely discussed as one. While Israel's Minister of Foreign Affairs Abba Eben resisted resettlement and declared it in the UN a military post, the returnees declared they 'came here as citizens in every sense'.[11]

Gideon Aran, who has studied Gush Emunim since the early 1970s, identified deep transformations in settler narratives and self-written historiography, stating that 'informants [have] forgotten and denied facts for a number of reasons, honest and less honest'.[12] Aran chose to publish his original study based on ideas expressed in interviews in the 1970s and 80s, rather than updating the data for current settler ideas, as he has found the forgotten facts cardinal for understanding the movement. My own focus in this article on the early formation of Gush Emunim ideology in settlement form takes a similar approach. Therefore, in attempting to locate the pivotal moment of change, I look for the change in the movement's self-narration to pinpoint change in settlement strategy and ideology. When and how has Israel's regime come to identify citizen housing as acts of violence in a national conflict, as reflected in Netanyahu's statement quoted above? Why would the Israeli state transform a housing ethos of shelter to one of national violence? What does the deep divide between housing as violence and housing as shelter mean for Israeli society at large? This article aims to (1) examine these questions using detailed architectural history of early settlement and the pivotal change in settlement practices and (2) contribute to our theoretical understanding of spatial violence by reconceptualising 'conflict' and 'violence' as two analytical and discursive categories with different political consequences.

Violence, conflict, and housing: theoretical inquiry

The use of violence is increasingly understood spatially in the context of national conflict, as in Paul Farmer's framework of 'structural violence'.[13] The Israel-Palestine case has been significant, with architectural studies on the implications of walls, checkpoints, and barriers to movement by Michael Sorkin, Eyal Weizman, Derek Gregory and others.[14] Violence in dwelling environments has been the subject of a number of important studies, among them Teresa Caldeira's study of the 'talk of crime' and its contribution to 'solutions' like gating and urban segregation of the Brazilian city.[15] Eyal Weizman's studies demonstrate the deep entanglement of civilian and military practices in Israeli housing, producing civilian-cum-military settlements.[16] 'Suburban red-roofed single family homes replaced the tank as the basic battle unit; houses were deployed in formation across a theatre of operations to occupy hills, to encircle an enemy, or to cut its communication lines', writes Weizman.[17] Erez Tzfadia, Haim Yacobi and Oren Yiftachel point to the inherent opacity between the civilian and the military when it comes to political geography in

housing both within and outside the 'green line'.[18]

Conflict is the object of study most commonly identified for Israel-Palestine,[19] understood by scholars and the public alike in normative terms as undesirable and in need of 'solving'.[20] Liberal thought usually reads societies of conflict as deviant: 'pathological or deemed to the expression of irrational forces', politically underdeveloped, and 'on the way to becoming a proper polity'.[21] However, scholars of subaltern studies as well as scholars advocating for 'South-South relations' have pointed to the deep fallacies of the liberal-developmental perspective for the production of knowledge on these societies and political society at large.[22]

Chantal Mouffe's theory of agonism has identified conflict as central to the very formation of a polity. For her, agonism, a conflict that cannot be resolved, suggests a productive role for conflict in assembling a society, based on the object upon which the irresolvable conflict is waged. This object thereby forms a polity out of conflicted social actors by 'bringing them together because it divides them'.[23] From such a standpoint, conflicts are not seen as disturbances that unfortunately cannot be eliminated, as empirical impediments that render impossible the full realisation of harmony. Rather, Mouffe identifies the insolubility of the conflict as essential to political communities. Moreover, Mouffe has written, plural democracy is always a democracy 'to come', as conflict and agonism are at the same time its condition of possibility and the condition of the impossibility of its full realisation.[24]

The argument regarding agonism in political space is supported by a number of studies that find such spaces to be formed as a result of conflict rather than consensus, including AbdouMaliq Simone's study of African cities, Aihwa Ong's study of China's 'Special Economic Zones', and Nezar AlSayyad and Ananya Roy's study of urban informality.[25] A number of architectural studies have also identified the private-domestic space of housing as the site for continuous struggle over the identity of nation and citizens, including John Archer's study of the roots of American-dream suburban housing, Becky Nicolaides's on blue-collar suburbs, and Diane Harris's study of the construction of race in American post-war housing.[26]

The idea of agonism draws attention to an important element within conflict beyond social interaction, what Mouffe calls 'the object of agonism' over which conflict is waged and polity is formed. This object, for Mouffe, is not an obstacle to harmony but the very thing around which political society is forged.[27] Mouffe's work is complemented by Bruno Latour's work on the social significance of objects.[28] This article proposes *housing as the object of conflict* for Israel-Palestine and places significant focus on the object at stake in conflict. Rather than the site or means of violent conflict, I identify housing as the object around which conflict revolves, not merely situated in dwelling spaces but rather enacted by and directed at dwelling spaces. As such, the Israeli-Palestinian context poses a surprising theoretical contribution to understanding spaces and geographies of conflict, suggesting that violence in this struggle over homeland is directed primarily at space itself, and more specifically, at the concrete space of dwelling as emblem and building block of national homeland.

The West Bank settlement project studied here is marked by actual experimentations in housing and settlement forms, applied not by professional architects and planners, but by future dwellers for the purpose of testing out dwelling forms that would constitute viable permanent ones. The study of these experiments maintains housing studies' focus on the social issues and power mechanisms producing and distributing housing, while re-introducing to this discussion the architectural

lens for data collection and inquiry, insisting on the primary sources and disciplinary tools of architectural history, namely the 'reading' of building types, construction techniques, and materiality, along with the decision-making involved in design and construction processes.

Rebuilding civilian settlements, 1967–74

Much has been written about the experimental period of settlement in the West Bank (1967–1977), focusing primarily on the state's political manoeuvring and on the movement's political theology of 'Kookism', introducing Rabbi Kook's theology to mainstream Zionism.[29] Surprisingly few studies investigate experiments in the built environment – namely the 'design' of experimental settlement and housing – to examine how settlement was articulated and exercised by early settlers and ideologues.

The sources available for the study of this question are primarily pamphlets, historical photographs and videos, news reports, and oral testimonies, since settlement attempts were conducted via temporary structures, and all were quickly removed. Planning documents prepared by professional architects and planners can be found only for later stages, starting in 1978, of the consolidation of settlements and construction of permanent structures. Studies of West Bank settlements by leading scholars like Segal, Weizman, Tzfadia and Neuman focus on the period of state involvement and support of the settlement movement starting in 1977, as well as on formal planning by means of masterplans and detailed planning, addressing the bureaucracy and politics involved in administration.[30] Further, the historical focus of these studies zooms in on the post-Oslo period (1990s–present), a period I identify here as significantly different from earlier ones. These important studies therefore require elaboration and historical reframing that looks into the experimental phase of settlement building.

Between 1967 and 1974, Jewish settlement in the West Bank was limited to specific sites: the Jewish Quarter of Hebron, which was deserted after the 1929 massacre of Hebron Jews, an event identified by historians as 'the beginning' of the Israel-Palestine conflict, and the four Gush Etzion kibbutzim lost on the last day of the 1948 war.[31] Citizens, rather than the state, initiated the resettlement of Hebron and Gush Etzion. The Israeli government permitted limited 'return' to these sites, justifiable based on individual return home, while resisting new settlement on occupied land as determined by international law.

The 'children of Gush Etzion', who partook as young adults in the triumph of the 1967 war, organised immediately after the war to re-establish their kibbutzim. The kibbutz settlement form, the iconic building block of Zionist nation building since the 1920s, included by 1967 a network of 230 communes across the country based on a clear, proven, formulaic settlement pattern in terms of social composition and built environment. The kibbutz social-spatial structure consists of a tight commune, in which the residents share most of life's functions in places like a communal kitchen, showers, a children's house, and so forth, resulting in the perception of the entire kibbutz as one's home, with the sole private space being one's immediate dwelling space.[32]

'Kibbutz Kfar-Etzion children' debated whether to resettle in their original kibbutz framework or as a regular urban settlement. Those arguing for an urban (non-communal) settlement proclaimed their goal as 'settling as many Jews in Judea and Samaria', while others argued for the social-ethical cachet of the 'Kibbutz Movement which carried Israel's first rebirth struggles on its back and set [Israel's] borders'. These latter enjoyed the support of the kibbutz leadership of the time, who held significant positions of power in politics and intellectual life.[33] The Religious-Kibbutz Movement, a

subset of the Kibbutz Movement that was less influential during the 'first rebirth struggles', proposed itself as the new leader of the Kibbutz Movement and ideology by adding religious ideology to kibbutz socialism.

Given state resistance to civilian presence in the West Bank, returnees argued among themselves whether to seek state approval for resettlement or settle without it, disregarding the state. The 'children of Gush Etzion' met with Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, who famously said, 'well kids, if you want to – ascend'.[34] Returnees demanded a New Year's prayer at the resettled kibbutz; thus, resettlement was celebrated on 27 September 1967, four months after the 1967 conquest.

In practice, the iconic kibbutz framework made it easier to gain state support, yet restricted early ideas of Jewish settlement to the small scale of the tight communal social and physical structure of the kibbutz settlement form. Kfar-Etzion returnees refrained from conflict with the state over civilian settlement and did not produce a new housing or settlement form. Nonetheless, Kfar-Etzion fomented a new political ideology for the Kibbutz Movement and Zionist settlement at large, which would extend well beyond the kibbutz framework, and addressed the Israeli state as its ideological opponent.

Experimenting with new civilian settlement forms: Sebastia, 1974–75

The idea of forming new settlements in the West Bank was first articulated in 1974, seven years after the 1967 occupation, and at first, limited the idea of resettlement. Kfar-Etzion's secretary Hanan Porat, who was closely affiliated with Rabbi Kook, was among the first to articulate a vision for Judea and Samaria beyond the limited kibbutz format, in new (rather than returning) settlements. Judea and Samaria were held since 1967 by the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) as a military zone whose only civilian population was Palestinian, administered by the military rather than civilian state mechanism.

On 5 February 1974 in Kfar Etzion, Porat hosted the initiating meeting of the messianic activist movement known as Gush Emunim, which proposed civilian settlement as a means to resist the government's Alon Plan to withdraw from most of Judea and Samaria and allow Palestinian – rather than Israeli – civil autonomy upon it.[35] Gush Emunin demanded the inclusion of the West Bank as part and parcel of the civil homeland rather than as occupied enemy territory by allowing Israeli citizens to make it their home by settlement, enacted via a settling group called Elon Moreh.

Unlike the small-scale, government-approved resettlement of Kfar Etzion in kibbutz form, Gush Emunim attempted to form new cities and attract thousands of Israelis to the West Bank, articulating the principle of settling as many Jews in the biblical homeland as possible, in explicit defiance of state policy and IDF military governors. Starting in June 1974, Elon Moreh activists enacted eight 'ascents' involving mass mobilisation pilgrimage events and performances of full settlement, echoing the concept of 'ascent' in Jewish immigration to Zion since the 1880s, as well as the concept of ascent to holy sites, primarily Jerusalem's Temple Mount. As Elon Moreh civilians had no permit to settle in land held under martial law, they were repeatedly evacuated in clashes between settlers and the IDF. Settlers viewed the state and military, rather than the Palestinian population, as their ideological and actual opponents against which they barricaded and voiced threats of violence.

Elon Moreh's first 'ascent' took place on 5 June 1974 south of Nablus. A convoy of 20 trucks and cars carried 100 settlers, including spiritual leader Rabbi Kook, and equipment, including a generator, kitchen facilities, furniture and religious artifacts. Settlers are reported to have fenced off an area of two hectares by the Horon military base; set up

ten tents for dwelling; and designated tents for a synagogue, kitchen, and kindergarten. This settlement attempt included all elements of a 'proper' settlement relying on the kibbutz model in its 'tower' and 'stockade' iteration of the 1930s, which produced instant settlements to circumvent British restrictions on new Jewish settlements. The 'tower and stockade' strategy eluded the restrictions by performing a civilian pioneer act in defiance of the State of Israel as foreign/other.[36] Indeed, as settlers refused to leave, they were surrounded by soldiers and military police who carried them one by one to evacuation buses.[37]

Following the failure of this first attempt, which was well documented by the press, Elon Moreh published a pamphlet addressing the general public, arguing that civilian settlement is an issue of civil rather than military concern, thus pitting the Israeli regime against the Israeli public. The pamphlet proclaimed: 'We set out today to found a city in the heart of Eretz-Israel near Nablus', choosing the site of the old Ottoman train station by the Palestinian village of Sebastia, associated with biblical Samaria.[38] While declaring their goal to be 'a city' involving a large number of settlers, this settlement attempt again relied on the kibbutz model as precedent and justification for 'illegal settlement', producing the performance of settlement by including all aspects of the kibbutz model – from the kindergarten and shared kitchen to the flagpole. Tents were set up for dwelling, an infirmary, and other communal services, while the old train station served as a barricade. A group of right-wing members of parliament, writers, and intellectuals joined the settlers, as well as many reporters who documented Elon Moreh's 'renewal of Jewish settlement in Samaria'.[39] As settlers refused to leave, again military personnel removed them from the site. Elon Moreh's subsequent attempts alternated between the tower and stockade strategy of instant settlement and the mass mobilisation of the general public in festive events, though repeatedly failed to reach the goal of civilian settlement.[40]

Elon Moreh's successful eighth attempt of 30 November 1975 meshed the two strategies of public mobilisation and tower and stockade instant settlement. Activists organised a festive march of thousands of families from Netanya to Sebastia on the Hanukah school holiday, which was complemented by the transportation of equipment and building materials to form an instant settlement occupied by these families. Facing harsh weather conditions that particularly affected the young children present, the military allowed settlers to stay for the weekend. Settlers again organised an impromptu full settlement. Settlers' supporters managed to transfer a truck full of precast elements for concrete structures, smuggled into the site and assembled there. The tent town formed by settlers remained through the weekend and attracted large crowds of additional supporters.[41]

Elon Moreh leaders used the large crowd of civilians to argue for mass civil support of their demand for civilian settlement. Resisting eviction, settler leaders posed threats of violence in the form of civil war should they be forced to evacuate Sebastia. 'We actively, purposely, contributed to generating fear of civil war […] our public was dedicated to go all the way […] with the message "we will defend this place as one defends one's home" […] we exploited the atmosphere of threat to reach a compromise'.[42] The threat of civil war marked West Bank settlement as an internal Israeli affair rather than an intra-national struggle with Palestinians, and forced the State and military to reconsider the terms of the Israeli hold on the West Bank. Negotiations between settlers, the government, and the army resulted in a compromise: in exchange for voluntary evacuation of Sebastia, the Minister of Defence in charge of martial law in the West Bank allowed a group of 30 civilian families to remain in Samaria within the

Fig. 1

Fig. 2

Fig. 3

Fig. 1: Elon Moreh settlement in Sebastia, 1974. Photo: Moshe Milner. Source: National Photo Collection.

Fig. 2: Elon Moreh builds in Sebastia, March 1975. Photo: Shaya Segal. Source: Midreshet Kdumim.

Fig. 3: The Samaria March, March 1975. Photo: Israel Sun.

nearby Kedum army camp.[43] The threat of violence in the form of civil war was therefore successful in gaining settlers a foothold in the West Bank in the form of civilian settlement within an army camp. [Figs. 1–3]

The compromise reached at Sebastia involved accepting 30 settler families into Kedum army base, thus maintaining the principle of a military rather than civilian hold of Samaria as far as the state and army were concerned. No alterations were made to the Kedum camp to accommodate the settlers, who had to care for their own housing and communal facilities within the camp and employed the design of a civilian-built environment as a major tool for transforming the camp into a civilian settlement. Kedum settlers successfully argued for the introduction of supplies from outside the camp, donated by members of the general public with varied interests – from kibbutzim who viewed settlers as the ideological continuation of pioneer settlement to contractors interested in the business opportunity offered by settlement. Elon Moreh's demand for permanent dwellings in winter time was met with 45 mobile homes supplied by the Jewish Agency, a compromise between durability and temporality.[44] In addition, settlers managed to argue for civilian services such as postal services and public transportation. Befriending the camp commander and Nablus governor, settlers gained access to more and more camp facilities and an increased area, including a separate, civilian entrance to serve them independently from the soldiers, later closed off by the Minister of Defence. The state, settlers, and army thereby negotiated the terms of civilian presence in the military-held West Bank upon the everyday built environment of settler housing and services. 'In "basement" conditions yet "penthouse" morale […] the settlement gradually constructed itself as a separate entity […] Supporters who came here saw the making of a new form of pioneer life [… and] were sparked with the seed that fruited with more and more Elon Moreh [settlements] in Judea and Samaria', reported Zvi Slonim, Gush Emunim secretary.[45]

Kedumim: 'communal settlement' as a typology of expansion

Upon rising to power in 1977, Menachem Begin celebrated his victory in the Kedum camp, declaring, 'there will be many more Elon Morehs'.[46] Begin's right-wing administration realised its protracted promise of support for Gush Emunim by granting Kedum settlers full legal status and permits to settle permanently, declaring 'we stand on the land of liberated Israel'.[47] The permanent Elon Moreh settlement was founded south of the Kedum camp in several prefabricated concrete houses and named Kedumim, literally 'ancients', reflecting the idea of reconnecting to biblical space-time.[48] Kedumim therefore seemed to mark the end of the conflict between settlers and the state.

As the permanent materialisation of the practices experimented on in Sebastia, the Kedumim settlers mediated between two key typologies in the history of Zionist settlement – the kibbutz and the Hebrew city – to produce the first iteration of the 'communal settlement' typology. The communal settlement marked the family housing unit as its key element and unit of expansion, forming a dwelling-based landscape. Much discussion has been devoted to communal settlements' suburban political economy, a form of 'good life modernism' based on commuting to the Tel Aviv and Jerusalem metropolises rather than forming urban centers.[49] Yet the communal settlement typology is distinct from an ordinary suburb and serves as the nucleus of the future towns destined to be populated by large numbers of settlers. Based on small, highly ideological communities, the communal settlement closely resembled the kibbutz, yet the Gush Emunim aim of mass Jewish settlement had to depart from the closed community and closed typology of the kibbutz in order to form expandable settlements. It is a typology independent from scale restrictions, as



Fig. 4

Fig. 5

Fig. 4: Elon Moreh – Kedumim, a trailer home, undated. Photo: Asher Koralik.

Fig. 5: Kedumim, 1982. First permanent homes. Photo: Avraham Zaslavski. Source: National Photo Collection.

capable of sustaining a small one-hundred-family settlement like Itamar as a town of thousands like Efrat.

Relying on state support of the settlement movement, Elon Moreh took the opportunity to employ the state mechanism's strongest tool: planning. In 1978 Elon Moreh published their vision for regional planning for the West Bank, including cities, towns, 'garden cities', communal settlements and rural settlements. [Fig. 6] The Jewish Agency took up this civilian initiative and produced the 'Gush Emunim Master Plan' of 1978, outlining a five-year plan for settling 27,000 families in 46 new settlements and 38 existing settlements. The plan was based on the family as civilian unit and calculated two million Lira per family, which was allocated for infrastructure, temporary housing, permanent housing including public institutions, water, means of production, and 'other'.[50] The plan does not distinguish between Jewish and Palestinian settlements, which would have reflected a view of 'conflict', nor between settlements in Israel proper versus the occupied West Bank. [Fig. 7] Moreover, the plan allocated no funds for security or military purposes, reflecting Elon Moreh's insistence that the settlements were civilian rather than military.

Yet Begin's regime soon proved a disappointment to the movement, as Begin accepted the international legal dictum that only military purposes are valid in occupied territories and demanded settlements be defined as military posts. Since Elon Moreh explicitly rejected state categorisation of the settlement movement as military-purposed, its leaders went on a hunger strike.[51] 'The government has argued before the Supreme Court that settlements beyond the Green Line were erected for military purposes […] defined as temporary (until the end of occupation) – declaring all settlements temporary.'[52] Settlers were concerned about the precedent set in 1978, which involved receding from the Sinai to Egypt in the framework of a peace treaty and accepting occupied land as foreign land held temporarily rather than as an integral part of the homeland. 'Our demand', the Elon Moreh leaders stated in a pamphlet, 'is for parliament to issue a law excluding land in Eretz-Israel from categories of "occupied", "foreign", and "temporary" that can only be used for "military purposes" […] to allow for […] civilian Jewish settlement'.[53] State support for the settlement project under the conception of military purpose was for Elon Moreh ideologues a double-edged sword they feared undermined their entire enterprise. Such state initiatives as Ariel Sharon's 12-point plan for settlement strongholds on strategic West Bank hilltops were discussed at the time as explicitly countering settlement purpose and ideology, explicitly posited on being civilian rather than military.[54]

Nonetheless, settlers' struggle to transform the West Bank from military zone to civilian homeland has largely been won: by 1993 civilian 'communal settlements' based on family dwelling units already housed 116,000 settlers served by publicly-funded civil services and infrastructure.[55] Planning documents for Elon Moreh and Kedumim made as early as 1982 and as late as 1993 demonstrate formal planning for suburban layout and infrastructure that persisted even as violence erupted, starting in 1987 with the first Palestinian Intifada. [Figs. 4–7]

Locating the space-time of the turn towards violence: Kedumim stronghold

When and how has the housing-violence cause-and-effect relationship transformed? Where did the idea of housing as retaliation or offence come from? The question arising here concerns the pivotal moment of historical change in the settler mindset and settlement strategy, a shift from their consistently civilian project to the military one. An interesting lead can be found in settler-produced historiography. Starting in the 1990s, a dramatic change of tone emerged in the settler narrative in the context of the brief political move to the left with

Yitzhak Rabin's administration, after some 15 years of right-wing settlement-supporting government and Rabin's actions to 'resolve' the occupation in the Oslo Accords. New historiographic accounts of early settlement, for example by Shafat in 1995, reframed the motivations and context of early settlement. Rather than an internal struggle for civilian settlement voiced via threats of civil war, settlers' new historiography revolved around violent struggle with Palestinians, reflecting a shift towards political violence.[56]

The transformation in the settlers' housing ethos from civilian shelter to political violence began in the early 1990s in response to early negotiations over a two-state solution that would no longer consider the West Bank part of the Jewish homeland. The Oslo accords of 1993, in which the State of Israel accepted the West Bank as the Palestinian homeland, was a watershed event for the settler mindset. Settler representatives in parliament demanded more construction in order to 'make settlement a fact', so major clusters of land are left intact or swapped for other territory, and – starting in the early 2000s – explicitly intended to render the two-state solution unfeasible. These goals increasingly conceived of settlement as an act in the context of conflict, generating a transformation in the purpose and ethos of settlement, as well as its historiography.

The state-imposed settlement halt led settlers to search for new expansion strategies, resulting in the strategy of building settlement outposts, small-scale settlements formed in strategic locations that gradually accumulated to full-fledged settlements. Settlement outposts have been the subject of extensive writing concerning the creeping process of outpost building, which is initially justified by security needs like communication but then comes to include dwellings and ends up de facto settlement.[57] 'This is how it is done', writes Sasson, 'the stronghold is labeled "neighbourhood" of an existing settlement, thus "permitted". If the stronghold-disguised-as-neighbourhood is included in the work plan for a government office, it can subsequently receive a monthly budget from the Ministry of the Interior and a special budget for construction by the Ministry of Housing'.[58] This 'system', whose architecture and geography are the subject of Weizman's work, has characterised the settlement project since the 1990s. Yet how has 'the system' formed and taken shape?

The pivotal case again can be found in Kedumim, where an illegal residential outpost named Mizpe Yishai – literally Yishai overlook – was formed at a strategic location facing Kedumim on the opposite side of arterial Road 55 linking Qalqilya to Nablus, a major throughway for the Palestinian population. Mizpe-Yishai thus transformed Road 55 into an internal road within Kedumim, consequently blocked at times during escalations of violence 'for the security' of Kedumim residents.

A video titled 'Mizpe-Yishai – History,' telling the formal history of the outpost, was produced by Etrog Studios of Kedumim for its formal inauguration in August 2003 in the presence of Housing minister Effi Eitam.[59] The video includes historical images and footage collected from the individual settlers involved, embedded within interviews with leaders and activists who recount the strategies they had employed in materialising the outpost. The historiography projected from the video clearly addresses Mizpe-Yishai area as 'the eastern hill… located on the other side of the intra-urban road', hence not an obvious extension to Kedumim. The hill was part of Ariel Sharon's much discussed hill-top or 'star' plan, which framed settlements as military outposts, to the dismay of settlers. While controversial, this state-administered plan was nonetheless an act of government and placed no burden on the settlers to act themselves to secure the West Bank as homeland.

Yet as Yitzhak Rabin took power and declared



Fig. 6: Elon Moreh's 1978 regional planning for the West Bank, including cities, towns, 'garden cities', communal settlements and rural settlements across Judea and Samaria. Source: Tsvi Raanan, *Gush Emunim* (Tel Aviv: Sifriat Poalim, 1980).

Fig. 7: Jewish Agency 'Gush-Emunim master plan', 1978. Source: Tsvi Raanan, *Gush Emunim* (Tel Aviv: Sifriat Poalim, 1980).

a freeze on construction in Judea and Samaria, settlers from Kedumim carried out the first act relating them to the eastern hill by mounting a trailer home as a declarative act of future civilian settlement there. 'The trailer withstood heroically the rain and sun', states the video, 'silently facing the insults of those who did not believe a neighbourhood would be built here.' In summer 1995, as public debate over the future of the West Bank and its settlers heated, culminating in the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin on 4 November, Kedumim residents formed an impromptu youth camp at the bottom of the hill to 'demonstrate the continuity of Kedumim beyond the road'.

Despite the election of Netanyahu's right-wing government after Rabin's assassination, Kedumim settlers did not withdraw to the civilian background but assumed an active role in initiating settlements as an explicit barrier to the implementation of the Oslo peace accords, expressing their mistrust in both the state and military to prevent the receding of the national homeland. Settlers took over the hill overlooking Kedumim in 1996 in response to the escalation of violence and the IDF's stated intention to form a military post on it. 'Due to the site's strategic importance, the IDF decided to remove the trailer on the hill, and found a military post', recounts the video, 'yet the dismantling of many military posts in that period raised the concern that this site might too be deserted'. On 6 October 1996, Lieutenant Yishai Sechter, age 21, of Kedumim was killed in a battle along the Lebanese border. A Kedumim committee decided to name the eastern hill after the community's war hero to demonstrate the role assigned to this settlement stronghold in 'defending the homeland'.

Construction was conducted by the Kedumim 3000 construction firm, 'a firm which makes sure not to cross the green line – on its eastern border of course'. Nahman Zoldan, the head of Kedumim 3000, is interviewed in the Kedumim video, saying, 'once the army announced it is taking over this site, I approached Daniella [Weiss, council chairperson] for her permit to come up to this site. We came here… as you see without a plan. We built seven houses – plainly laid on the landscape, one tall, one low… We then looked for the first seven lunatics who would buy the houses.' Zoldan marketed the houses as a unique business and dwelling opportunity contravening the state-imposed construction freeze.

'Mizpe Yishai was our "departure from the walls"', declares Zoldan, referring to the identification of Jewish people stepping outside the walls of Jerusalem to settle the homeland as the beginning of Zionist settlement. Declaring Mizpe-Yishai as the settlers' 'departure from the walls' and a milestone in Zionist settlement might seem overstated at first, yet as I show here, Mizpe-Yishai initiated the transformation of the Zionist housing ethos from shelter to violence. The Kedumim takeover of the hill is situated in the context of escalating violence over the West Bank, as well as the threat posed by the Oslo accords that the West Bank would be recognised as the Palestinian homeland.

While the first iteration of Gush Emunim argued for the replacement of military hold with civilian settlement as a means to declare Judea and Samaria part of the Jewish homeland rather than enemy territory, the Kedumim settlers used Mizpe-Yishai to defy the state and military commitment to territorial resolution and to perpetuate violence within the conflict. Namely, Kedumim settlers founded Mizpe-Yishai in the explicit context of violent struggle between Palestinians and Israeli military-rule forces, marking settlement as an act of offence in the national struggle over the homeland, contravening and actively defy the accords. The settlers' mistrust of state commitment to the idea of Judea and Samaria as part of the Jewish homeland deepened to include mistrust of the ability of the IDF to hold onto the homeland – and to a sense that

the settlers need to replace the army themselves. The settlers' choices in founding Mizpe-Yishai were hence explicitly military-minded, executed in concrete and declarative tactics among them by their arranging houses in formation and naming the neighbourhood after the local war hero.

The 'Mizpe-Yishai – History' video clearly expresses the role assigned by the Kedumim settlers to housing units in marking the new settlement-stronghold in exercising offensive action in the national struggle over the homeland. Kedumim chairperson Daniella Weiss is interviewed, stating, 'this neighbourhood, Mizpe-Yishai, is not only the houses – 30 houses, 50 houses or 100 houses – it is part of a plan for 500 housing units that would extend with God's help to 5000, reaching Havat-Gilad not far from us. Construction here is an expression of continuation.'

The two key differences between the formation of Kedumim and Mizpe-Yishai include the use of housing as a means of national violence rather than civilian dwelling, and the threat of violence directed towards the Palestinians rather than towards Israeli civil society. The Kedumim logic of housing-as-outpost has eventually taken over the state rhetoric to become Israel's new housing ethos, as seen in Netanyahu's 2011 statement. [Figs. 8–9]

The turn towards violence in Israel proper: housing neoliberalisation

While most scholarly and general attention to violence in Israel-Palestine is directed at the country's contested periphery, a fascinating phenomenon of mass citizen protest identifies housing as the arena in which orchestrated state violence is exercised upon citizens, a violence which goes almost entirely unnoticed. This violence was first articulated as such in July 2011, four months after Netanyahu's kill-build statement, by the largest social movement since the 1970s. Hundreds of thousands of citizens protested the high cost of housing as a commodity in an inflated neoliberal real estate market and demanded renewal of Israel's housing-based social contract by which housing was provided as a social right reflecting Israel's ethos as the Jewish collective home. While different classes of people define 'proper dwelling' differently and suffer the indignities and absurdities of dwelling in their own ways, discontent over access to proper dwellings is strongly shared. The neoliberalisation of Israel's housing market since the 1990s has transformed dwelling space from a right of the citizenry to a means of production for developers and the state itself, which owns 94 percent of the land.[60] Dwelling options for citizens have come to include committing oneself to high 30-year mortgages, paying up to 50 percent of one's income for housing, offsetting high costs with long commutes, or dwelling in very poor conditions. The housing protest movement acted to make state violence towards citizens evident by subjecting them to accumulation by dispossession – a phenomenon discussed in this geopolitical context as military-based and exercised on Palestinian subjects.[61]

Historian Danny Gutwein advocates studying the settlement project in the context of the neoliberalisation of Israel since the late 1970s, which has accelerated since Netanyahu's tenure as Minister of Finance. The introduction of housing-as-violence in the West Bank in the early 1990s paralleled Netanyahu's introduction of neoliberal measures to the housing market in Israel proper. While housing is provided as a public good in the occupied territories – the sole site where the principles of the Israeli welfare state prevails, the responsibility to house oneself was increasingly relegated to the market within Israel proper. Netanyahu's regime deliberately used neoliberal governmentality to distribute the risks of dwelling-based accumulation by dispossession among individuals in Israel proper, while settlers are shielded as a collective group, benefitting from a generous package of subsidised no-interest mortgages, free infrastructure (roads,

electricity, sewage), and services in a state of exception.[62]

Yet while the neoliberalisation of Israel proper has been deepening, the majority of Israelis have been refusing the generous 'benevolent state' offer of state-sponsored housing in the contested space of the territories. While the Israeli citizenry has kept Netanyahu in power, it has been 'voting with its feet' against the settlement project by individually choosing to reside within the Green Line, despite the higher cost of property and everyday living and in spite of the opportunity to be included in the privileged settler milieu.

Simon Springer suggests that neoliberalism has a role in relegating violence to certain 'irrational' and 'local' spaces where violence occurs, positioning the global market as the sole provenance of nonviolence and ostensible opposite to violence as irrationality.[63] Considering Springer's proposal, we can read Israelis' embracing of the liberalised housing market as an attempt to assign a rational, non-nationalist meaning to dwelling, distinguishing themselves from both settlers and Palestinians fighting over biblical lands 'over there' by discussing housing as real-estate rather than homeland.

The mass public protests of 2011 marked a moment of historiographical shift among the Israeli public, through which the brutality of housing neoliberalisation was first discussed and popularised as such, largely rewriting the historiography of citizen housing in popular discourse and the media. Why did the silent, complicit, Israeli public suddenly reject the neoliberal promise of normality, take to the streets, and engage in rewriting its housing history?

The mass protest made many realise the failure of the neoliberal promise to employ market rationality in Israeli housing and distinguish Israel proper from the irrational otherness of the territories. Moreover, the mass protest finally exploded the neoliberal idea of individual governmentality and risk by demonstrating that the lack of access to housing was not their individual failure, but the result of institutional, orchestrated violence. Since 2006, Israel saw a steep hike in housing costs, the causes of which have been debated extensively with no conclusive economic theory.[64] While boom and bust periods in housing real estate and rental costs have characterised the Israeli housing market since the creeping neoliberalisation of the 1970s, by 2011 it was clear that a bust is unlikely, and that what the public believed to be an open market in housing is highly state-controlled and far from benevolent to the citizens.

While many protesters and movement leaders tried to keep the movement 'a-political', the movement was decisive in the political realisation that Netanyahu's regime has deliberately used neoliberal governmentality to distribute the risks of dwelling-based accumulation by dispossession to individuals in Israel proper. The neoliberal violence directed towards citizens who have been rejecting the 'benevolent state' of the West Bank arguably serves to turn the tide and attract as many Jewish Israelis to the settlements. As neoliberal violence within Israel increases, so – at least theoretically – would the incentive to offset neoliberal violence with political violence, thereby contributing to the national struggle over the homeland by settlement. The settlement project's dependence on mass settlement, and deepening international pressure to reach a two-state solution, required a substantial push to draw citizens to the West Bank. This process arguably reached a tipping point following Israel's 2005 disengagement from Gaza and the subsequent operation 'Summer Rains' of 2006, which provoked a mass public debate over the future of the settlement project, Israel's hold of the biblical West Bank, and settlers' protracted political leadership of the country.

Netanyahu's regime 'others' subjects living under

Fig. 8

Fig. 9

Fig. 8: Aerial photograph of Kedumim and Mizpe-Yishai across Road 55, 2013. Photo: Samaria settlements committee.

Fig. 9: First trailer home of Mizpe-Yishai. Screenshot: 'Mizpe-Yishai – History', 2011.

the neoliberal regime of housing in Israel proper from the collective national body, which he identified with the settlement project in his 'kill-build' statement. The present regime thus subjects the majority of its citizens to increasing levels of market violence by stripping them of state provision of subsidised housing, once a staple of Israeli citizenship. Pitting segments of society against each other based on the deep inequalities in access to housing, Netanyahu's regime benefits from social erosion, curbing the opposition against him. To protest their lack of access to housing, protesters set up tent camps across the country, claiming that housing was 'a right rather than a commodity'.[65] Forming an alternative built environment no one could disregard, protesters employed the object through which violence was inflicted on them – namely housing and settlement – to protest their condition as lesser citizens.[66]

The neoliberalism of the housing market has eventually turned against citizens living in Israel proper and exposed itself as a violent – rather than rational – measure. Neoliberal violence disrupts the idea of neoliberalism as rational and disinterested, as well as of the idea of 'home' as a real estate commodity, a traded object of investment capital. Neoliberal violence therefore suggests that housing has deeper meanings, re-invoking Israel's housing ethos of shelter and nation building. Rather than resisting neoliberal violence as individuals, the housing movement formed surprising, encompassing solidarity among conflicted segments of society, rearticulating it as a polity based on the right to housing. The protest movement attempted to restore the social contract and reverse the change in housing ethos – a struggle yet to materialise in real politics. [Figs. 10–11]

Conclusion: Israel proper and the West Bank as separate sites of housing-as-violence

This article identifies a transformation in Israel's housing ethos from an ethos of shelter, which has served Zionism both pre- and post-statehood, to an ethos of national violence. Employing detailed study of settlement housing practices since 1967, I identify the tipping point – Netanyahu's 2011 'kill-build' statement – at which the settlement project transformed its housing ethos from civil to offensive, taking housing from meaning 'a place of shelter' to serving as an act of violent retaliation. The year 2011 exposed the two key means by which citizen housing is employed as political violence in the context of national conflict over homeland: as political violence directed at the Palestinian opponent, and as neoliberal violence directed at most of Israeli society. 2011 therefore saw housing explicitly declared – and publicly realised – as an object of violence.

While settlement housing is assumed to have always served as an object of conflict in the national struggle over the West Bank, this article shows that settlers used housing to challenge the state and army and argue for civilian Israeli hold of land as homeland (rather than military hold of foreign land), invoking the Israeli ethos of housing as stand-in and building block for the nation. The settlers' transformation of the housing strategy and ethos to an offensive act and object of conflict over the homeland was a response to the Oslo Accords, employing housing as a proxy for military posts and strategic appropriation of territorial homeland. The 'benevolent' State's support of settlements by providing housing, infrastructure and services is complemented with the neoliberalisation of the housing market in Israel proper.

Since political membership in Israeli society is tied to dwelling in the homeland, the struggle over Israel's housing ethos is central to the very identity of the nation and its citizens. The transformation since the 1990s of the Israeli housing ethos to one of violence leaves Israeli citizens between the proverbial rock and hard place: either they are left to the mercy of Israel's inflated real estate

Fig. 10

Fig. 11

Fig. 10: Housing protest, July 2011, Tel Aviv. Photo: Author.

Fig. 11: Housing protest tent city, Tel Aviv, August 2011. Photo: Activestills.

housing market, or they comply with Netanyahu's doctrine and enjoy the public provision of housing as an act of violence in the West Bank. The theoretical implications of housing-as-violence suggest the actual material space of houses as the object of conflict, rather than the site or means for it, and invokes Mouffe's discussion of the object of conflict as forming a polity around it. Rather than resisting neoliberal violence as individuals, the housing movement formed a surprising, encompassing solidarity to resist the consequences of neoliberal violence, rearticulating the Israeli polity as based on the right to housing. The movement rejected the transformation of housing to act of violence and demanded restoration of Israel's housing ethos as shelter – a struggle yet to materialise in real politics.[67]

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Biography

Yael Allweil is an architect and Assistant Professor in the Faculty of Architecture and Town Planning at the Technion, Israel. She completed her PhD in architecture history at UC Berkeley exploring nationalism in Israel-Palestine as a regime of housing. Her research agenda explores the history of housing in Israel and Palestine and the history of struggles over urban public spaces, emphasising the spatialities of political struggles. Her research was published in the monograph *Home-Land: Zionism as Housing Regime 1860–2011* (Routledge, 2016) and a number of journal articles. Yael's work involves academic research and activism in the context of the Israeli housing social movement.

On the Spaces of Guerre Moderne: The French Army in Northern Algeria (1954–1962)

Samia Henni

Introduction

On the night of Friday, 13 November 2015, as the Paris attacks were still unfolding, François Hollande, President of the Fifth Republic stood before national television and declared the closing of the country's borders and a nationwide *état d'urgence* (state of emergency). The French media compared these attacks with the calamities of World War II, thus disregarding and undermining the Paris Massacre of 17 October 1961, during *La Guerre d'Algérie* (the Algerian War, 1954–1962), which killed hundreds of peaceful Algerian pro-independence protesters who had gathered in Paris. The Paris police forces were then under the authority of Maurice Papon, a French civil servant who had served twice in Algeria under French colonial rule, and who was convicted of crimes against humanity in 1998 for his participation in the deportation of Jews in Bordeaux to concentration camps during World War II.[1]

The French newspaper *Libération* of Saturday and Sunday, 14–15 November, wrote that the exceptional law of the state of emergency was rooted in the *Evènements d'Algérie* (Algeria's events), as it had been decreed for the first time on 3 April 1955, five months after the outbreak of the Algerian Revolution on 1 November 1954. The expression *Evènements d'Algérie*, as well as *Opérations de maintien de l'ordre* (the enforcement of law and order), were employed by the French authorities during and after the war to designate the Algerian War. It was not until 18 October 1999, under the presidency of Jacques Chirac, that the French National Assembly formally recognised the term *war* by law and authorised the use of the appellation *La Guerre d'Algérie* in French schools and in official terminology.[2]

In 2015, sixty years after the institution of the state of emergency, the same extraordinary law is enforced, but it took the French president a few hours to call the Paris attacks 'an act of war', and a few days after that to proclaim that 'France is at war'. Hollande and his government, however, had no intention of recalling the peculiar character of warfare that France waged (and is still waging), a war that Colonel Roger Trinquier, a French army officer and theorist who served in Algeria, termed *la guerre moderne* (modern warfare).

The aim of this article is to trace the genealogy of the practices and theories of French modern warfare, its *modus operandi,* and its exportation to other parts of the world. The paper does not pretend to scrutinise the spatial organisation and built forms that resulted from this type of warfare, but rather to uncover the psychology and bureaucracy of militarily designed and controlled spaces.

Pacification is not peacemaking

On 3 April 1955, the French National Assembly and the Council of the French Republic approved law no. 55–385 on the state of emergency. Although the bill was modelled on the *état de siège* (state of siege) – that is, a state of war – the state of emergency was not legally deemed a state of war in the

eyes of the French authorities, because Algeria was considered a French territory; ironically, a state of war thus would have meant a civil war.[3] The law gave exceptional powers to the then minister of the interior, François Mitterrand; to the French Prefects; and, in Algeria (under French colonial rule), to the then governor general of the French government in Algeria, Jacques Soustelle, a French ethnologist and former intelligence / anti-Vichy propaganda agent.

The exceptional law of the undeclared war empowered the French authorities to confiscate legally owned weapons; control the press and censor publications, radio broadcasts, cinematographic screenings, and theatre performances; close gathering places; pronounce house confinements without judiciary oversight; forbid the circulation of vehicles, people, and gatherings in given areas and times; institute zones of protection or security where the 'sojourning' of people was regulated; and forbid the sojourning of any person who sought to hinder public authorities' actions in any way.[4] Given the (at the time) recent precedents of the Vichy regime and World War II, the law forbade the establishment of camps, stating that 'under no circumstances [… may] the home arrest […] result in the creation of camps in which the persons referred to in the precedent paragraph would be under detention'.[5]

In the Aurès Mountains, one of the most revolution-affected regions in north-eastern Algeria, the state of emergency was immediately enforced on 6 April 1955. Six days later, the military cabinet of the governor general in Algeria circulated a memo bearing the title *La pacification de l'Aurès* (Aurès Pacification). It claimed that 'the recovery of the situation in the areas where the state of emergency is enforced will be achieved by means of the policy of pacification'.[6] *Pacification* in this sense consisted of systematic practices of profoundly dissimilar, yet interconnected, character that included the organisation of an extensive network of administrators and military officers; the application of significantly in-depth political and administrative actions; and the destruction, the capture, or the prevention of so-called rebels from threatening law and order. The military directive articulated the peculiar characteristics of *pacification* by means of three operations, which involved:

1. *Action humaine*: human action performed upon civilian populations, by becoming acquainted with them, supervising them, gaining their confidence, and obtaining their profound and unconditional support;

2. *Action constructive*: constructive action that may comprise the construction of new connecting roads and infrastructures, the building of new administrative centres and military posts, and the improvement of living conditions in the Aurès; and

3. *Actions de protection*: action of protection that were meant to create a permanent environment of insecurity for the rebels by (a) intelligence, human contact, and ambushes; (b) the presence and action of military forces, and police controls based on intelligence and political actions; (c) the progressive arming of the population in order to manage its own self-defence; (d) the *éloignement* (distancing) of 'suspects'; and finally (e) conventional armed fighting against the rebels.[7]

Whereas the term *rebels* alluded to Algerian revolutionaries, the fighters for the liberation of a colonised population and territory, the word *suspects* entailed (as deliberately defined in the military directive) those 'who provide any personal, volunteer and effective assistances to the rebels'.[8] To this end, if any person – a family member, neighbour, friend, colleague, or anyone else – dared to feed, treat, dress, lodge, hide, or perhaps even speak to a revolutionary, he or she would systematically be considered a potential suspect and would immediately be 'distanced' from the general population.

The same guidelines stated that during the process of the *éloignement* of suspects, 'no collective sanctions of deportation character [will be] accepted. Construction sites [are] to be specified as soon as possible.'[9] Because there were no written instructions that dictated how to distinguish 'suspects' from 'non-suspects,' however, the entire Algerian population thus became potentially suspect: enemies who should be converted into non-suspects, or, if possible, friends.

Despite the use of the epithet *pacification* by the French military and civil authorities in the nineteenth century (in the contexts of the colonial wars and the colonisation of Africa and south-eastern Asia), the policies, processes, methods, and technologies of *pacification* had been considerably upgraded to meet the conditions of the twentieth century: specifically, since the end of World War II and the beginning of the long Cold War. In his 1961 book *La Guerre Moderne*, Roger Trinquier – who had served in World War II, the Indochina War (1946–1954), and the Algerian War – defined modern warfare as 'an interlocking system of actions – political, economic, psychological, military'.[10] Trinquier unreservedly argued that 'the *sine qua non* of victory in *modern warfare* is the unconditional support of a population. According to Mao Tse-tung, it is as essential to the combatant as water to the fish.'[11] To this end, the Algerian War marked a shift from conventional to unconventional warfare; from the clash of two armies in a given battlefield to a much more complex system of operations, in which the target is hardly discernible, and therefore the entire population is at risk.

Modern warfare was also frequently referred to as asymmetric, irregular, subversive, psychological, or revolutionary warfare. Its counterpart term, *counter-revolutionary warfare*, was immediately substituted with the term *counterinsurgency operations*, most likely because the term *revolution* entailed a forcible overthrow of an established authority in a country and its replacement by a different order, whereas insurrection suggested merely a temporary uprising against an authority that will not necessarily result in the conquest of power. While the term *counterinsurgency* thus suggests non-permanent politico-military actions that are designed and executed against the activities of insurgents, this is, as we know, hardly the case.

Pacification is not peacemaking. In his *Grammaire Africaine* (African Grammar) in his 1957 book *Mythologies*, Roland Barthes claimed that during the armed conflict in Algeria, the French authorities employed a language whose aim was not to communicate but rather to intimidate. This *écriture cosmétique* (cosmetic writing), as he argued, was ideologically burdened and politically loaded: a mask intended to divert the nature of the war and to cover the real facts with a 'noise' of language. Barthes wrote:

> War – the aim is to deny the thing. For there are two ways: either to name it as little as possible (the most common method); or to give it the meanings of its own antonym ([the] more devious method, which is the basis for almost all the mystifications of bourgeois language). *War* is then used in the sense of *peace* and *pacification* in the sense of *war*.[12]

The French doctrine of modern warfare

Among the leading practitioners and theorists of *modern warfare* who gained their practical experience in World War II, Indochina, and then in Algeria (some were also celebrated for the bloody Battle of Algiers) were colonels Marcel Bigeard, David Galula, Charles Lacheroy, and Roger Trinquier; and generals Paul Aussaresses, Jacques Massu, and Raoul Salan, who was then France's most decorated soldier. He also founded (in January 1961) a far-right extremist paramilitary group, the *Organisation Armée Secrète* (OAS, or Secret Armed Organisation), which violently opposed the independence of Algerians and of Algeria. In 2003,

the year of the invasion of Iraq and the capture of the Iraqi capital, Baghdad, by US forces, Marie-Monique Robin, a French journalist, released a film documentary titled *Escadrons de la mort: l'école française* (Death Squads: The French School), in which she told of the export of the French military doctrine imposed by the French army on Algerians (including the systemic use of torture) to North and South America, notably to Argentina, Chile, and the United States.[13] Robin interviewed French officers who were still alive and who were willing to confirm the doctrine they had set up, and their role in disseminating their war strategies and tactics during and after Algeria's independence. To understand the French doctrine of the death squads, it is relevant to analyse some of the discourses and practices that France enforced in Algeria in order to keep Algeria under French colonial rule and to exploit the Algerian Saharan region.

On 2 July 1957, Colonel Lacheroy, then Chief of the Service of Psychological Action and Intelligence at the French Ministry of National Defense, and who later served in the Algerian cities of Constantine and Algiers, delivered a lecture to an audience of two thousand officers at the auditorium of the Sorbonne in Paris entitled *La guerre révolutionnaire et l'arme psychologique* (Revolutionary Warfare and Psychological Weaponry). He drew particular attention to the radically distinct character of this form of warfare, which consisted of *total warfare*. He claimed:

> total, because not only [does it mobilise] in this effort all industrial, commercial, [and] agricultural powers of a country, but also it takes and pushes in the effort of war all children, all women, all elderly men, all that thinks, all that lives, all that breathes, with all their forces of love, all their forces of enthusiasm, all their forces of hate, and it throws them into war. This is the new factor. Total war because it takes the souls as well as the bodies and it yields them to the obedience of the effort of war.[14]

In the same line of thought, Colonel Trinquier, who recommended and defended the use of torture, claimed that the population may be forced to support the French anti-independence struggle, highlighting that 'such support may be spontaneous, although that is quite rare and probably a temporary condition. If it doesn't exist, it must be secured by every possible means, the most effective of which is *terrorism*.'[15]

Colonel Galula, meanwhile, noted that 'pacification would be achieved if we could gradually compromise the population in the eyes of the rebels'.[16] Galula is well known to English-speaking military strategists and readers, since he published two manuals in English when he was a research associate at Harvard University's Center for International Affairs between 1962 and 1967: *Pacification in Algeria, 1956–1958* (in 1963) and *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (in 1964).

Colonel Galula's 1964 monograph on the theory and practice of counterrevolutionary warfare influenced the Department of the US Army, even in the writing of its 2006 field manual FM 3–24, entitled *Counterinsurgency*, which was addressed to US soldiers fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. As noted in its foreword, the manual was meant to fill a doctrinal gap of twenty years.[17] Colonel Galula's thinking was frequently cited in the manual's second chapter, 'Unity of Effort: Integrating Civilian and Military Activities', notably when he argued that in this type of war, 'the soldier must be then prepared to become […] a social worker, a civil engineer, a schoolteacher, a nurse, a boy scout. But only for as long as he cannot be replaced, for it is better to entrust civilians' tasks to civilians.'[18] Colonel Galula's claim of the extra-military responsibilities of army officers was informed by the French school of colonial warfare that recognised the so-called social role of army officers. The school was developed by Marshal Thomas Robert Bugeaud in French colonial

Algeria, refined by Marshal Joseph Simon Gallieni in French colonial Indochina, and then disseminated by Marshal Louis Hubert Gonzalve Lyautey in the French Protectorate of Morocco.[19] In his first influential article, *Du rôle social de l'officier dans le service miliaire universel* (On the Social Role of the Officer in the Universal Military Service), from 1891, Marshal Lyautey criticised the rigidity and inadequacy of the French military education. He demanded that it provide 'a fruitful conception of the modern role of the officer to become the educator of the entire nation'.[20] Furthermore, he argued that it was necessary to transform the cruel sides of the war into a good opportunity, and thereby to 'display, during the course of the military service, not only the violent and sterile fatigue, but also the broader field of the social action'.[21] Both warfare doctrines employed the term *pacification* in order to imply *war*, both applied the military strategy of winning hearts and minds, and both employed soldiers to serve as 'nation builders as well as warriors':[22] that is, to meet both civil-political and military objectives.

Over the course of the French War in Algeria, such aims coincided with specific territorial and spatial operations. Officers drew new borders, built new infrastructures, forcibly displaced Algerian civilians, and erected new shelters: not to colonise Algeria (because Algeria was already considered a French department), but to oversee and monitor every movement and activity of the colonised populations who were deemed to be potential suspects. Given that 1) the entire population (then about ten million) was affected, that 2) the Algerian territory was enormous (about four times larger than France), and that 3) the rural population was spread over its large countryside, the French authorities forced entire populations to adhere to new maps that dictated a new distribution of the whole rural population and a portion of the urban population. Colonel Galula described the exemplary geographic situations for Algerian liberation fighters, whom he called the 'insurgents', and for the French civil and military authorities, whom he termed the 'counterinsurgents', as follows:

> the ideal situation for the insurgent would be a large landlocked country shaped like a blunt-tipped star, with jungle-covered mountains along the borders and scattered swamps in the plains, in a temperate zone with a large and dispersed rural population and a primitive economy. [Fig. 1] The counterinsurgent would prefer a small island shaped like a pointed star, on which a cluster of evenly spaced towns are separated by desert, in a tropical or arctic climate, with an industrial economy.[23] [Fig. 2]

With the latter figure in mind, the French authorities remodelled the entire Algerian territory, causing a massive forced resettlement of roughly three million people that they named the *regroupement des populations* (regrouping of populations); the subsequent built settlements were termed the *centres de regroupements* (regrouping centres). In reality, however, they looked like camps.

Militarily controlled camps

In an attempt to legitimise the reorganisation of the Algerian territory and the massive resettlement of the Algerian rural populations, the French governors general in Algeria – Soustelle and his successor, the socialist Robert Lacoste – claimed that Algeria was dangerously underadministered, and that its population was too large to maintain the 1848 territorial departmentalisation. According to Lacoste, a new territorial reorganisation ought to face several of the population's most urgent administrative necessities.[24] He drew particular attention to the departments of the Hauts Plateaux (where the Aurès Mountains are located), in which, according to him, minor rural populations occupied overly vast, underdeveloped areas. As a result of a planned enhancement of Algeria, new regions, departments, districts, and municipalities were created between 1955 and 1958, coupled with a strategic choice of new administrative epicentres in order to ensure a

pressing national security regime and to facilitate the regional communication and enforcement of French regulations.[25] At the military level, however, the entire territory was gradually interpenetrated by adjustable infrastructures and hermetic cobwebs of checkpoints, watchtowers, military posts, border fortifications, minefields, and electric fences, all of which enabled continual counterrevolutionary military operations.[26]

The French army progressively allocated particular areas of the Algerian territory to one of the three main military categories: *zones opérationnelles* (zones of operation), *zones de pacification* (pacification zones), and the *zones interdites* (forbidden zones).[27] In the zones of operation, officers were ordered to utilise any means possible to restore security. In the militarily controlled zones of pacification, the army employed the *action psychologique* (psychological action) against civilians, who were forcefully administered, supervised, and indoctrinated, as well as being induced to collaborate with the army.[28] Finally, there were the forbidden zones, which consisted of free-fire zones for both air and ground military forces; these zones needed to be cleared of any living beings, including animals. The prohibited regions were frequently isolated places, and they often comprised vast woodlands and highlands, but they also included inhabited rural areas, from which large masses of civilians were forcefully relocated to ensure safe zones for the French army.

The various territorial categories spawned frequent spatial misunderstandings and border conflicts between the civilian and military authorities. The civilian administrative subdivisions, for their part, consisted of departments, districts, and municipalities, while the systematic military *quadrillage* (gridding) was composed of zones, sectors, subsectors, *quartiers*, and *sub-quartiers*, which were intended to be combined with one of the operational, pacification, or forbidden military zones. The most unmistakable directive, however, was to evacuate the forbidden zones, thus forcing civilians to leave their homes, villages, and arable lands. This military operation not only damaged countless Algerian villages and uprooted numerous Algerian peasants, but it also engendered the establishment of thousands of *centres de regroupement*.[29]

The French term *centre de regroupement* poses translation problems, because it involves both a displacement and a concentration of civilians – the extrajudicial detention enabled by the state of emergency – into an enclosed and surveyed space; it also entails precisely that which it is not. For obvious reasons, the words *concentration* and *camp* were circumvented in official military parlance, and, consequently, by the majority of the French media. In 1957, Maurice Papon, at the time the Inspector General of Administration in the Extraordinary [civil-military] Mission in Eastern Algeria and Prefect of the Department of Constantine, rigorously requested the immediate suppression of the term *camp* from all road signs and indications in the Algerian Department under his authority, stating: 'the term camp will have to disappear from the terminology'.[30]

The term *regroupement*, on the other hand, seems to inhabit a purely military sense, in that it coincides with the meaning of *concentration*. According to one French dictionary, *regroupement* is the action of *regrouping*, which means, '1. To group, to unite anew (what was dispersed): *To regroup officers of an army*. 2. To group (dispersed elements), together. à to reassemble: *To regroup the populations*.'[31] C*oncentration*, meanwhile, is the action of *concentrating*, which means (according to the same dictionary) 'to gather in a centre. Military: *The concentration of troops in an area of the territory*. à Grouping, roundup, regrouping. Special: *Camps de Concentration*.'[32]

Whereas the state of emergency empowered the Fourth Republic to acquire a lawful form that allowed for regulating the residence and circulation



Fig. 1



Fig. 2

Fig. 1: Ideal territory for the insurgent © Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 28.

Fig. 2: Ideal territory for the counterinsurgent © Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 28.

of civilians and controlling their activities, as well as arresting persons at any time and at any place, the creation and construction of camps was unquestionably banned, as mentioned earlier. Nevertheless, camps were intensively and continuously created. One estimate for 1960 evaluated 2,157,000 forcibly resettled persons; another evaluation (for 1961) considered that at least 2,350,000 persons had been concentrated into camps, and that an additional 1,175,000 persons were compelled to leave their original homes due to constant and violent military operations.[33] That is to say, 3,525,000 persons were compulsorily displaced in Algeria under French colonial rule.[34] Another figure, for 15 February 1962 – just a few weeks before Algeria's independence – reported that 3,740 *camps de regroupement* had been built in French Algeria since the outbreak of the revolution in 1954.[35] Even today, historians – both Algerian and French, civil and military – have yet to agree on the exact numbers of the resettled populations, the devastated villages, and the camps that were built.

Despite the fact that these camps had been created since the outset of the Algerian Revolution, it was not until 1957, under the military command of General Raoul Salan, that official military policies stamped 'secret', 'secret–confidential', or 'top-secret' began to regulate the creation of the forbidden zones, as well as of the forced resettlement of civilians. Notable among these endeavours was the construction and completion of the defensive perimeter called the Morice Line that sealed off Algeria's eastern and western borders with Tunisia, Libya, and Morocco in order to prevent human circulation and material exchanges.[36] The Morice Line provoked a rapid and massive expansion of the camps. Furthermore, the military Challe Plan fortified the Morice Line in 1958 with additional electrified wire, minefields, barriers, and checkpoints. These systematic counterrevolutionary operations intensified the imposed evacuation of civilians from the forbidden zones, and therefore the number of camps continued to increase throughout the course of the Algerian War of Independence.

The *Inspection Générale des Regroupements de Population* (IGRP, or General Inspection of the Regroupings of the Population), a French military institution that was mandated to inspect the regrouping of the Algerian population that had been accomplished by military officers, argued that 'the creation of the regroupement is the most effective means for subtracting the population from the influence of the rebels'.[37] It went on to claim that 'the policy of the regroupement is one [of] the masterpieces of the manoeuvre of pacification'.[38]

The architects of the camps

Central to the construction of the *camps de regroupement* were the extraordinary army units called the *Sections Administratives Spécialisées* (SAS, or Specialised Administrative Sections). The SAS were deployed in September 1955 in rural areas in order to assume the powers that were usually offered, as per Decree no. 55–1274, to 'administrators of civil services on the individual decision of the Governor General of Algeria'.[39] The military missions of the SAS officers entailed the gathering of intelligence, the diffusion of propagandistic information, the ensuring of law and order, and the direct control of the civilian population, while their civil functions consisted of providing social, economic, educational, sanitary, and medical facilities, as well as to evacuate the populations and monitor the construction of militarily controlled camps with technical knowledge that was almost nonexistent.

Similar divisions were subsequently implemented in urban areas in order to cope with the alarming numbers of the *bidonvilles* (slums, literally 'can-towns'), in addition to performing most of the aforementioned civil-military responsibilities; these were then named the *Sections Administratives*

Urbaines (SAUs, or urban administrative sections). By the end of 1961, twenty SAUs coexisted in urban neighbourhoods inhabited by the Algerian population (including the Casbah of Algiers), and there were more than seven hundred SASs in the vast areas of Algeria's countryside and the immense Sahara.[40]

In an attempt to supervise the majority of the population, every SAS extended its various operations over a maximum of ten to fifteen thousand persons, which was thought to correspond to the population of two to three Algerian villages. The chiefs of the SASs were expected to be able to speak the local language of the geographic areas in which they were appointed (either Arabic or one of the Berber languages), or were quickly trained to speak the language if they did not. In most of the SASs, the team members included one to three subofficers, a secretary, an interpreter, a radio operator, often an auxiliary medical officer, and one or two nurses. Each SAS possessed its own security forces, called *Makhzen*, which comprised from thirty to fifty Algerian men who were in one way or another compelled to serve in the French army.[41] In order to gain an intimate knowledge about Algerians, SAS officers received special training in administrative, legislative, geographic, economic, health, agricultural, religious, traditional, historical, gender, and sociological features of the Algerian Arabic and Berber populations.

In October 2005, fifty years after the establishment of the SAS, the military *Centre de Doctrine d'Emploi des Forces* (CDEF, or Doctrine Centre for Forces' Employment) under the French Ministry of Defense released a ponderous study called *Les Sections Administratives Spécialisées en Algérie: Un outil pour la stabilisation* (Specialised Administrative Sections in Algeria: An Instrument for Stabilisation). The military survey was based on a number of interviews with former SAS officers and selected literature on the SAS. It was intended to divulge French experiences in colonial Algeria during the Algerian War, and in particular to provide a guide for the *stabilisation* of local populations who had been claimed and enforced by French troops who were 'in charge of similar assignments in Bosnia, Afghanistan and soon in Kosovo'.[42] As asserted in these military guidelines, the SAS were the direct heirs of the nineteenth-century *Bureaux Arabes* (Arab Bureaus) in colonial Algeria, of the twentieth-century *Affaires Indigènes* (Indigenous Affairs) in Morocco, and of the greatest French colonial military officers, notably Bugeaud and Lyautey. The manual made no mention of the camps, however, nor of the special roles played by SAS officers in the politico-military policy of mass resettlement of the civilian population. Instead, it dedicated less than a page to the *villages de regroupement*, which it said were part of the socio-economic activities of the SAS within the Plan de Constantine launched by General de Gaulle in October 1958.[43] Contrary to this assessment, French military archival documents demonstrate that SAS officers were responsible not only for evacuating existing villages for military reasons, but also for supervising the construction of the camps.

One such piece of evidence may be found in the various factsheets about the *centres de regroupements* that were drafted in August 1958 by the SAS chiefs of the Department of Bône (today Annaba, Algeria) in response to the telegram of the General Commander of the Zone of Eastern Constantine (ZEC) asking for accurate quantitative data about the camps. The majority of these archival records contained the camps' names, dates of creation, and geographic locations; their populations; the conditions of their shelters; their hygienic circumstances; their medical services; their existing schooling facilities; their means of subsistence; their possibilities of employment of the labour force; their clothing and food requirements, such as oil, condensed

milk, sugar, and coffee; and their monthly needs of semolina, wheat, and barley.[44] The figures of the evacuated populations, as well as the effective conditions of the standing shelters varied from camp to camp and from SAS to SAS.

For instance, in the SAS of Bordj-M'raou, which monitored the daily lives of 1,346 people in the camp of Bordj-M'raou, the majority of the huts were made of straw and had only one main opening; only five people (who were considered by the SAS to be 'traders') had been able to build a house of durable materials, with a thatched roof.[45] In the case of another SAS (of Gounod, in the arrondissement of Guelma), the housing and living conditions of the displaced civilian inhabitants of the ongoing *regroupement* were, according to its chief, very precarious. Most of the people were piled 'into the ruins of damaged barracks or housed in tents – some families have been resettled in "improved huts" whose construction was carried on as long as the municipality provided the credits.'[46]

In another larger camp called Herbillon, which held three thousand people, families were distributed in either huts or tents. Fifty families were about to be transferred to one of the fifty newly built dwellings named *cités d'habitat rural* (rural housing settlements), and that an additional *cité de regroupement* of a hundred metal-framed housing units was initiated so that within the next two months, a hundred families would again be relocated.[47] In contrast to this reality, as specified in the survey about the camps in the municipality of Mondovi, during the previous two years, 'many families [had been] invited to leave their habitual place of residence in the mountain[s;] nothing was planned or officially organised to receive them'.[48] The survey described the disastrous hygienic conditions and the distress of certain families who were constrained to rent the floor of courtyards as living spaces, as in the case of 132 people who were compelled to argue over 120 square metres of space. And to complete this insight into the vicissitudes of a handful of SASs in just one department, a tiny part of the *regroupement* of Barral presented an exceptional situation: 145 families (out of two thousand people) were lodged in dwellings that were purpose-built by the *Commissariat à la Reconstruction et à l'Habitat Rural* (CRHR, or Rural Housing and Reconstruction Commission), which had been established in the aftermath of the devastating earthquake of 9 September 1954 in the Algerian town of Orléansville (today Chlef).[49]

A typical plan from 1956 of the *habitat rural* (rural housing) in the camp designed by the CRHR consisted of a one-floor unit composed of two identical spaces; one served for indoors activities and the other (a courtyard) for outdoors pursuits, so essential to the daily lives of Algerian families. The dimensions of the courtyard were six by just less than five metres, resulting in an area of about twenty-nine square metres. The indoor entity was composed of a main room of less than fourteen square metres (4.9 by 2.9 metres); a smaller room, of around seven square metres (3 by 2.3 metres); a tiny kitchen; and a minuscule WC. The kitchen (2 by 1.7 metres) comprised cooking equipment and a small washbasin, whereas the space for sanitation facilities included no sink, but merely a WC that was also to be used as a shower. While the housing unit was juxtaposed with another identical one, the latter was shifted in such a way that the courtyard of the former was always surrounded by three indoor spaces, which was not always taken into consideration; therefore, the privacy of the dislocated families was again further invaded. This overall configuration could result in an infinite row of housing units, and its multiple iterations could compose what the CRHR have called the *cité d'habitat rural* (rural housing settlements), and some SAS simply as the *cité rurale* (rural settlement). Despite the considerable differences in climatic and socio-economic conditions, such dwellings, destined for rural displaced populations, were analogously built across the entire territory of Algeria.

Transforming camps into 'villages'

In April 1959, a year after the first 'Generals' Putsch' in Algiers, the collapse of the Fourth Republic, and the return of General de Gaulle to power, and a few months after the adoption of the constitution of the Fifth Republic, a media scandal over the existence of the Algerian camps arose in France. The scandal was provoked by two Frenchmen who were allowed to visit the camps: Monsignor Jean Rodhain (1900–1977), Secretary General of the *Secours Catholique* (Caritas France), who had just returned from a visit to colonial Algeria and had launched an emergency appeal for humanitarian aid there; and Michel Rocard (b. 1930), the young Inspector General of Finances, who leaked his report on the *centres de regroupement*, which he submitted in February 1959 to the newly appointed general delegate of the French government in Algeria, Paul Delouvrier (1914–1995).

Newspaper articles reported on the disgraceful conditions of the camps, and deplored the material and psychological situations of the resettled Algerian families, which included a great number of children who suffered from diseases and famine. Their titles speak of the Algerians' misery: '*Dans les camps d'Algérie des milliers d'enfants meurent…'* (In Algerian Camps, Thousands of Children Die); '*Un million d'Algériens "regroupés" par l'armée menacés de famine'* (One Million Algerians 'Regrouped' by the Army Threatened with Famine); '*Un million d'Algériens dans les camps: c'est la guerre'* (One Million Algerians in Camps: This is War); '*Un million d'Algériens parqués dans des camps de "regroupement"'* (One Million Algerians Parked in 'Regroupment' Camps); '*J'ai visité, près de Blida, les villages de regroupement'* (I Have Visited, near Blida, the Villages of Regroupment), '*Un million d'Algériens derrière les barbelés*…' (One Million Algerians Behind Barbed Wire); '*Algérie: un million de personnes déplacés'* (Algeria: One Million People Displaced); '*Un million d'Algériens de l'Atlas ont été rassemblés dans mille villages'* (One Million Algerians from the Atlas Mountains Have Been Gathered in a Thousand Villages).[50] [Figs. 3–5] The unique and apparently preconceived number – one million – announced by the French media was merely indicative. In fact, among the French army, the situation was rather different; as argued by the IGRP, it was clear that by '1959 we [had] found ourselves […] facing a very serious situation: it had become impossible to quantify even approximately the volume of the displaced rural populations since 1954'.[51]

In the wake of the media scandal and criticism, Delouvrier proclaimed that he would personally take care of the *regroupement* of Algerian populations, and subordinate it to his direct control, and he announced a large rural renovation programme that he called the *Mille villages* (One Thousand Villages). The regrouping suddenly became grounded on rural modernisation reforms, and was thereby rapidly attached to General de Gaulle's strategic politico-economic Plan de Constantine (1959–1963). In his communication to Delouvrier, de Gaulle wrote that 'the will of the Government is that Algeria, through the ordeals and despite the delays, reveals gradually itself in its deep reality thanks to the action conducted by all France. To this end, you need to pacify and administer, but at the same time, transform.'[52]

Delouvrier ordered an immediate improvement of the subsistence and economic conditions of the camps. He established mobile teams, composed of a military officer and two skilled professionals of rural planning, which he called *Equipes Itinérantes d'Aménagement Rural* (Mobile Teams for Rural Planning).[53] These teams were expected to study (a) the future of the regrouping; (b) the economic viability of the centres; (c) the legal status of occupied lands; (d) the people's administrative needs for education and health care; (e) the extent of immediate assistance; and (f) the military concerns of security and self-defence.[54]



Un million d'Algériens derrière les barbelés...

LE délégué général du gouvernement, M. Delouvrier, vient d'annoncer que désormais il contrôlera personnellement les opérations dites de « regroupement » des populations musulmanes. Il déclare dans une note aux autorités militaires et civiles qu'il n'autorisera que les regroupements « absolument nécessaires sur le plan militaire et résultant de la volonté manifestée des populations elles-mêmes ». Ce qui est reconnaître implicitement que, jusqu'ici, les populations ont été regroupées sous la contrainte. Et c'est la vérité.

Depuis plusieurs mois, le général Salan, puis le général Challe — félicité aujourd'hui par de Gaulle — avaient mis au point une tactique par laquelle, disaient-ils, le F.L.N. serait coupé de tout contact avec la population. Cette tactique consistait à faire évacuer des douars entiers et à les rassembler dans des enclos de barbelés surveillés jour et nuit par la troupe. C'est ainsi que les populations des zones interdites ont été les premières à être internées — le mot n'est pas trop fort — puis celles des régions de Kabylie où les combats étaient les plus nombreux.

L'essentiel étant d'isoler ces populations des forces algériennes qui tenaient la montagne, le problème de leur subsistance ne venait qu'en second lieu. Coupés de leurs sources de ravitaillement, c'est-à-dire de leurs champs, ces paysans algériens et leurs familles se retrouvèrent sans ravitaillement, ou presque, dans des conditions d'hygiène particulièrement catastrophiques. L'hiver qui vient de s'achever a été atroce dans ces camps. Combien d'enfants algériens y sont morts au cours de ces six derniers mois ?

Le scandale est tellement éclatant qu'aujourd'hui M. Delouvrier est amené à recommander aux états-majors de réinstaller les camps existants près des terres cultivables, à faire des abris en dur. Mais la vérité, c'est qu'à l'heure actuelle un million d'Algériens, en majorité des femmes, des enfants et des vieillards, vivent dans des conditions épouvantables dans les camps de regroupement et ont passé l'hiver sous des abris de fortune.

« L'Algérie c'est la France », clament à tous les échos les adversaires de la négociation. M. Delouvrier devait lui-même reconnaître, hier encore, devant un groupe d'étudiants : « On ne peut administrer l'Algérie comme la Bretagne. »

Fig. 3

UN MILLION D'ALGÉRIENS PARQUÉS dans les camps de "regroupement"!

Des milliers d'enfants y sont déjà morts

SI le rapport sur le regroupement des populations musulmanes n'avait pas été établi par de hauts fonctionnaires de l'administration algérienne et sur la demande de M. Delouvrier lui-même, son contenu serait certainement taxé de mensonger et d'odieux. Hélas ! les faits qu'il relate sont réels et leur simple exposé fait apparaître la guerre d'Algérie sous un de ses aspects les plus inhumains et les plus cruels.

L'on ne cherche même plus à contester que le nombre des « regroupés » atteint actuellement un million de personnes.

Nous ne pouvons croire — et nul ne le croira — que « les nécessités de la pacification » exigent que l'on enferme des centaines de milliers de femmes et d'enfants derrière des fils de fer barbelés et qu'on les y laisse mourir de faim. L'opinion française ne l'admettra jamais.

Le rapport précise, il est vrai, que tous ces centres ont été créés par l'autorité militaire — et par conséquent sous sa seule responsabilité. Cela n'est pas une excuse. Au-dessus de l'autorité mi-

Fig. 4

Les Nouvelles du Monde

Un million d'Algériens dans les camps: c'est la guerre

UNE CATASTROPHE PLUS IMPORTANTE QUE LE CYCLONE DE MADAGASCAR

Il y a quelques jours, S.E. le cardinal Feltin, archevêque de Paris, et le pasteur Boegner, faient un appel en faveur du lion de personnes « regoupées Algérie » que T.C. a publié dans dernier numéro. Ils demandent des dons en espèces (1), aussi des vocations de médet d'assistantes sociales, guerre atroce accumule les s. Nous savons déjà que famille algérienne — à bord qu'elle appartienne ure un mort ou un disparu. vons déjà dit combien d'au- Algériens ou Français de — sont marqués pour tou- ans leur chair ou dans leur r les tortures qu'ils ont u qu'ils ont pratiquées, ons vu assez de ces jeunes venir d'Algérie silencieux, troutés, à jamais marqués 'ils ont vu ou ce qu'ils

Le camp de Kouiba.

LES CAUSES

IL existe des précédents. Le plus connu est celui de la Malaisie, ou des maquis communistes ont mené dans la jungle, pendant plusieurs années après la guerre, le combat contre les troupes anglaises. Celles-ci ont imaginé d'en venir à bout, en séparant totalement les rebelles de la population, ce qui revenait à les soumettre au blocus. Les populations des villages ont été rassemblées dans des camps, gardés par l'armée et entourés de fortifications.

Triple avantage militaire du système :

— les populations ralliées à l'armée sont protégées.

accès à leurs anciennes terres ». Des chantiers mage ont été lancés par l'armée dans de nombr tres. Ils apportent une aide sensible, mais dont carité est évidente.

● **Alimentation** : c'est dans ce domaine que tion est la plus grave. Les paysans regroupés o leurs réserves (qui jouent un rôle si importa leur alimentation). Deux cent mille d'entre e aucune ressource. On leur distribue des rat maigres dues à l'initiative d'un officier ou d tionnaire. La famine règne dans de nombreu

● **Santé** : conséquence directe de la situatio taire, l'état sanitaire est exécrable. « Dans tou

Fig. 5

Fig. 3: Newspaper clipping, *L'humanité*, 17 April 1959. FR SHAT 1 H 2485 © Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre.

Fig. 4: Newspaper clipping, *Libération*, 18 April 1959. FR SHAT 1 H 2485 © Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre.

Fig. 5: Newspaper clipping, *Témoignage Chrétien*, 7 June 1959. FR SHAT 1 H 2485 © Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre.

Fig. 6

Fig. 7

Fig. 8

Fig. 6: Camp de regroupement in Northern Constantine in 1959. ECPAD D104-127 © Etablissement de Communication et de Production Audiovisuelle de la Défense.

Fig. 7: Regroupement in Thiers (Kadiria today) in the region of Kabylia in 1959. ECPAD ALG 59 378 R6 © Etablissement de Communication et de Production Audiovisuelle de la Défense.

Fig. 8: Regroupement of Bazer in the region of Setif in 1958. ECPAD ALG 58-347 R17 © Etablissement de Communication et de Production Audiovisuelle de la Défense.

Fig. 9: Regroupement in Tizi-Ouzou. FR SHAT 1H 1119/1 © Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre.

Fig. 10: Regroupement in Tiaret. FR SHAT 1H 1119/1 © Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre.

On 24 April 1959, Delouvrier circulated directive no. 3.444 CC, in which he recalled his guidelines that announced that if the *regroupement* were based on sane economic and property foundations, it might become a *foyer de promotion sociale* (a place of social promotion), but, as he highlighted, 'if the inhabitants would not find, in the dictated places of settlement, opportunities for normal existence, the regroupement is the place of impoverishment and discontent in which the politico-administrative organisation of the adversary would find a fertile ground for agitation'.[55] In order to circumvent rebellion, Delouvrier endeavoured to turn existing camps into *foyers de promotion sociale* by enhancing the living conditions of the forcibly resettled populations and by providing prospects for 'normal existence', to paraphrase Delouvrier, although the circumstances of war were far from being 'normal'.

According to Delouvrier, 'the sought objective is to render economically viable all regroupements, that is, to ensure every regrouped family the possibility to gain its means of subsistence from a productive job, which will mostly be farming'.[56] This aim was to be applied in different cases and was to be achieved depending on the case; he described three plausible circumstances: two opposing situations, and one intermediate situation that he urged was to be considered the priority. The first consisted of *regroupements* that were located in territories without any access to arable land and pastures; he recommended submitting these cases to the general commanders of the zones in question, who would, in accordance with military obligations, displace (again) the populations into more advantageous locations. The second probable situation consisted of the forced regrouped populations who now had access to their original farming land, and had been allowed to maintain their own domains of subsistence; as such, they did not require any urgent mediation. And finally, all those *regroupements* that belonged neither to the first case nor to the second necessitated an immediate intervention.[57]

Delouvrier's appeal for the 'betterment' of the camps was not always upheld thanks to the weighty French bureaucratic machine, the long, drawn-out freeing up of appropriate funds, and the lack of determination of a number of military and SAS officers. In his circular no. 3.852 CC of 5 May 1959, Delouvrier informed civil and military authorities that the general delegation of the government in Algeria had signed an agreement with the French Red Cross, and that three specially equipped lorries were formally authorised to circulate throughout the *regroupements* and to procure food and medical aid. The first Red Cross lorry departed only on 25 June in the Region of Algiers, as announced by Delouvrier in his circular of 1 July 1959, in which he requested his men to engage in total collaboration: 'in these difficult circumstances that we are facing, and given the enormous needs created by the Centres de Regroupement, I believe that we must welcome and facilitate, insofar as possible, the offers of help that we are likely to receive'.[58] To this end – and in addition to this humanitarian assistance that undeniably displayed the inability of the French army to deal with the socio-economic problems that it had generated in the camps – Delouvrier promoted any sort of patronage, sponsorship, and twinning of the camps, including offers by a number of religious organisations.

Whereas the *centres de regroupement* were often surrounded by barbed-wire fences and watch-towers, from whence armed guards were ready to open fire, the *mille villages* were intended to look like planned rural settlements.[59] Their locations were strategically selected, however, and a strict gridiron plan was frequently employed in order to enable military surveillance and to facilitate the enforcement of law and order. The ideal site for a grid plan was undoubtedly the plains, far away from the remote mountainous topography that was typical of the Aurès. A wide linear main street ran through the flat land of a typical settlement to permit immediate access. The central area of

such a place accommodated a large square and military headquarters, and the involuntarily resettled populations were distributed around the main access and military posts. [Figs. 6–10] The small, juxtaposed shelters differed according to the availability of the financial resources that were assigned, the construction materials that were supplied, and the time that the camps had existed. The shelters varied from standardised boxes built of durable materials (in the best of cases) to little more than barracks placed in quadrangular formations, in strict accordance to the grid system.

Concluding note

The evacuation of civilians from the forbidden zone, the construction of camps, and the conversion of camps to 'villages' were all components of the French doctrine of modern warfare in Algeria as a state of emergency. Such planned politico-military objectives led not only to the uprooting of millions of civilians, but also to an irreversible disequilibrium of socio-economic structures that had until that time partially managed to resist colonialism and its expanded exploitation. In 1964, two years after the independence of Algeria from France, Pierre Bourdieu and Abdelmaled Sayad avowed: 'this population displacement is among the most violent […] that history [has] ever known'.[60] Since that time, involuntary violent displacements have only proliferated.

The case of the French army in Algeria did not serve to reconsider or begin anew the design of camps, but rather to extract an operational theory of the French doctrine of modern warfare – or counterinsurgency operations – directly from military practices in Algeria. The objective of French officers was to refine the bureaucratic aspects of forced displacements and constant control of civilians, and export their skills to other parts of the world.

Notes

1. Richard Golsan, *The Papon Affair: Memory and Justice on Trial* (New York and London: Routledge, 2000), 1.
2. Law no. 99–882 of 18 October 1999. *Journal Officiel de la République Française (JORF)* of 22 October 1999. https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr.
3. Unlike other French colonies and protectorates, Algeria was deemed a French territory, whose colonisation began in 1830. It was composed of the three northern departments of Algiers, Oran, and Constantine and the southern territories of the Sahara.
4. Law no. 55–385 of 3 April 1955, which instituted the state of emergency and declared its application in French departments in Algeria for a period of six months. https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr.
5. Article 6. Law no. 55–385 of 3 April 1955. All translations of French sources by the author, unless otherwise stated.
6. Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre (Historic Service of Land Forces, hereafter 'SHAT'). SHAT 1H 1119 D1, , *Note Memento A/S de la pacification de l'Aurès [Memo on Pacification in the Aurès*], Algiers, 12 April 1955.
7. Ibid., 2–3. The arming of certain individuals resulted in the creation of what the French called the *village d'auto-défense* (self-defence village).
8. Ibid., 3.
9. Ibid.
10. Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View on Counterinsurgency,* trans. Daniel Lee (London and Dunmow: Pall Mall Press, 1964 [1961]), 6.
11. Ibid., 8.
12. Roland Barthes, *Mythologies* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1957), 157.
13. Marie-Monique Robin, *Escadrons de la mort, l'école française* (Ideale Audience, ARTE France, 2003), documentary. A year later she published *Escadrons de la mort, l'école française* (Paris: Editions La Découverte, 2004).
14. SHAT 1118 D3. Conférence du Colonel Lacheroy, Chef du Service d'Action Psychologique et d'Information du Ministère de la Défense Nationale. *Guerre*

révolutionnaire et l'arme psychologique. 2 July 1957, 4.

15. Trinquier, *Modern Warfare*, 8. (Italics in the original.)
16. David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), 92.
17. Quoted in David H. Petraeus and James F. Amos, *Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual FM 3–24 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 15 December 2006).
18. Ibid., 2–9.
19. On the development of the colonial school of warfare, see, for example, Douglas Porch, 'Bugeaud, Galliéni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare', in *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 376–407.
20. Hubert Lyautey, *Le rôle social de l'officier: suivi de textes et de lettres autour de ŒLe rôle social de l'officier,* ed. Christian de Bartillat (Paris: Albatros, 1984), 37. Lyautey's article was first published in 1891 in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, under the title 'Du rôle social de l'officier dans le service militaire universel.'
21. Ibid., 38.
22. Petraeus and Amos, *Counterinsurgency*. Foreword.
23. Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 27–28.
24. Decree no. 56–641 of 28 June 1956. https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr.
25. Ibid.
26. See, for example, Jean-Charles Jauffret and Maurice Vaïsse, eds., *Militaires et guérilla dans la guerre d'Algérie. Actes du colloque de montpellier des 5 et 6 mai 2000, organisé par le Cente d'étude d'histoire de la Défense et l'UMR no. 5609, Idéologies, Défense, du CNRS* (Brussels: Editions Complexes, 2012); Marie-Catherine Villatoux, *La défense en surface (1945–1962), Le contrôle territorial dans la pensée stratégique française d'aprés-guerre* (Paris: Service Historique de la Défense, 2009); André-Roger Voisin, *Algérie 1956–1962: la guerre des frontières sur les barrages électrifiés* (Charenton: Presses de Valmy, 2002).
27. In 1959 some *zones interdites* (forbidden zones) became *zones de contrôle militaire renforcé* (zones of reinforced military control). See Patrick Kessel, *Guerre d'Algérie: Ecrits censurés, saisis, refusés 1956–1960–1961* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2002), 234–235.
28. Marie-Catherine Villatoux, *Guerre et action psychologique en Algérie* (Paris: Service Historique de la Défense, 2007).
29. Another consequence of the forbidden zones is the internal migration of the Algerian population: those who were able to escape from the atrocities of the war in rural areas and managed to reach urban areas such as Algiers and Oran. As a result, the number of the *bidonvilles* (slums) increased tremendously during the Algerian War.
30. Cited in Charles-Robert Ageron, 'Une dimension de la guerre d'Algérie: les 'regroupements' de populations,' in Jauffret and Vaïsse, eds., *Militaires et guérilla*, 236.
31. 'Regroupement, Regrouper', *Le Nouveau Petit Robert. Dictionnaire alphabétique et analogique de la langue française* (Paris: Dictionnaires Le Robert, 1993), 2143.
32. 'Concentration,' *Le Nouveau Petit Robert*, 482.
33. Pierre Bourdieu and Abdelmalek Sayad, *Le déracinement. La crise de l'agriculture traditionnelle en Algérie* (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1964), 13.
34. Michel Cornaton, *Les camps de regroupement de la Guerre d'Algérie* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1998), 122–123.
35. Ibid., 121.
36. Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954–1962* (London: Macmillan London Limited, 1977), 230.
37. SHAT 1H 2030 D1, *Les regroupement de population en* Algérie [Regrouping of the Population in Algeria], Algiers, 11 December 1960, 15.
38. Ibid.
39. Decree no. 55–1274 of 30 September 1955. https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr.
40. Jacques Frémeaux, 'Les SAS (sections administratives spécialisées),' *Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains* 4, no. 208 (2002): 56.
41. Archives Nationales d'Outre-Mer (Overseas National Archives, hereafter 'FR ANOM'), FR ANOM SAS DOC 5. *Les SAS, Sections Administratives Spécialisées, leur politique, leur role et leurs méthodes* [Specialised

Administrative Sections, their Politics, Roles and Methods],10 March 1958, 8–9.

42. Ministère de la Défense, Centre de Doctrine d'Emploi des Forces (CDEF), , *Les Sections Administratives Spécialisées en Algérie: Un outil pour la stabilisation* [Specialised Administrative Sections: an Instrument for Stabilisation], October 2005. http://www.cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr.
43. Ibid., 51.
44. FR ANOM 933/154. Département de Bône, Arrondissement de Bône, SAS Sidi Aissa; SAS de Barral; SAS d'Ain-Zana, SAS d'Hammam-Zaid, SAS de Bordj El Hassane.
45. FR ANOM 933/154. Département de Bône, Arrondissement de Bône, Regroupement de Bordj-M'raou, SAS de Bordj-M'raou, 20 August 1958.
46. FR ANOM 933/154. Département de Bône, Arrondissement de Guelma, 1 September 1958.
47. FR ANOM 933/154. Département de Bône, Centre de Regroupement – Herbillon, 22 August 1958.
48. FR ANOM 933/154. Département de Bône, Comune de Mondovi – Centres de Regroupement, 29 August 1958.
49. FR ANOM 933/154. Département de Bône, Affaires Algériennes, SAS de Barral, 22 August 1958.
50. SHAT 1H 2485 D2. Press cuttings of the *camps de regroupement*, 1959.
51. SHAT 1H 2030. *Les regroupements des populations en Algérie* [Regrouping of Populations in Algeria]. Algiers 11 December 1960, 13.
52. Roselyne Chenu, *Paul Delouvrier ou la passion d'agir* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1994), 284.
53. SHAT 1H 2030 D1. Paul Delouvrier, Directive no. 3.444 CC, *Regroupement de populations* [Regrouping of Populations], Algiers, 24 April 1959.
54. Ibid., 2–3.
55. Ibid., 1.
56. Ibid., 2.
57. Ibid.
58. SHAT 1H 2574. Paul Delouvrier, Circular no. 5.766 CC. *Regroupement de populations*. Algiers, 1 July 1959, p. 2.
59. As part the budget of the first phase of the construction of the *centre de regroupement*, both watchtowers and barbed wire are often included. See 1H 4394, ZEA and 27° DIA, Etat-Major, 5° Bureau, *Regroupement de populations*. Tizi Ouzou, 17 June 1959, p. 4. In addition, several published aerial photographs clearly show the watchtowers and barbed wire.
60. Bourdieu and Sayad, *Le déracinement*, 13.

Biography

Samia Henni (b. 1980, Algiers, Algeria) holds a Ph.D. (with distinction) in the History and Theory of Architecture from the ETH Zurich on 'Architecture of Counterrevolution: The French Army in Algeria (1954–1962)' awarded with an ETH medal. She is currently a lecturer and postdoc fellow in the History of Architecture at the ETH Zurich, and an Associate Professor in Research Practices at the Geneva University of Art and Design. Her teaching and writings focus on the intersection between colonial policies, military measures, and the expanded field of art, architecture and planning.

Envisioning a Post-Conflict Tripoli: The Inclusive Urban Strategy and Action Plan for Bab Al-Tabbaneh and Jebel Mohsen

Fabiano Micocci

An urban design strategy for post-conflict reconstruction

The tasks of reconstruction in post-conflict areas are critical and complicated. Recent investigations into the role of architects in this field have questioned all previous beliefs about reconstruction processes and, specifically, urban design in post-conflict situations. These studies consider the experience of some architects involved in reconstruction projects around the world, and point out how post-conflict reconstruction paradigms, valid until the Marshall Plan after the Second World War, have now been revealed as obsolete. These considerations have emerged upon reflection on the nature of contemporary conflicts and how they differ from the past. The first difference concerns the opponents facing each other in a conflict, who are often non-state actors and are not clearly identified. Secondly, conflicts have changed geographically: neutral stages of conflict do not exist anymore, as they are fully embedded in the urban environment and integrated with the local population. These sensitive areas, the ones most dramatically affected by war in terms of civilian involvement, often remain under stress even after peace has been established. This is usually the result of the lack of clear solutions and the difficulties in instituting steady conditions of peace.[1]

This shift brings to the fore the limits of architects and of the whole architecture practice in the context of post-war reconstruction. Architects never think about reconstruction in terms of psychological reconstruction: usually they focus more on building objects per se and on quick and ready solutions instead of fully analysing the possible impact of interventions over a long span of time. Against the limitations typical of the discipline of architecture, Esther Charlesworth introduces the figure of the architect as a pathologist who 'diagnoses the fractured urban condition, analysing and prescribing remedies for dysfunctional and often still politically contested cities.'[2] Nate Berg reframes the architect as a diplomat with the power to influence decisions by reconsidering the complex relationship between human culture and space.[3] Sultan Barakat assigns architects the role of potential negotiators of post-conflict built environment politics.[4] All these positions recommend a two-way dialogue between architects and all the other participants to rethink their capacity and influence in post-war contexts: on the one hand multidisciplinary teams help to explore areas of interdependence across many fields, while the members of traumatised communities can also actively take part in every stage of the regeneration process.[5]

Local communities thus emerge as the main beneficiary of any intervention of reconstruction. Indeed conflicts affect inhabitants, their daily habits and how they use the city: their trust of neighbours and administrators, their fears and their prospects for the future. The trauma goes beyond mere physical destruction, harshly manifested in damaged buildings and physical symbols, but it has significant implications for spatial organisation and dynamics. Spatial aspects may thus assume a relevant role

for the establishment of peace, the prevention of threats, and to reach social stability within the large framework of reconstruction activities in post-conflict situations.[6] Examining local problems that emerged during the conflict as well as those existing beforehand, in the light of their spatial manifestation allows one to understand the physical environment where traumatised communities live and the side effects that conflicts have on everyday life. Looking at these spatial aspects to learn from them has the advantage of avoiding consolidated and top-down formulas; on the contrary it forces one to look for alternative solutions and to evaluate their adaptability to the specificity of the context.

This article will illustrate the *Inclusive Urban Strategy and Action Plan,* proposed by a multidisciplinary team, together with the municipal office and a local consulting firm for the post-conflict area of the north-eastern neighbourhoods of Bab Al-Tabbaneh and Jebel Mohsen in the city of Tripoli in Lebanon.[7] [Fig. 1] Since 2007, a bloody civil war, caused by a violent ethnic conflict with regional relevance, has severely depleted the urban environment. It has had grave social and economic consequences and generated a strong urban partitioning. The *Inclusive Urban Strategy and Action Plan* is grounded in case studies of partitioned cities like Beirut, Mostar, Jerusalem, Belfast, and Nicosia, where 'intercommoned rivalry threatens normal urban functioning and security.'[8] In partitioned cities the notion of public welfare is mostly absent because of a disharmonious situation generated by the combination of multiple factors: the fraught engagement with discredited political mechanisms, the marginalisation of local professionals, and the erosion of the contract between local government and the citizens. These case studies bring to the fore how the field of urban planning has been slow to acknowledge both partitioned cities and post-conflict areas, thus to build a professional literature that could support 'the development and critique of strategic approaches to ethnic division.'[9] This happened mostly because the traditional discipline of urban design education looks for neutral fields of intervention in a context where neutrality doesn 't exist.

Strategies are deemed good when they are based on processes of engagement through significant work in the field, and when they attach primary importance to the link between the social and spatial syntax of a specific context.[10] Two such strategic urban development plans were formulated by UN-Habitat in Somalia and in Kenya. The sustainable urbanisations of Bossaso and Homa Bay are pursued with participatory approaches that include all stakeholders. The plans employ a spatial analysis that is used as a tool for understanding dynamics, problems, and development opportunities. While participatory planning may provide good urban governance that could be responsive to the needs of the citizens and promotes economic development through the right management of resources, spatial analysis offers a technical base for discussion to sustain urban strategic planning processes. The combination of participatory planning and spatial analysis is considered a prerequisite to design specific projects integrated into the city development plans.[11]

Traditional professional training is grounded in the 'faith in the transformative powers of design where a harmonious social context is taken more or less for granted.'[12] Avoiding positivist approaches and abstract rules, some recent urban rehabilitation strategies and practices – implemented in metropolises of the Southern hemisphere – effect the transformation of the social context through design. The infrastructure system – made of escalators together with new public libraries and public spaces – in the Comuna 13 district of Medellin in Colombia, one of the poorest districts of that city,[13] and the urban acupuncture implemented in Curitiba by Jaime Lerner, major of the city,[14] are only some episodes of a panorama of methodologies that integrates city dynamics with economic processes

Fig. 1: Context map of Tripoli, Al-Mina and the location of the study area on the eastern side of Abu Ali River. Source: Abu Mrad et al., *Inclusive Urban Strategy and Action Plan, Bab Al-Tabbaneh and Jebel Mohsen*.

through the institution of a set of tools.

The *Inclusive Urban Strategy and Action Plan* is grounded in the knowledge of this literature, combining partition cities, strategies in post-conflict areas and urban design principles. Its ambitious task is to tackle the complexity of problems and the multi-layered implications existing in Tripoli with a holistic and fully comprehensive plan of actions. Aims are not limited to the reconstruction of a shattered city but they look forward to urban renewal to guarantee the socio-economic rehabilitation of Bab Al-Tabbaneh and Jebel Mohsen and the regeneration of the whole Tripoli metropolitan area, formulating shared visions and credible hypotheses to foster peace in the area.

The paradigmatic shift of the *Inclusive Urban Strategy and Action Plan*

Tripoli is a very significant case study in the field of post-conflict interventions because it is an example of a modern conflict that presents an interlace of local issues with international implications: its territory is a sort of game board where diverse interests play with the dramatic involvement of the local community. In fact the conflict had the local dimension of civil war, manifest in the clashes between the community of Sunni, established in the neighbourhood of Bab Al-Tabbaneh, and the Alawite group settled in Jebel Mohsen. [Fig. 2] The tribal opposition of the two close communities had been fueled by international political interests, and most significantly by the tense relationship between Lebanon and Syria, by the ongoing war in Syria and by sporadic infiltrations by ISIS. As in other partitioned cities, the prolonged civil war had undermined the urban contract established between citizens and the untrustworthy urban managers.[15] Indeed residents have been left alone to meet their needs elsewhere, like sending children to schools in adjacent neighbourhoods or using health care facilities located in villages outside Tripoli. The limited accessibility of basic infrastructure, the destruction of the physical fabric of the city including heritage buildings, and the depletion of ecological resources gave shape to new partitions and altered the social geography of the area. As Robert Bevan points out, an objective of warring parties and an active and systematic means of conducting hostilities, is to damage significant structures and places.[16]

The *Inclusive Urban Strategy and Action Plan* was initiated by the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) of USAID (the United States Agency for International Development), a leading US government agency active in areas of extreme global poverty to enable resilient, democratic societies to realise their potential.[17] The OTI was supported locally by Beyond Reform and Development, a Lebanese consulting firm offering the strategic framework in the area, and providing support and assistance to the municipality of Tripoli for the development of a strategic action plan.[18] Moreover, the OTI supported the municipality in establishing a local development office and provided in-kind grants to support a strategic plan delineated into five sectors: health, education, employment, civic engagement and urban planning. The *Inclusive Urban Strategy and Action Plan* is part of the urban planning section and was formulated between August 2014 and January 2015 by a multi-disciplinary team of experts that included architects, landscape architects, urban designers and activists, to tackle the complexity and the multi-faced aspects, often contradictory, of the study area. The elaboration of the strategy started immediately after the Lebanese armed forces and the international security forces had implemented a security plan that guaranteed a period of relative calm. The team worked in constant collaboration with Beyond Reform and Development and the municipality of Tripoli, and with the participation of the local community and NGOs and associations present in the area.

The main objectives behind this joint venture was to offer a new convincing, realisable and shared

Fig. 2: The demarcation line between Bab Al-Tabbaneh and Jebel Mohsen. Photo: Elias Abou Mrad.

alternative scenario that could reach a multitude of interlaced objectives. Some objectives were clear from the beginning and shared among all the partners: harmonising different initiatives and efforts and planning investments for future funding in an inclusive and sustainable approach; addressing the spatial segregation between neighbourhoods and the break of historic socio-economic ties between them and the city of Tripoli to achieve physical, economic and socio-cultural linkages; enhancing the livability of these neighbourhoods by improving their economy, culture and mix of functions and people; celebrating this area as a reconciliation zone to counteract the rise of violence and to reach a long-term peace among conflicting parties; adopting innovative solutions to address poverty, illiteracy and unemployment that lead to social desperation; improving access to basic infrastructure and upgrading current infrastructure systems; strengthening the local distinctiveness of communities and their sense of belonging but also presenting Tripoli in a new light; and planning for sustainable growth in setting a vision for the future.

The development of the work was structured to allow a constant dialogue among all the actors involved to try to achieve a shared and realisable vision. The work is divided into two parts: the diagnosis – including different studies that had been intersected – and the strategy and action plan. The diagnosis part includes the study of the physical setting, household surveys and the benchmarking of divided cities, strategies in post-conflict areas, and urban design methodologies. This large body of information was intersected through a SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats) analysis to initially formulate planning directives, a list of general intentions, and successively to build three alternative urban scenarios that could help to trigger debates and confrontations. The second part of the research includes the strategy in all its aspects: the vision; the strategy that illustrates physical transformations and interventions; and the action plan composed of the phasing and implementation tools for the efficient realisation of the strategy. The methodology used eschewed any preconditioned principles driven by promethean architects in favor of a full immersion into the real context to discover existing practices, matters and dynamics. The raw materials collected during the rigorous diagnosis of the context were used to establish the planning directives, to build up the scenario debate and finally to ground the multitude of interlaced aspects that structured the final proposal.

The significance of this strategic development lies first in its timing, given the critical political and security situation in Tripoli. Secondly, this project explores how inclusive urban strategies can engage in reconciliation and yield benefits for peace building processes in divided cities, addressing the conflict zone as an integral part of wider local and national contexts. Thirdly, it aims to achieve reconciliation by addressing critical, social, cultural and physical issues in a dispersed manner, directly operating through physical changes in the urban fabric – its voids and linear breaks – drawing strategic connections and allowing urban cohesion. Finally, the strategy aims to merge previous lessons learnt in a holistic approach that represents a paradigmatic shift from reconciliation as reconstruction to reconciliation as an urban renovation for the future.

The Tripoli Green Line and the Dawn of Prosperity

Tripoli is the second largest city of Lebanon. Its region is called Al-Fayhâ and includes Tripoli (229,369 inhabitants), Al-Mina (54,052 inhabitants), the city's port, and Beddawy (36,763 inhabitants, including the Palestinian refugee camp population).[19] Tripoli's long history crosses the Phoenician, Greek, Roman and Mamaluk domination until the presence of the Ottomans between the fifteenth and the nineteenth centuries. For centuries, relationships of trade, culture, and kinship flourished with

little care for nationality or religion. The prosperity of the city was due to its specific geographical position that allowed it to assume a relevant role in trade and commerce, enhanced by the competition with cities like Beirut and Saida. This rich past is still present in the historical core of Al-Mina, the cathedral (know today as the Al-Mansuri Mosque) and the citadel of Saint Gilles, which marks the presence of the crusaders (1109–1289). These are the main landmarks of the area and also the most famous tourist attractions. The city's past commercial prosperity is still evident today in the proliferation of *khans*, mosques and baths.

Tripoli society was always considered peaceful and advanced. Various neighbourhoods – characterised by families and residents from different religions and backgrounds – were deeply interwoven until the Lebanese Civil War of the 1980s, which caused the strong sectarian demarcation among neighbourhoods that still persists today.[20] Syria-aligned Lebanese Alawites aggregated into Jebel Mohsen and fought against the Sunni Tawhid movement which was mainly based in Bab Al-Tabbaneh. Tensions among the two communities remained throughout the civil war. After the war, the tribal segregation persisted in the old sectors of the city and spread into the newly built residencial areas. During the war years, Tripoli had a dual and contradictory identity: on the one hand, the aspiration of being an important international centre, displayed in the unfinished construction of the Rashid International Fair by Oscar Niemeyer in the 1970s;[21] on the other hand, the protraction of the Lebanese Civil War interrupted urban growth and negatively affected social and economic dynamics. The consequence was an increasing national and international marginalisation.

The Arabic Democratic Party of Jebel Mohsen re-armed in 2007 after the threat of Fath Al-Islam, a radical Sunni Islamic group. Fights erupted again the following year in violent battles for government control between March 14 Alliance, a coalition opposing the Syrian regime, and March 8 Alliance, a pro-Syrian group, both formed in 2005 during the Syrian occupation of Lebanon. Since then and throughout the ongoing war to defend or dethrone the Assad regime in Syria, the situation has spiraled into a cycle of violence, leaving the most deprived and densely populate areas deeply impoverished.

The war in Syria since 2011 has had undeniable repercussions in Tripoli and particularly in Bab Al-Tabbaneh and Jebel Mohsen. The arrival of Syrian Alawites and Sunni refugees in large numbers in these two neighbourhoods has intensified the conflicts since 2008. Both rival groups further demarcated their territories, enhancing the already evident spatial and social seclusion. Moreover, the arrival of Syrian refugees posed a real menace to the fragile economic and social structure of the city, because they could take any job accepting lower wages than what locals used to accept.

The civil war, the regional political instability and the economic crisis that followed contributed to Tripoli's isolation. Its historic role as a place of administration, economy, culture, and tertiary services was disrupted, affecting its regional relevance. Furthermore, the size of the Tripoli metropolitan region grew enormously in a response to rural migration, increasing the levels of urban poverty (in 2009, Tripoli and the North were home to 30 percent of the poor families of Lebanon).[22] Nevertheless, the Old City is the second best preserved Mamaluk city after Cairo, and its landmarks (*madrassas*, *khans*, *hammams*, and mosques) and its urban fabric represent an important medieval Islamic heritage. Its physical structure is continually degraded by the encroachment of unauthorised construction and of uncontrolled urban growth. The demographic changes, tenuous circumstances and deteriorating economic conditions discourage property owners from investing in the maintenance of their properties, and have led to the decay of the urban fabric.[23]

Security tensions, political divisions and humanitarian crises have ruined the economy and provoked a dramatic isolation. Tripoli's poor reputation also affected its attractiveness and competitiveness, discouraging investments. Moreover the deprived urban conditions, the spread of unemployment, the abandonment of houses, the segregation, and absence of trust among neighbours and the municipality created a very critical and sensitive community. The necessity for urban renovation arises from social, economic and cultural needs, as well as from the need to end the ethnic conflict. This urban renovation should engender a general rebranding of Tripoli, which will be addressed both to the local Lebanese population and to tourists and foreigners.

Spatial syntax of the conflict

The conflict between communities has led to a partitioned city with isolated neighbourhoods. The demarcation line adjacent to Syria Street, the main road that connects Tripoli to Syria, identifies the border between opposed tribal groups. Here demolished buildings, bullet holes in the walls and small fissures for snipers still vividly bear witness to the harshness of the clashes.

Beyond these recent changes in human geography, Tripoli has a very defined topography, and the Abu Ali River plays an important part in defining its geographical setting. The river crosses two hills, and separates the north-eastern section of the city, traditionally inhabited by the lower-income population of Bab Al-Tabbaneh and Jebel Mohsen, from the historic city center towards the south. The river had always been a relevant element of connection and identification between the two opposite parts until its natural bed was altered in the 1960s, when concrete banks were constructed to address the problem of flooding. The result of this harsh operation is an impoverishment of the urban life and vast ecological damage; suddenly the river was turned into a physical separation between the East Bank and the city centre.

The topography also influenced the urban organisation and the circulation system. Neighbourhoods on hills adjacent to the river are connected by a network of staircases and winding streets that create a unique character and a high level of pedestrian traffic. The streets follow the contour lines of the hills, integrating the stairs into a complex network that infiltrates the urban fabric and flows into some important open spaces along the river (the market space and a small sport field). In this chaotic network, the market emerges as the main economic and spatial structure. Because of the segregation inflicted by the war, the market, once of regional relevance, has seen its area of influence restricted to local inhabitants on this side of the river.

The dense network of streets defines the spatial configuration of the city, which responds to social values attached to privacy and protection through a separation of private and public spaces. Main streets are usually informally occupied by vendors, backgammon players, women sweeping their doorsteps and many other occasional practices, showing a vibrant and participative community. Notwithstanding, the living community has organised itself in enclosed family circles leaving the main public spaces and squares empty because they are considered unsafe.

The urban setting presents a great variety of buildings and urban structures, making this complex patchwork of great interest. It is a combination of vernacular buildings that follow the complex organic patterns of the streets, dating back to the formation of the Ummayad city, with varied small-scale building shapes intricately connected. Regular grids and large building blocks demarcate the shift towards top-down urban planning implemented since the mid-twentieth century. Modern building regulations enforced a geometric land division, resulting in linear streets that cut through the vernacular fabric.

The one kilometre-long Syria Street emerges as the main artery representing both an infrastructural break and a social boundary between areas.

The consequences of the long-term conflict are evident in the widespread degradation: empty lots are used as garbage dumps, crumbling houses inhabited by large families lack bathrooms, vernacular and historic heritage buildings are derelict and abandoned. The infrastructure systems – storm water drainage, waste water collection and solid waste management – is undersized and obsolete, and in a complete state of decay. These systems do not have the capacity to respond to the urban development pressure and the population increase. For example, several houses have resorted to the discharge of their sewage into irrigation canals or into the Abu Ali River, causing severe water, land and air pollution.[24]

Previous planning solutions have not proved successful, and have in fact further encouraged the spatial segregation. Three main interventions have, instead of bringing improvements, made things worse. In the 1990s the Cultural Heritage and Urban Development Office attempted to rehabilitate the urban role of the river by building a 280-metre-long platform connected to the central market. Although well-intentioned, the intervention did not reach its initial objective of linking the two banks through a system of public spaces, and today its surface is not used and market activities are still relegated to the eastern side of the river. A second intervention by President Hariri saw some social housing built uphill in Jebel Mohsen. These buildings introduced a different typology, scale, and building palette that disturb the urban landscape. Because it was initiated by President Hariri, very close to the Alawites group, the housing project increased exclusion. Finally, the municipality provided a master plan for the new urban development towards the east, but its prescriptions were limited to the design of a regular grid suitable for large-scale speculation. This grid does not consider any existing circumstances, like the topography, the existing houses, or the cemetery crossed by a new road. The municipal plan also foresaw the enlargement of some roads as an easy and effective transportation system, but without the adequate sensitivity and respect towards the existing urban fabric, and the plan will lead to the demolition of many traditional houses.

A most effective effort has been made with Tripoli Vision 2020, an apolitical initiative with a comprehensive approach to accelerate the development of the city.[25] Tripoli Vision 2020 is in essence a plan that aims to reshape both the local and national economy, by strengthening infrastructures, promoting employment and training, supporting start-ups and funding new initiatives.[26]

Building scenarios for possible futures

One of the priorities of the *Inclusive Urban Strategy and Action Plan* was to learn from the context and to bring to the fore distinctive features that could nurture optimistic and effective visions for the future. The huge amount of information collected in the context study – the historic study, the morphological analysis, the household survey, the socio-economic survey – culminated in the SWOT matrix, a well know strategic planning method that offers an evaluation and summary of the combined results.[27] Applying the SWOT analysis to the post-conflict situation helps to draw priorities and to trigger participation and confrontation.[28] The SWOT matrix was arranged thematically, with a special focus on the spatial, environmental, infrastructure and mobility aspects and their interrelations with social, economic, political and security aspects.

The studied area is characterised by a strong urban setting, an efficient pedestrian network, a traditional urban fabric and a unique topography, although impoverished and in a state of abandonment. Notwithstanding the conflict, life never disappeared, as main public structures – like

a school, a university campus, and the market – continued working without interruption. Recognising these strengths instead of considering the context a tabula rasa means using the raw material of the city to build a strategy that could be respectful of the population and of the local history.

Identifying strengths is a necessary step to balance the long list of weaknesses that could depict a wholly negative situation. Nonetheless, spatial, social, economic, environmental, infrastructural and mobility weaknesses are interwoven issues that cause a diffuse vulnerability and instability. If many of these dysfunctions are consequences of the conflict and of the dynamics generated by the ethnic partitions, many are also engendered by urban politics implemented during the last decades. For example, issues related to accessibility, congestion and poor road conditions, or environmental issues like the pollution of the river, the malfunctioning sewage system and the inadequate infrastructure services are on the one hand the consequence of a planning deficit, but on the other hand their state worsened dramatically during the conflict. Weaknesses have a clear topographic and physical expression that can be easily identified in the shattered urban fabric as the material manifestation of social segregation, absence of collaboration and trust, and other social and economic issues.

Despite its having been a stage of war, the area has a well-established community. Many opportunities can be recognised in the existing underdeveloped or underrated structures, or in elements like the market, the heritage buildings, or the many neglected and decaying schools. The local population is vividly aware of all these elements, and eager to reclaim what they can. The presence of low-cost local labour, craftsmen, investors and possible voters gives rise to positive consideration for successful implementations. The study estimated that any interventions that would consider these opportunities would be favourably accepted by the local community because such interventions would be embedded in the existing urban fabric already shared among the inhabitants.

Threats are particularly significant in post-conflict areas because of the presence of structural barriers and obstacles that menace the positive outcome of every kind of intervention. These structural barriers are caused by the weak nature of the state and the authorities, the presence of elite minorities that control business and land, the relevance of the informal sector as the most dynamic force in place, and the migration of the intellectual and entrepreneurial sector that impoverished the existing social pattern. Furthermore, political and ideological patterns may continue the conditions of hostility among former enemies. In such critical and fragile conditions, external actors should move cautiously to avoid misperceptions and even hindrance from locals. Empowering local institutions that demonstrate a commitment to externally-determined goals may also enhance social inclusion.

All the aspects from the SWOT analysis were filtered with a benchmarking analysis of precedents from divided cities, post-conflict reconstruction and urban design solutions, to draw up the list of planning directives to achieve initial objectives. The main task of the planning directives was to interlace spatial and infrastructure guidelines, a list of possible interventions that could be included in the strategy, with social and economic guidelines. This made it possible to isolate architecture and urban design with their possible future implications, highlighting the objectives they can reach in a broader and more holistic framework. Following such a complex and varied list of guidelines could be a hard task, considering the questions to face and the level of coherence and harmony that the strategy requires.

Guidelines were thus translated into three different scenarios, different hypotheses for the

future, to easily transmit ideas to parties external to the process, and to engage them in what should effectively be a roundtable open to everyone. The first scenario proposed, 'Renaturalisation', aimed at creating new common environmentally friendly spaces and facilities by establishing a landscape framework to address social changes through environmental issues. [Fig. 3] The second scenario was focused on one central element, the market ('One Hub') to reconnect the area with the old city border via socio-economic ties. The market was seen as the pulsating centre of a capillary system of secondary activities realised through medium- and small-scale punctual interventions, what amounts to community centres and learning/capacity building centers to engage with personal and community initiatives. [Fig. 4] The third scenario, 'City Scale Cohesion', employs both large projects with a regional relevance (health, sport, culture and a transportation hub), and small placemaking projects at the neighbourhood scale, as acupuncture interventions at sensitive points. The scope of the scenarios is to rebuild trust with the municipality and reassert local distinctiveness. [Fig. 5]

The strategy and its implementation tools

Reconstruction is considered a way to build mutual trust among communities, to enhance the capacity for dialogue and agreements, and thus increase the readiness for peace among the former warring parties. Economic investments are not enough, because first it is necessary to create the conditions for a sustainable economy (a long-term challenge). The strategy should be considered a negotiation tool for re-establishing community relations among all stakeholders and as a way to rebuild trust between the population and the political sphere. This process may facilitate reconciliation on the basis of solving common problems relevant to the inhabitants and of great concern to the municipality. For this reason, instead of proposing concrete solutions, like pointing at specific reconstruction activities, the proposed strategy aims at initially generating the necessary conditions to trigger processes of recovery and therefore future development.

The preferred scenario was developed as the outcome of the preceding scenario debate. The three different scenarios were presented and discussed with the Municipality Development Office and the Beyond Reform and Development Team. Each scenario has a clear objective and a simple structure, and it aims to function as a tool to trigger a debate focusing on priorities, to measure interests and more importantly, to consider incertitude and risks. [Fig. 6] Having considered all the interlaced aspects between the three scenarios, a fourth and final scenario came out as a merging between the previous three with the scope to tackle most of the issues presented during the debate. The variety of interventions that characterised each of the three scenarios was thus re-arranged into a system that includes the linear landscape framework (named 'urban armature'), large-scale projects with regional relevance ('functional injections'), together with medium- and small-scale punctual interventions ('multi-functional open spaces').

As a tool for cooperation and negotiation, the fourth scenario was initially tested in a first workshop organised with the presence of local citizens, and a second workshop inviting NGOs active in the areas and schools from Bab Al-Tabbaneh, Qobbeh and Jebel Mohsen.[29] During these workshops both the contents of the scenario as well as the possibility of its implementation were discussed. Citizens present in the first workshop expressed great interest and optimism for the significant changes that such plan would bring to the area. However the participants of the second workshop, because they come from a background of experiences with the civil society and they had been involved in other civic initiatives, were focused more on the process and worried that the presented plan would not be followed through. Feedback, opinions and reactions were received and used to inform the development of the strategy.



Fig. 3: Scenario 1: 'Renaturalization'. Source: Abu Mrad et al., *Inclusive Urban Strategy and Action Plan, Bab Al-Tabbaneh and Jebel Mohsen*.



Fig. 4: Scenario 2: 'One Hub'. Source: Abu Mrad et al., *Inclusive Urban Strategy and Action Plan, Bab Al-Tabbaneh and Jebel Mohsen*.

Fig. 5: Scenario 3: 'City-scale Cohesion'. Source: Abu Mrad et al., *Inclusive Urban Strategy and Action Plan, Bab Al-Tabbaneh and Jebel Mohsen*.



Fig. 6: The three scenarios compared for the scenario debate. Source: Abu Mrad et al., *Inclusive Urban Strategy and Action Plan, Bab Al-Tabbaneh and Jebel Mohsen*.

The *Inclusive Urban Strategy and Action Plan* that was subsequently elaborated was organised into two interwoven parts: the *Urban Strategy* illustrates the spatial transformations of the urban context, while the *Action Plan* includes criteria and guidelines for its implementation. The *Urban Strategy* acts at three interlaced levels of intervention: a network of public spaces to increase physical and visual permeability (the 'urban armature'); functional injection to sustain the local economy and to link conflicting communities (the 'functional injections'); and a platform of public spaces that may trigger community participation in common activities to informally re-inhabiting outdoor spaces ('multi-functional open spaces'). These levels are basically structured around different spatial aspects at different scales, selecting sensitive points and areas where intervening is considered crucial. As they comprise a complementary list of different topics, they also take into account the diverse scale of financial support, the different involvements of the various stakeholders, and they foresee a mixture of typologies of intervention. [Fig. 7]

The 'urban armature' is composed of the circulation system and movement at ground level; it links major arteries, pedestrian paths, infrastructural elements like the river and the fragmented arrangement of small alleys and stairs, bridges and escalators.[30] This may happen through the rehabilitation of public spaces, drawing new connections or reinforcing existing ones. This network may be integrated with an efficient system of light transportation – Integrated Active Mobility – to facilitate movement at different speeds, and to improve accessibility and walkability. The scope of the urban armature is to physically connect the areas of the city that are now separated.

The 'urban armature' is the structure where 'functional injections' and 'multi-functional open spaces' are embedded, linking all these punctual interventions. 'Functional injections' are selected special buildings inserted at sensitive points in the existing context to blur the edges between the old city and the study area, or between the segregated neighbourhoods, following the principle of urban acupuncture. Large-scale buildings, like health services, sport facilities, a transportation hub and a theatre, are integrated with a socio-cultural platform made of cultural centers, youth- and employment offices. The socio-cultural programme will be injected into existing, currently abandoned heritage buildings. The rehabilitation of these buildings may also drive the empowerment of citizens through the recovery of a shared memory.

The 'multi-functional open spaces' constitute a public platform for informal appropriation. These new public spaces are planned to take place in unused or abandoned areas, and in damaged or polluted waste land. After an appropriate recovery of unclean surfaces, these re-discovered spaces may feature events and manifestations, may host sitting and meeting areas, while physical design elements will be placed to work as attractors. Low cost interventions like these allow the process to reach immediate results more quickly, and then to trigger a subsequent process.

The three interlaced levels thus enhance and promote healing conditions through generating various planned and, more importantly, unplanned and unexpected consequences. Indeed the strategy includes not solely a set of interventions following a top-down process, but also aims to empower the citizens at various social levels through active involvement in many bottom-up initiatives. The strategy is thus configured as an open system that leaves space for the unplanned, a crucial factor in facing the unpredictability and incertitude of post-conflict areas.

The action plan sets the guidelines for the implementation of the strategy thought phasing (pilot projects and a implementation timeline) and it



Fig. 7: The matrix of interventions of the Inclusive Urban Strategy. Source: Abu Mrad et al., *Inclusive Urban Strategy and Action Plan, Bab Al-Tabbaneh and Jebel Mohsen*.

recommends a variety of implementation tools. The flexible, adaptable and retroactive configuration of the action plan takes into consideration the difficulty of programming and making decisions, probable risks, uncertain investments, and potential stakeholders' interests. Moreover the action plan aims at a constant and persistent involvement of every stakeholder in order to enhance the legitimacy of the strategy and citizen identification with it.

Pilot projects are small architectural, landscape or engineering projects used as a testing ground; they pave the way for long-term public support and cooperation.[31] They can also be used to test the strategy's assumptions and the feasibility of the implementation at a small scale before investing in a larger-scale intervention. Pilot projects should be evaluated with a set of parameters before their execution, and immediately after their realization, because their impacts may differ in various contexts. In the aftermath, it is important to assess the impact on citizens, to allow them to slowly adapt to the changes, and to get used to the active presence of the municipality in the field. The success of a pilot project may help to raise funds more rapidly as investors may feel more confident in the success of the operation.[32] Pilot projects are just the first step in the implementation timeline that follows the same principles: testing the ground and in case of success, moving forward with larger interventions that require greater financial support. For this reason the implementation timeline includes a large series of activities, workshops, communication, meetings, and confrontations. The benefits are twofold: testing and proving, and on the other hand optimising time and resources.

Provided along with the phasing are a set of implementation tools that function in the framework of the strategy. These tools offer prescriptions and guidelines on how to manage the process, to support it, and how to establish participation and collaboration among stakeholders, disciplines, interests, and funds. The tools include both communication and advertising, as prior actions to share the vision and to obtain support, and project management techniques to facilitate implementation of every stage of the intervention.[33] Awareness and training tools, participatory tools, cross-disciplinary tools, legislative and regulatory tools, and technical tools form a complex mechanism that maximises inclusiveness, synchronises different efforts, manages side-effects, and generates inclusiveness. At the same time, more importantly, these tools guarantee the initial social and economic benefits that can lead to enduring conditions of safety, recovery and peace.

Conclusions

The *Inclusive Urban Strategy and Action Plan* is an attempt to translate post-conflict processes of reconstruction into a holistic urban design, to be realised with the urgency that post-conflict processes usually require.

The strategy can be considered a starting point for an in-depth detailed masterplan; the Municipality Development Office was asked to consolidate and use it as a negotiation tool with the relevant institutions and stakeholders in to order to achieve a more detailed action plan and a clear implementation timeline that takes into consideration budgets and availability of funds. Attributing to the local municipality the task of approving and initiating the process may be considered a first obstacle to a positive outcome. The strategy requires the significant involvement of the municipality, but it has until today avoided taking any part in the issue of Bab Al-Tabbaneh and Jebel Mohsen. Like in many divided cities, the municipal government is afraid to lose its neutrality if they intervene, condemning it to inactivity.[34] Indeed, as the security plan implemented in 2014 was a matter of national security, the shift of responsibilities to the local administration may look like a heavy burden. This is due to

the fact that security is difficult to achieve fully in contested cities like Tripoli, where external factors undermine stability on a daily basis and where the risk of infiltration by military groups continues.

The strategy includes many tools to test and try out, but they are mostly directed at the local community. The possibility to involve other stakeholders like entrepreneurs or investors is a complex task that should be taken on tactically in the in-depth masterplan, despite the fact that today the area is not attractive for external actors. Managing funds is another major issue, not solely with regard to distribution, but also in considering the particular interests that donors and privatised agencies may have in the reconstruction process. Looking back at previous case studies, a private-public cooperation, although difficult to realise, looks like the only agency that may satisfy a large number of objectives.

A final consideration must be how to initiate the strategy in the case of investors who are reluctant to get involved. This risk is taken into account within the strategy with the inclusion of cultural activities, public events and placemaking that form the 'multifunctional open spaces' layer. These actions are low-cost episodes that can be driven independently by voluntary actors and NGOs. The importance of this option resides in the fact that the success of these initiatives may instigate a more active involvement of the municipality and raise interest in other actors and possible investors.

To conclude, the strategy's main weakness is its not having been implemented by the municipality, so it has not really been tested. Many reconstruction projects have changed during the implementation phase, adapted to various circumstances and because of a shift of interest. Many others have met with different fortunes, but often fail the primary objective of fostering reconciliation among locals. Waiting and hoping for the evolution of the political scenario that will support the strategy more decisively, what remains is an initial study for a holistic urban strategy that tackles many open and problematic issues in the panorama of post-conflict reconstruction processes.

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Biography

Fabiano Micocci graduated from Roma Tre University in 2002 where he also specialised in History of the Design Process (2003). He obtained his PhD in Architecture and Urban Design from the University of Florence (2010) where he was a teaching fellow. In 2013–14 he was Visiting Assistant Professor at the Lebanese American University of Beirut. He teaches at the Akmi Metropolitan College of Athens and at the University of Thessaly in Volos. He has participated in several international conferences and workshops as tutor and has taken part in various international architectural competitions, receiving several prizes. He is Senior Associate at Urban Transcripts and co-founder of NEAR Architecture, a design and research practice based in Athens and Rome.

Stasis: Charging the Space of Change

Sarah Rivière

Prologue: *Alien* (1979) directed by Ridley Scott

Ridley Scott's first *Alien* film opens with the crew of the *Nostromo*, a massive and cumbersome mining spaceship, being awakened from *stasis* by 'mother', the ship's computer, to investigate 'a transmission of unknown origin'. The camera dwells on the crew as they are effectively reborn as septuplets from seven interconnected *stasis*-pods, frail and naked but for their white undergarments and the electronic sensors that they peel away from their bodies on rising. Far from Planet Earth with their searching radio calls unanswered, the crew are presented as seven kindred siblings with a shared yet desperate dream: to get themselves safely back to Earth. [Fig. 1]

The alien that the crew faces seems, from the physical point of view, to be everything that the crew is not: erupting from a hatchery on an inhospitable and 'almost primordial' planet, its blood is highly corrosive 'molecular acid' that raises fears for the integrity of the ship's hull, and, with a skin of 'protein polysaccarides' and cells of 'polarized silicon', it, unlike the crew, boasts 'a prolonged resistance to adverse environmental conditions'.[1] It is also *alien* to the crew in its mode of survival: unlike them it does not rely either on technology or teamwork for its continued life, but it is, instead, the ultimate lone predator as it picks off its prey, one by one. But it is the crew's common humanity, their common human frailties and shared reliance on technology, their common contractual commitment to the same commercial company, their shared isolation from all outside assistance, that both express and underline their *kindred* nature to each other – while the alien is repeatedly confirmed as being purely *alien,* the opposite of *kindred*, by its very lack of any such shared commonalities.

The main action of the film takes place in the spaceship *Nostromo,* whose name echoes the lost *Nostoi* poems of ancient Greece that reputedly tell of the Greek heroes' tragic attempts to return to their homes after the Trojan War. But the film is also rounded with another Greek term, *stasis* (στάσις). It opens with the crew being woken from *stasis*, and the same arrested state closes the final scene with Ripley (Sigourney Weaver) – 'last survivor of the *Nostromo*, signing off' – returning to *stasis* to resume her interrupted journey back to Earth. For her, *stasis* is blessed relief: it bestows utter physical, temporal, and emotional suspension where fears are annulled, the spatial extent of the long distance home is erased, and where the flow of time becomes timeless.

The *Alien* film locates the space of *stasis* in the 'safe' removal from engagement offered by futuristic *stasis*-pods of technological arrest. These transparent, encapsulated, coffin-like spaces present us with the complete dislocation of their inhabitants from the onward flow of time. But as this article looks back in time to the ancient Greeks it becomes clear that, for them, a *stasis* was a very different matter: a powerfully charged state of inter-kindred drama measured by restraint, *stasis* at that time

involved the lively exchange of forces between the active and vital parties to a system. Thus, in the case of the film *Alien*, the space of *stasis* would exist not in the pure isolation of sealed *stasis*-pods but in the lively space between the members of the *Nostromo's* crew.

And so, according to an ancient Greek understanding, the film's space of *stasis* would manifest itself at the round table of the ship's mess, in the ship's corridors, its bridge and medical bay, and even in its landing craft: in short, in the ship's public space where the film's inter-crew conflicts – from light-hearted jostling to outright hostility – are played out, and where the members of the crew constitute themselves, revealing and defining their characters within the film through such exchanges. This, the spaceship's public space of *stasis,* is neatly juxtaposed in the film with its parallel space of *war*: the ship's massive, abandoned, and labyrinthine bowels and shafts, where the crew's merciless *war* with the alien takes place.

Introduction

When surveying the landscape of meaning of a word in contemporary use, one soon becomes aware of multiple echoes of past meanings upon which current understandings depend. We use language to depict, describe, and negotiate our world, but it is not always the closeness of a word to its meaning, but often it is the shadows of accumulation of meaning or the points of slippage, dislocation, or loss between words and their meaning that have the greatest power to extend our knowledge into new understandings. *Stasis* is a word which, rather than growing culturally richer over time, instead reveals itself as impoverished today when viewed against its abundant past. It is this past that I will address below.

As pointed out by Otto Alvin Loeb Dieter in his 1950 text *Stasis* on the roots of *stasis* in rhetoric, 'when we look for stasis in ancient thought and culture, we seem to find it everywhere'.[2] Not only was *stasis* in ancient Greece widely applied as the term for civil conflict,[3] the same term also had an active life in, to mention just a few, pathology, physics, boxing, and rhetoric.[4] When looking at the frequency of use of the word across many disciplines, as well as the precision with which it was used within each discipline at that time, one soon becomes aware that *stasis* in ancient Greece occupied a cultural space that boasted a breadth and depth that have been lost to us today.

Today the word *stasis* has, of course, survived from antiquity and is still used in contemporary English, for example, in science fiction where *stasis*-pods or fields enable a total artificial disconnection from the onward flow of time, or in pathology, psychoanalysis, or palaeontology,[5] where a *stasis* refers to a state of stagnation in a flow of bodily fluids or semi-fluids, sexual energies, or evolutionary development respectively.[6] Indeed, *stasis* today is mostly used as a relatively pejorative term to describe conditions where forms of unwanted blockage or stagnation either arise or are created. This understanding is naturally echoed in current architectural discourse where *stasis* is used, for example, by Greg Lynn as a term of opposition to dynamism in architectural work,[7] linking it to words like inert, traditional and static, or by Markus Miessen as a term for a lack of interaction.[8] But although he uses the term *stasis* in this way, the thesis set out by Miessen in his 2010 book *The Nightmare of Participation* reveals apparent points of resonance with the concept of *stasis* as understood in ancient Greece. Referring to the agonistic theory of the Belgian political theorist Chantal Mouffe, Miessen calls for a 'conflictual model' of achieving consensus, where conflict becomes understood as 'an enabler, a producer of a productive environment rather than as direct, physical violence.'[9] In ancient Greece *stasis* was recognised as just such an enabler, but one that also set out precise demands of relationship, moderation, and reconciliation, while holding the



Fig. 1: Screenshot by the author from the film *Alien*. Directed by Ridley Scott. London: Twentieth Century Fox, 1979. The crew of the *Nostromo* are woken from *stasis* by the spaceship's computer to face the alien.

promise of new, energetic onward movement for all parties post-*stasis*.

This links to contemporary political philosophy, where awareness of the need to accommodate the conflict inherent within a system is discussed, for example, in the work of Jacques Rancière, Giorgio Agamben, Chantal Mouffe, and Slavoj Žižek. Indeed in his recent book Agamben calls for a new theory of civil war directly referencing *stasis* in antiquity as a source of knowledge in this area.[10] In discourse by scholars of classical history the role of *stasis* in ancient Greece has been addressed in some depth, but with the emphasis being laid on *stasis* as civil strife between political factions escalating into outright civil war,[11] although Nicole Loraux's work on *stasis* in the Athenian state broadens the discourse to include *stasis* in a range of expressions such as between the family and the state.[12]

In this article I have specifically chosen not to delve further into the state of *stasis* as civil war, but to concentrate instead on the active and frequent use of the word *stasis* in ancient Greece in medicine, literature, and participatory politics; i.e. on what I term the milder expressions of *stasis*. To say these forms of *stasis* are milder is not to infer that they are in any way comfortable or welcome, but rather it refers to the level of cultural concern associated with the term in each context. My aim in this paper is to raise an understanding of the past subtleties of the *stasis* interaction, and its points of moderation and restraint, and these tend be pushed into the background when the more destructive and often violent nature of *stasis* as outright civil conflict, and the fear it raised in the hearts of citizens at the time, are allowed to dominate.[13]

So what can new discussion of the lost cultural richness of one word – in this case, *stasis* – bring us? In his 1976 book, *Keywords,* Raymond Williams described the problems of the meaning of a word as being 'inextricably bound up with the problems it was being used to discuss,' which raises the question as to whether the current impoverishment of meaning of the word *stasis*, once valued as a word that enabled a high level of cultural engagement with a precise form of conflictual interaction, limits our own ability to discuss the particular set of problems with which it was once associated.[14] For the shifting meanings of words create more powerful dislocations in cultural understanding over time than their etymological roots can reveal. Architectural historian Adrian Forty advises that 'to find the meaning of a word at any one time is to know the available possibilities: meanings cannot be identified the way one looks up a word in a dictionary.'[15] This article sets up a series of direct encounters with a range of past possibilities of meaning enabled by the word *stasis* as it was used in ancient Greek culture, with the aim of reaching a broader understanding of this specific constellation of processes and forces, and its implications on the spaces and systems from which it arose.[16]

If understood as a term that merely denotes stagnation then *stasis* would have limited relevance to contemporary architectural and urban space. But twentieth century literature supplies an example of the word *stasis* being used with a deeper meaning that echoes that of the ancient Greeks. In 1964 the poet T.S.Eliot wrote of 'a period of stasis; of relative and precarious stability, it is true, a brief halt in the endless march of humanity in some, or in any, direction'.[17] For T.S. Eliot *stasis* not only offers a specific kind of pause before new movement but it also becomes a space of clarification as to where humanity currently stands. His words reveal the potential concealed within *stasis* for creating a temporal (and temporary) halt that also spatially locates and reorientates, while also showing *stasis* as one part of a more extended sequence of *kinesis-stasis-kinesis*, where *kinesis* – undirected movement – forms the counter-term to *stasis*. This quote gives a modern hint as to why *stasis* in ancient Greece was held in such cultural esteem:

Fig. 2: Plato (left) and Aristotle (right), in a detail from *The School of Athens (*1510–1511) by Raphael.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org.

its specific energy and located spatiality, and its defined place in a temporal sequence, had powerful implications for the future of the system from which it seemed repeatedly to emerge, only to retreat again with the silent promise to return should the system demand it.

In Section 1 below, I will refer to Plato's *Republic* to raise the concept of the *kindred* in ancient Greek culture, which is fundamental to the concept of *stasis.* Section 2 considers *stasis* as a space of loaded potentiality between two different movements in space through ancient Greek literary texts; Section 3 discusses the inevitability of *stasis* in the ancient Greek constitution through Plato's *Republic;* Section 4 presents the active role of *stasis* within the human body in ancient Greece primarily through Plato's *Timaeus*; while Section 5 explores *stasis* as a space of participation in the community arena through Solon's *Law on Stasis*.

Stasis between kindred elements in a compound system

For the ancient Greeks, the universe was full of kindred substances that were naturally held together by virtue of this kindred nature. In the *Timaeus,* Plato describes how such elements in the universe inevitably move towards each other, writing: 'and the processes [...] take place just as the motion of everything in the Universe takes place, namely, according to the law that every kindred (συγγενὲς) substance moves towards its kind.'[18]

The collective group that is constituted by such a set of kindred elements will be referred to here as a 'compound system'. In the ancient Greek understanding, the compound system within which the kindred elements resided was the locus of interaction of these elements, including through the processes of *stasis*. Such interactions were understood to enable the system to change over time, from which the system derived its ability to adapt and survive in the longer term.[19] [Fig. 2]

In *The Republic* Plato describes how the state of *stasis* as civil conflict was commonly understood as differing from that of *war* in a very precise way that depended on the parties to the *stasis* being kindred in their relation within the compound system, in this case the system of the Greek city-states. He explains how *war* (πόλεμός/polemos) and *stasis* (στάσις) are to be understood as very different cultural matters requiring different terms to be used when discussing them:

> In my opinion, just as we have the two terms, *war* and *stasis*, there are also two parties, distinguished by two differentiae. The two parties I mean are, firstly, those of the same house and kindred, and secondly those of different houses and strangers. Now the term employed for hostility between those of the same house is *stasis*, and for that between those of different houses is *war*.[20]

While both *war* and *stasis* are referred to as hostilities, the distinction between the two, as Plato has Socrates explain to his friend Glaucon here, lies in the relation (or lack of relation) between the parties involved: the parties to a *war* are 'of different houses and strangers' and, as he continues later in the same discussion, are 'enemies by nature,' while those to a *stasis* are 'of the same house and kindred (οἰκεῖον καὶ συγγενές)'.[21] Later he describes as kindred those 'who expect to be reconciled'[22] and confirms *stasis* in this context as being 'any difference with Greeks who are their own people'.[23] In another text Plato has the character of the Stranger agreeing with Theaetetus that *stasis* is 'the disagreement of the kindred (συγγενοῦς)'.[24]

Above and beyond this, *stasis* and *war* also demanded very different attitudes and actions towards the opposing parties both during and after hostilities. Socrates made this distinction clear in *The Republic*, setting it out in his argument as to how soldiers should conduct themselves in the case of hostilities where one Greek city is fighting

against another (a *stasis*) – as opposed to fighting against 'barbarians' (a *war*), where the 'barbarians', Plato writes, are all 'enemies [of the Greeks], men, women and children'.[25] Socrates and Glaucon agree on the question of how opponents should be treated in a *stasis* hostility:

> 'Will they not then regard any difference with Greeks who are their own people as a form of stasis and refuse even to speak of it as war?'
> 'Most certainly.'
> 'And they will conduct their quarrels always looking forward to a reconciliation?'
> 'By all means.'
> 'They will correct them, then, for their own good, not chastising them with a view to their enslavement or their destruction, but acting as correctors, not as enemies.'[26]

Overall, Socrates and Glaucon conclude that such actions as burning land, destroying houses, ravaging the territory, and enslaving the population are not possible in the case of *stasis*, but only in the case of *war*.[27] *Stasis* and *war* demand different attitudes to the opposing parties (in a *stasis* 'they will not admit that in any city all the population are their enemies, men, women and children, but will say that *only a few* at any time are their foes'), different limits to the engagement (in *stasis* they 'will carry the conflict only to the point of compelling the guilty to do justice'), and different aims – in *stasis* the aim was ultimate reconciliation with one's opponents.[28] In effect, in *stasis,* acknowledgement of the particular *kindred* relation between the opposing parties to the hostility had an effect on the characteristics, constituents, tools, and the level of restraint used within the space of engagement, creating a space that was very different to that of *war*. With this reading our contemporary term 'civil war' seems not only to be a misnomer but also an impossibility: a hostility that takes place in civil space (i.e. within one community or state) cannot in this understanding constitute a *war* but only a *stasis*; and nor is it possible for a *war,* by definition, to ever occur in a civil context between kindred parties.

The above reading of *stasis* as a specifically delineated form of hostility between parties that are kindred within a common system finds echoes in Mouffe's agonistic model of democracy where adversaries are 'friendly enemies' who share common ground. As Mouffe explains, 'the main difference between enemies and adversaries is that adversaries are, so to speak, "friendly enemies", in the sense that they have something in common. They share a symbolic space. Therefore, there can exist between them what I call a "conflictual consensus"'.[29] But, as I describe below, the space of *stasis* in ancient Greece also made further demands and had further implications on its participants.

'Charging' the space of *stasis*

Take a bus in Greece, and you may notice that each intermediate stop *en route* to the final destination is known, in modern Greek, as a *stasis*. As passengers we immediately understand that each such *stasis* stop is of a different nature to that of the final terminus. The *stasis* enacted here by the compound system of the bus, its driver, and its passengers, is not simply a stop in movement but a stop of a specific kind with precise shifts in occupation, concentration, engine power, orientation, and velocity of the various parties involved. The *stasis* is a located yet dynamic and active pause for necessary adjustment that seems to ensure the available energy for the subsequent movement, as well as being part of a larger given sequence of movement, and as such is very different to other forms of stopping: to a break-down, a simple coming to rest through a loss of energy to proceed, a final halt by parking, or to ending the journey in the violence of a crash.

Here in this modern Greek usage *stasis* is by no means a stoppage or a stagnation, echoing the fact that in ancient Greece, neither in medicine nor in

literature was the word *stasis* used in a way that can be directly translated as such. Instead when studying Plato's works it becomes clear that the verbs that he used for stagnating or stopping a forward flow were either ἐμποδίζω (to fetter) or derivatives of ἴσχω (to curb or restrain), while for an 'inaction' a derivative of the verb ἡσυχάζω (to be still or kept quiet) was used.[30]

But, concentrating on the period from approximately the eighth to fourth century BCE, a number of examples of *stasis* can be found that reflect and extend the concept of *stasis* as a specific kind of charged pause. For example, in the *Iliad* of Homer the participle form of *stasis,* στήσασα, is used to describe how 'the goddess, white-armed Hera, *stayed* the horses' in order to pause her chariot by Zeus to ask for his assistance on a question of revenge.[31] She then 'touched her horses with the lash; and nothing loath the pair flew on between earth and starry heaven.'[32] Xenophon describes in his *Cyropaedia* how a child delights his family by composing (στήσαντα) his countenance with a *stasis*, 'assuming an expression somehow so grave and important' to offer his grandfather a cup of wine, after which he drops his grave expression to laugh and spring onto his grandfather's lap to kiss him.[33] Thirdly, in the popular sport of boxing the state of poised readiness, of tension and awareness in both body and mind that came between active attacking and defensive moves during of the bout was called a *stasis*. For example, the Greek statesman Aeschines writes in his speech *Against Ctesiphon*, 'as, therefore, in gymnastic contests you see the boxers contending with one another out of a position of *stasis* (περὶ τῆς στάσεως)'.[34]

In each of these three texts from Homer, Xenophon, and Aeschines, the *stasis* is a charged pause that follows one, but precedes another, dynamic action – it is part of a clearly defined temporal sequence of *kinesis-stasis-kinesis*. One can imagine Hera's horses stamping with bridled energy until the *stasis* is released and they may fly off; in Xenophon the child's laughter bursts out in a release of the curbed tension of the composed *stasis* that made him look so grave and important; and in Aeschines, one can picture the boxer's *stasis* as a tension of body and mind that enables a quick, forceful, and appropriate action or reaction to each of his opponent's attacks. In each case a new movement occurs post-*stasis* without the system having lost its energy: in fact, on the contrary, the elements of the system – the horses, the child, or the boxer's body – seem in each case to have been charged by the located tension of the *stasis*, on whose release new energy can flow.

At this point it is also important to note what *stasis* in this context is not. It is not, for example, a space of equilibrium, balance, or of idealised permanent harmony, but nor is it a space of violence or of collision. In each case the compound system (chariot, boy, or boxer) is understood to be active and generative both pre-*stasis*, and again post-*stasis*, where the second movement is in each case different and non-symmetrical to the first. Thus the two energetic movements (*kineses*) that bound a *stasis* in time do not oppose each other spatially: rather than being a place where opposing forces clash, the space of *stasis* is part of a clearly defined sequence that enables the energetic charging and the careful directing of forces, while also containing the assurance that the second movement, po*st-sta*sis, will differ from the first.[35]

The inevitability of *stasis* in a living system

In *The Republic,* Plato discusses the effect of *stasis* on another kind of body, namely the body of the state, as part of the process of constitutional change. He acknowledges five possible forms of governance: aristocracy, timocracy (a constitution based

on the love of honour), oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny. In Plato's text Glaucon and Socrates set up a hypothesis as to how changes in the 'materiality' of the citizens within an aristocracy, considered the best and most moral form of governance, lead to a *stasis* through which the aristocracy is transformed into a timocracy, considered a less ideal form of governance. Such changes in the constitution were not seen as permanent, but as cyclical with the timocracy later giving way to oligarchy, oligarchy to democracy, democracy to tyranny, and tyranny back to aristocracy, and so on. Here *stasis* in the political realm involved shifts within the citizens who constituted the whole, initiating tensions and oppositions within the body of the state, and the resulting constitutional change was acknowledged as an accepted part of the cycle of political reality.

While describing precisely how one form of government arises out of another, Socrates also points out that innovation and change would not be possible without this process of *stasis*:

> 'Come, then,' said I, 'let us try to tell in which way a timocracy would arise out of an aristocracy. Or is this the simple and unvarying rule, that the cause of the constitution being thrown into a different position [πολιτεία μεταβάλλει:] comes from the ruling class itself, when stasis [στάσις] is born within the constitution; but so long as a state, even a small state, is at one with itself innovation is impossible [δύνατον κινηθῆναι]?' 'Yes, that is so.' 'How then, Glaucon,' I said, 'will the polis be set in motion [κινηθήσεται] and in what way will our helpers and rulers disagree or express their different opinions either with each another or between themselves?' [36]

It seems that within the ancient Greek concept of *stasis* there is an acknowledgement that permanent peaceful equilibrium between constituents of any system as the ideal to be indefinitely maintained is, in fact, unrealistic. In any 'living' system that is a compound system of active parts, be it the Greek city-state or any other compound system, there was an understanding that these shifts and *stasis* interactions would inevitably occur. And it is also worth noting that in this understanding a *stasis* again never returns a system to its pre-s*tasis* state. Instead, in each case the *stasis* enables a new form of onward movement to be expressed by the system post-*stasis*. This idea was echoed and extended in another area where the ancient Greeks discussed the internal processes of *stasis* in some detail: in discussions of the processes of disease in the human body.

Stasis as enabling the integration of change

The modern definition of *stasis* in pathology as a 'stagnation or stoppage of the circulation of any of the fluids of the body, esp. of the blood in some part of the blood vessels',[37] is an echo of Chambers's earlier definition from 1753: 'Stasis, a word used by physicians to express a stagnation of the humors.'[38] Whether a stoppage of movement of blood, lymphatic fluids, or intestinal semi-fluids, this understanding of *stasis* as an unhealthy stagnation in a preferred forward flow within the body is also echoed in modern Chinese herbal medicine. In a book published in 2005 on this subject the uncomfortable signs of blood *stasis* are described as follows: [Fig. 3]

> blood stasis […] can also be seen in traumatic injuries with bruises, purple spots, stagnant nodules, fixed pain, purple dusky tongue or with purple spots on tongue, and choppy or wiry pulse.[39]

But in ancient Greek pathology *stasis* was not understood as being stagnation in a flow *per se*, but rather it was understood that this temporary pause in onward flows was only one consequence of *stasis* in the human body. Plato describes the causes of

stasis and disease as follows in the *Timaeus*:

> The origin of disease is plain, of course, to everybody. For seeing that there are four elements of which the body is compacted,—earth, fire, water and air,—when, contrary to nature, there occurs either an excess or a deficiency of these elements, or a transference thereof from their native region to an alien region; or again, seeing that fire and the rest have each more than one variety, every time that the body admits an inappropriate variety, then these and all similar occurrences bring about *stases* and disease.[40]

In ancient Greece the human body was considered as a constellation of elements, defined here by Plato as earth, fire, water, and air.[41] He describes *stasis* in the body as being initiated by an unwanted change in volume or location of one of these, but does not directly explain what caused this change beyond indicating that these shifts are not the exception: he talks here of 'every time' they occur, as if these shifts and the adjustments they demand from the body are a regular and expected part of life. Interestingly when talking of nutrition in his text, *On Ancient Medicine*, Hippocrates of Cos describes this initial change in one element that causes the *stasis* as making the element in question 'apparent', also translatable as 'manifest'. He sees the component parts of man as 'salt and bitter, sweet and acid, astringent and insipid', elements also present in food. When these elements in the food are 'mixed and compounded with one another [they] are neither *apparent* nor do they hurt a man; but when one of them is separated off, and stands alone, then it is *apparent* and hurts a man.'[42]

But Plato continues by describing how during the *stasis* all of the body's 'particles that formerly were being cooled become heated, and the dry presently become moist, and the light heavy, and they undergo every variety of change in every respect.'[43] The *stasis* that Plato describes here is an attempt by the body as a whole to adjust to the initial change. The *stasis* is a charged place where gradients of moisture or temperature or other pressures are actively applied within the system. In ancient Greece the performance of this kind of *stasis* was seen as being expressed outside the body in fairly uncomfortable ways: in the 1st century CE papyrus *On Medicine* by the unknown author *Anonymus Londinensis* we can read that 'phlegms, boils, and substances like them are expelled from our bodies' as a consequence of *stasis*.[44]

Stasis in the ancient Greek body involved an uncomfortable but seemingly inevitable performance of adjustment to enable the body to respond to and thus accommodate an initial change, and shows distinct similarities to Plato's description in the *Republic* of the role of *stasis* in constitutional change, cited above. It was part of the life process of the living body (or the living city-state) to adjust to these shifts using the process of *stasis.* The performance of this *stasis* was what enabled the integration of those changes that were seen as inevitable within any living system composed of active elements.

Stasis as space of full participation

Solon's *Law on Stasis* has kindled surprise, confusion, and a range of attempts to justify or negate this law from Roman through to modern times.[45] The *Law* was part of Solon's constitutional reforms of the Athenian state, which have long been considered as fundamental to the development of democracy but which have only survived in fragments. With these reforms, Solon aimed to counteract a visible decline in the morals of the state at that time, and specifically addressed questions of how relationships between parties to the state, members of the family, and between foreigners and the Athenian community were to be constituted.[46] The earliest citation of his *Law on Stasis* is given to us by Aristotle and sets out a very clear position demanding every citizen's participation in a *stasis* when it arises:

Fig. 3: ‘Daoyin technique to rectify blood stasis’ from a nineteenth century Chinese manuscript. Image courtesy of the Wellcome Library, London.

> And as he [Solon] saw that the state was often in a condition of stasis, while some of the citizens through slackness were content to let things slide, he laid down a special law to deal with them, enacting that whoever when stasis prevailed did not join forces with either party was to be disfranchised and not to be a member of the state.[47]

The fact that Solon made this *Law on Stasis* (and in this article I will remain with Aristotle's reading of the *Law*) acknowledges his concern that *stasis*, although surely unwelcome, will inevitably arise within a state, and thus a rule as to how citizens should act when it does arise is required. The *Law on Stasis* demanded the active presence of all the relevant actors – all citizens who had power to act within the political structure of the time – when such a *stasis* should occur. It ensured that the *stasis* became a space of full participation of those citizens in constituting and directing their own common good. Once active, the position or role that a citizen took within the *stasis* was left open: in Aristotle's reading Solon simply demands that citizens 'join forces with *either* party,' unlike Plutarch whose interpretation of the Law some 450 years later had citizens required to take up the 'better and more righteous cause'.[48]

The consequences of this active participatory space of *stasis* for the polis are manifold. Solon is clearly not of the opinion that such full and active participation in a *stasis* would escalate hostilities in a negative way, but nor does he reassure us that this would, on the contrary, reduce the hostilities present in the *stasis* as it was played out. Clearly, full participation in the *stasis* would ensure the presence of those with a milder or more differentiated attitude to the questions alongside those who were more immediately concerned with the arguments, bringing into play a range of judgements, passions, and opinions, each of which could inform but also make demands upon the others. Perhaps, with this, the constellation as a whole becomes more multi-faceted, but whether this finally results in an escalation or de-escalation of levels of hostility present in the system during the *stasis* is open to interpretation. But according the reading of *stasis* set out in Section 2 above, the state of *stasis* was understood to 'charge' a system with energy to be channelled into the subsequent *kinesis* of the system once the *stasis* was resolved; thus in this case, although total levels of active energy in the *stasis* may indeed be increased with the maximum participation of all citizens, this energy would raise the energy of productive flow of the state post-*stasis*, with positive consequences for the system as a whole.

According to the reading given in this article, a much greater danger for the state is held in the risk of a *stasis* becoming reinterpreted by participants as its more destructive alternative, *war*. It could be considered that Solon's requirement for the active participation of all citizens in the *stasis* would have implications for those citizens' awareness of their being kindred to each other within the system of the polis, in that the very act of their taking part in directing the aims of their common city-state would reinforce those parties' understanding of themselves as holding an interest in the state that housed them, i.e. as being in a common *kindred* relation within the state. As discussed in Section 1 above, the acknowledgement of a kindred relation between the parties of a *stasis* is, following Plato's definition of *stasis* and *war*, precisely what denies the possibility of a *stasis* becoming a *war.* It seems that the greatest danger to the system as a whole would arise if a shift occurred in the parties understanding of the hostilities from *stasis* into *war* through a denial of their *kindred* relation to the other parties involved: this would have had dramatically negative implications for all those involved and for the spaces in which they commonly dwelt due to the uncontrolled levels of violence and destruction that would then have become not only conceivable but also viable.

Conclusion

This article discusses *stasis* as a specific and finely nuanced state of located dynamism. It resurrects a complex understanding of this particular kind of charged and generative pause from selected ancient Greek texts referencing milder forms of *stasis*. In ancient Greece the constituents of the *stasis* interaction were kindred elements dwelling together in a compound system of which they constituted the active parts; indeed the life of the compound system was generated, and its survival ensured, by the *stasis* interactions that occurred between these kindred constituents.

Using texts mainly from Plato but supported by other ancient Greek writers, examples of expressions of *stasis* in ancient Greece in literature, medicine, and the political arena have revealed a number of interlinked aspects of the state of *stasis*. These include: *stasis* as a 'charged' space of location and orientation that creatively enables new and energetic production to follow; *stasis* as a non-violent state through which a living system maintains the capacity to adjust itself to inevitable change; and *stasis* as a state that demands full participation both for its proper resolution and so as to counteract the danger that a *stasis* shifts into the uncontrolled destruction of *war*.

Relating these findings back to existing discourse in political theory on *stasis* as civil conflict, it is possible that the understanding of *stasis* discussed here could inform contemporary questions and problems relating to conflictual hostilities between kindred parties. Of particular relevance to such contemporary hostilities is the concept of *stasis* as a state that involves restraint and the careful measurement of force, and as a state with the potential to enable a system to move into energised productive flow, post-*stasis*, once the change that initiated the *stasis* has been addressed. This discussion has also raised the question whether the term *civil war* is itself an unhelpful misnomer in situations of civil hostility, a question which goes hand in hand with the raised awareness of the implications for unrestrained violence should a *stasis* be transformed into a *war* in the relevant parties' understanding. *Stasis* in ancient Greece seems to inform us that a city or nation that seeks to define itself through depicting its opponents as non-kindred or alien to itself before engaging in hostilities with them, should be aware of the consequences of engaging in what the ancient Greeks would term *war* not *stasis*.

The interlinked aspects of the richer and more complex reading of *stasis* in ancient Greece discussed in this article are of real relevance to current architectural and urban discourse and practice. Indeed, as a powerful form of located interaction, *stasis* challenges us to review our current understanding of what constitutes spatial dynamism, and to consider the consequences of what could be seen as an ongoing imbalance between *stasis* and *kinesis* in the built environment. Our cities need lively, generative urban spaces of civic revitalisation that can both welcome and encourage communal energies of exchange and, as a practicing architect, I see the concept of *stasis* as relevant to the problem of positive reactivation of public space in our cities. The public spaces that we design for our cities should be able to accommodate and even welcome the frissons of active civic engagement: corresponding to Mouffe's concept of democratic adversaries as 'friendly enemies', *stasis* offers the concept of 'charged kindred engagements' which confirm reconciliation as the common aim, demand restraint due to the kindred relation between the parties, and acknowledge the *stasis* engagement as itself part of a temporal sequence which can 'charge' the space enabling energetic productive flow post-*stasis.* Beyond this, the public space of *stasis* can be seen as a space of location that could enable participants, be they families or communities, to resist excessive *kinesis*: a space to define and reorientate themselves within what T.S. Eliot termed the 'endless march of humanity

in some, or in any, direction' of our times. Finally, the shifts that the *stasis* engagement demands of the parties involved are precisely those that could enable our cities or states as a whole to adapt to inevitable change in the long term, and subsequently to become communicative, energetic, and outward-looking places during the reassuringly inevitable post-*stasis* periods of harmonious and productive flow that *stasis* in ancient Greece predicts.

Notes

1. *Alien*. Film. Directed by Ridley Scott. London: Twentieth Century Fox, 1979.
2. Otto Alvin Loeb Dieter, 'Stasis', *Speech Monographs* 17:4 (November 1950): 345–369. Dieter refers to a range of uses of the term *stasis* in ancient Greece, writing: 'the stall in which the horses stood was to the Greeks a *hippostasis*; they spoke of the *stasis* of the wind, the *stasis* of the water, the *stasis* of the air, the *stasis* of the bowel, and of the *stasis* of politics'. Dieter goes into detail on the ancient Greek understanding of *stasis* in rhetoric and physics (which I have not repeated in this article).
3. The primary sources referred to in this paper provide examples of the term *stasis* from within the Athenian context in ancient Greek culture selected from the Archaic period through to the end of the Classical or Helenic period, more specifically, from the time of Solon to that of Aristotle.

   Chronology of ancient Greek and Roman writers referred to in this article:

   From the Greek Archaic period (c.8th–c.6th century BCE): Homer (7th or 8th century BCE); Solon (c. 638–c. 558 BCE).

   From the Greek Classical or Helenic period (5th–4th century BCE): Hippocrates of Cos (c. 460–c.370 BCE); Xenophon (c. 430–354 BCE); Plato (c.428–348 BCE); Aristotle (384–322 BCE); Aeschines (389–314 BCE).

   From the period of the Roman Empire (27 BCE–395 CE): Plutarch (a Greek who became a Roman citizen) (c. 46–120 CE); Anonymus Londinensis (c. 1st century CE).
4. For *stasis* as civil strife in the work of fifth-century BCE historians Heroditus and Thucydides see Andrew Lintott, *Violence, Civil Strife and Evolution in the Classical City* (London: Croom Helm, 1982), 34, 51, 75–6. For *stasis* in ancient Greek pathology, see Plato, *Timaeus* 81e6–82b1, from W. R. M. Lamb (trans.) *Plato in Twelve Volumes*, Vol. 9 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1925); in physics and rhetoric, see Dieter, 'Stasis'; in boxing, see Charles Darwin Adams (trans.), Aeschines, *Against Ctesiphon* 3:206. http://www.perseus.tufts.edu.
5. The *Oxford English Dictionary* describes the etymology of *stasis* as follows: 'stasis, n. /ˈstæsɪs/ /ˈsteɪsɪs/ Etymology: modern Latin, < Greek στάσις standing, station, stoppage, < στα- to stand'. Its counter-term, *kinesis*, is defined: 'kinesis, n. /kaɪ-/ /kɪˈniːsɪs/ Etymology: modern Latin, < Greek κίνησις motion', with *kinesis* in biology defined as: 'an undirected movement of an organism that occurs in response to a particular kind of stimulus'. http://www.oed.com (stasis) and http://www.oed.com (kinesis).
6. For (selected) examples of *stasis* in modern science fiction, see Larry Niven, *Ringworld* (New York: Ballantine, 1970); in pathology, see Sir William Arbuthnot Lane, *The Operative Treatment of Chronic Intestinal Stasis* (London: Nisbet, 1915); in psychoanalysis, see the psychoanalytical theory of Wilhelm Reich. www.wilhelmreichtrust.org. Accessed 13 November 2016; in palaeontology, see Donald Prothero, 'The Mysteries of the Tar Pits', Skepticblog, 27 March 2013, www.skepticblog.org.
7. Lynn writes, 'What makes animation so problematic for architects is that they have maintained an ethics of statics in their discipline. Because of its dedication to permanence, architecture is one of the last modes of thought based on the inert. More than even its traditional role of providing shelter, architects are expected to provide culture with stasis.' Greg Lynn, *Animate Form* (New York, Princeton Architectural Press, 1999).
8. Miessen writes, 'consensus often means a decrease in interaction. No more interaction means stasis.' Markus Miessen, *The Nightmare of Participation*

(Crossbench Praxis as a Mode of Criticality) (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2010), 83.

9. Ibid., 96.
10. Giorgio Agamben, *Stasis: Civil War as a Political Paradigm* (Meridian, Crossing Aesthetics, 2015), 5. Agamben points out the 'manifold internal conflicts, or civil wars, that increasingly afflict the worlds populations', referring to Hannah Arendt's concept of the second world war as global civil war from her 1963 text *On Revolution*.
11. Lintott, *Violence, Civil Strife* discusses the role of *stasis* in political revolutions in Archaic and Classical Greece from 750–330BCE; M.I. Finley, *Democracy Ancient and Modern*, (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1985), 43, outlines his view of the political meaning of the word *stasis:* 'one of the most remarkable words to be found in any language'; while Benjamin D. Gray, *Stasis and Stability : Exile, the Polis, and Political Thought, c. 404-146 BC* (Oxford University Press, 2015), 54, extends Loraux's thesis that 'in many cases […] Greeks treated *stasis* as a collective madness or disease, for which individuals could not reasonably be held responsible'.
12. Nicole Loraux discusses *stasis* in the Athenian state in detail in her *La Tragédie d'Athens, La Politique entre l'Ombre et l'Utopie* (Paris: Éditions de Seuil, 2005); see also Nicole Loraux, *The Divided City: On Memory and Forgetting in Ancient Athens* (New York: Zone Books, 2001); and her 1986 lecture, 'La guerre dans la famille', *Clio. Histoire, femmes et sociétés*, 5(1997), published online 1 January 2005. http://clio.revues.org/407.
13. As note 11. Also Hans-Joachim Gehrke, *Stasis: Untersuchungen Zu Den Inneren Kriegen in Den Griechischen Staaten Des 5. Und 4. Jahrhunderts V. Chr*. (Munich: Beck, 1985); and Ronald Weed, *Aristotle on Stasis: a Moral Psychology of Political Conflict* (Berlin: Logos Verlag, 2007).
14. Raymond Williams, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society* (London: Croom Helm, 1976).
15. Adrian Forty, *Words and Buildings: A Vocabulary of Modern Architecture* (London: Thames & Hudson, 2000), 15.
16. See Gerald Raunig, *Dividuum. Machinic Capitalism and Molecular Revolution,* vol. 1, trans. Aileen Derieg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2016), who traces early documented occurrences of the term 'dividuum' in Latin texts upon which foundation he develops his philosophy of dividuality.
17. T.S. Eliot, *The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism* (London: Faber & Faber, 1964), 103. Eliot (1888–1965) is referring here to Matthew Arnold, the Victorian poet and cultural critic, who died in 1888.
18. Plato, *Timaeus* 81a.
19. Plato, *Phaedo,* in Benjamin Jowett (trans.), *Dialogues of Plato* (New York, Colonial Press, 1899), 100.
20. Plato, *The Republic* 470b, author's translation and emphasis. Translation adapted from Paul Shorey (trans.) *Plato in Twelve Volumes,* vols. 5 & 6 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969).
21. Ibid. 470b, 470c.
22. Ibid. 470e.
23. Ibid. 471a.
24. Plato, *Sophist* 228a, author's translation. John Burnet, ed. *Plato. Platonis Opera*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1903).
25. Plato, *Republic* 470d, 471a.
26. Ibid. 471a.
27. Ibid. 471b.
28. Ibid.
29. Miessen, *Nightmare of Participation*, 109; and Chantal Mouffe, *Agonistics: Thinking the World Politically* (London: Verso, 2013).
30. Plato, *Cratylus* 416b*,* 421b. Trans. Benjamin Jowett, http://classics.mit.edu.
31. Homer, *Iliad* 5.755: ἔνθ' ἵππους στήσασα θεὰ λευκώλενος Ἥρη. Author's emphasis. Homer, *The Iliad in Two Volumes,* trans. A.T. Murray (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1924).
32. Ibid. 5.770.
33. Xenophon, *Cyropaedia*.1.3.9. Xenophon, *Xenophon in Seven Volumes*, vols. 5 and 6, trans. Walter Miller (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1914).
34. Aeschines, *Against Ctesiphon,* 3:206. Author's translation and italics.
35. My interpretation of the vector relationship within the

physics of *stasis* differs from that set out by Dieter, *Stasis*, 348–353. Dieter quotes Stanley Caisson's *Progress and Catastrophe*: 'Between all opposite, or contrary, motions, movements, functions, or actions, there must needs always be a stasis', a position with which I slightly differ: I see the tensions between parties in stasis as part of the internal 'charging' process of the stasis, and the vectors of the flow of movement or action of the system as a whole pre- and post-stasis as always being different to each other but by no means opposing or contrary to each other.

36. Plato, *Republic* 545d, author's translation.
37. *Oxford English Dictionary*.
38. Ephraim Chambers and George Lewis Scott, *A Supplement to Mr. Chambers's Cyclopædia: Or Universal Dictionary of Arts and Sciences* (London: W. Inngs & J. Richardson, 1753).
39. Chongyun Liu, Angela Tseng, and Sue Yang, *Chinese Herbal Medicine: Modern Applications of Traditional Formulas* (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2005).
40. Plato, *Timaeus* 81e6-82b1. Lamb's 1925 translation has been modified in that the Greek term *stasis* has been returned to its original form by the author for the purpose of this article.
41. In the papyrus *On Medicine* by Anonymus Londinensis the elements are blood and bile (hot elements) and wind and phlegm (cold elements). W. H. S. Jones, *The Medical Writings of Anonymus Londinensis* (Cambridge: University Press, 1947).
42. Hippocrates of Cos, *Ancient Medicine*, chap. 14. http://www.loebclassics.com.libproxy.ucl.ac.uk. Author's emphasis.
43. Plato, *Timaeus* 82a–82b1.
44. Jones, *The Medical Writings of Anonymus Londinensis*.
45. See, for example, Alexei Zadorojnyi, '"Stabbed with large pens": trajectories of literacy in Plutarch's Lives', in Lukas de Blois, et al., eds, *The Statesman in Plutarch's Works*, vol. 2 (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2008).
46. Kathleen Freeman, *The Work and Life of Solon, with a Translation of His Poems* (New York: Arno Press, 1976), chap. 5.
47. Aristotle, *Aristotle in 23 Volumes*, vol. 20, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; 1952), section 8, v.5. For the purpose of this article the original Greek στασιάζουσαν is translated here as *stasis* by the author, in an amendment to Rackham's original translation.
48. Plutarch, *Plutarch's Lives with an English translation by Bernadotte Perrin in 11 Volumes*, vol. 1, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967 [1914]), 45.

Biography

Sarah Rivière is an architect based in Berlin. She set up her office as a sole practitioner in London in 1998, establishing the Berlin office in 2001. Her office's most recent project for a five storey residential building in Berlin-Kreuzberg was completed in Autumn 2016. A member of the ARB, RIBA UK, and the Berliner Architektenkammer, she has also taught urban design at the Technical University Berlin. She is currently researching a PhD in Architectural Design at the Bartlett in London on *stasis* as a generative state of spatial engagement.

Militarised Safety: The Politics of Exclusion

Arsalan Rafique and Ayesha Sarfraz

At a time of escalating global conflict, cities and urban centers have become the battlefields for contemporary warfare. With urbanisation rates soaring across global economies, cities have evolved into networked entities that are physically unfortified and seemingly borderless. Militarised entities operating within urban shells are well aware of advantages the urban infrastructure and institutions provide them with.[1] As critical nodes within a globalised system of exchange,[2] cities are now not only the sites but also the very medium of warfare.[3] Urban arenas in developing countries like Pakistan constitute a wide and complex array of economic, demographic and geopolitical factors, which have hitherto proven evasively incomprehensible to the discourse surrounding cities in conflict. It therefore becomes imperative to understand not only the new typologies of threats but also the role of the developing world in the urban century specifically.

Conflicts such as sectarian violence, socio-economic friction and the threat of terror attacks that used to be at the periphery of developing-world cities have grown into global trends that define the outcomes of geopolitical events across the globe. They have also become crucial to the everyday mobility of citizens in the urban battle space and affect the functionality of state mechanisms. With layered scales and levels of conflict and violence, the distinctions between wars within nations and wars between nations dissolve, leaving military/civilian binaries inseparably intertwined and complex.[4] The effect of this radical blurring proves to be quite precarious for citizens as well as governing bodies, rendering 'life itself [as] war';[5] engendering an ongoing, boundless exercise that places almost everybody within the xenophobic targeting mechanisms deployed in cities all over the globe. Cities in developing countries provide an insight into the lives of those who reside as functioning civilians while circumnavigating a perpetual state of chaos, which dictates their everyday lives.

The idea of a globally networked system of power and economics is certainly not new.[6] A more updated analysis of a 'networked urban world' would confirm that cities as vital conduits for conflict have direct or indirect linkages with global issues, resulting in an entanglement of physical scales – from the global to the neighborhood; interventions at any scale have direct consequences on all the others through multiple expressions. The Arab Spring did not reach the same conclusions in Egypt and Syria, but sheer political mobilisation of urban masses across the Middle East was undoubtedly accelerated by broadcast images of the spectacle at Tahrir Square. The idea of revolution being tied intrinsically to public space was exemplified in the following months: populations in Libya, Syria, Hong Kong, Brazil and Pakistan, amongst others, recognised the potency of converting their symbolic public spaces, which include social media platforms, into active battlegrounds. Furthermore the standard techniques of urban control – cordoned off security zones, walling, tracking, targeting, and biometric profiling – are similar in Gaza, Baghdad, New York and Karachi,

rendering the contested cities as connected, consistent and harmonious – at least to the state security mechanisms. The attacks on Paris and Brussels have led major European cities to rethink their perceived distance from the war zones and to reassess the idea of security and global inclusion. Combined with the mass migration from Syria and other affected countries, the situation is becoming more complex by the day. The essence of the European Union being borderless and permeable, as it stands today, is on the brink of malfunction. It is already apparent that the global issue of terrorism is proving detrimental to tolerance and diversity, creating conflicts that are offshoots of a wider epidemic. What was perceived as a condition of the East is slowly transfixing itself onto the entire globe, flattening geographies and de-territorialising the notions of threat and threatened in its wake.

The fragility of the targets and the global impact of conflict on complex urban networks pose a dilemma that state mechanisms, even with numerical advantage and technological superiority, have been unable to address so far. State-sanctioned militaries have faced an unprecedented setback in neutralising insurgencies, which do not rely on matching strengths, or direct confrontation, to balance the odds against the global super powers and their shared resources. For instance, it is disturbing and revealing that a handful of undetected armed men can sabotage Pakistan's entire natural gas distribution system by walking a few miles from their homes in Dera Bugti with great ease.[7] The mobility of the attackers in Paris in November 2015 or the Mumbai attacks in 2008 further testify to the fact that even with supposedly sophisticated countermeasures of defense, such as satellite surveillance and advanced weaponry, the threat is still able to effectively permeate the city by means of camouflaging itself within the urban fabric. The attack on Bacha Khan University in Charsadda in January 2016, in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Pakistan, is an iteration of the December 2014 attacks on the school in neighboring Peshawar where more than 140 children were killed during a five-hour siege of the campus. The small number of attackers in the above-mentioned cases and their disproportionate impact is another indicator of how institutions and infrastructure are targets of an extremely mobile and elusive threat. Perpetrators have proved how vulnerable the idea of perceived security is by circumventing systems in one way or another to create more complex catastrophes.

The Global Terrorism Index Report 2015 stated that terrorism has remained concentrated with most of the activities befalling developing countries. Furthermore roughly 70–75 percent of attacks were aimed at entities within various cities across these countries, again reinforcing the position of vulnerability of comparatively denser populations with a diverse involvement and role in shaping the fate of said nations. The unique responses and aftermaths of unfolding terror in these cities are highly enlightening pieces of information which shed light upon the vividly unreal mechanisms shaping the urban space in developing countries within the global landscape of conflict. With the statistics of conflict zones around the world set to include previously safe urban hubs such as European and Far Eastern cities the need to study the wide spectrum of threats and targets alike becomes obvious, and pressing. By concentrating on Pakistan as a country where war and peace exist simultaneously and perpetually, the aim of this article is to preach caution as well as to learn from the heavy toll on Pakistani society and cities as a whole.

Since 2001, Pakistan has been heavily invested in the so-called 'War on Terror'. Starting off as peripheral allies, they are directly engaging with the threat that was once bred in the lawless regions of the country. This *engagement* has seeped into the major cities as the army's actions in the Federally

Administered Tribal Area evoke militarised reactions that target the lively urban hubs that were insulated from the direct effects of war. Societal and ethnic differences have been made prominent by a massive influx of refugees testing the limits of cities. Furthermore, sleeper cells have been plugged seamlessly into the fabric of the city. While the targets are innumerable, their motives to instigate violence can span from commercial and territorial gains to political strong-arming and sectarian subjugation. These factors make cities in Pakistan highly volatile and are reflective of how the urban fabric is increasingly becoming a contested and divisive entity.

A complex amalgamation of both global and regional factors cause these unique conditions for conflict to thrive perpetually within the ever-growing expanse of cities in Pakistan, and the developing world in general. With an increasing number and frequency of events leading to unrest across the country, there seems to be no time to mourn and remember the dead collectively. News broadcasts and social media patterns are testament to this short-term memory where headlines and comments keep piling upon one another, which in turn creates a blur of events, allowing the observers to create their own narratives. Survival becomes the mode of operation when one dwells in the cities of perpetual insecurity. Remarkably, these hubs remain alive with pockets of functional compromise as a skewed normality resumes after temporary disturbances. Even in completely war-torn countries like Iraq and Syria, a sense of the civic is present and visible, albeit barely. A closer look reveals that rather than isolating the conflict and the threat, cities in Pakistan absorb it, making them porous entities that tread on the border of resilience and dysfunctionality. Conflict, in cities of the developing world, has become a part of daily life. In order to function, their inhabitants have to conjure mechanisms that are not sanctioned by any official entity but are rather *hyper-situationist* exercises of circumnavigation around the various obstacles that lie across the cities.

This article presents an unfolding history of violence in Pakistan as a causal study into the functionality of cities, their streets and public spaces. This is an attempt to make sense of the various factors that play a major role in defining how cities are locally perceived and navigated and what mechanisms are devised to keep one as safe and functional as possible in these volatile conditions. Furthermore, we will analyse how cities have embraced the violence on their streets and in their buildings' ornamentation, thereby actively playing multiple roles in the enactment and proliferation of both local and global conflicts.

Divided nation: the case of Pakistan

Today Pakistan is one of the countries in the world most affected by terrorism. In the past twenty-five years more than fifty thousand people have lost their lives to terrorism, the national economy has incurred losses estimated in billions of dollars, and the social fabric of Pakistan's society and cities has been exposed to immense stress.[8] Yet the current situation in the country cannot be fully comprehended based on the last 20 or so years of conflict alone. It has a history of violence, disguised in almost every political move and revealed in how citizens conduct their everyday lives. A mere retelling of the history would not only be redundant, but also prove insufficient in understanding how major cities like Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar, Gilgit and Quetta (the five provincial capitals) have evolved alongside the conflicts that they endure. [Fig. 1]

The very idea of diversity has historically been used to create instability in the region. The British policy of 'divide and rule' can be quoted in this context as a mechanism to maintain imperial rule by identifying pre-existing ethno-religious factions and then manipulating them in order to prevent any possibility of a unified uprising.[9] This eventually

festered and in 1947 resulted in the division of the Indian subcontinent into what is today India and Pakistan, with Kashmir as the disputed region that is still the core of the troubles between the two states. It was one of the most violent migrations in history and left more than fifteen million uprooted, and between one and two million dead.[10] These countries have had the principle of divisiveness and exclusion of the 'other' as the foundations on which they were legitimised as independent nation states. These were the first roots of the xenophobia that to this day still dictates the course of regional history.

Fractures in the societal fabric became starkly visible across urban centers in the region as the losses from mass migrations started becoming apparent. Pre-partition Karachi, the largest city and the first capital, was 47.6 percent Hindu while Delhi, India's capital, was comprised of a roughly 30 percent Muslim population. In the following decade, Karachi hardly had any Hindu population left whereas Muslims vacated Delhi by the hundreds of thousands. As cities became less diverse and moved towards homogeneity, the drive and intensity for conflict increased and tolerance decreased, which is manifested in the fragmentation of the society and the urban fabric in different factions. The division of East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, was the first of many fractures within the flawed idea of unity under the banner of one religion, as we can see in many other manifestations on micro levels.

Pakistan's geographic location has been vital in shaping not only its own destiny but also that of its neighbors. The Cold War brought Pakistan into the foray of global politics, with demands of allegiance being made of many previous neutral countries. The Afghan War fought against the Russians had Pakistan playing the role of a conduit between the US, Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan, training and arming jihadists that had been facilitated by military dictatorships which have plagued Pakistan's independent history for a long time. Internal instability was increasing, with the dictator General Zia-ul-Haq overtly promoting a right-wing *Wahabbi* sect of Islam, popularised by Saudi interests. After the Soviet Afghan War, many immigrants and different groups of fighters, including Taliban who had trans-border ethnic and cultural ties with the Pakhtuns of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), were welcomed into the country as future assets to realise its regional ambitions.[11] While immigrants found sanctuary in various urban hubs, 'warriors' were recruited by the government through political cover and financial aid, as well as autonomy to function within *madrassas* (religious schools) which were left undeniably unchecked. Throughout the 1990s, events in Afghanistan were dictated by the mountainous regions of North West Pakistan, which served the country and its broader allies in Saudi Arabia and the US.

The situation changed after the World Trade Centre attacks of 11 September 2001. The global war on terror was primed to be exported to many parts of the world, and the effects are visible today. It was undoubtedly a tough situation for Pakistan, which was once again under a military regime (curiously, just like during the Soviet-Afghan War) that had deep-seated interests in and sympathies for the militants harboured on both sides of the country's western border. Furthermore, careful treading was advised in the state's internal circuits, in part because of the fact that the militant organisations are not only confined to the northwestern border territory but have spread out across the country during the years before 9/11.

When Pakistan's complicity in the 'War on Terror' was violently challenged by the Taliban and other militant factions who were against US involvement in the region, the government and the army realised the urgency as well as their responsibility to fight extremism head-on, thus making this war their own.[12]



Fig. 1: Frequency of violent attacks nation wide. Map: author.

What results from this direct onslaught against recently outlawed extremist outfits is an unprecedented increase in securitisation across key urban areas within Pakistan. In a society already battling to embrace differences of opinion, citizens became further removed from each other, as the insidious impact on their daily lives increased and their interactions with other citizens diminished. The migration of internally displaced persons has also added to the friction between different ethnic groups. In a cultural landscape where more than seventy local languages are spoken, communication and cooperation have evidently become strained, which leads to reliance solely upon the most immediate support networks.[13] Neighborhoods that were once heterogeneous in their demographics are becoming starkly parsed, territorial, intolerant and hostile to outsiders.

(In)security: the rise of urban introversion

Segregation and intolerance have replaced the vibrancy of the heterogeneous aggregations of diversity that were once symbolic of South Asian cities. In 1947, when Pakistan had just gained independence, close to 23 percent of its population was non-Muslim. Today that figure has aggressively declined to approximately three percent.[14] Furthermore, religious minorities, including Islamic factions, have suffered and been the targets of attacks, including forced conversions amongst other forms of violence.

The variegated level of conflicting interests and ideas of the diverse sects and strata of society in Pakistan have had a significant impact on its urban fabric. There has been a visible ghettoisation of minorities who have become increasingly vulnerable with the rising intensity of conflict, as was the case with the arson attack in the Christian community in Badami Bagh in Lahore in March 2013.[15] However, it is not only the lower end of the socio-economic spectrum that is being ghettoised. The city's elite also tend to cocoon themselves in their 'safe' ghettos, often articulated as gated communities. This phenomenon is especially evident in the army cantonments that double as elite civilian residential quarters around the country. Both typologies reflect introversion and vulnerability and speak volumes about social control. But by the creation of protective bubbles in cities with high crime rates, these enclaves also cause a drastic shrinking of the public domain, challenging democracy and polarising space.[16] As a result, these pockets of space perpetuate divisions which translate into various forms of repression and control such as exclusive access to safety. The *demonisation of space* through the exclusionary attitude in turn has an antagonising effect on the environment.[17] [Figs. 2a, 2b, 2c]

As Sobia Ahmad Kakar observes, that with the focus of state authorities in overlooking informal governance over the blind spots in the city, a number of low-income settlements start gaining relevance as 'breeding grounds' for terrorism and other subversive channels.[18] For instance, Sultanabad, a low-income high-density settlement located in the neighboring areas of one of Karachi's highest security zones, is reported to be controlled by the outlawed terrorist organization, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).[19] This polarity and proximity coupled together inevitably increases the volatility and the potential for conflict in already vulnerable environs.

In order to minimise damage and ensure the safety of the immediate support networks, communities that are threatened and targeted on a regular basis are forced to reconfigure their location within the city on the basis of anticipated attacks.[20] A visible introversion is practiced with paranoid self-policing, multiple checkpoints and an aggressive demarcation of habitable limits as *modus operandi*. Marriabad, a Shia Hazara town in Quetta, is a case in point. Instead of the prosperous expanding community it was in the 1980s, the Hazara minority



Fig. 2a

Fig. 2b

Fig. 2c

Fig. 2a: Cantonment checkpoints in Lahore and Quetta. Map: author.
Fig. 2b: Cantonment checkpoint, Lahore. Photo: author.
Fig. 2c: Cantonment checkpoint, Lahore. Photo: author.

has now confined themselves to an extremely restricted area. The perceived threat and the threatened have become inseparably intertwined yet starkly distinct within the city limits. This particular instance can also be seen as an attempt to homogenise cities in myopic ethno-nationalist terms where cultural diversity is antagonised and viewed as a 'cultural pollutant'.[21]

Another typology is the compound Nine Zero in Karachi, the headquarters of the powerful political party, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM). The party was founded to represent the interests of the *Mohajirs*, the migrants who poured in after the partition and though seemingly secular and moderate, the party itself is actively involved in many a violent occurrence in the largest city of Pakistan. Mechanisms of *self-securitisation* that tend to come about in regions with weak governance are most effectively demonstrated here as the notions of safety and vulnerability diffuse through streets and neighborhoods. The compound is a hub of illicit activities and is guarded by tight security justified by their stance as a party for the minority; they have reacted robustly, and at times violently, to form and protect their base of operations.

Cultures that suffer through a weak writ of the state resort to vigilantism, making their own rules of civic and administrative operations. Both Marriabad in Quetta and Nine Zero in Karachi are self-sustained community units where policing is controlled by the inhabitants and barriers or checkpoints overseen by the weaponised youth. These communities perceive themselves to be threatened, and have resolved to rely on some of the most nuclear forms of social organisation, i.e. neighborhood and family, as the only support networks. Saskia Sassen saw these emerging roles as tending towards 'territorial fractures that the project of building a nation state sought to eliminate or dilute'.[22] These areas possess the sharp edge of violence and in order to exercise their authority, they rely on social pressure. They are providing facilities that include but are not limited to education, infrastructure and security, eventually becoming autonomous and rejecting the state altogether.

The rise of private security has wide-ranging implications for the landscape of security architecture, as the likelihood increases that state control will be contested by violent means – at times, even by the armed forces where they see fit. The limited possibility of territorial control in complex urban scenarios creates further opportunities for both state or non-state actors to challenge the state and establish quasi-structures and different modes of security governance. Both the government and private security have begun remodeling their forces along (para)militarised lines.[23] All of this demonstrates the fragmentation and paranoia in the city as more and more institutions are failing or disappearing from the public realm.

Landmarked: the politics of symbolism and threat

As Georges Bataille once observed,

> Monuments inspire social prudence and often even real fear. The taking of the Bastille is symbolic of this state of things: it is hard to explain this crowd movement other than by the animosity of the people against the monuments that are their real masters.[24]

The idea of landmarks and monuments is inclusive, as they are primarily serving as places of gathering and refer to the spirit of the people throughout time. While historically they hold their place as memorials, they have also been the symbolic background and stage where conflict unfurls into a spectacle, as it has at places like Palace Square (St Petersburg), Red Square (Moscow) and Tahrir Square (Cairo) as symbols of patriotism, nationalism and identity.

Furthermore, the permanence of architecture has long been its strength, and has aided

the validation of regimes to mark their territory and power. Historically, it is the destruction of this architecture that symbolises the victor's conquest of territories. The more politically and historically relevant the structure is, the more it is prioritised on the list of *urbicide*. For instance, the outlawed separatist party Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) targeted the Ziarat residency (home of the nation's founding father, Muhammad Ali Jinnah) in 2013 and burnt it to the ground. Targeting a popular historic symbol of the birth of the nation was a strategic move in getting their message across. However, what is equally interesting was the state's response, wasting no time to rebuild an exact replica of the structure. Though architecturally the effort seemed nothing short of kitsch, it stresses the importance of symbolism for both the state and its enemies.

Similarly, the structures built during the British rule, that riddle the boulevards of Lahore and Karachi, represent the history of a troubled colonial past. Architecturally, subjugation was in effect when those buildings were planned and designed. The fabric of the cities was radically altered by the spatial experimentation of the British, in order to better understand and exercise control over the urban territory. Such restructuring is not particularly unfamiliar, as in the case of Marshall Thomas Robert Bugeaud in the 1940s and his success in putting an end to the insurrection in Algiers by, amongst other atrocities, the removal of entire settlements to make way for large boulevards.[25] Initially, high Victorian designs replaced the organic order prevalent in the old capitals of Indian subcontinent, which over time evolved into a more accepted Indo-Saracen style. This is evidence of the built fabric responding directly to the British policy in the region throughout the years. These buildings are still prioritised targets for destruction as they are still active and house state and institutional functions.

Sufi shrines, churches, Shia mosques and other places of devotion that are not right-wing Islamic tend to become victims of severe destruction as well. The terrorist attack on the Federal Investigation Agency in 2009, on the shrine of Data Sahib in 2010 and the twin attacks on Saint John's Catholic Church and Christ Church in the Christian-dominated district of Youhanabad in 2015 are just a few examples that all took place in Lahore – perceived to be the safest city in the country. [Figs. 3a, 3b, 3c] These targets represent the vulnerability of state security institutions and their giving way to a process of ethnic cleansing – both symbolising domination in terms of governance and populace.

All these attacks have legitimised a new architectural vocabulary that has defense as its primary function, thus materialising exclusion and paranoia as security tectonics, or mere *ornamentation*. Though security tectonics were already a part of the cityscapes, especially in government and religious buildings, the attacks on the Army Public School in Peshawar prompted the government send an official security document to educational institutions across the country. This memo provided strict instructions for 'Foolproof Security Arrangements', including the construction of an eight-foot-high boundary wall with an additional two feet of barbed wire protection, the erection of concrete barriers at entrance points, the provision of snipers and vehicular search devices, the installation of surveillance cameras and so forth.[26] Notices of this kind are obviously responding to concerns about attacks but they also represent the failure of the state to provide safety, resulting in demands for private security. [Fig. 4] The rapid securitisation of institutions by barring access through the security ornament gives an updated meaning to the symbolic structures around Pakistani cities. At the same time, however, it poses a dilemma as to which other buildings need to be secured. The targets and their typologies change as the insurgents find soft spots within the city fabric.

Questions arise about the effectiveness of the defense apparatus and what the state refers to

Fig. 3a

Fig. 3b

Fig. 3c

Fig. 3a: Security outside Data Sahib's shrine, Lahore five years after the attack. Photo: author.
Fig. 3b: Security ornamentation in Lahore. Photo: author.
Fig. 3c: Entrance to the High Court, Lahore. Photo: author.

Fig. 4: Security at a private school in Lahore. Photo: author.

as 'fool proof security'. The same visual cues that seemingly protect a place can also make it more conspicuous and in turn more vulnerable. [Fig. 6] As Stephen Graham puts it in his essay 'Cities and the 'War on Terror', '[by] publicising the probabilistic absurdity of places of targets, the geography of paranoia is expanded to contain the most obscure and remote sites (as well as the obvious one) rendering these sites into a regime of anxiety'.[27] How far can architecture and its programs be pushed to ensure the safety of the city? If geographic specificities and the idea of grounded and permanent structures are effective targets then can the traditional understanding of architecture be considered prosaic and expired?

The street as a reconstruction of conflict

The points of intersection between major routes and arteries of cities across the globe have been important in establishing the unique inherent character of those cities. Likewise, in Pakistan, nodes and points of traffic have a highly charged meaning and significance in the political and sociocultural landscape. As distinct symbolic markers of the cities' various economic and social culmination these visually prominent devices often mark territory and serve as symbols of authority and power.

A considerable budget of all major cities in Pakistan goes to identifying these points with follies or other symbolic markers, such as fighter planes (*China Chowk*, Lahore), giant marble swords (*Teen Talwar* – literally translated as three swords – Karachi) or just a flailing angry fist (*Mukka Chowk*, Karachi); they all warn of the hostility towards unwanted elements. The symbolism is inherently aggressive, seething with anger and reprisal, and reflective of the tension inherent in these nodes. While these visual symbols often refer to a heroic feat or a memorable historic event, their confrontational nature is lending them a different identity. This perceived aggression becomes the backdrop of many political rallies, most noticeably at the time of political elections. Banners overcrowd the view around these intersections while every neighbourhood showcases its allegiance and seemingly displays its predicted voting patterns with flyers and flags competing for space. Aside from their political value, the physical material from the campaigning often has an extended use as shade for market places and hot pavements, while others can be seen constructing makeshift shelters for themselves out of it. However, the metaphorical canopy of political affinities offers one a fair idea of how to navigate one of the many political microclimates that must be encountered in streets and everyday life.

Public protests and rallies like the *D-Chowk* sit-in by the political party *Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf* (Pakistan Movement for Justice) in Islamabad towards the end of 2014, played out as a festival with concerts and free food to ensure the longevity and inclusion of people in the demonstration. Whether the seriousness of the demands or the financing of these events came across as suspicious was a secondary concern. With the shrinking public space in the city, people found evening entertainment and the media gave daily prime time coverage to the leader of one of the major political parties of the country. This form of *protest-ainment* quickly became a popular trend; one may even attribute the originality of the idea to Cairo's Tahrir Square. Other demonstrations often get tense and confrontational as competing parties try to compete for higher turnouts, louder concerts with bigger celebrities, and of course more food.

In an earlier example, the 2006 Anti Danish Cartoon riots in Lahore, protestors rampaged the Mall Road – one of the main arteries built by the British in the late 1800s to connect the old quarters of the city with the new cantonment, flanked with iconic and important buildings – violently destroying buildings and looting goods; acts that had nothing to do with the cause of their protest. Due to the

official silence of the government, police were reluctant to regain control. As the protest and plundering continued an interesting mix of people, ranging from beggars and small-time thieves to a thrill-seeking populace (including women and children) joined in.

Mobility is becoming an increasingly important factor to determine how users navigate conflict thus allowing the streets to enact and reconstruct the state of affairs of a society through demonstrations and other public performances. Movement is also a way of ensuring some form of safety, as events will manifest and dissipate before they can become the target of an attack, whether by state authorities or terrorists. [Figs. 5a, 5b, 5c]

The first instinct of protection has architecturally always been to raise walls. Historically, the wall has represented security, and some semblance of durability. However, walls are also a primary instance of exclusion – the most significant example would be the endless Israeli wall running through the West Bank, its gloomy precedent the Berlin Wall or the potential violence of the (as of yet) unbuilt wall between the United States and Mexico. As a counter-narrative to the permanence of the wall, the roads of Pakistan are cluttered with mobile security checkpoints.[28] Checkpoints are set up fairly sporadically – for annual celebrations, Friday prayers, upon the visit of dignitaries or state guests or sometimes for no reason at all. Some points are more intense, like those around the cantonment areas, which are multiple and labyrinthine in nature, flanked with armed army personnel and streamlined. Other checkpoints are more dubious – like the ones that stop cars suspected of possession of alcohol, only to blackmail the drivers into giving bribes. Road users are left more or less to their own devices to conjure up new navigations in what Eyal Weizman refers to as 'elastic geographies', which are revised and redistributed with every political development and decision.[29]

In a time when public gatherings are deemed a threat to the establishment, exacerbated by an overload of political *protestainment*, most public places in Pakistan are either re-appropriated into inaccessible areas or heavily securitised. To prevent even the streets and nodes from being used as public spaces or places to demonstrate, the state uses Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code, forbidding groups of more than five people from gathering on the streets, as a way to prevent protests and demonstrations in the name of security. The result is that the public has barely any space left, except for the affluent minority who use sprawling golf and country clubs for their leisure activities. We witness an impromptu utilisation of other infrastructure that was not designed or sanctioned to be used as public space. One can witness hordes of people swimming in the canal in Lahore, officially used for grey water and irrigation, in times of intense heat. Picnics dot the place on any regular hot weekend; the fact that the canal is flanked on both sides by high-speed traffic is no deterrent. Similar leisurely activities can be seen around green belts, traffic roundabouts and shrines. The elastic geographies that are constantly re-formed allow the public to tend to their civic needs, and are fascinating in the multiplicity of their manifestations.

As Pakistani cities become a series of spontaneous obstructions and revised geographies,; inconspicuous passages, defiant spaces and cracks in the urban fabric have become some of the most important traits in the navigational realm for the citizens to navigate. This is reminiscent of the Situationists' 1950s plea for as an increasingly personal contact with urban surroundings that would transport the citizen away from the overloaded spectacle of the city.[30] As an intuitive itinerary, this *psychogeography* is elusive and ephemeral in nature.[31] Additionally, the *dérive*, as they called the delicate balance of chance and planning, suggests a novel way of experiencing the city in an unprescribed, temporal and an all-encompassing

fashion.[32] Tertiary routes which have always carried connotations of the fear of unused territories, have as a result become crucial to understand the city as it stands today. [Figs. 6a, 6b]

Whereas the Situationists were fighting for 'anti-spectacular' spaces or streets, looking for spatial experiences, cities like Lahore or Karachi need the obscure spaces to keep running smoothly, as a 'spectacle' in such cities has the potential of costing hundreds of lives. Similar to the *dérive* itself, the cartography of this experience questions conventional mapping techniques and challenges one to be creative. It is ironic that where Debord and his peers hoped to explore an urban condition where the personal human experience and interaction would take precedent over the monotony of planned modern cities, the users of Pakistani cities have no choice but to be *flâneurs* in order to navigate on an everyday basis.

Tentative avenues – conclusions

It is difficult to distinguish between acts of terror and other forms of violence in the developing world generally. This is particularly true for Pakistan, given the 'conceptual minefield that is the current state of classification and understanding of political violence'.[33] Moreover, local acts of urban political violence can become entangled, making it difficult to decipher among various forms and causes of aggression. In adapting to insecurity, it is also important to note that aside from the imposed violence, the fragmentation of the urban fabric itself is causing breaks in social systems and structures that exacerbate these very frictions. This goes to show how the relationship between the city and violence is deeply complex, multifaceted and interdependent on a variety of supporting structures that already exist within the urban realm. These relationships also reveal how the *new military urbanism* produces political subjectivities that heighten marginality and vulnerability for minorities.[34] Even though the factors to create unrest and eventual chaos were culturally and geopolitically unique, the destruction of cities like Aleppo, Baghdad, Tripoli and Homs serve as a warning to societies on the brink of divisiveness and potential demise. Since reliance on state mechanisms and of course the perpetrators does not preserve the intention of safeguarding the resilience of urban hubs, citizens are compelled to mobilise what Stephen Graham calls 'counter geographies' – these are a step further towards not only understanding the critical conditions of Pakistani cities but to 'contest and disrupt the circuits and logics of the new military urbanism, with its normalised separation of "us" and "them"'. As observed in this article, traditional modes of resistance such as street protests and political movements can easily get derailed by the multiple complexities, and as such other creatively deployed mobilisations are important complements if we are to spark a multifaceted discourse between the currently scattered and divided public.

Beyond the visual clutter of security arrangements and political banter, one has to pay attention to the sort of culture of anticipation that is brewing as everyone in society, including children, are in a near-constant state of preparation for some form of an attack or hijacking of space – either from the terrorist as a form of a physically violent attack, or from the state under the guise of protection. The same sensibility also has the tendency to desensitise one to different forms of violence, as weapons and bomb drills in schools become daily part of casual conversation. Artist Bani Abidi's work Security Barriers A-L, 2008 is an attempt to catalogue security mechanisms, which suddenly sprouted around the city of Karachi during a time of heightened paranoia. Modeling these temporary architectural elements as innocuous 3D objects against a pure white background, the work provides an analysis of how state violence and demarcation can become a habitual occurrence in cities, thereby preparing the masses for the diminished freedom of movement.[35] One might see this as a form of



Fig. 5a

Fig. 5c

Fig. 5b

Fig. 5a: Security mapping Lower Mall, Lahore. Map: author.
Fig. 5b: Entrance to the Government House, Lahore. Photo: author.
Fig. 5c: Recently cocooned Government College, Lahore. Photo: author.

resilience, but such adaption or desensitisation is also precarious. Abidi makes a point of highlighting the obvious, yet disturbing, trend that has engulfed Pakistani cities.

South Asian cities have historically come a long way, through times of political mutinies and violence, and have managed to retain their cultures of vibrancy while maintaining their core characters and identities, which has still kept them considerably habitable. What becomes important here is to identify the factors that unify a nation, rather than the ones that are inherently divisive. A comprehensive re-imagination of permanent geographies towards fluid ones is called for. One such project, *Exhausted Geographies 2015* published by a multidisciplinary team of artists, architects and lawyers, examines the alternative narratives of Karachi. Writings are accompanied by both conventional and unconventional maps, which evoke the parallel realities of a metropolis in turmoil. The themes explored in these works range from 'the politics of development/ displacement, missing persons and state-enforced disappearances, cartographic silences of local knowledge productions, eighteenth-century narrative geographies of Sindh, colonial reordering of the city, community mapping and regularisation politics, visual architectures of desire and longing, spatial memories and embodied subjectivities'.[36] Another artist, Farida Batool focuses on the anxious experience of walking through a city laced with tension in her work Kahani Aik Sheher Ki – Story of A City, 2012. Her walk through the Mall Road in Lahore, exhibited as a 70-foot long lenticular image, demonstrates the various politics of exclusion, insecurity and consumerism from a very personal perspective. These examples are attempting to engage the issues of representation in a critical fashion while allowing the perspective of the public to seep into the works. Perhaps understanding these cities from an objective perspective is difficult, as the nuances that inhabitants experience on a daily basis during configurational navigation cannot be fully comprehended through traditional mapping.

Strategies of surveillance and the increasing limits of physical or administrative control are reducing the already confined pockets of democratic space with echoes of an Orwellian dystopia. It becomes relevant to note the long-term value of such strategies and their social and political repercussions, as they seem to be mutating proportionately with the sophistication of the threat, and increasingly omit a growing demographic from the public realm. In response to increasingly privatised, securitised and segregated public spaces, Beyond Walls, 2011 by the Tentative Collective organised a tea-drinking gathering of around 50 strangers on top of the boundary wall around one of Karachi's most beloved parks, to which public access had been restricted by building a boundary wall and charging an entry fee.[37] This mobilisation is similar in essence to the hordes of people swimming in Lahore's irrigation canal, and is bordering on dissidence punishable by law. Furthermore the gathering included immigrants from a nearby settlement, thus it can be said that both the events in discussion were confronting the politically and economically motivated filtration of marginalised masses. It would be prudent to note that this marginalisation is the trickling down of global binaries that are being sanctioned through localised ideas of threats. In light of such tensions, novel forms of resilience can be fascinating to observe as they not only shed light on how life carries on in times of conflict but also act as a litmus test for communities and cities to deal with a perpetual state of insecurity. Observation of such traits can provide valuable clues in order to re-establish civic order to some extent.

Whereas these creative endeavours display strong sentiments and protest against the violation of space in cities, it needs to be taken into account that these voices do not penetrate the public realm

Fig. 6a

Fig. 6b

Fig. 6a: Approach to the Punjab Assembly, Lahore. Photo: author.
Fig. 6b: Newly raised walls at the Punjab Assembly, Lahore. Photo: author.

for the most part. However, it is of value that many artists and activists report directly from the front lines where violence is not romanticised or theorised, but instead is conveyed through first-hand translit-eration of experiences. Pushing these forward for political agendas to reclaim democratic domains would require alliances in the mainstream and public sectors where visionary efforts can be accessed beyond the confined spaces of art galleries through effective channeling like those of social and tele-vised media. It is imperative that these matters be catered to with critical understanding and a multi-pronged approach that prioritises the safety of the civilians and the democracy of space while taking into account that cities are ever-evolving and ever-adapting organisms, and that the concretisation of security alone would not contain, mitigate and erad-icate threats and conflicts.

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Anxious Architecture: Sleep, Identity, and Death in the US-Mexico Borderlands

Sam Grabowska

Since its formation in 1848, the US-Mexico border has been a site of conflict and inconstancy. The international boundary was and remains both a delineation and a linkage (economic, cultural, and political) between two nations.[1] This kind of push-and-pull between keeping immigrants out and welcoming their labour has resulted in various waves of immigration.[2] While policies change, so do the conditions on the border including an increase in militarisation and patrolling tactics.[3] Additionally, the modes of crossing and the actors involved in unauthorised migration have changed including cartels, guides, the Border Patrol agency, migrants, and humanitarians.[4] The constant flux of conditions creates anxiety, as the border and the borderlands are unable to remain stable and unyielding, 'they bring about their own demise as if by a subtle form of self-destruction – of being undermined not from without (that is, from a failure to hold back overt invasions) but from within, on their own terms'.[5] The overbearing and overcompensating strategies to protect inside from outside, self from other, end up eroding the functionality and proficiency of the border itself. The border begins to undo itself through anxiety.

In the borderlands, 'anxiety' seems to be a particularly useful term when dealing with the landscape, its crossers, and its architecture because there exists a persistent threat (whether of being lost, discovered, displaced, or confronted) and one must continually seek to avoid this threat, whether real or imagined.[6] Avoidance and escape of a threat are triggered by a deleterious external condition (a helicopter flying overhead, the heat of the sun, a threatening human…) and thus require the seeking of a protective interior state (rest, shelter, resilience…).

As border-crossers and the border emote and embody this anxiety, so, too, does the architecture they build. Fashioned out of available materials (cactus, shrub, grass, stone, and so forth), the small structures built in the US-Mexico borderlands are an anxious entity born out of a contested terrain. The structures work to mitigate unforgiving terrain, harsh climate, detection by Border Patrol, contested cartel routes, and other threats to personal safety. The characterisation of architecture as an emotive and emotional subject, draws from scholars who have emphasised the life (even agency) of objects.[7] In a loose sense, the following text performs a 'psychoanalysis *of* architecture […] – as if architecture were on the couch so to speak – that would reveal, by implication, and reflection, its relationship with its "subjects"[…] stressing the active role of objects and spaces in anxiety'.[8] The subjects, in this case, are the physical landscape of the borderlands, the builders of the structures, as well as the other human and non-human actors inhabiting and forming the borderlands.

This article employs the analysis of architectural form, artifacts of material culture, and interviews gathered from two summers of fieldwork in the US and Mexico. This fieldwork was completed under

the guidance and support of Dr. Jason De León's Undocumented Migration Project (UMP). Around 40 structures were documented within a ten-mile radius north of the US-Mexico border in Arizona (part of the Sonoran desert borderlands) and were found using a combination of transect land surveying and exploratory walks around artifact cluster sites identified by the UMP. Approximately 50 one-on-one semi-structured interviews were conducted with migrants, *coyotes* (guides), and *burros* (drug smugglers) in Nogales and Altar, Mexico during the spring and summer of 2012 and the summer of 2013.

Drawing from this fieldwork, this article identifies three modes in which architecture becomes 'anxious' as a spatial tactic to cope with conflict. Framed largely by Jonathan Crary's theorisation of capitalist spaces and sleeplessness, the first mode is an investigation of deprived sleep and the ways in which border-crosser huts both deny and afford physical rejuvenation or counter-surveillance in a landscape of trauma. The second mode, insecure identity, reveals how shape shifting can both mitigate and fall victim to power structures referencing Foucault and De Certeau. The third mode, fear of death, looks at the erasure and exposure of bodies (both carnal and architectural) that cannot rest in peace and draws from Anthony Vidler's exploration of uncanny architecture.

As anxiety is a response born out of duress, it is not the same as a transgressive response born out of a self-conscious desire to rebel against and overcome an oppressive force.[9] Anxious architecture thus becomes an adaptive spatial tactic arising out of conflict and trauma that can protect, be alert or combative, and aware and responsive.[10] At the same time, a constant state of vigilance also takes a toll, eroding the body (both of the builders and of their structures) and its capacity for endurance and wellbeing.

Lit sleep: interrupted cycles

Currently, the conditions along the US-Mexico border in Arizona are replete with checkpoints up to 50-some miles north of the border, Border Patrol stations, patrol cars, helicopters, infrared cameras, and watch towers, among other modes of surveillance and patrolling. [Fig. 1] The ever-watchful gaze of surveillance lights up the dark, exposing what wishes to remain hidden: 'Full lighting and the eye of the supervisor capture better than darkness, which ultimately protected. Visibility is a trap.'[11] Given the surveillance, it is better to travel at night than the day. However, temperatures in the summer months reach upwards of 49 degrees Celsius as the sun relentlessly blazes, making daytime rest difficult. Whether due to policing or climate, border-crossers and their architecture must capitalise on, or fall victim to, an anxious depletion of sleep.

An architecture that disables rest becomes a far different structure than one that enables rest. In the desert, rest and sleep are strictly regulated activities whether they are controlled by people in power (cartels, humanitarians, Border Patrol) or by the obstacles of the natural environment (the sun, the monsoons, the nearly untraversable steep terrain). The building or inhabitation of structures is equally regulated. In the borderlands, both rest and architecture become contentious and political. Shelters where people do not rest are built for the purpose of vigilance and counter-surveillance, used for watching others as much as for evading detection. In this context, architecture becomes a technological apparatus, much in the way that Jonathan Crary describes the capitalist global labourer or the modern soldier. Just as with 'sleep mode' on a computer, restless architecture and its inhabitants are 'an apparatus in a state of low-power readiness […] It supersedes an off/on logic, so that nothing is ever fundamentally "off" and there is never an

Fig. 1: The militarised border as visualised by US Customs and Border Protection with various surveillance technologies and tactics to detect and capture border-crossers. Source: United States Customs and Border Protection 2012: 14. Illustration: Author

actual state of rest.'[12] At the same time, an anxious architecture can disrupt the surrounding landscape. It provides a refuge by circumscribing the unknown, deflecting surveillance, and limiting vulnerability.

For many of us, sleep is a given; a mundane fact of life. But in the desert borderlands, sleep falls somewhere between desperate bodily need and terrifying vulnerability. To be asleep is to be helplessly unaware of the world around you. Natalia, a woman trying to cross the border, made this clear: 'We didn't see them [Border Patrol]. And when they caught us, we were sleeping.' Sleep is a time when one's guard is down, when one's eyes are closed – the watcher becomes the watched.[13] Thus, border-crosser architecture's siting responds with multiple tactics. It is built to be big enough to house a small group of people that can warn one another (safety in numbers). Or it is organised in small but separate clusters so people can quickly egress and disperse from multiple locations. Or the architecture becomes a full-body shield to ensure protection from elements, animals, and surveillance at all times.

Some shelters take this latter all-compassing approach, with walls or coverage extending in all directions. This 360-degree coverage suggests that people stay longer in these places, not only because they have protection from the sun at any time of day during any season, but also because this kind of structure takes longer to build and requires more structural ingenuity (it is far easier to build a quick lean-to singular wall than to orchestrate a self-standing enclosure). A less temporary, more advanced and complicated architecture affords more sleep. Border-crosser architecture thus responds to 'a generalized inscription of human life into duration without breaks, defined by a principle of continuous functioning', and 'terminal disruption of the cycles and seasons on which ecological integrity depends'.[14] It is a round-the-clock apparatus.

BW-01 was the first structure to be documented during the summer of 2012 in Arizona's borderlands. Located just off a small wash, its overall form is S-shaped with one curve larger than the other. [Fig. 2] Its form, materiality, and siting illustrates how border-crosser architecture strives for an artificial environment of imposed darkness in order to escape the unrelenting and dehydrating sun and to use the darkness as a cloak for movement. In order to keep out the light, BW-01's walls rest upon a mesquite tree's load-bearing tree trunk. These walls protect the border-crosser from on-the-ground reconnaissance as well as the sun while the mesquite's canopy provides cover from helicopters and aerial surveillance as well as sun and precipitation. The vertical, broken-off branches are all Y-shaped and placed carefully, alternating along the circumference: YʎYʎYʎ, like crutches holding up the tree and protecting whomever is inside.

While the structure of BW-01's large room is impressive in its construction and degree of cover, it clearly failed to meet all the needs of subsequent inhabitations and thus the need arose for an extension, an annex, in the form of the smaller curve of the S. Neither structure actually provides full relief from environmental threats. The measured difference in brightness in the large room during the day exhibits a paltry gift of shade (the external light reading in the early morning was 14.9 exposure value (EV), the interior light readings ranged from 10.6–13.8 EV). There are remnants of grass thatching on the walls that suggest the structure was at one point less permeable to light, but even so, these shelters cannot turn day into night. Instead, they do what they can to deflect heat and create a slightly more tolerable space that may allow for a brief nap.

When groups are able to rest in the half shade or unsettling night, there are, of course, no pillows and no beds inside the structures. Most structures are made of thorny flora and claustrophobically envelop the body, often without leaving any room to shift

Fig. 2

Fig. 3

Fig. 2: Due to the skilled selection and placement of branches, BW-01's walls stand fast. However, due to wind, monsoon season, and the passage of time, there remain few tufts of grass that were used for thatching. Photo: Author

Fig. 3: GP-01 sits atop a ridge and with its dense dome structure and rock wall, is the sturdiest structure found. A small pile of gathered firewood rests just outside the fire pit. A decaying nylon sports jacket rests at the entrance. Photo: Author

postures. To enter BW-01, one must perform a swift series of choreographed gestures comprised of leg lifts and head bobs, torso swerves and arm extensions. Once inside, the bodily maneuvers are not yet complete: squatting, turning, folding-unfolding-refolding appendages, are all necessary just to situate the self awkwardly in the cramped confines of unwieldy, thorny walls. Often it is better not to sit down at all for fear that a mesquite thorn will rudely present itself on your fleshy backside or into vulnerable palms as you set down your hands for balance. In its generous volume, BW-01 is more comfortable than most structures, but even so, sleeping on the desert floor (replete with curious centipedes, displaced cactus needles, unforgiving mesquite thorns, scuttling ants, and so on) is far from luxurious. With only two people inside, body heat begins to raise the interior temperature quickly.

In the desert, this resting space is often adulterated, used instead as a space to fill the body with substances to counter the natural need and desire for sleep. Occasionally there is a blanket or a trash bag left behind as evidence of a moment of rest, but not at BW-01. Across all structures, artifacts of stimulation generally far outweigh the artifacts of sedation, suggesting that while architecture lends a moment of 'down time' to the traveler, this moment is temporary and often hi-jacked by ulterior motives. An empty Red Bull can, a discarded pill package (often containing pain suppressant or caffeine pills), a 'Be Light' water bottle… the border-crosser must stop infrequently, push the body beyond its limits, limit the weight of her own body, and deny herself rest and sleep. When the body's natural sources of adrenaline (generated from fear or excitement or both) wear off, these packaged substances artificially replace the body's chemicals.

In these cases, instead of enabling sleep, architecture enables altered states, intoxication, and concealed consumption of drugs. This place of transgression surrenders the far-too-luxurious privilege of sleep, rest, and hydration. The energy drink propels aching, otherwise surrendering muscles up and over steep hills and also heightens the senses. One must always be aware of the surroundings; a rustle in the bushes could mean Border Patrol, could mean competing cartel operatives, or could mean a rattlesnake. Felipe, a 22-year old male raised in Arizona and deported after an arrest told us, '[You don't sleep] as good as you would when you're at home but I mean you try. You're kinda… aware during the time you're sleeping you're constantly… any little noise… you wake up, you don't know… it could be an animal or it could be a border agent approaching so… you sleep real… with a lot of conscience [sic]… like… You're not fully asleep.'

Border-crosser architecture is a double-edged paradox: it provides shelter and creates shade in order to enable sleep while also disabling rest and enabling stimulation. It overcomes the border-crosser's physical needs while putting her in greater danger by muting the body's signals for the need for rest or daily cycles. Especially in the context of a constantly threatening natural landscape, border-crosser architecture highlights the violence of sleep deprivation. One woman reported being allowed to build a shelter but not being allowed to speak at all – the entire night was cloaked in silence. At least she was able to sleep soundly. Women more commonly reported issues with sleep, playfully but honestly recounting, 'But the men snored a lot! They all fell into a deep sleep and left me and my friend awake and watching. That night, you hear noises, you start imagining what could be making that sound. Like an animal or something. There were some birds that were making terrifying noises and flapping their wings. In the desert, during the night, when the wind is blowing hard like it's from an approaching helicopter. Light sleepers, like me, we get scared. But yes, you imagine lots of things. And with the fatigue, it would get worse.' Women were also often quick to characterise their coyotes as being surprisingly tireless, hinting that they

may have been on some sort of drugs. If women wanted to stop and rest, their requests were often quickly met with either condescension or brusquely rejected. As Camila, a young woman cheekily relayed,

> I wasn't able to sleep… they didn't give us enough time. We were always walking, through the whole night, and the time that they did give us to rest was for only five minutes but it was really cold. They left us on top of the mountain and I couldn't sleep with that cold.

However, when the guide was tired, 'half an hour for him! Because *he* was going to rest, *he* got his rest. But no, we couldn't sleep because of the cold.' These coyotes' rules often keep the group in perpetual motion, disrupting any social bonding or adequate rest for his group. Sleep becomes a commodity regulated by those in power who also control whether shelters are built.

There are thus structures that are more about a destruction of time and sleep cycles, responding less to earthly measures of time and more to political ones such as Border Patrol shifts and the duration of a marijuana high. There are also structures that are more responsive to traditional or classic markings of time such as nocturnal/diurnal and seasonal cycles. The borderlands are inscribed in overlapping and often irregular measures of time – at once an eternal and geological time and a modern fragmented time without cycles. A 48-year old woman, Isabella, relayed how after she and her husband were separated from their coyote and group, they fell asleep near a highway. Sleep took over and then 'it was the funniest thing, it made me laugh, we were sleeping in the desert and my cell phone's alarm clock started going off.' Border-crossers often describe moments that their current state (being in the middle of nowhere with no modern conveniences and with their daily schedule disrupted) is punctured by something – a piece of technology like a cellular phone or a memory of childhood or of family life back in Mexico. Some migrants begin to hallucinate in the desert and in nearly every interview, details such as number of days or nights spent in the desert were confused and contradictory.

As coyotes are often in full control of time and movement, migrants walk until they are allowed to rest, often only for a minute or two before starting up again. Sometimes people sleep at night, sometimes during the day. Other times people spend days on the Mexican side of the border waiting for Border Patrol presence or the harsh climate to ease up. The patterns of movement are syncopated, irregular, and highly variable across groups and depending on specific conditions. There are dead spaces of waiting followed by hyperactive scurries. Border-crosser architecture is sited amidst these pulses and thus must anxiously sway between permanence and flight as well as territorial strongholds and fearful ephemerality and so can never fully be itself as architecture or shelter.

Insecure identities: self-erasure and shapeshifting

The Sonoran borderlands are not only restlessly anxious but also socially anxious. 'In social anxiety disorder (social phobia), the individual is fearful or anxious about or avoidant of social interactions and situations that involve the possibility of being scrutinized'.[15] This scrutiny is part of what creates the US-Mexico border through a rhetoric of 'illegality', framing the 'illegal alien' as 'someone who is officially out of place in a space where she or he does not belong'.[16] In a shifting boundary condition, the border-crosser's identity can be as ambiguous as the threats to her safety. Is the migrant a welcomed laborer, a perceived terrorist, a hated *other?* Will she pass fairly easily through a tunnel, a port of entry with false documents, or will she walk miles in the desert being swarmed by helicopters or invisibly surveilled with infrared cameras? Where one's status and threat is unclear, a single clear-cut action to secure one's safety is unavailable, if not also

counter-productive and self-exposing. Instead, one must dream of every possible outcome and anticipate every condition, an impossible and taxing feat. Anxiety ensues because 1) things are not always what they seem as outward appearances do not reflect inward states, and 2) someone is always watching and therefore dictating or precipitating an outcome, behaviour, or limit of identity accordingly.

It is often difficult to tell exactly where one is in the borderlands and thus know if one is a citizen or a trespasser. Despite the massive border walls erected through the cities and towns on the border, there are miles of gaps where the only thing separating Mexico from the United States is a thin barbed wire fence. The same fencing is used by ranchers in Arizona to demarcate their land parcels and to keep cattle from roaming. On top of these geographic confusions brought about by homonymic fences, other things are also not quite what they seem. Any human intervention in the desert can mark a cartel territory or be a trap. Many migrants we interviewed relayed that they thought the food and water left by humanitarians were poisoned or wired to a motion sensor. The origin and identity of objects become obscured and untrusted.

In the past twenty years, the roles and identities of those who cross the US-Mexico border have also been mutating and overlapping – migrants carry drugs to pay for their passage, guides begin to work for cartels, and so forth.[17] Border-crossers shift identities by traveling with forged ID cards or having none at all.[18] Their names, countries of origin, and ages become virtually untraceable. This anonymity is both a source of power and subjugation for border-crossers.[19] What results from this is an architecture (like its builder) that shifts identity in its appearance and role in an attempt to respond to perceived and potential threat, as well as an architecture that in a way, loses a singular self with so many repeated maskings of itself.[20]

Border-crosser structures have insecure identities in that they are trying to be something different than what they are. They try to be anything but architecture; for example, instead, a bush or a space, much like De Certeau's conception of walking as a practice to invent spaces: 'Within the structured space of the text, they thus produce anti-texts, effect of dissimulation and escape, possibilities of moving into other landscapes, like cellars and bushes'.[21] Anxious architecture must erase itself. It must evade permanence and visibility because for border-crossers, architecture is an exposing trace. Just as people wear 'slippers' made from sanitary pads or carpet to smear their footprints beyond recognition, so, too, this architecture works to create absence where there is presence, to erase the body. Just as the makeshift slippers endanger people's physical wellbeing when crossing slick, rocky terrain, so, too, architecture takes a toll for its masking role. For every reward there is a risk. When one young man (a drug mule and a guide) was asked about building shelters in the desert, he proudly replied that he built them in less than fifteen minutes, stayed in them for as long as necessary, and then immediately destroyed the structures when he was on his way. The building must demand as little time, energy, and space expenditure as possible and then disappear as if it were never there. The destroyed or cloaked structure is the unnamable blur left behind by quick darts and hyper speeds; the anxious vibration of displacement.

Beyond becoming invisible, anxious architecture can also take on different guises, guises which are often heavily influenced by power dynamics. Just as 'at the international border, boundaries that delimit nation and nationhood reflect sociopolitical practices created by established power relations that designate who belongs and who does not', so, too, do social hierarchies among border-crossers begin to dictate when, where, and by whom something can be built.[22] The form and location of border-crosser architecture is not just a matter of the material and

site affordances of the landscape or the builder's knowledge of design and craft skills. Luciana, age 22, told us, 'no, we weren't allowed to build anything because it was like leaving a sign behind.' Others told us that when they were left behind by a group, they fashioned a makeshift shelter. Thus making a safe place for oneself is not only about one's personal experience but also contingent on the surrounding social rules.[23] Border-crosser architecture reflects these identities; some structures are arrogant and stalwart while others are timid and haphazard.

Exercising bravado, GP-01 is situated high on a ridge of a steep mountain and was one of the most extensively articulated structures with a rock wall, a small fire pit (hidden from view by the rock wall and also situated so that heat would deflect back into the structure), densely woven walls, and a thin but effectively cushioning layer of dried grass on the floor. [Fig. 3] A Border Patrol helicopter flew overhead during fieldwork and once inside the shelter, one became completely obscured from surveillance. When peering out from the small entrance, a phenomenal view opened to both the access road in the valley, where Border Patrol vehicles could be seen and heard passing below.

Some structures are humble and understated in their prowess while still being alert and insecure. Strategically cradled in a wash in a small valley, TH-01 is S-shaped with two rooms with separate entrances: one toward the north-east and the other south-west. [Fig. 4] The two rooms are scaled similarly but are built out of different materials and thus have quite different identities. The delicate western room gracefully sweeps into a crescent shape, almost completely encircled with long, wispy grasses. [Fig. 5] The rough eastern room is an entangled mass of branches in an over-bearing dome shape. One room seems to have been added on later than the other, perhaps even by a different builder. Border-crosser architecture thus adapts through reinhabitations and modifications – different builders can reappropriate an existing structure. The origin and identity of the structure is altered and amended, morphed into something different.

A burlap sack, empty bag of tuna, and empty bag of beans in the western room suggest that TH-01 was built by drug mules. Burlap sacks are often used to carry marijuana while food bags are lighter and more compact than cans, suggesting that the border-crosser had previous experience with crossing, selecting more expensive, but more convenient food items. The western room is ideally sited for morning sun, with its entrance toward the west, while the eastern room is ideal for evening sun. This creates a 24-hour shelter with two rooms where the builder or inhabitant could stay in one place continually, perhaps while waiting for further instructions from cartel look-out points on when Border Patrol was no longer sighted.

TH-01's roof is fashioned from velvet ash branches, imported from trees on a nearby ridge – it seems time was taken to not only use immediately available materials from the mesquite shrub but also to bring branches from further away. The builder was patient, focused, and had time to spare. This suggests he was familiar and confident in his surroundings; his identity unwavering. At the same time, TH-01 lacks any rock foundation and instead relies structurally on long, thin, Y-shaped branches that reach out diagonally from the ground. This light footprint on the earth allows the structure to be easily destroyed and erased if needed. The delicate frame of the building suggests it is anxious and itching to disappear at any time, much like its builder.

The size and form of border-crosser architecture indexes the anxieties of the borderlands with regard to social roles and rules. While at times structures like GP-01 can establish a territory or stronghold, it is still anonymously built and no one can legally stake a claim to it as property. While it



Fig. 4: A rendering of the two rooms of TH-01 where rocks predominantly make up the foundation of the eastern room and branches outline the western room. A human figure has been added to depict scale and possible activities. Illustration: Author

Fig. 5: The western room of TH-01 delicately curves out from a trunk of a tree. Photo: Author

works to protect its inhabitant and give shelter, it at the same time tries not to look like architecture. Just as migrants are trying to be invisible and anonymous with camouflage or walking at night, anxious architecture tries to be 'not there' while still trying to enclose a space and not get lost in the unknown of the borderlands. It is an architecture that struggles against itself and external forces that undo it into something other than architecture, denying a named author, a touted aesthetic, or a designated use. It constantly encounters the looming death of itself.[24]

Restless remains: carcasses and haunted space

The number of border-crosser deaths and missing persons in the borderlands is staggering. According to the Border Patrol agency's Sector Profile reports, in the Tucson sector alone, there were 194 recorded deaths in 2013 and 177 recorded deaths in 2012.[25] These numbers, however, do not account for the countless missing people or bodies that are never recovered.[26] Between 1990 and 2013, the leading cause of death (45 percent) of recovered bodies examined by the Pima County Medical Examiner was exposure to the elements (hyperthermia or hypothermia often coupled with dehydration).[27] Since 1993, the border enforcement of the United States has aimed to push border-crossing away from (safer) urban points of entry and into dangerous terrain, thereby instituting violence and masked corporal punishment through policy.[28] The desert borderlands are essentially deployed as not only a deterrent, but a weapon to kill those who dare to cross. Indeed, in many of our interviews, border-crossers frequently expressed their greatest fear to be running out of water, being lost, and dying in the desert. In this ominous landscape, the persistent threat of death creates preoccupations and anxieties.

Some of those we interviewed said that during the nights they dreamt of a dead grandmother or were torn awake by the shrill, terrifying cries of coyotes. But much of the borderland's anxieties of death seem to manifest during the exposure of the day: 'all things are called uncanny which should have remained secret, hidden, latent, but which have come to light'.[29] Many migrants whom we interviewed reported seeing bodies or human skeletons when crossing. Camila, age 18, said:

> I saw a lot of stacked rocks like when there is a dead body and they put lots of little rocks on it. But I didn't see a cross or anything. I did not know if there was a dead body because I was scared to check. The first time [I crossed], yes, we did see one [a cadaver]. We saw the little feet that were covered, sorry, uncovered, and the clothes next to it. But you could see that there was a corpse.

Arizonan prospectors and ranchers in the borderlands do stack rocks to mark claims or to delineate property boundaries, and yet even these innocuous markers become insidious triggers for an anxiety of death. Isabella, age 48, recalled that when she first saw bodies in the desert, she immediately saw them as people just like her:

> There were some small bones. I'm not sure if they were two small boys or two small girls, or a married couple, or a dad and a son, or a mom and a daughter. But yeah, the two were left wrapped up together, nothing but little skeletons… I thought my husband and I were gonna end up like that, because when we were left alone, just the two of us, I had to lay down with him because I couldn't keep going.

Her identity became bound up with the skeletons, anxiously projecting her possible future. When shown photographs of rock cairns or piles of clothing, Isabella immediately asked if it was a photograph of a dead body with no context or prompting. After having seen one pile of rocks covering corpses, she then began to see all piles of rock as markers of dead bodies. As Peter Stallybrass intimates, objects

'take on a ghostly existence, emerging to prominence, or even to consciousness, only at moments of crisis'.[30] Thus in a landscape of conflict, things like rock cairns in the borderlands become otherworldly, inciting fear and serving as an unrelenting reminder of one's proximity to death.

Like cairns, border-crosser architecture becomes a kind of spectral marker. The half material, half immaterial structures can at once be a mode of orientation (here is where I am or where I will go), and an unsettling bit of one's own remains (someone used to be here, have I been here before?). Because of this dual nature, an anxiety of being lost, that is, feeling displaced no matter where one is, emerges. Felipe told us: 'Everything seemed the same to me. I felt like I was going in circles', and Mariana, age 25 from Mexico City, said: 'No. It is a very big place, so extensive, it has no end. It has no end. There are no homes, no streets, no freeways, no nothing. No nothing.' Mariana repeats the phrases that underscore infinity and a void, suggesting that migrants and their building become stuck like a ghost in purgatory: 'only to find [oneself] back, sometime later, in almost the exact same spot from which [she] had set off […] this is the ghostly reproduction of the self'.[31]

While only a few interviewees called the structures they built *casitas*, little homes or houses, there is a certain domesticity about them. At structures such as EA-02 and EA-B, artifacts are organised around the interior. There is a small garbage area where food wrappers, empty tuna cans, and water bottles are placed together and across the way, clothing items are discarded together such as a pair of socks next to a t-shirt.[32] Just as a house has a place to sleep, a place for refuse, a place to clothe oneself, so too does border-crosser architecture. Order and organisation is maintained; despite the chaos of the wilderness outside, the interior is domesticated through small gestures. And yet, 'the homely, that which belongs to house and home, a sentiment of security and freedom from fear, gradually [takes] on the ominous dimensions of its apparent opposite, the unhomely'.[33] Fear finds its way inside.

There are few things that smell as repulsively sweet as a body in decay. At the Pima County Medical Examiner's office, in a room full of body bags, the odor of the unidentified flesh is strong enough to escape the tightly sealed black vinyl, and piercing enough to defy the calming, cooling qualities of the fiercely refrigerated chamber. According to the medical examiner, this was a 'slow month' in 2012, with 'only' 46 bodies waiting to be processed after being extricated from Tucson sector of the desert in various states of decomposition. The morgue smell is also present in the desert. The sickly scent is the very same that emerged from a gel deodorant stick when recovered from inside the shelter of BW-01. Where originally the deodorant was designed to mask the body's ripe sweat, now having undergone the trials of border-crossing it only heightened the smell of rotting flesh. Discarded to the side, the artifact lay half empty and half full, with its cap in place, peaking out from grass that began to reclaim its ground. Even inside the shelter walls, the sun beat down on the black container, heating the contents into a gelatinous state of instability as if abandoning its purpose, no longer owned or needed. In the desert, even the seemingly steadfast object succumbs to the same fate as a mortal body.

Border-crosser architecture haunts the landscape with the restless traces of border-crossers and their abandoned objects. Inside FP-01, two dark blue fading jackets lie limply on the ground. From a distance, it is indiscernible whether the two lumps of fabric are covering a dead body in fetal position or if an almost imperceptible hot breeze, a false breath, is billowing up into the jacket's chest cavity. It is enough to make one approach with caution and a quickened heart. One of the sleeves reaches up from the shallow grave of a few inches

Fig 6: Originally dark blue in color, this nylon sports jacket was recovered at BW-01. Half buried, badly faded, and torn in many places, its condition reflects the dire conditions of border-crossing and the way in which inanimate objects become animate with variable responses and vulnerability to environmental trauma. Photo: Author

Fig. 7

Fig. 8

Fig 7: At OJ-01, a butterfly roof fashioned out of bent ocotillo stalks resembles a ribcage in disarray. Photo: Author

Fig 8: TH-03, once thatched to provide more shade, now lays exposed, the bones of a lean-to shelter. Photo: Author

of dirt that accumulated on top from wind and water. The jacket could have been left behind a year ago, or maybe ten. The fabric has been bleached, faded, and cracked by the unrelenting sun. [Fig. 6] The decaying roof, no longer able to withstand its own weight, sheds a few tufts of dry grass and casts strong, geometrical sunbeams that etch the surface of the jackets with discolouration. In the desert borderlands, danger lies *less* in the hidden and the shadows (for darkness actually offers repose and refuge) and more in the light of day and that which is lain bare. Martina, age 27, conveyed this horror: 'It was very hot. The ground is cracked. The rabbits, the deer, everything is dead and you just see their skulls… I was on the edge of my death… That's what's taking me towards death right now, tormenting me a lot…' This torment, the anxiety of being torn between life and death, takes its toll on the body of the border-crosser as well as the body of the architecture.

Structures like OJ-01 and TH-03 are the exposed remains of shelter, their curved walls jutting up like starved and hollowed rib cages. [Figs. 7–8] The thatching of grasses, desiccated by the sun, peels away like mummified skin, exposing the slightly damp interior to the sun's penetrating rays. When migrants or drug mules leave, their architecture stays behind like a shed skin or a gutted carcass, a haunting of a passing life. Sometimes the structures surrender to the climate, other times they are destroyed out of necessity, to erase traces. Either way, the forced destruction of home become restless remains, hovering between life and death. 'This house-cleaning operation produced its own ghosts, the nostalgic shadows of all the "houses" now condemned to history of the demolition site. Once reduced to its bony framework', these skeletons can easily become symbolic stand-ins for the loss of home, for being in transit, being neither of this realm nor completely of another.[34] Border-crosser architecture is part of the constant motion of border-crossing, creating shadow selves and ghostly traces. Just as 'the long poem of walking manipulates spatial organizations, no matter how panoptic they may be […] it creates shadows and ambiguities within them', the structures begin to embody the very limbo (in passing) they and their builders, inhabit.[35]

The lack of object constancy (knowing something will remain even when one is separated from it), coupled with a lack of official ownership over buildings, creates an anxious architecture, indeterminate and unstable, worried that it will be here one moment and gone the next, while still potentially leaving behind a detectable trace that will expose the builder and lead to their capture, disorientation, or fatality. The spectral traces of others who came before – their scent, their molecular detritus – also linger as though they are still there. Just for a moment. Border-crosser architecture helps to sustain life while also being a constant reminder that death is impending. No matter how effective the intervention of building can be, there remains the persistent, inevitable, insurmountable anxiety of death.

Conclusion

> In this situation, any individual attitude is conceivable: flight (back home, elsewhere), fear (of the self, of others), but also intensity of experience (performance) or revolt (against established values). It is no longer possible for a social analysis to dispense with individuals, nor for an analysis of individuals to ignore the spaces through which they are in transit.[36]

The political rhetoric of the latest United States election was saturated with immigration issues. This year, thousands of migrants and refugees flee from Syria, the Middle-East, and other areas of conflict. It thus seems to be a particularly pressing time to think of ways in which architecture intervenes upon the land across which people move as well as into the lives of those who are crossing borders. The

form, materiality, and siting of border-crosser architecture reveal the complexity of the borderlands, underscoring how even a simple structure must constantly respond to ever-changing and unexpected circumstances. There is never a simple, single solution and even a building that works one moment must be destroyed, reinhabited, or adapted the next. This is the way in which architecture and its makers become anxious, restlessly trying to anticipate every possible future threat. Just like its builders (drug mules, guides, and migrants), and its site (the US-Mexico border), border-crosser architecture exhibits wily adaptation, desperate survival, and everyday banality – self-protecting and self-defeating at the same time.[37]

In their anxious state, structures cannot sleep and must orient themselves toward a 24-hour cycle, changing day into night. While this can provide some repose to its inhabitants, the extreme exposure of the sun, the endless stretch of a repeating landscape, the penetrating gaze of search lights and infrared sensors, are all part of an unrelenting threat that can never fully be mitigated. Border-crosser architecture is anxious in its constant vigilance and disrupted cycles; responding to Border Patrol routes and cartel territory disputes, its walls are incessantly oscillating with impatience, and its apertures are always wide open, watching and listening. It displays the stubborn countermeasure of looking back. Of staring back. Of leveling the playing field.

Anxious architecture contends with multiple identities, at times even having to completely erase itself through ephemerality. It is here one moment and gone the next, with wind tearing away delicate thatching or drug mules destroying the evidence of their stay. The structures begin to take on characteristics of confrontational bravado or muted shyness and their very existence is predicated on the social roles of those who build them. While formal architecture reveals itself and those who build or inhabit it as well as territorialises and digs into the earth with a foundation, both of these tendencies are contrary to the need for mobility and invisibility in the borderlands. Thus, border-crosser architecture has no choice but to deny itself the assets of being 'Architecture' (such as notoriety and permanence) while still capitalising on the affordances of being invisible, anonymous, and self-destructive.

The fear of and proximity to death in the desert creates a kind of existential dread. Structures attempt to wall off the great expanse of the unknown while themselves falling victim to unforgiving elements, their carcasses strewn across the landscape. In so doing, they expose the helplessness of architecture to shield against death in spite of the desperate attempt to negate it. The uncanniness of the structures is not only an otherworldly psychological haunting, but a very real artifact of the dire context of border-crossing.

The socio-political and ecological landscape of the US-Mexico borderlands is as anxious as the architecture and the border-crossers within it. An architecture that emerges from this conflict both undermines and underlines itself and so anxiety becomes an adaptive spatial tactic, a survival mechanism, that both works to protect and to erode one's wellbeing.

Notes

All interviewee names are pseudonyms. All interviews were conducted in Spanish and later translated into the English with the exception of Felipe's. The author would like to extend deep gratitude to Dr. Jason De León and the UMP for enabling this research. Many thanks also to the incredibly talented Amelia Frank-Vitale and Rolando Palacio for their help, support, resilience, intellect, and insight during fieldwork. Appreciation to Joern Langhorst and Dr. Joseph Juhasz for being indispensible sounding boards. Gratitude to Annel Diaz, Rene Tovar, Vicky Mogollon Montagne, and Mauricio Gomez for their generosity and assistance with transcription and translation. This article would not

have come together were it not for the constructive criticism of the anonymous reviewers and editors. Nor would it have seen the light of day without encouragement from Tuong Gia Tran, Dr. Marek Grabowski, Joshua Shipper, Ridge Zackary, and Andy Rauworth who helped guide me through the very real (and also at times very silly) crises that come with this territory. Above all, thank you to those who trusted us with their experiences, voices, and stories during what was often an incredibly vulnerable time in their lives.

1. Juan Mora-Torres, *The Making of the Mexican Border* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2001).
2. Jorge Durand, Douglas S. Massey and Rene M. Zenteno, 'Mexican Immigration to the United States: Continuities and Changes', *Latin American Research Review* 36 no. 1 (2001): 107–127.
3. Jeremy Slack, Daniel E. Martinez, Alison Elizabeth Lee, Scott Whiteford, 'The Geography of Border Militarization: Violence, Death and Health in Mexico and the United States', *Journal of Latin American Geography* 15 no. 1 (March 2016): 7–32; Timothy J. Dunn, 'Border Militarization Via Drug and Immigration Enforcement: Human Rights Implications', *Social Justice* 28 no. 2 (2001): 7–30; and Lisa Meierotto, 'A Disciplined Space: The Co-Evolution of Conservation and Militarization on the US-Mexico Border', *Anthropological Quarterly* 87 no. 3 (Summer 2014): 637–664; Peter Andreas *Border Games: Policing the US-Mexico Divide* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009).
4. These shifts in identities and roles are discussed and referenced in a later section of this article.
5. Edward S. Casey, 'Border Versus Boundary at La Frontera', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 29 (2011): 393.
6. '*Fear* is the emotional response to real or perceived imminent threat, whereas *anxiety* is anticipation of future threat', in 'Anxiety Disorders' in American Psychiatric Association, *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders*, Fifth Edition (May 2013). In the borderlands, of course both current threats and future threats are ever-present, and the difficulty to extract one from the other seems to be precisely the indeterminacy that breeds anxiety.
7. In her 'The Force of Things: Steps toward an Ecology of Matter', *Political Theory* 32 no. 3 (June 2004): 347–372, Jane Bennett gives life and power to things by focusing on, not 'the thing as it stands alone, but rather the not-fully-humanized dimension of a thing as it manifests itself amidst other entities and forces' (366) and that thing-power has 'political potential [which] resides in its ability to induce a greater sense of interconnectedness between humanity and nonhumanity', 367. Things thus are not quite fully anthropomorphic, and yet still have a certain kind of agency that is both formed by, and independent of, human and cultural meaning.
8. Anthony Vidler, *Warped Space: Art, Architecture, and Anxiety in Modern Culture* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000), 13. While this article's analysis does not aim to find the Freudian sources of anxiety or otherwise delve formally and disciplinarily into psychology, it does work to frame border-crosser architecture as exhibiting material and emotional qualities that parallel and enable similar anxieties experienced by border-crossers and the borderlands.
9. This distinction is made here to situate border-crosser architecture as something similar to, but still apart from, the various incarnations of transgressive, guerilla, radical, and informal architecture discussed by scholars like Lydon, Villagomez, Crawford, and Sara. These often underline the positively-valued and valiant characteristics of self-built and emergent architecture without necessarily fully addressing the self-harming risks inherent in the endeavor. These risks include, but are not limited to, inadvertently reinforcing the very same power structures against which the architecture is built and the builder as well as the structures themselves suffering the blowback from the conflict. Mike Lydon and Anthony Garcia, *Tactical Urbanism: Short-term Action for Long-term Change* (Washington, DC: Island Press/Center for Resource Economics, 2015); Erick Villagomez, 'Claiming Residual Spaces in the Heterogeneous City', in *Insurgent Public Space: Guerilla Urbanism and the Remaking of Contemporary Cities*, ed. Jeffrey Hou (New York: Routledge, 2010):

81–95; Margaret Crawford, 'Blurring the Boundaries: Public Space and Private Life', in *Everyday Urbanism*, ed. John Chase, Margaret Crawford, and John Kaliski (New York: Monacelli Press, 1999) 22–35; Rachel Sara and Jonathan Mosely, 'The Architecture of Transgression: Towards a Destabilising Architecture', *Architectural Design* (January 2014): 14–19.

10. The term tactic borrows from Michel De Certeau's *The Practice of Everyday Life* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1984), 96: 'One can follow the swarming activity of these procedures that, far from being regulated or eliminated by panoptic administration, have reinforced themselves in a proliferating illegitimacy, developed and insinuated themselves into the networks of surveillance, and combined in accord with unreadable but stable tactics to the point of constituting everyday regulations and surreptitious creativities that are merely concealed by the frantic mechanisms and discourses of the observational organization.' While De Certeau emphasises spatial tactics in the city as a way to be unconsciously resistant to a system of hegemonic power while still working in it, anxious architecture stresses the ways in which tactics are double-edged modes of retaliating against one's condition, having harmful effects as well as liberating ones.
11. Michel Foucault, *Discipline And Punish: the Birth of the Prison,* trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977), 200.
12. Jonathan Crary, *24/7: Late Capitalism and the Ends of Sleep* (London: Verso, 2014), 13.
13. For a clear and powerful ethnography of anxiety and sleeplessness, please see: Sarah Willen, 'Toward a Critical Phenomenology of "Illegality": State Power, Criminalization, and Abjectivity among Undocumented Migrant Workers in Tel Aviv, Israel', *International Migration*, 45, no.3 (2007): 8–38.
14. Crary, *Late Capitalism and the Ends of Sleep,* 10.
15. American Psychiatric Association, 'Anxiety Disorders'.
16. Joseph Nevins, *'*A Beating Worse than Death: Imagining and Contesting Violence in the US-Mexico Borderlands*', AmeriQuests* 2, 1 (2005) available online www.ameriquests.org. For further discussion of the rhetorical construction of the 'illegal immigrant': Nicholas P. DeGenova, 'Migrant "Illegality" and Deportability in Everyday Life', *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 31 (2002): 419–447; and Juanita Sundberg '"Trash-talk" and the Production of Quotidian Geopolitical Boundaries in the USA-Mexico Borderlands', *Social & Cultural Geography*, 9, no.8 (December 2008): 871–890.
17. Jeremy Slack and Scott Whiteford, 'Violence and Migration on the Arizona-Sonora Border', *Human Organization*, 70, no.1 (2011): 17.
18. David Spener, *Clandestine Crossings: Migrants and Coyotes on the Texas-Mexico Border* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009); Jason De León, Cameron Gokee, and Ashley Schubert, '"By the time I get to Arizona": citizenship, materiality, and contested identities along the US-Mexico border/ "Quando eu chegar ao arizona": cidadania, materialidade e identidades contestadas ao longo da Fronteira E.U.A.-Mexico', *Anthropological Quarterly* 88, no.2 (2015): 445ff.
19. Martha Luz Rojas-Wiesner and Maria Devargas, 'Strategic Invisibility as Everyday Politics for a Life with Dignity: Guatemalan Women Migrants' Experiences of Insecurity at Mexico's Southern Border' in Thanh-Dam Truong, ed. *Migration, Gender and Social Justice: Perspectives on Human Insecurity* (Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2014), 193–211.
20. Jacques Lacan, *Ecrits*, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999), 752: 'Must I, in order to awaken their attention, show them how to handle a mask that unmasks the face it represents only by splitting in two and that represents this face only by remasking it? And then explain to them that it is when the mask is closed that it composes this face, and when it is open that it splits it?' Lacan works to undermine the concept of an authentic face below a mask of false identity and instead, though this passage, reveals the complexity of self, being multiple or fragmented, united through a mask. In a similar fashion, border-crosser architecture displays this anxious projection of multiple identities, masking itself as not-architecture while also being shelter, a political entity, and an artifact of material culture with agency.

21. De Certeau, *Practice of Everyday Life,* 107.
22. Anna Ochoa O'Leary, 'In the Footsteps of Spirits: Migrant Women's Testimonios in a Time of Heightened Border Enforcement', in K. Staudt, ed., *Human Rights Along the U.S.-Mexico Border: Gendered Violence and Insecurity*, (Tucson, University of Arizona Press, 2009), 89.
23. David Canter, 'Putting Situations in Their Place: Foundations for a Bridge Between Social and Environmental Psychology', in A. Furnham, ed., *Social Behaviour in Context,* (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1983): 208–239.
24. This kind of paradoxical self-destructive behavior in order to ensure survival, brings to mind Paul De Man's framing of theory as a self-resisting entity in 'The Resistance to Theory', *Yale French Studies* 63 (1982), 20: 'Nothing can overcome the resistance to theory since theory is itself this resistance […] theory is not in danger of going under; it cannot help but flourish, and the more it is resisted, the more it flourishes, since the language it speaks is the language of self-resistance.'
25. 'United States Border Patrol Sector Profile – Fiscal Year 2013 (1 Oct.–30 Sept.)' (2013) www.cbp.gov; 'United States Border Patrol Sector Profile – Fiscal Year 2012 (1 Oct. – 30 Sept.)' (2012); www.cbp.gov.
26. Raquel Rubio-Goldsmith, M. Melissa McCormick, et. al., 'The "Funnel Effect" & Recovered Bodies of Unauthorized Migrants processed by the Pima County Office of the Medical Examiner, 1990–2005', *BiNational Migration Institute* (October 2006) available online http://bmi.arizona.edu; Lynn Stephen, 'Los Nuevos Desaparecidos y Muertos: Immigration, Militarization, Death, and Disappearance on Mexico's Borders', in *Security Disarmed: Critical Perspectives on Gender, Race, and Militarization,* ed. Barbara Sutton, Sandra Morgen, and Julie Novkov (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2008).
27. Daniel E. Martinez, Robin Reineke, et. al., 'Structural Violence and Migrant Deaths in Southern Arizona: Data from the Pima County Office of the Medical Examiner, 1990-2013', *Journal on Migration and Human Security* 2 no. 4 (2014): 271.
28. Wayne A. Cornelius, 'Death at the Border: Efficacy and Unintended Consequences of US Immigration Control Policy', *Population and Development Review* 27 no. 4 (2001): 661–685.
29. Anthony Vidler, 'The Architecture of the Uncanny: The Unhomely Houses of the Romantic Sublime', *Assemblage*, 3 (1987): 12.
30. Peter Stallybrass, 'Worn Worlds: Clothes, Mourning, and the Life of Things', *The Yale Review* 81 no. 2 (1993): 39.
31. Lisa Hill, 'Archaeologies and Geographies of the Post-Industrial Past: Landscape, Memory and the Spectral', *Cultural Geographies* 20 no. 379 (2013): 392.
32. Leon Battista Alberti posits the ordering and designation of space as the foundational act of domestication and precursor of architecture in *On the Art of Building in Ten Books,* trans. Joseph Rykwert, Neil Leach and Robert Tavernor (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), 8: 'In the beginning, men sought a place of rest in some region safe from danger, having found a place both suitable and agreeable, they settled down and took possession of the site. Not wishing to have all their household and private affairs conducted in the same place, they set aside one space for sleeping, another for the hearth, and allocated other spaces to different uses.'
33. Vidler, 'Architecture of the Uncanny', 11.
34. Ibid., 24.
35. De Certeau, *Practice of Everyday Life*, 101.
36. Marc Augé, *Non-places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity* (London: Verso, 1995), 120.
37. For an investigation of this conflict between the intent of self-protection and the result of self-harm in the context of border-crossing, please see Jason De León, '"Better to Be Hot Than Caught": Excavating the Conflicting Roles of Migrant Material Culture', *American Anthropologist* 114 no. 3 (September 2012): 477–495. He finds migrant selection of objects and tools to be 'logical within the context of the BCSS [Border Crossing Sociotechnical System] but [that

they] often have conflicting somatic impacts […] In many instances, migrant material culture is profoundly oppressive and often runs counter to the goals of avoiding detection and surviving the desert,' 492.

Biography

Sam Grabowska is a doctoral candidate at the Taubman College of Architecture and Urban Planning with a cognate in cultural anthropology at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Her work engages the spaces that people seek and build in times of trauma and she has contributed a chapter to the book, *Excavating Memory: Sites of Remembering and Forgetting*.

Case Study

The Interface: Peace Walls, Belfast, Northern Ireland

James O'Leary

The Interface

The Interface is a system of control.

The Interface manages and controls both spatial and interpersonal relations.

The Interface is reinforced concrete, brick, steel, sheet metal, razor wire and mesh.

The Interface mutates by adapting to local conditions, both real and perceived.

The Interface is an equilateral triangle with the word 'VISION' at its apex.[1]

The Interface is a manifold of local adjustments and modifications.

The Interface is material, opacity, dimension, solidity and communicative value.

The Interface alternates between barrier and backdrop.

The Interface is nine feet deep underground wall, built in the City Cemetery in the 1880s.

The Interface actively encourages, maintains, and polices separatist conditions.

The Interface is both system and sign.

The Interface truncates through-roads.

The Interface engenders ghettos.

The Interface generates space for temporary businesses, both legitimate and otherwise.

The Interface is a medium for the reproduction of closure.

The Interface is a canvas that accepts pigmentation.

The Interface eradicates horizon.

The Interface splits a park in half.

The Interface is a form of relation.[2]

The Interface closes roads.

The Interface constructs interstitial spaces.

The Interface is a particular pattern of local shopping habits.[3]

The Interface is no man's land.

The Interface is PRONI HA/32/2/55.[4]

The Interface is scanned by multiple video cameras simultaneously.

The Interface resists landscaping initiatives.

The Interface pretends it is not an Interface.

The Interface harbours small broken trees.

The Interface is witness to scenes of violence and killing.[5]

The Interface presents Bob Marley, Che Guevara, and Nelson Mandela.

The Interface supports art projects that have no meaning.

The Interface is a perceived loss of tourist revenue.

The Interface is haunted by low-res, high-contrast faces.[6]

The Interface is a support for melted materials that form local encrustations.

The Interface shields fires, locally blackening metal grates.

The Interface is seven locations where roads have gates that are closed occasionally.

The Interface generates furtive glances.

The Interface is a cluster of flowers tied to a tree next to a metal mesh gate.

The Interface closes at 4pm.

The Interface is a memento mori, a network of remembering.[7]

The Interface is offset lines of boulders, palisade fencing, metals sheets.

The Interface is an enclosed piece of ground,

Fig. 1

Fig. 2

Fig. 1: Cluster 02, Sliabh Dubh View, Belfast, 2015.
Fig. 2: Cluster 02, Moyard Parade, Belfast, 2015.

Fig. 3

Fig. 4

Fig. 3: Cluster 03, Beverley Street, Belfast, 2015
Fig. 4: Cluster 03, Townsend Street, Belfast, 2016

Fig. 5

Fig. 6

Fig. 5: Cluster 03, Cupar Way, Belfast, 2014
Fig. 6: Cluster 05, Sandy Row, Belfast, 2014

Fig. 7

Fig. 8

Fig. 7: Cluster 07, Alexandra Park, Belfast, 2014
Fig. 8: Cluster 09, Flax Street, Belfast, 2015

inaccessible, filled with debris.
The Interface is viewed from watchtowers.
The Interface is a quick look over your shoulder.
The Interface exfoliates over time, revealing remnants of past events.
The Interface is an uprooted tree, discarded on the grass, next to an empty bag of crisps.
The Interface opens at 6.30am.
The Interface guides runoff from industrial processes.
The Interface tries to erase itself.
The Interface comingles the military-industrial with the domestic.
The Interface is five concrete blocks misaligned.
The Interface is an index of deaths recorded straightforwardly and with equal respect.[8]
The Interface is a paint-ball machine.
The Interface supports strange forms of plant growth.
The Interface cuts down oak trees that block a visual axis.
The Interface is GOC Lieutenant-General Sir Ian Freeland, dealing with things on the ground.[9]
The Interface is multiple shards of broken glass next to a concrete bollard.
The Interface oscillates between conditions of 'porosity' and 'lockdown'.
The Interface is a statistic.[10]
The Interface attempts to be decorative, varying its silhouette through facetted extrusions.
The Interface is primarily in Flemish stretcher bond.
The Interface is a curve of large concrete cubes, tied together with horizontal scaffold bars and clamps.
The Interface occasionally cleans its brickwork of unwanted messages.
The Interface is a pink shipping container that supports a car-wash business worked by eight Romanians.
The Interface is an irregular pattern of dents caused by projectiles of various classes and types.
The Interface can become a row of shops with space for a suicide hotline.
The Interface is a paramilitary mural overgrown with small shrubs surmounted by a large advert for the Ulster Bank.
The Interface is a park that resembles a military cemetery.
The Interface is reference code UK INT-ARC PA2015 CL09-P0001.[11]
The Interface is gold-enameled celtic knotwork on dark polished stone.
The Interface is an array of monochrome faces surrounding a local map.
The Interface is a fence that is bigger than a house.
The Interface supports plywood cut-outs of Pac-Man characters floating above the surrounding landscape.
The Interface has tri-partite classical proportions.
The Interface is to be reduced to a 'normal' size, some time in the future.
The Interface supports non-committal light industrial sheds.
The Interface is an MP4 video file on YouTube, with justification for a riot explained in a fluoro-pink font.
The Interface is a warning sign bleached white by fire.
The Interface is a curving line following the motorway.
The Interface is a matrix of responsibility for 54 interface structures, 41 walls or fences and 13 gates.[12]
The Interface attracts used tires.
The Interface is a landscape of inscription.
The Interface is a band of pink sheet metal, tap-welded at lapped edges.
The Interface is a strange feeling that creeps over you.
The Interface is a yellow sun painted over a uniform blue sky on corrugated sheet metal.
The Interface mutates as the conditions mutate over time.
The Interface is an abandoned cross-community family centre with broken windows throughout.
The Interface is emblematic of contested origins.
The Interface is a parody social media account, adding fuel to the fire.
The Interface is a fantasy landscape, a 'Secret

Garden' in red lettering, next to a metal-shuttered window.
The Interface is an institute for conflict research.
The Interface is the possibility of sealing off access to prevent infiltration.[13]
The Interface enfolds various institutions of the state including gaols, police headquarters and army compounds.
The Interface stretches from mountain to motorway ring.
The Interface is an attitude hardening.
The Interface is a communications site purchased by the Ministry of Defence.[14]
The Interface is the hope for collective acceptance of a shared narrative.
The Interface is a discussion regarding the optimal conditions for contact.
The Interface is an array of video surveillance screens monitoring the situation in real time.
The Interface configures openness and closure.
The Interface is organised geographically by cluster.[15]
The Interface is the word SECRET in red ink, stamped on the top-middle and bottom-middle of each page.
The Interface is formal government decisions, including the information and evidence placed before ministers.
The Interface is a 15-foot-high weldmesh fence installed above a 10-foot-high school perimeter fence.[16]
The Interface is greenstone (dark red) to porphyritic trachyte (orange).
The Interface is a wider trend of cul-de-sac planning facilitated by ongoing planning initiatives.
The Interface is 67 hectares of adjacent wasteland.
The Interface is local residents being surveyed out.
The Interface encircles enclaves.
The Interface is the continual occlusion of the 'day after' question.
The Interface is an immaterial psychic dimension.
The Interface adapts, folds, creases, extends and disappears as local conditions demand.
The Interface is a published policy that specifies a government goal by 2023.
The Interface is Trend Analysis: Contested Space.[17]
The Interface does not register on the current Ordnance Survey map.
The Interface is contoured by fear.

Notes

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5. Niall Cunningham and Ian Gregory, 'Hard to miss, easy to blame? Peacelines, interfaces and political deaths in Belfast during the Troubles', *Political Geography* 40 (2014): 64–78.
6. Martin Melaugh, '"Remembering": Victims, Survivors and Commemoration. The Human Face of Conflict: Photographs of those killed', 2009, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk.
7. Elisabetta Viggiani, 'Public Forms of Memorialisation to the Victims of the Northern Irish "Troubles" in the City of Belfast', 2006, accessed February 10, 2016, http://cain.ulster.ac.uk.
8. Malcolm Sutton, *Bear in Mind These Dead: An Index of Deaths From the Conflict in Northern Ireland, 1969–1993*. (Belfast: Beyond the Pale Publications, 1994).
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Biography

James O'Leary is currently a Senior Lecturer in Innovative Technology and Design Realisation at the Bartlett School of Architecture, University College London, where he leads the M.Arch Architecture 'Design Realisation' module operating across all Masters design units.

In 2014 he was granted a TECHNE doctoral studentship to conduct research into the role of the architect in the transformation of 'post-conflict' sites, with a specific focus on the long-term transformation of 'Interface Areas' in Belfast, Northern Ireland. He is pursuing this work as a member of the 'Understanding Conflict' Research Cluster at the University of Brighton.

Case Study

From Refugee Camp to Resilient City: Zaatari Refugee Camp, Jordan

Nada Maani

The Syrian civil war began in the early spring of 2011 as part of the Arab Spring Protests in the Middle East. The war resulted in over two million Syrian refugees. To deal with the influx of refugees into Jordan, the Jordanian government and the UN built the Zaatari refugee camp 12km from the Jordan-Syria border.[1] Zaatari opened in June of 2012. The reason I find myself attracted to the camp is the commercial district the refugees have created along the primary streets. They refer to it as the Champs-Élysées. They manipulate the prefabricated housing units and transform them into shops. There are about 600 restaurants and 3,000 shops.[2] These businesses are more than just a way to make money; they are an attempt by refugees to fight for a better future, to find a way to occupy their days, and to feel part of a community. Despite refugee camps being designed to suppress grass-root urbanism, refugees have transformed some camps into informal cities with neighborhoods and growing economies. Camps are considered a burden on host countries, and any sense of permanence is discouraged. My vision is to create spaces that respond to existing social networks inside established refugee camps. Traditionally, emergency relief is reactionary and temporary. My goal is to challenge this notion and begin to respond with long-term resilient solutions.

During September of 2014, I visited the Zaatari camp, with the aim of doing some fieldwork along the intersection that I have identified. During my visit I realized that the Champs-Élysées was male adult dominated. I knew then I wanted to design for the children and women of the camp. The design intervention will transform the street to symbolise a future for all refugees, not just male adults. To understand not only how to design the permanent within the temporary but also how to design for the Syrians, I began an investigation into understanding 'the physical' in pre-war Syria through the lens of 'the social' and interpreting how the relationships between the public, the private, and the in-between appear in the camp. Studying traditional courtyard housing and understanding the various spaces created and why they are created aided me in looking at this street as a courtyard; thus creating spaces for everyone. The layers that traditionally exist in Syrian courtyard housing are fundamentally created for a woman's privacy, and to give her public space in her own home. I did not just mimic that, but I learned from it and translated it according to the needs of the refugees. I designed a module that articulated different layers and when many of these modules are combined along a street they create the courtyard.

The module creates a second social level by raising the child spaces above the existing shops and restaurants. This transforms the Nadi into a landmark by introducing a visual hierarchy. The camp has spaces to house various programs that engage children, but they only meet the immediate needs such as safety and protection. My design aims to not only meet these short-term goals, but to also address and question existing social norms that



Fig. 1: The context: Zaatari refugee camp. Image: author.

Fig. 2

Fig. 3

Fig. 2: Champs-Élysées: existing conditions. Image: author.

Fig. 3: Champs-Élysées: the courtyard. Image: author.

promote inequality. Given the socio-cultural nature of Syrian cities and their multi-public layers, I also designed spaces of interaction and customisation between publicness and privateness. Therefore, the module also includes an interstitial space on the ground level that allows the owners to market their business through signage, to customise their storefronts using the interstitial space, and allows access to each business separately, reminiscent of the souq in pre-war Syria .

My argument is not about improving the initial response to emergencies with the intervention of shelter and service. But given that the average life of a refugee camp is 17 years, the temporary infrastructure soon becomes insufficient; I do find many problems with the lack of progress and the continued support for so many years.[3] Architecture needs to be integrated into refugee camps, and it should be designed around the social networks created by refugees. In Zaatari, it was obvious that those networks stemmed from the commercial district. Having livable cities instead of refugee camps does not diminish a refugee's rights, nor does it ensure their permanence in a host country. So the question that I raise is whether as human beings we should be satisfied with the perpetuation of these poor living conditions, and if not, then as architects what actions can we take?

Notes

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3. UNHCR, 'Protracted Refugee Situations', Executive Committee of High Commisioner's Programme, Standing Committee, 30th Meeting, UN Doc.EC/54/SC/ CRP.14, 10 June 2004, 2.

Biography

Nada Maani is a Master of Architecture 2015 graduate from Portland State University. She was one of the first three students to complete the Graduate Certificate in Public Interest Design, the first of its kind in the nation, offered through the School of Architecture's Center for Public Interest Design. She currently works at Opsis Architecture in Portland, Oregon. Nada's interests lie in the intersection of architecture and politics and thus design that will empower people both socially and politically.

Case Study

Urban Terrorism: St. Peter's Square, Vatican City

Tan Guan Zhong Daniel

Cities have become theatres of radical terrorism today. Cities offer a unique confluence of vulnerabilities – as nodes of capital and human flow and sites of architectural spectacle – that work to the advantage of orchestrated and well-planned radical terrorism. The nature of threat has changed from an exogenous to an endogenous enemy, and battle lines brought from the outside to inside the city.[1] The natural density of cities and their roles as places of urban procession and activity make them attractive targets for terrorists aiming to destabilise, terrify, or destroy. The surge in terrorism that began with the destruction of the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001 and the subsequent spate of high-profile attacks in Boston, Bangkok, and Paris, all point to the convergence of terrorism, spectacle and mass destruction. Yet to this highly threatening convergence, present securitisation strategies and tactics appear contrary to the aims of architecture. Does this then require a rethinking of our entire basis of architectural design to accommodate securitisation?

The recent securitisation of St. Peter's Square (in November 2015) has illuminated three main contradictions between security and architecture that are apparent in practice today: the first relates to spaces and spatial practices; the second to the differing professional beliefs between the security and architectural professions; and the third concerns urbanity. The iconic status of St. Peter's Square as a tourist venue and the destination for pilgrims from all over the world makes it especially vulnerable to terrorist threats. Fresh in the wake of the 2015 Paris attacks that claimed 130 lives, and in response to FBI warnings about threats made against it by the Islamic State terrorist group, the Vatican pre-emptively imposed stringent security measures and barricade structures around the square to deter possible attacks.[2]

The imposition of a carceral system of security checkpoints and barricades in a bid to impose a closed system on the square damages the very life of the square. This closed system, with a clear interior enclosed by a ring of security, goes against the open nature of a square that is designed not to have such demarcations. It is also striking that, although the security features fall under the architect's purview, architects are generally not involved in the formulation and installation of these elements. Often, the responsibility of securitising urban spaces falls entirely on security experts. These professionals adopt methodologies that tend to impose a prison-like system of surveillance and control that renders many urban arenas lifeless.

The crux of the matter could lie with the diametrically opposed aims of the two professions: architects strive to promote mobility and interaction among people, while security experts, endeavour to enclose and restrict movement to facilitate securitisation. More worryingly, the increasing influence of security experts on urban spaces could potentially undermine the values that architects wish to imprint upon these spaces. With the

ever-increasing frequency and severity of terrorist attacks accelerating the rate of securitisation of cities, how will the influences of both these professions on our urban spaces be negotiated?

The longstanding trajectory of securitisation in cities also raises questions of how urbanity should be perceived. The very nature of exclusion and control brought about by the securitisation of St. Peter's Square corrodes the inherent nature of what the square previously symbolised: a sanctuary where all could enter and be welcome. By replacing the openness of the public square with a carceral system of security checkpoints and barricades, St. Peter's Square has morphed into a place injected with exclusivity, fear and paranoia.

The opposing forces of an architecture of security and an architecture of mobility and interaction raises tensions between space and spatial practices, among professional beliefs in architecture, and on urbanity. As the increasing frequency and severity of attacks raises the demand and pressure for security in cities, the relationship between architecture and security will become more prominent. Under these new conditions of terrorism, how can the architect still contribute to the discussion of a convivial city?

Notes

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Biography

Daniel Tan is based in Singapore, where he works as an architectural designer in internationally renowned firm Woha Architects. Graduating with a Master's Degree in Architecture from the National University of Singapore, he found his passion in architectural design and theory. His research explores the increasingly intertwined relationship of contemporary warfare with the urban spaces we inhabit, in particular the transformation of these spaces in the presence of warfare. He continues to contribute actively to journals, while establishing himself as a practicing architect in the thriving Singaporean architectural scene.

Case Study

Indigenous Perspectives: The Post-Conflict Landscapes of Rwanda

Killian Doherty

This research traces conflict through competing claims to Rwanda's landscapes. Rwanda is one of the smallest countries in sub-saharan Africa, and its terrain of hills and valleys and its temperate climate made it favourable for settlers that utilised them in diverse ways. Pastoralists acquired highland plateaus for the farming of cows, and as territory increased so did power.[1] Agronomists farmed hillsides, while hunter-gatherer communities inhabited highland forests and low-lying wetlands. Power, class and social rank in Rwanda remain deeply inscribed in these territorial arrangements that permitted access to resources, in turn contributing to the 1994 genocide.[2]

Today Rwanda is the most densely populated country in sub-Saharan Africa.[3] Human settlements nestle within a hilly network of forest, marshland, rivers and lakes. Land insecurity is rife, and the returning diaspora continue to re-settle in Kigali, the capital, with a population of 1.22 million set to triple by 2040.[4] Rwanda's redevelopment hinges upon the relations between land, resources and settlement, yet dominant forms of urban planning and architecture suggest otherwise.

Kigali is replete with generic high-rise buildings, sitting within inner city zoned land once occupied by low-income wetland communities.[5] Land reform policies consolidate rural settlements into 'model villages', as natural resources are monetised through tourism, energy and collective agricultural projects.[6] [Fig. 1] With relations between human settlements and land strained, livelihoods are undermined. It is the hunter-gatherer Twa who have suffered most from the supposed benefits of development.

Approximately 30,000 Twa reside across Rwanda in the worst socio-economic conditions of the national population.[7] Climate change, conservation and gorilla protection policies have forced Twa communities off their ancestral lands. In 2011 a Rwandan government project demolished temporary displaced Twa grass-roofed homes; built from materials that are today forbidden.[8] Twa communities today are forcefully 'reintegrated' into Rwandan society through 'modern' generic homes sited on government reservations. According to UN Reports on racial discrimination, post-war Rwanda does not in practice permit the same rights of access to housing, jobs, education and land for the Twa. As a result the Twa population is in decline.[9]

The political scientist Peter Uvin regards western development as a factor that reinforced Rwanda's internal colonialism, enacted through structural and direct violence.[10] Structural violence takes an indirect form through physical and physiological exclusion manifesting as poverty, hunger and marginalisation from society.[11] Direct violence needs little explanation in the Rwandan context. Uvin asserts that the privileging of one elite ethnic group through political and economic processes of development in Rwanda, legitimises one group's claims to sovereignty over another, aiding control of



Fig. 1: Resources relative to areas inhabitated by Twa, © Killian Doherty.



Fig. 2: Indigenous value mapping, © Killian Doherty.

land and natural resources therein.[12] Development in Rwanda, Uvin fears, operates through a 'narrow economic-technical approach', therefore neglecting the non-economic interests and overlooking 'human rights violations, income inequality, authoritarianism, humiliation and fear'.[13] To neglect the non-economic in Rwanda is to overlook the relations between settlement practices and the landscape that defines 90 percent of the population's livelihood. Bruno Latour refers to the division arising between the human/cultural and the non-human/natural world as 'the constitution of modernity'; an understanding he claims is deepened through anthropology.[14]

In 2014 I began to communicate with Twa communities regarding their displacement, land-poverty and forced reintegration. Using hand-drawn maps and a three-dimensional landscape model, sites of cultural importance were documented by hand and inputted into a GIS database. [Fig. 2] The dominant representations of the Virunga forests within government maps illustrate them as an uninhabited, vacant and static space. The Twa however map the forests as a dwelling of relations through sites of physical, emotional and spiritual well-being, with movement criss-crossing the frontiers of Rwanda, Uganda and the DRC, irrespective of official claims to sovereignty.

Yet the unrelenting script of national unity and societal prosperity that development embodies, imposes the paradigm of the new 'modern' house upon the Twa, as an unspoken evolutionary gain. However without access to land and customary rights the new home signifies a loss; sedentary structures are for indigenous communities material non-sequitirs.[15] Pierre Bourdieu considers the reorganisation of the dwelling space a means to achieve 'a new framework of existence'.[16] Rehousing and resettlement in Rwanda manifests as a pretense to eradicating ethnic differences, yet regaining control of the landscape's economic potential.

Exposure to the Twa's non-western, non-dualist perspectives have challenged my own western conventions of scale and the temporality of dwelling and the landscape itself. Design interventions, if they occur at all, must therefore be multi-scalar, connecting the political scale of the constrained dwelling to the environmental scale of the increasingly delimited cultural landscape.

Ethnic difference remains absent within the discourse of democracy, unity and development in Rwanda. As social architecture in Rwanda flourishes primarily by western firms aligned with development intentions, it cannot engage directly with political matters of social justice and human rights violations.[17] Circumnavigating this paralysis anthropology, sociology and political economy are used to examine the contradictions that resound within the built spaces of development, to articulate a spatial voice conceived from difference. This research aims to explore this through mediation between the Twa's dual perspective of dwelling, as violently constrained and potentially boundless within the forests.

Notes

The author would like to acknowledge the Twa communities in Rwanda for the formation of this PhD research. This research, at the UCL Bartlett School of Architecture, is funded by the Frederick Bonnart-Braunthal Scholarship.

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12. Ibid., 54.
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16. Pierre Bourdieu and Abdelmalek Sayad, *Le déracinement. La crise de l'agriculture traditionnelle en Algérie* (Paris : Les editions des minuit, 1964).
17. For examples see the work of USA based firms MASS Architects and Sharon Davis Design.

Biography

Killian Doherty is an architect who has practiced in New Orleans, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Rwanda and runs a collaborative practice 'Architectural Field Office', that has a particular interest in sites of conflict, and the dissonance of modernity and development in Africa. He has written for the Architectural Review, Mascontext and VOLUME magazine on these themes. He currently is undertaking a PhD by Design at the Bartlett School of Architecture. For more see www.architecturalfieldoffice.org.

Case Study

Reclaiming Political Urbanism in Peace Building Processes: The Hands-on Famagusta Project, Cyprus

Socrates Stratis and Emre Akbil

Cyprus is a divided country where ethnic conflict has been domesticated for the last 42 years. [Fig. 1] Any debate on the island's potential reunification through peace building processes seems to go hand-in-hand with the dominant 'techno-managerial' paradigm of consensual economic activities, which depoliticises the practice of urbanism.[1] Moreover, it turns urbanism into an agent of territorial distribution that keeps ethnic enclosures, such as the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot ones, intact. Our aim, through the *Hands-on Famagusta* project, is to reclaim a political form of urbanism before the potential Cyprus reunification by enhancing 'agonistic' collective practices across the Cypriot divide.[2] Consequently, we may contribute to opening up of ethnic enclosures and resist the perpetuation of the 'techno-managerial' logic.

The *Hands-on Famagusta* project[3] positions itself where architecture and urbanism contribute to assembling the 'political'[4] to transform antagonisms fueled by ethnic conflict thus provide 'new forms of spatialisation'[5] for emergent collectives. By virtue of the material and immaterial technologies devised by the 'Hands-on Famagusta' project, architecture and urban design acquire agencies that transform divisive representations of the contested territories of Famagusta into territories-of-common-concern. *Hands-on Famagusta* introduces an agonistic paradigm for reconciliation, making a shift from consensus to 'dissensus'.[6] Such an approach opposes techno-liberal paradigms that neutralise conflicts and impose laisser-faire mechanisms of reconstruction. The project introduces the notion of creative conflict by interrelating regeneration and reconciliation processes. More precisely, *Hands-on Famagusta* operates as a critical spatial practice employing design as a potential political tool to achieve democratic, social and economic change towards the city's commons.

Famagusta is a contested city grounded in ethnic conflict driven by geopolitical actors interested in the larger Eastern Mediterranean area. A consequence of British decolonisation in 1950s, the conflict started as inter-communal turmoil and resulted in war with Turkey in 1974 which caused the de facto division of the island into two ethnic parts. The Greek Cypriots, including the Famagustian inhabitants, were forced to flow to the southern part of the island while Turkish Cypriots moved into the northern part, which is exposed to neocolonial strategies of Turkey. Each part is further fragmented by military enclaves, camps and buffer zones. Famagusta is at the intersection of many borders and buffer zones and is composed of isolated urban enclaves, such as the uninhabited fenced-off part of the city, named the 'ghost town', the port area, a medieval old town surrounded by Venetian fortifications, fenced military areas extending along the coastline, industrial zones, a university campus and ecological sites. [Fig. 2]

Fig. 1



Fig. 2

Fig. 1: The trips of the 'Imaginary Famagusta' group across ethnic enclaves, military enclosures and ceasefire zones, courtesy of *Hands-on Famagusta*.

Fig. 2: Famagusta: a multi-enclaved urban territory for common concern among the communities in conflict, courtesy of *Hands-on Famagusta*.

Fig. 3: The portable physical model as a material agent for reconciliation, courtesy of *Hands-on Famagusta*.

Transforming ethnic conflict into urban commons

The *Hands-on Famagusta* project participated in the 15th Venice Biennale of Architecture, at the Cyprus Pavilion entitled *Contested Fronts: Commoning Practices for Conflict Transformation*.[7] It has contributed to the creation of an open source archive for conflict transformation through three kinds of commoning practices: 'Counter-mapping', 'Creating Thresholds' and 'Introducing Urban Controversies'.[8]

Firstly, 'Counter-mapping' aims to challenge dominant divisive narratives by creating alternative representations of the urban contested spaces. The aim is to transform the representation of territories of ethnic conflict to that of territories-of-common-concern, recognising a departure point for agonistic. Secondly, 'Creating Thresholds' encourages practices of exchange across edges, which in turn open up territories of exclusion to the commons of the city. It embodies strategic and tactful actions, based on transformative themes for urban regeneration and hands-on actions for reconciliation.[9] Thirdly, 'Introducing Urban Controversies' is the unfolding of creative conflict within the political realm of production of urbanism and architecture where urban actors are in a continuous process of alliance and disagreement. Thus disagreements with regard to the role of the commons during post-conflict reconstruction or urban regeneration could be structured to create arenas of creative confrontation among urban actors with divergent agendas.

The material agents of the 'Hands-on Famagusta' project play a prominent role in these commoning practices. Some of them are: an interactive web-platform (www.handsonfamagusta.org), a roundtable workshop series, a portable large-scale city model, a cardboard 'action dove' logo stencil, a visual matrix of enclaves printed on A1 sheets of paper, and a large colour-printed isometric view that emphatically distorts the 'exclusive parts' of the city. [Fig. 3] All these objects are documented in the *Guide to Common Urban Imaginaries in Contested Spaces* as well as in the Cypriot Pavilion of the Architecture Biennale in Venice.[10]

How to sustain agonistic urbanism?

The *Hands-on Famagusta* project has associated the word 'collective' with materialities, technologies and temporary communities across the Cypriot divide, but not yet with institutions and policies, because the hostile environment of the Cypriot division and the absence of resolution regarding the reunification of the island makes this impossible. The challenge is to maintain a role for enabling an agonistic production of urbanism despite the actual hostile status quo of division and the eminent neo-liberal urban transformations. The ability to transcend antagonistic conflict depends on re-evaluating daily practices and behaviours and creating spaces of contestation and disagreement. Such an approach may enhance the foundation of new institutions and procedures based on policy changes and the enrichment of practices. Otherwise, the productive and creative domain of conflict remains intangible, and thus risks remaining frozen or falling back into a cycle of violence and turmoil.

Notes

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Biographies

Socrates Stratis (www.socratesstratis.com) is Associate Professor, Department of Architecture, University of Cyprus. He has a Doctorate Degree in Urban Studies-Planning, University of Paris 8 and Bachelor and Master Degrees of Architecture (Urban Design) from Cornell University. Socrates’s research focuses on the political role of architecture in uncertain, and also contested contemporary urban environments. His is one of the main founders of the agency AA&U, (www.aaplusu.com) and part of the I.F. (Imaginary Famagusta) team. He is the editor of the *Guide to Common Urban Imaginaries in Contested Spaces*, (Berlin: Jovis, 2016). He curated the Cyprus pavilion at the 15th Venice Biennale of Architecture.

Emre Akbil is an architect based in Nicosia and Famagusta, Cyprus and a PhD candidate in Theory of Architecture at, Faculty of Architecture, Eastern Mediterranean University. He is also part of the I.F. (Imaginary Famagusta) team, a think-tank for contested urban spaces. His work focuses on agency of architecture, which is not reduced into its spatial dimension but also informs about strategies and processes empowering autonomous collectives while reflecting on theories on subjectivity, power and politics.

Case Study

Urban in-betweenness: Rotterdam / Mexico City

Moniek Driesse and Isaac Landeros

The city is a place of clashing forces, a field of reactions through all scales. The objectification of these conflicts represented by catastrophic events in an out-of-proportion block of overwhelming numerical facts, creates distance between the scale of the event and the way it is perceived by those who are not suffering from it directly. It seems impossible to take into account each person involved in a conflict, but in fact this is what is reflected in the city: an atomisation of individuals going through a traumatic experience, each of them working as a seed of change that eventually will have spatial repercussions. Global conflicts – natural disasters, exoduses of refugees, chemical spills – are made concrete in the city and are synthesised in experiences that respond and adapt to personal habits.

In that sense, conflict can be seen as the origin of urban resistance; an opportunity for citizens to reconsider, renew and reorder physical configurations and social patterns. It happens 'here and now', and in this immediacy there is no room for hesitation: either you act or lose your chance to turn catastrophe into opportunity. This defines the city as a temporary construction, which is made and unmade, every day, again and again, rebuilding it from the social realm. Hence, the city, for its dwellers, is a sequence of spatial accidents that hosts their activities and everyday dramas. It is not intellectualised, it is suffered. And it all starts at a micro scale.

Designers, like urbanites, increasingly face places of complex distant relations, new spatialities, and multiple subjectivities. We, as design researchers immersed in the urban context, explore the bridges between the static imagery and the effervescent action–between the built environment and society. As the space is practiced, as the city is lived, there are elements that help us to understand the value of what has been taking place in space and time; tangible and intangible components that change scale. In that sense, the city has to acquire a real and raw dimension that goes beyond paper and words. At street level, the borderlines of these elements are blurred by the overlapping layers of the urban realm; each of these elements hides behind its apparent meaning and function a whole different set of possible interpretations both in sense and in modes of use. This is what space, subject to conflict, manifests. This is where the door to Nepantla opens.[1]

In Rotterdam, for example, the highway intersection of Kleinpolderplein used to be a symbol of progress after World War II. [Fig. 1] But it also emphasizes how modern urban planning dissected the city, creating a withered space and social boundaries between neighbourhoods. Now that the four-story intersection has reached its expiration date, and cars are banned out of the city center as an aftereffect of global warming, several artistic interventions catalyse transition into a more

Fig. 1

Fig. 2

Fig. 1: Intersection Kleinpolderplein, Rotterdam. Aerial picture of the roundabout.

Fig. 2: Street level view on the Kleinpolderplein, including one of the flyovers, the pond and the artwork "Die bocht" by artist collective Observatorium (2011).

Fig. 3

Fig. 4

Fig. 3: Aerial view on Mexico City.

Fig. 4: Appropriation of public space in Pueblo de la Magdalena Mixiuhca, Mexico City.

humanised space: a pond harvesting rainwater marks the initial construction of a park, along with plinths giving space to abandoned public art works from all over the city. [Fig. 2] Here, traffic lights, narrow sidewalks and the imposition of a vehicular highline were elements trapped in a passively accepted semantic field showing the supremacy of the car. After the conflict – after the state of uncertainty – other possibilities of practice were detected.

In a different context, in the conflict-ridden neighborhood Pueblo de la Magdalena Mixiuhca in Mexico City, certain physical traces represent the sense of belonging and appropriation of space. [Fig. 3] As a result of hyper-urbanisation caused by social inequality, increasing violence and water scarcity, the village transformed from a rural area that provided fruit and vegetables for most of the city to a notorious place for the cultivation of opium poppy and the distribution of drugs in the centre of the megalopolis. Nowadays, while walking through the neighborhood one can notice numerous trees planted spontaneously by inhabitants and plenty of flowerpots on the balconies. [Fig. 4] This guerrilla gardening is a way to hold on to the former sociocultural narrative of the village while transition is slowly setting in.

The very solid built environment and the very fluid human actions blend together in a turbulent serendipity that leads to a relentless state of in-betweenness. This blurred space – a threshold loaded with ambiguity, which is exalted in times of conflict – also creates opportunities for intervention and innovation. However, we need to be capable of identifying the elements that interact before, during and after conflicts have taken place. There could be clues at a micro scale that stand out from the chaos causing actions that could eventually impact a macro scale.

Paraphrasing Italo Calvino, we have to seek and be able to recognise who and what, in the midst of hell, are not hell, then make them endure, give them space.[2] The fragments of the city are recalibrated through small fragmented actions, just like the atomised individuals who give rise to them. A chasm stabilises, at least momentarily, and the state of Nepantla stops being alienating. The physical space becomes a natural extension of human action. Until the next conflict arises. Until we have to go through Nepantla again.

As design researchers we need to discover the meaning loaded onto the elements already composing the urban environment; how do they transmit information? How is this information codified, interpreted and used? And most importantly, how can these blocks be recodified into new opportunities for understanding the needs, wishes and dreams of the users that live in daily conflict.

Notes

1. The Nahuatl word Nepantla origins from 16th century Mexico and conceptualises the state of ‘in-betweenness’. It can refer to the act of resistance in which a part of something (eg. culture) that cannot synthesise into a new situation is left behind, but other parts become part of the new situation. In this case, we use the concept of Nepantla to reflect upon the mixed condition of the city, its fragmentation and the micro forces that give shape to the urban environment.
2. Italo Calvino, *Las ciudades invisibles,* trans. Aurora Bernárdez (Madrid: Ediciones Siruela, 2010 [1972]).

Biographies

Moniek Driesse (The Netherlands, 1983) is a design researcher living and working in flux between Rotterdam and Mexico City. She considers art and design as powerful tools to catalyse dialogue on political, social and cultural issues. From her interest in working at the boundaries of disciplines, she collaborates in diverse projects, increasingly focused on artistic practice and architecture in contexts of conflict and the development of tools for dialogue and activism. Within those (self-initiated) projects she utilises design, curating, publishing and education, to create a cohesive practice that connects arts, politics, (social) science and daily reality.

Isaac Landeros (Mexico, 1983) is an architect and landscape designer living and working in Beijing since 2012. His interest in design, architecture and public spaces has taken him to major global capitals in order to obtain a firsthand understanding of the diverse layers involved in the most iconic urban environments. These experiences have become an engine that propels his design ideas. He pursues a path based on transdisciplinary collaboration that goes from mapping the city to graphic and furniture design; he is immersed in a world that mixes local culture, art and trends from the four corners of the world.

Footprint is a peer-reviewed journal presenting academic research in the field of architecture theory. The journal encourages the study of architecture and the urban environment as a means of comprehending culture and society, and as a tool for relating them to shifting ideological doctrines and philosophical ideas. The journal promotes the creation and development – or revision – of conceptual frameworks and methods of inquiry. The journal is engaged in creating a body of critical and reflexive texts with a breadth and depth of thought which would enrich the architecture discipline and produce new knowledge, conceptual methodologies and original understandings.

In this issue, the following papers were peer-reviewed: 'West Bank Settlement and the Transformation of the Zionist Housing Ethos from Shelter to Act of Violence'; 'On the Spaces of Guerre Moderne: The French Army in Northern Algeria (1954–1962)'; 'Envisioning a Post-Conflict Tripoli: The Inclusive Urban Strategy and Action Plan for Bab Al-Tabbaneh and Jebel Mohsen'; 'Stasis, Charging the Space of Change'; 'Militarised Safety: The Politics of Exclusion'; 'Anxious Architecture: Sleep, Identity, and Death in the US-Mexico Borderlands'.

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