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Contents

Introduction

Trans-disciplinarity: The Singularities and Multiplicities of Architecture

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Contemporary architecture culture – as discourse and as design – seems to oscillate between two opposing positions. The first understands architecture as a node of economy, politics, society, and culture, suggesting that these diverse forces generate the multiplicity of architecture's tools, procedures and performances; the second focuses on architecture as a singular object, aesthetic, formal, self-contained and irreducible to the conditions from which it emerges or the effects it stimulates. Attempts to bridge this dichotomy of architecture's multiplicities and its singularity can be identified both in design practices and in theory: while the majority of today's state-of-the art studios hover between practicing architecture as a derivative of a series of parameters and as a unique icon, contemporary theory similarly oscillates between conceiving architecture as an outcome of the multiplicity of contexts which overdetermine its production, and as a singular event expressing the individuality of the architect or the 'individuality' of the corporate client.

With this inaugural issue of 'Footprint', we would like to underline the negotiation between architecture's multiplicities and its singularity as a crucial undercurrent of contemporary architecture culture, as well as one of the driving forces of architecture's 'tradition of the present' - a lineage of discourses and designs which has provided since the 1960s, and continues to provide today, an orientation for architecture practices.

This negotiation has been pursued within the tradition of the present by means of several strategies subscribing to alternating disciplinary definitions of architecture, and differing not just in the characterisation of the profession, but also in the understanding of the concept of 'discipline' itself.

One strategy, which emerged in the wake of the disappointment with the functionalist city in the late 1950s, consisted of interdisciplinary researches, practices and institutions; it embraced a diffused concept of the discipline of architecture, which it understood as a mediation between its social, economic, political, ecological, or aesthetic facets. The program of the Atelier d'Urbanisme et d'Architecture (A.U.A.), for example, the first and most important interdisciplinary planning practice in France, founded in 1961, was developed in opposition to the individualised 'artistic' architecture of the late-modernist masters and their followers, such as Claude Parent and Paul Virilio.

While the interdisciplinary approach attempted to preserve the profession's authority by means of understanding the discipline as a set of interdependent domains governed by rules in perpetual transformation, not unlike Foucault's concept of 'discipline' in his theorising of power, it was confronted with the second strategy, aimed at staking out the unique core of architecture. This strategy was exemplified by the positions of the Italian Tendenza and the lineage of Colin Rowe and his students, delineating the specificity of architecture by emphasising form and typology as the essence of the discipline,

autonomous from the social conditions of its production. The Tendenza was positioned as an alternative to the late modernist work of Bruno Zevi and his attempt to posit architectural space as a common denominator unifying architecture's multiplicities; these multiplicities, addressed as 'interpretations' in Zevi's 1957 'Architecture as Space', included politics, philosophy, religion, science, economy, society, technology, physiology, psychology and aesthetics.[1] Massimo Scolari, one of the members of the Tendenza, specifically defined its work as an architecture 'that refuses interdisciplinary solutions to its own crisis; that does not pursue and immerse itself in political, economic, social, and technological events only to mask its own creative and formal sterility'.[2] Scolari, perhaps paradoxically, postulated architecture's 'withdrawal into itself' as a pre-condition for a subsequent intervention in the multiplicity of these 'events'.[3] A similar approach was followed by Aldo Rossi, with his concept of architecture as the 'singular urban fact', preserving in a single monumental structure the richness of the urban phenomena.[4]

Thus, both strategies aimed at thinking architecture as a multiplicity and a singularity, while differing in the directions in which the arguments were developed: whereas the disciplinary definition of architecture looks for its singularity as the vessel for gathering and relating architecture's multiplicities, the interdisciplinary research perceives the singular performance of architecture in its management of the multiplicity of its conditions and contexts. In other words, in spite of the antithetical rhetoric and different points of departure, several significant trajectories and oeuvres of the tradition of the present were oriented towards a possibility of constructing architecture as a unique object, and a specific practice, which links the heterogeneous forces of the contemporary urban society. It is this intertwining of the disciplinary and interdisciplinary definitions of architecture which we call trans-disciplinarity.

The fragility and difficulties of a trans-disciplinary approach were exemplarily expressed in the splits between the philosophers and architects within the French radical groups of the 1960s, including the rupture within the Situationist International between Guy Debord and Constant Nieuwenhuis, and the split of the Utopie Group following Jean Baudrillard's disagreements with Jean Aubert, Jean-Paul Jungmann and Antoine Stinco.

These events, which coincided with the beginnings of the tradition of the present in architecture culture, can be understood only when situated within the context of the French debates of the late 1950s and 1960s, following the critique of the postwar functionalist city. Rejecting the self-proclaimed scientific and apolitical character of this architecture and urbanism, Henri Lefebvre, in his writings from the 1950s and 1960s, demonstrated that these practices were implicated in the general technocratic restructuring of French society and closely interrelated with the oligopolist economy, state planning, structuralist philosophy, and the idiosyncrasies of everyday life in the emerging *bureaucratic society of controlled consumption*. Lefebvre's analysis of the fragmented postwar production of space, both in design (the diffraction of functions in the CIAM urbanism) and in research (the specialisations of diverging academic disciplines), was paralleled by the introduction of interdisciplinary research into the institutions of urbanism in France in the mid-1960s and the emergence of interdisciplinary studios such as the A.U.A.

In the late 1960s, Jean Baudrillard merged the critical Marxist tradition with the structuralist methodology and the conclusions of the sociological research on postwar France carried out by Henri Lefebvre, his PhD supervisor, and formulated the consequences of these analyses for architecture: in his writings of that period, Baudrillard disclosed architecture as overdetermined by a series of economic, political and cultural forces; the autonomy of archi-

tecture was thus revealed as an illusion.[5] Criticising Lefebvre's 'naivety',[6] Baudrillard did not see any possibility of a residuum which would evade this determinism; even the 'lived' of architecture – the essential category in Lefebvre's critique of postwar urbanism from the perspective of an everyday experience – was counted among other products of the capitalist society and included in its system of signs. In other words, the structuralist claim about the death of the subject – its dissolution in its constitutive social forces – was paralleled by the death of the architectural object, a 'death' already announced by the avant-garde of the early twentieth century.[7] Consequently, the radical fight against the alienating society and its products in the course of May '68 must have been directed against architecture - not just against its institutions, as in the successful attack on the École des Beaux-Arts, but against the object of architecture itself, and 'every formal and symbolic practice'.[8] Thus, referring to 'objet, cache-toi', the May '68 slogan written in the staircase of the Sorbonne, Jean Aubert commented: 'we were the object, obviously… even if we had pretensions of thinking a little, just a little bit, we were makers of objects'.[9]

The splits within the radical French groups were symptomatic of a growing difficulty to reconcile architecture's singularity with the increasing awareness of its multiple conditions and consequences. The arena of this contestation was by no means limited to architecture or to France, but incorporated a variety of disciplines and took place in countries such as the UK, the US and Germany. Much of the debate in the UK was initially hosted and generated by the Centre for Contemporary Culture Studies in Birmingham, founded in the mid 1960s as an interdisciplinary institute with the objective of reconstituting a unified understanding of culture and society and headed by Richard Hoggart and Stuart Hall. A hotbed of structuralist and critical thought, the CCCS was torn between the dissolution of the author within the social and economic forces and his reconstitution as an active agent. Stuart Hall believed that the solution to this dichotomy would be enabled by constructing a dialectics of a posthumanist, 'multiple' approach and a more traditional humanism with emphasis on 'the singular'.[10] Nevertheless, the CCCS ended up dismantling in its studies the singular aesthetic artefact, embedding it in its social context and circumventing traditional 'disinterested' aesthetic interpretations.

In parallel, European and American artists launched a wide institutional critique via works such as 'Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum Board of Trustees' (1974), by the German artist Hans Haacke, in which he inferred that the museum, its policies and preferences were determined by corporate interests outside the art world. This view was theoretically strengthened by the literary critic Peter Bürger, who in his 1974 'Theory of the Avant-Garde' exposed the idea of artistic autonomy as a middle-class ideology, thus delegitimising art's primary vehicle of a singular self-understanding.[11]

What is the relevance of these debates today? Clearly, the positions of Baudrillard, Foucault and other post-structuralist thinkers are still major references for architectural discourse. However, the significance of the rupture between the philosophers and designers of the SI and the Utopie lies not in it being a symptom of the 'eternal' opposition between theory and practice. Neither does the relevance of these debates depend on the critical potential invested in the project of architecture's disciplinarity, nor on the transgressive ambitions of the interdisciplinary research: in contrast to thirty years ago, interdisciplinary practices can no longer be perceived as rebellious; they have been widely appropriated by management and business, which currently prefer broad, 'horizontal' knowledge to specific, 'vertical' expertise;[12] similarly, architectural autonomy can no longer be seen as 'critical' or as a refuge from commodification - the status of ideology Bürger associated with artistic autonomy is easily

applicable to architecture as well.[13]

Rather, these ruptures manifest the difficulties in relating the multiplicities of architecture in contemporary society with the belief in its singularity. These difficulties are evident in Baudrillard's late 'Singular Objects of Architecture' (2000). In this dialogue with Jean Nouvel, Baudrillard suggests that the possibility of architecture's singularity stems from the breaches in the fundamental relationships between the architectural object and its determining conditions - the relationships traditionally referred to by such concepts as meaning, context, subject, object;[14] in other words, the condition necessary to theorise the singularity of architecture is its isolation from its determining multiplicities, an isolation explained within Baudrillard's postmodern ontologies.

Baudrillard's recent contribution reveals the negotiation between singularity and multiplicity of architecture as urgent, relevant, and unresolved. Accordingly, this issue of 'Footprint' postulates the concept of trans-disciplinarity in order to focus on the methods and techniques which enable rethinking the object of architecture as the framework in which the diverse forces relate to each other, compete or converge.

At the same time, the concept of trans-disciplinarity allows linking today's architecture culture to a series of contemporary debates. These include Jacques Rancière's recent efforts to embed the aesthetic object in its political and social context without dismantling its singularity; Rancière's aim can be described as a formulation of a specific trans-disciplinary theory of art and politics.[15] Similarly relevant are Bruno Latour's analyses of 'hybrids', or 'quasi-objects' - singular social actors being 'real as nature, narrated as discourse, collective as society, existing as Being', thus relating the multiplicity of social processes.[16] It is in this context that one should understand the recent interest in the work of Henri Lefebvre, whose theory of production of space can be described as a project of relating the Western-Marxist perspective on the social processes of production and consumption to the phenomenological analysis of the individual consciousness, perception and experience of space in the practices of everyday life.[17]

The articles included here offer a variety of approaches which relate the singularity and multiplicity of architecture; they range from a wide overview to a delineation of specific instances of 'trans-disciplinarity', sharing the perception of the late 1960s as the moment in which the current trajectories of architecture culture originated. Wouter Davidts examines architectural design and discourse as a condition for art; Michael Hays revisits the narrative as a form of understanding the object of architecture within the forces which it reflects and opposes, and from which it emerges; Patrick Healy explores the roots of architecture's contradictory singularity by reconstructing Max Raphael's project of an empirical theory of art and architecture; Mark Jarzombek questions architecture's singularity as a philosophical project; Ákos Moravánszky maps the relationships and interchanges between theory, design, history and education as the multiplicity of contemporary architecture; Jean-Louis Violeau traces the collaborations between architects and sociologists on architectural research in France since the late 1960s. Reviews of Eisenman's doctoral research and 'A Vision for Brussels' exhibition close this issue; the former belongs to the inception of the tradition of the present, the latter, with its explicit premise that architectural form is political, can be described as a recent example of the subsistence of this tradition. These diverse articles, while embedded in the tradition of the present, underline the question of trans-disciplinarity as one of the - multiple - horizons of today's architecture culture.

Notes

1. Bruno Zevi, *Architecture as space: how to look at architecture* (New York: Horizon Press, 1957).
2. Massimo Scolari, 'The New Architecture and the Avant-Garde', in *Architecture Theory since 1968*, ed. by K. Michael Hays (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2000), p. 131.
3. Ibid.
4. Regarding the subsistence of the Cologne Cathedral in the midst of the destroyed postwar city, Rossi noted that 'it is not the context or some illusionistic quality that enables us to understand a monument; […] only by comprehending the monument as a singular urban artefact, or by contrasting it with other urban artifacts, can we attain a sense of the architecture of the city'. Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City*, trans. by D. Ghirardo and J. Ockman (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1991), p. 124. See also Pier Vittorio Aureli, 'The Difficult Whole', *Log*, 9 (Winter/Spring 2007), pp. 39-61.
5. Jean Baudrillard, *The System of Objects*, trans. by J. Benedict (London: Verso 2005).
6. Jean Baudrillard, 'On Utopie', in *Utopia Deferred: Jean Baudrillard, Writings for Utopie* (1967-1978), trans. by S. Kendall (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2006), p. 29.
7. Comp. Manfredo Tafuri, *Theories and History of Architecture*, trans. by G. Verrecchia (London: Granada, 1980).
8. Baudrillard, 'On Utopie', p. 15.
9. Aubert quoted in Jean-Louis Violeau, 'Utopie: in acts…', in *The Inflatable Moment: Pneumatics and Protest in '68*, ed. by Marc Dessauce (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1999), p. 50.
10. See Stuart Hall, 'Cultural Studies: Two Paradigms', *Media, Culture and Society*, 2 (1980), pp. 57-62, and 'Cultural Studies', in *Encyclopedia of Aesthetics*, Vol. 1, ed. by Michael Kelly, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 480-83.
11. Peter Bürger, *Theory of the Avant-Garde*, trans. by M. Shaw (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).
12. See Richard Sennett, *The Culture of New Capitalism* (London: Yale University Press, 2006), pp. 97-98, and Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello, *The New Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. by G. Elliott (London: Verso, 2005).
13. Tahl Kaminer, 'Autonomy and Commerce: The Integration of Architectural Autonomy', *ARQ: Architecture Research Quarterly*, 11, issue 1 (March 2007), pp. 63-70.
14. See Jean Baudrillard and Jean Nouvel, *The Singular Objects of Architecture*, trans. by R. Bononno (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), p. 15.
15. Jacques Rancière, *The Politics of Aesthetics*, trans. by G. Rockhill (London: Continuum, 2006); Jacques Rancière, *On the Shores of Politics*, trans. by L. Heron (London: Verso, 2007).
16. Bruno Latour, *We have never been modern*, trans. by C. Porter (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 6.
17. See Lukasz Stanek, 'Space as a Concrete Abstraction: Hegel, Marx, and Modern Urbanism in Henri Lefebvre', in *Space, Difference, Everyday Life: Henri Lefebvre and Radical Politics*, ed. by Stefan Kipfer and others (London: Routledge, 2007) [forthcoming].

Why and How 'To Do Science'? On the Often Ambiguous Relationship between Architecture and the Social Sciences in France in the Wake of May '68

Jean-Louis Violeau

Is it necessary to recall that the humanities in general and sociology in particular have experienced a veritable glory hour in France, lasting one entire decade, from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s? Perhaps paradoxically, this is better remembered outside France. The period, beginning around 1966, was the heyday of structuralism, with the publication of Les Mots et les choses, with Roland Barthes' response to the Sorbonnard Raymond Picard via his Critique et vérité, and with Lacan publishing the first volume of his 'Écrits'; it ended in 1974, once the shockwaves of the oil crisis became overbearing. Paul (Jean-Pierre Léaud), interviewer for l'IFOP (Institut français d'opinion publique [French Institute of Public Opinion]) can still be called to mind, for example, in Godard's 1966 'Masculin Féminin', chatting up Madeleine (Chantal Goya) as an undercover agent of sociology, oscillating between a question about democracy and commenting 'I like how you boogie'. And so here you are today, looking at a forty-year-old issue of the journal of the 'Internationale Situationniste' which reproduced a double-page of the lifestyle magazine 'Lui', presenting the panoply of the 'modern man' of the period; the first volume of the works of Marx in the édition de la Pléïade by Gallimard well situated in the midst of all the household goods and other symbols of consumerism of the 1960s. From a certain point of view, the convergence that took place in France - and elsewhere - between architecture and social sciences, shall we say a structuralist-Marxist convergence, profoundly lacks originality. This convergence was merely an ephemeral inscription into the pace of the dominant intellectual mood. But this does not prevent the encounter in architecture, as much as in other intellectual universes from being active underground, despite the disappointments and even the disillusions, and despite the voluntary silence about the mutual fertilisations that could have blossomed.

The beginnings of architectural research in France after May '68

Around the time of the 'events' of May '68, the 'architectural research' in France posited itself as a direct challenge to the education of the 'Beaux-Arts', to the latter's insulation from academic disciplines, in particular from human and social sciences, and the absence of a critical dimension required by any 'scientific' approach.[1] Once the 'Beaux-Arts' education `was dismantled, the question regarding the legitimacy of theory was formulated in the course of the creation of a new pedagogical project with, in particular, the recovery of research as a motor of renewing knowledge, and as a key strategy of resisting the downgrading of the profession. The state therefore put into place incentive policies, regularly issuing calls for projects and generously financing architects and researchers. These policies came at a time in which the architects and researchers were already struggling with the architectural object, and demanded the setting up of a framework for an 'architectural research', a task primarily directed to sociologists.

CORDA (Comité de la Recherche et du Développement en Architecture [Committee for Research

and Development in Architecture]) was founded on the 10th of February 1972, following a directive of the Minister of Cultural Affairs, Jacques Duhamel, expressing the wish that architecture 'embrace research which presents rigour in its methods, wholesomeness in its demands and is efficacious in its results'. This was the founding moment. At that time, Philippe Boudon, Bernard Lassus, Nicole and Antoine Haumont as well as Henri Raymond participated in the preliminary discussions. While the work of Henri Lefebvre, via his students - including Henri Raymond, Nicole and Antoine Haumont, already mentioned above - would clearly mark the start of architectural research, his great rival, Paul-Henry Chombart de Lauwe, was held out of the way. In a biographical interview with Thierry Paquot in the 1990s, de Lauwe stressed the existence of many disagreements with Lefebvre (and sometimes even invoked the 'theft' of concepts): 'two parallel routes which never had the opportunity to rejoin'.[2] Moreover, he has remarked with some bitterness that he had been deliberately sidelined from the introduction of humanities in architectural schools after '68: 'the architects of the Communist Party were generally opposed to me, like certain researchers of the non-communist left, not because of my political ideas, but under the influence of two or three amongst them who have spoken nonsense about my so-called functionalism or humanism'.[3]

The creation of CORDA arose from the initial decision of Edmond Michelet, Minister for Cultural Affairs, in December 1969, to put in place an architectural research sector integrating the institutions concerned.[4] As a result, a ministerial commission presided over by mathematician André Lichnerowicz[5] was charged with elaborating propositions, submitted in 1970 and spelled out in an official memo in 1971 (the official foundation of CORDA). Supported by the new Institut de l'environnement [Institute of the Environment], created in 1969 around several former members of the Bauhaus in Ulm, Claude Schnaidt the most prominent among them, CORDA began to function with a certain administrative flexibility. It thus contributed to creating an 'environment' for researchers, embracing, in numerous occasions, foreign experts and exchanges, translating fundamental works, aiding the publication of research and publishing a specialist journal, and last but not least, supporting, in collaboration with the Plan Construction,[6] architectural experimentation and its evaluation.

The year 1974 marks therefore a turn for French research with the launch of CORDA's first general call for tenders, aimed at specifying and outlining the field of the nascent architectural research.[7] The call was articulated in four sub-programs: theory, epistemology, education and architecture; operational processes and architectural conception; the integration of architecture in its environment; the system of production by social users of architecture. The experts solicited to select the research projects included Joseph Rykwert and Manfredo Tafuri, as well as personalities external to the proper architectural environment such as Michel de Certeau. 1974 is also the year in which an important seminar took place, 'Histoire et théories de l'architecture' ['History and Theories of Architecture'], at the Institut de l'environnement. In the columns of the 'AMC' journal,[8] Olivier Girard, employing irony, summarises rather faithfully the problems that already fracture this nascent universe:

Success is so distant and yet so close in the competition. Work can be communicated, but much remains unsaid. Attention! Who will replace the demiurge-architect? The historian or the semiotician? The sociologist somewhat misses the point. At the Parisian level, and in veiled words, the combat regarding the heritage of the architecture of May '68 endures. The lawyer brought the whole family together. After the exile years '69-'70-'71 it is for everybody a return to the elitist abode. And the hopes for integration at the University have a new figurehead: 10-15 years after the Sorbonne, the

Beaux-Arts discovers LACAN.

Does one accept, following Olivier Girard, 'the death of the architectural avant-garde, to prepare the advent of an avant-garde about architecture'? But instead of an institute combining the teams, dispersion was preferred, with the scattering of teams of researchers within the educational collectives of the young Unités pédagogiques (UP) created in December 1968, and primarily within the Parisian UP 1, 3, 6 and 8. Contractual research was thus the solution for this disintegrated space of knowledge.

'Doing science'

Understandably, the texts of the first calls for tenders were premeated by this wish 'to do science' and by a symmetrical resentment of the feebleness or supposed failure of the architectural 'concepts', of the lack of rigour of certain borrowings from other disciplines. Subsequently, the guiding text that opened the second call of 1976, was explicitly named 'Des concepts rigoureux et de préférence architecturaux' ['Rigorous and preferably architectural concepts'], and was presented as a 'call for what is necessary to carry out, in any domain, a substantial research'. Here, the 'vague' concepts or, once more, the borrowings that are rarely 'sufficiently reflected and argued'[9] are deplored. From its very first call for tenders - which resembled a guide for the diligent-little-researcher - CORDA already insisted on the elaboration of concepts ('one says elaboration and not just definition') and took care of the disassociation of 'the scientific concept (or object), and the ordinary concept (or the empirical object)' by encouraging the candidates to 'overcome the obstacle that is constituted precisely by concepts and objects of common language (and common sense)'.[10] It could hardly be more explicit about a proclaimed requirement of 'scientificness' which here essentially subscribes to the Bachelardian ideal of epistemological rupture (which was, after all, the explicit basis of 'architecturology', the structuralism-inspired project carried out by Philippe Boudon) and 'catches up' with the 'logical' and 'scientific' revolt which, paradoxically, was associated with the symbolic revolution of May '68.

The first teaching program of the UP6, for example, launched in July 1969, was dominated by numerous and dense courses in construction and humanities. These courses were convincingly articulated, referring precisely to the scientific ideal in order to justify the refusal to teach architectural design.

A constituted architectural knowledge does not exist at the moment; what exists is only fragmented knowledge. A scientific approach that allows the integration of the different theoretical knowledges in the project does not exist either. At this moment, it is impossible, therefore, to have specific teaching in design [...] *the task of architecture teachers will no longer be only the transmission of a certain professional 'know-how' (corresponding to the practice in the design studios) but to carry out a research about the problems of design starting from a scientific basis.*[11]

Q.E.D... The guidelines of the first calls for tenders express the difficulties of dealing with the idea of independence; an identity quest that in its extreme forms of expression may even be called pathological. Thus, CORDA's fourth call for tenders (1980) - which in the meantime had become the Secrétariat de la recherche architecturale [Secretariat of Architectural Research] - included both expressions of approval[12] and the first critical reports on the beginnings of architectural research, notably with regard to linguistic analogy. The call expressed the regret that architecture theory still seems to fall short of the hypothetical epistemological rupture which was supposed to found it, after having successively yielded to the modes of 'evolutionism borrowed from biology, to the theory of perception borrowed from Gestalt psychology, to the cultural models inherited from anthropology and sociology, and to the linguistics'. And it affirms anew 'the need of

architectural teaching to be founded on consistent knowledge' in order to surpass the 'impressionistic discourses copied from other disciplines', knowing that 'the most urgent problem of architecture theory' remains 'its capacity to formulate its own proper concepts'.[13]

Some tormenting or even existential doubts are thus expressed, correlated to the wish 'to do science'.[14] Besides, since the very first call for tenders of 1974, it is possible to identify an equivocation which directs certain architect-practitioners to pretend that their own conceptual work is itself research. A first call for projects stressing that a research should be incorporated in a vast field of reference (hence beyond strict questions of personal nature or of opportunity) should depart from a 'problematique', and has to generate results that can be extrapolated: notably, it has to challenge 'the particular importance that [in the milieu of architects] is given to the notion of studies carried out with a view to future realisation (situated or not), the demands of a client (at least potential client) and above all concerning an empirical object as much as an abstract one (space)'.[15] And in 1980, after several years of efforts and three calls for tenders, it was still necessary to repeat that research is 'distinct from material production' and that it does not 'directly compete with it as such'.[16] It is difficult to escape this aporia... and we are still faced with the same conundrum in 2007, for the worse and (sometimes) for the best.

Architecture and social science: a policy of action?

What has happened in the meantime to social sciences and to sociologists? After all, their arrival in architecture was long-awaited but soon disappointing, without doubt disappointing because the expectations were too high. In 1974, CORDA's first call for tenders specified that 'many young architects expect from the fourth sub-program, "Système de production et usages sociaux de l'architecture" ["System of production and social usages of architecture"], a renewal or an enrichment in the preparation and in the exercise of their profession';[17] by the end of the 1970s, the relationship was already dissipating. Only a few years beforehand, the contribution of sociologists had been perceived as a way to respond to doubts about the status and the very condition of the architect; increasingly, several sociologists discerned a desire to escape into the sociological discourse: a desire to flee from the responsibilities of architects and from the risk of the project.

In their own respective ways, the sociologist Henri Raymond and the architect Bernard Huet, these two 'companions of interdisciplinarity', have stipulated, when interviewed in the mid-1990s, the content of this turn and how it disappointed those searching to establish the junction between architecture and sociology. Huet surely recalls the 'abuse', but also a symmetrical 'reaction', 'just as stupid, as this infatuation and appeal en masse to the sociologists', generating a situation 'very difficult for both parties'. He accused the social sciences of having 'changed the object a little' and of not having 'exhausted the object they had commenced to explore', and consequently, having 'confined themselves, at a given moment, to themselves'. Meanwhile, 'among the people who were more open to architecture, some have completely lost their identity and have little by little become hybrids, neither architects, nor quite sociologists, somewhat a historian, etc'. This disillusion affected many architects as well, 'withdrawing into the practices of the Project', undoubtedly 'because the questions had been incorrectly posed'. But, to conclude, 'something is now over': 'now, an architect no longer makes a Project and pretends to ignore ... not the user, because he [the architect] still ignores him ... but he cannot pretend to substitute himself for the user nor for the project manager. This type of architect no longer exists', said Huet.[18]

Henri Raymond, on the long road towards architecture,[19] recalled with nostalgia the beginnings of UP8, 'a time in which intellectual production had the upper hand over project production', situating the 'fracture at the moment in which Ciriani enters the School, following some aberration of the managers, the architecture professors!'. Ciriani therefore 'literally demolished the School because he understood with his ruse, with his viciousness, it must be said, that the period would be one for Studios, for the Project, for the charismatic architect, for the master, the chief, etc. So, all this was smeared with a humanist vaseline about which I will not go into further detail as it is not worth the effort... All this, naturally, in the name of man, of progress, etc. But at the end, well, vaseline is vaseline, and it is a fact that Ciriani has concretised, not produced, but crystallised the architects' wish to make projects, something Bernard Huet, at the time, did not do. Therefore, in a certain sense, the story of the UP8 is nothing other than the rather explicit story of contradictions in the field of architecture between 1970 and 2000'. A decade after having granted us this interview, Raymond does not hesitate to complete the assault in an autobiography that he recently published: 'Ciriani is the prototype of the architect totally incapable of understanding, for example, that people prefer really dumb buildings over his type of realisations, simply because the sight of these buildings reassures them. […] one should teach the architect not to annoy the world.'[20]

These two interviews describe a general turn;[21] it is not a coincidence that this turn paralleled the complete self-obliteration of political activism: the numerous retrospective testimonies that we have collected suggest that the sociologists have indeed been assimilated, more or less explicitly, to the leftist universe of the French architects-intellectuals. Perhaps, with the mourning of the loss of militant hopes, this generation had suddenly understood that it had real difficulty in affecting the social; moreover, this generation realised that it was a great hubris to believe that it had such power - precisely what it contested in the positions of some of its predecessors, Le Corbusier to the fore! Subsequently, sociologists appeared as 'obstructionists' and no longer as collaborators, resources or supports. Similar to the leaders of the former sectarian groupuscules, often described by witnesses as repressing personalities, possessing a powerless severity and a sterile dogma, the sociologists were depicted as an 'obstacle'. It was a chronological coincidence, surely, that the arrival of the social sciences at architectural schools preceded by a few months the 'events' of '68, but a significant coincidence because the witnesses willingly associated the sociologist with the ideological line and idelogical censureship, and with the perpetual call to militancy.

Bernard Huet, regretting this burden, spoke of a 'misunderstanding', 'because the architects awaited their salvation by sociology, and the sociologists, in return, were tempted to accept a discourse in practice even though they had always forbidden themselves to do so!': 'the sociologists, like many people at the time, could not support the demiurge side of the architects'; 'unfairly to many of the architects', 'they accused in fact the architects of being accomplices, even though they were not responsible for all the policies taken... '. That said, while 'the average sociologist passed his time in teaching a lesson to the architects', the accusation of the architect-accomplice (of association with Power, with Capital, with the technocracy and with the triumphant multinationals) has hence not been only the privilege of sociologists. But it remains plausible that certain sociologists, eagerly addressing such a hot 'object' as this milieu preoccupied by self-analysis, were tempted to simply look for what they already wished to find there: the critique that sociology had already begun to formulate, repeating the discourse of disdain and the 'self-hatred' that - a part of - the profession already held, reinforcing therefore the effect of censure. This is clearly manifested in the

first publications at the time on the 'profession' of architects, including a special issue that the journal 'Esprit' dedicated to those doubts and questions.[22] Paul Chemetov,[23] who described himself accurately as a forerunner (in the professional practice within the AUA rather than in his side-activity of teaching) of the embracement of sociology, noted this drift off-course. From a shared position that 'architecture cannot be nourished within architecture alone', there remained little after '68; 'something entirely different has happened' - the human sciences have 'erupted not as substantial nourishment for architecture, but as hate of architecture'.

I was in the Plan Construction [of which he was first counsel, then, in 1982, vice-president] *and most humanities that were included* [in the Plan] *hated architecture, hated the risk it represents... Philosophically, architecture, in the Popperian sense, is a figure at risk, a fallible figure. That does not mean that it is always bad and erroneous...* [...] *architecture is nothing but an experience, a practice, but an essential one for making the City. The Project is a fundamental tool for making the City - the Project, with its risks, rather than the statistical attitude. Sociology is very good. I am pro anthropology; I am in favour of everything... But, at a given moment, one must construct!*

Were there two views, completely different though directed at the same object, architecture, two views that cohabited without encountering one another? Could these two views be represented by the two readings of Pessac, one articulated by the architect Philippe Boudon,[24] the other, separated by only a few years, by the sociologist Jean-Charles Depaule?[25] The first reading, from the postmodern perspective of the 'open work', noted the success of Le Corbusier's neighbourhood and supported all the appropriations and reformulations which had taken place, the second underlined the failure of an architecture rapidly transformed by dissatisfied inhabitants.

Disillusion or integration?

The nadir of this story, finally, is that following numerous disappointments, even the formerly zealous partisans of the arrival of sociologists finally returned to more distrustful and sceptical positions towards the contribution and the role of sociologists within the teaching of architecture. And it is even more than distrust or scepticism that Christian Devillers expressed in 1992 in an article published in the issue of 'L'Architecture d'aujourd'hui' dedicated to Henri Ciriani, a point of view 'Sur l'enseignement de l'architecture' ['On the Teaching of Architecture'].[26] The presence of these 'exterior' disciplines, Devillers claimed, was merely a fashion which did not require sustenance. He further discerned 'one of the main causes of the current malaise of architectural education' in 'the absurd egalitarianism' of the pedagogical responsibility. Pierre Granveaud, an admirer of Bourdieu-Passeron's 1964 'Héritiers',who introduced Bourdieu and Passeron to the Beaux-Arts before '68, and who was for a long time active within the 'Cahiers de la recherche architecturale', also returned during the course of an interview to those misunderstandings without placing the blame on the sociologists alone: having started his studies in the 'unconscious consciousness of a young man of eighteen, for me, it was the ideal craft that mixed art and society: how was this mixture achieved and for whom?'.[27] This sentiment was 'quite shared' at the time, he recalled, noting especially that all those questions were 'neither placed on the table, nor studied'; 'therefore, I think that it was what we wanted'. That said, he too evoked the experience of 'fascination' lived 'with all the spontaneity of '68, where, in the small schools, the masters had to disappear as masters', 'all architects are nitwits, all the professors are nitwits, etc. Therefore, one opens the path to others... ':

I *think, to conclude, that this entry* [of the human sciences into architecture], *that could have been very beneficial, has not been so, in my opinion. I have the feeling that it had instead damaged the*

teaching of architecture as such - and the teaching of the risk that the project represents - during a long period. All this, in order to return to the project, but in its least satisfactory form with the centre stage given to the most formal projects possible, without a reflection on foundation, on necessity... There were in these schools, all of a sudden, people who did sociology for sociology, linguistics for linguistics, informatics for informatics... these teachings were constituted in autonomous sections, all, to my feeling, making weak sociology, weak informatics, weak history, etc. And that is why the School of Architecture, it seems to me, has to be focused on the fabrication of space, of the project.

That being so, as Huet signalled in his conversation, it is equally necessary to recall that this sociological knowledge has been integrated as a competence by a generation, as a 'determining influence', in the architectural practice, notably in the conception of dwelling.

Completely integrating this knowledge into his conception of a project - in his habitus as it were - the architect would have forgotten sometimes to question it. Olivier Girard recognised this,[28] signalling a reciprocal retreat of everyone into his traditional domain:

At the moment the architects allowed themselves a certain autonomy of thought, they [the sociologists] *no longer had, it seems to me, much to offer.* [...] *Finally, this first contribution would nonetheless have lasted for ten years, well... Good. They* [the sociologists] *have become a bit repetitive. They wanted to have recourse to outdated statements. The habitat pavillonnaire* [the suburban house]*, the reflection on domestic usage, on domestic social usage, on the place of the house - the architects have integrated this, and then, well, this always remains very important, but it is now a given. One knows this. One works on this when making dwellings. And I believe that they have not really continued working by starting from the way in which architecture evolved in reaction to this first contribution on usage. Therefore, they have all, to a certain extent, gone back to their roots.*

In fact, while discussing practice and construction, a good number of architects of this generation have realised that stacking cells, with a front and a rear, a dissociated private and public realm, resolved none of the urban problems, and that a good dwelling, well-conceived but isolated, was only an ineffective palliative. Additionally, a paradox was created: it is precisely at the moment that the threshold in particular and the intermediate spaces in general have disappeared from the realities of the French ZUPs (Zone à urbaniser par priorité [Zone Designated for Priority Urbanisation]), at the moment that the boundaries of the private home have been neglected, at the beginning of the 1970s, that the terms for designating these transitional spaces have proliferated so much in the architectural theory enriched by the contributions of the social sciences.[29]

It could also be suggested that architects welcomed the sociologists when they were confronted with crucial problems, with the downgrading or even the survival of their profession, and once these problems were partially and temporarily solved, the architects became disinterested, or started avoiding the sociologists, like bad memories, preferring, for example, the company of philosophers and aestheticians who gave a meaning to the buildings that they had begun to realise, and who spoke about their work and not about the usage or such trivial questions... Bad memories that also break the silence, not to say the *omerta*, that veils today in France the adhesion of a number of architects of that generation to an 'architectural postmodernism' as it was defined during the 1970s, a moment embodied by the contribution of sociologists to the recent history of architecture. Certain sociologists, though disparate in their interests, do not repress today the memory of this formal furrow ploughed in common with the architects.

Marion Segaud, a close disciple of Henri Raymond, recalled, in a 2007 text about her forty-year experience in teaching and diverse cooperations, that 'the anthropology of space in France had accompanied the postmodern movement and its declared aim to contest Internationalism by returning to the local dimension, as well as taking taste into account, and returning to the common sense'.[30] Finally and more trivially, the historian of practices and usages of dwelling Roger-Henri Guerrand has brought up,[31] somewhat bitterly (like numerous other teachers of history or the human sciences who had worked within architecture schools), that in a general sense, as they are absorbed by their studios, the architects simply put an end to their reading effort:

The accumulating [research] *reports have served no one, except for certain sociological tribes... there is the report and there is the communication of the report. You know well that architects don't read. Some do read, but for the most part they don't. Intellectuals are rare amongst architects. They don't know how to write and they don't read, just like artists. When painters speak about their paintings, they speak monstrous nonsense. One can never grant credibility to the discourse of painters about their work - it does not hold. For architects, it's practically the same. People like Huet are very rare.*

Bernard Huet explained this withdrawal of architects from the Project - acknowledging that he no longer knows precisely what the sociologists working within his School teach - by the difficulties encountered in the research posed by 'interfaces', by elements of mediation between sociological knowledge and the Project. And it was up to the architect to propose some trajectories throughout this interview:

- That the sociologists are not only situated on the side of the social demand, but especially between command and demand;

- That one questions, in a general manner, the form within the framework of diverse social phenomena, since the essence of a society consists also in producing forms: social, legal or aesthetic;

- That one privileges history as an ideal transversal instrument to incorporate sociological knowledge into architecture;

- That one tries to construct the banal and that the sociologists ceased, before so many others, to be fascinated by non-banality, like Henri Lefebvre 'fascinated by the twaddle of Bofill';[32]

- That one suspends the utopian interest in the new, that one works on the window of the bathroom or the autonomous technical installations rather than on the introduction of demotics;

- That one attaches oneself at last to the taste of writing a new 'treatise' that would take advantage of sociology teachings, knowing that the Vitruvian categories, if they are set out in the same manner in each era, recover each time different realities and articulate themselves each time differently.

The ferrymen and the points of passage

In the course of this discussion, it becomes clear that while Bernard Huet declared to have lost his illusions, he has not lost interest in the contribution of the social sciences in general and sociology in particular. Thanks to this vivacity and this never-diminished curiosity (no matter what he has said about this himself), Huet exercised a true influence on the majority of the teachers coming from humanities with whom he has worked alongside throughout his career. This was well known, and Henri Raymond confirmed it in the autobiography cited above. Another 'disciple', but unrecognised or at least not yet officially acclaimed, the great demographer Hervé Le Bras, abundantly admitted his debt to Huet throughout a series of biographical interviews that he recently granted to the young sociologist Julien Ténédos. This friendship began in

Vincennes, the 'experimental university', the intellectual crossroads of the moment, where Jacques Lichnerowicz, the son of the mathematician whom we evoked at the beginning of this article, followed courses like many of his study-comrades in architecture. Le Bras, a graduate of the polytechnique seduced by the social sciences, was invited to Vincennes by the mathematician Marc-Paul Schutzenberger. Le Bras thus taught informatics 'without having at his disposal one single computer', introducing the teaching of music and informatics, law and informatics, art and informatics, 'in summary all that already existed *and informatics*'.[33] And it was Jacques Lichnerowicz who invited him one evening to meet Huet, who was at that time 'founding an architecture school on the ruins of the former Beaux-Arts and who was looking for a mathematician to take care of the teaching in the future school'. Associate Professor at the beginnings of the UP8, Le Bras discovered 'a complete discipline demanding remarkable capacities for synthesis'; he was interested to the extent of being prepared to consider 'becoming an architecture student'. And then he developed a friendship with Huet and Albert Flocon 'who have showed me the importance of spatialisation and the multiplicity of representations'; he put together research projects and discovered a very open environment, open and curious because of the uncertainties that still traverse it:

As the schools of architecture depended on the Minister of Culture and not on the one of National Education, the teaching methods were far more free. I gave, for example, a course on the means of verifying whether reality could exist: the students had to prepare the plans of a device which would allow approaching reality and fabricating it. Some would make a dark room, some Foucault's Pendulum, others would learn to calculate with an abacus. The inspiration for such teachings came directly from the Bauhaus; Albert Flocon-Mentzel, one of the last surviving Bauhaus students, was part of the team. I followed a course with him on interlaces and hexaflexagons, these curious sets relevant as much to art as to maths. [...] *These four years showed me that science was produced in the midst of an informal network of initiates that had nothing in common with the heavy hierarchies, the commissions and committees, the small leaders and other presidents of current institutions. The natural hierarchy connected me with Chomsky via Schutzenberger, to Kandinsky via Flocon, to Louis Kahn via Huet.*[34]

So here they are, the ferrymen but also the 'interfaces', whose disappearance Huet regretted even more, these susceptible points of passage in assuring the transition of knowledge from the social sciences to the architectural discipline. And this limit of hypothetical 'interfacing' with the Project was far from concerning only sociology. In the interview dating from 1995, and especially in the one dedicated more particularly to teaching (1996), Huet in fact reproached the disciplines that were supposed to serve architecture:

- Engineers who did not give the means to transfer knowledge to architects, turning around the object without ever entering it;

- Sculptors who preferred making 'installations' in the corridors of the School rather than learning to handle colours and drawing from models;

- And finally, in a manner perhaps even more incisive because it touched one of his own domains of preference, art historians who taught the history of architecture, stigmatising the disastrous influence of private turfs and 'disciplinary lobbies'.

Roger-Henri Guerrand mentioned pure and simple 'abductions' by sociologists and people from humanities in general, obtaining power and appropriating the architectural object in the void of the foundation ex nihilo of the UP, principally outside Paris.[35] The interest did not consist of simply combining disciplines but of achieving a synthesis

of superior quality; Bernard Huet noticed via his experiences the rather quick appearance of a limit and of an artificial discourse 'glued' onto the Project, an artificial discourse which subsisted thanks to its claims of 'cross-fertilisation':

The cultural models, like typology, are nothing; they cannot make architecture, they cannot even make space, they cannot even make an apartment... 'they' create nothing... Therefore, this knowledge has to be accompanied by a work on the objects themselves since, in fact, the Project manipulates objects and is not a simple discourse.

Nevertheless, the time was right for 'theoretical practice', as one said at the time; architectural research and architectural project were supposed to feed one another. A theoretical practice sometimes so literal that it posed new problems. A letter from Anne Hublin, a sociology teacher at UP1, addressed to 'AMC' and published in issue 35 (December 1974) about the project of a group of students of Bernard Huet composed of Druenne/ Leblois/ Moreau/ Depaule for PAN 5 [Programme Architecture Nouvelle],[36] contested the translations and the sometimes 'savage' borrowings of architects in their projects. Consequently, disciplinary and political arguments intertwine, as well as theoretical conflicts within the milieu of sociologists close to architects:

Architecture consumes more and more sociology. But which sociology? The sociological demand of the architect is generally limited. One wants sociology on top. Most often, on top of a spatial, morphological, constructive model, already conceived and elaborated into details, a cultural model is placed. That is to say that the gratuitousness of the aesthetic proposal would be substituted by a social foundation. [...]*[T]hus, a new sociological product appeared, very handy for the architects, and well reassuring for all, a new sociological product called the 'cultural model'.* [...] *The disciplinary transpositions certainly constitute an interesting heuristic method. But in any case this conceptual patchwork cannot provide a useful working base for the integration of sociological and architectural interests.* [...] [The cultural model] *plays the role of a machine to conserve social relationships. It is an active reproducer of social relationships. A concrete ideology.* [...] *Are the intellectuals the watchdogs of bourgeois society? Do they work, voluntarily or involuntarily - but objectively - on the conservation and the reproduction of models for a society of exploitation?*

Faulting sociologists, despite everything, for not having sufficiently questioned the way in which their discourse was utilised - if not 'instrumentalised' - blaming them equally for their ambiguities, for their hesitation between a false neutrality and the temptation of prescription, Bernard Huet regretted more profoundly the quality of the exchanges that have characterised an epoch, a moment. He notably regretted his collaboration with Henri Raymond - the summer seminars and the project of developing an 'architectural history of society', considering that these exchanges could only be fruitful within the frame of interpersonal collaborations and mutual interests: 'In general, we were always demanders and we were sent a "sociologist at our service" while there, it was him [Henri Raymond] who had encouraged the presence of architects and attempted to give their story a place in the department of urban sociology in Nanterre. It did not last but I think that it has been very, very important'. The extent to which his thought was marked by his collaboration with Henri Raymond and his mediation with Henri Lefebvre was felt throughout the interview. This influence is evident in the concept of 'cultural models', and also in this idea of 'switching' between command and demand,[37] or even in the references to Pierre Francastel which, although they might have appeared personal, have also been fed by these affinities and this cooperation.[38]

It is the irony of history that the architect Christian Devillers attempted to define this ideal pedagogical

program, this mode of cooperation in 1974, in the first issue of 'Architecture d'aujourd'hui' that Huet directed alone and which was significantly titled 'Recherche + Habitat' ['Research + Habitat']. The definition of type (a notion deified in that period, described simultaneously as an abstraction of spatial properties common to a class of edifices, and especially as a structure of correspondence between a designed or constructed space and the differential values attributed to it by social group) precisely conveys this new synthesis between architecture and social sciences that was welcomed by Devillers.[39] All this in an issue in which Henri Raymond took a large part, subscribing to this fertile logic of mutual contributions. Three years later, in 1977, in an issue of 'Communications', the sociologist picked up the reflection where Devillers had left it, precisely defining this 'substitution' which Huet nostalgically evoked as an uncompleted intellectual project: the type, as structure of correspondence, designates in fact 'the only effective, obvious communication, of which architecture presents us a history: the communication between the principal and the designer'.[40] From there arose Henri Raymond's entire project, consisting of questioning, finally, how this 'necessary substitution that, in a society such as ours, would result in the transposition into architectural space of spatial relationships that are implied by the type, and why this substitution is in certain cases missing?'.[41] And how and why the principal and the architect, though refering to the same thing, 'they do not speak - or rarely do - about the same object'?

The stake effectively was to resolve this profound aporia born out of the common questionings and claims, but if the working program was not able to deliver all the fruitful outcomes that were envisaged, this had to do with the institutionnal conditions. It is in fact evident that the French situation of architectural education, at the margin of the university, has certainly played a role in this, the lack of institutional stability explaining that the exchanges within the universities subsisted only as long as personal collaborations lasted. The Institut de l'environnement, created to reinforce the bonds between the fragmented schools, has nevertheless worked, through its Centre de recherche en sciences sociales on this bringing together of architects and sociologists and undoing certain incomprehensions by the means of seminars or publications. Beginning in 1970, Christian Gaillard and Monique Eleb, for example, carried out a study about the entrance of social sciences into architecture schools, already stressing these limits and incomprehensions in the title 'Le savoir et la provocation' ['Knowledge and provocation'], which hardly diminishes the doubts and difficulties related to this cooperation.[42] The 'Cahiers pédagogiques' regularly reverberated the echo of those attempts. The fifth issue (1975), for example, attempted to clarify the complex notion of 'need', a notion at the very heart of numerous mutual incomprehensions that the architects recalled throughout our conversations, sometimes forgetting they had asked at the time for some 'recipes' that the sociologists refused to deliver.[43]

The sixth issue opened with a triple interrogation which clearly manifests the doubts of the sociologists themselves: 'must one, can one, speak of architecture, and how should one speak about it?'. If a demand is posed to the sociologist, must he then 'restrict himself to the teritorry pre-defined by the architect?'. Can he offer a true contribution and 'not just tricks or diversions?'.[44] In this introductory text composed by Jean-Charles Depaule, the sociologist ends up interrogating himself about the 'imperialist' desires of his discipline and announces his will to construe a 'naive inventory of educational practices' practiced within the UP for several years.[45] Five years later, in a presentation about the education at UP3 [settled in Versailles], the same Depaule still searched for a middle ground: that of architecture as a sociological object, that of a social practice, that of the architectural work replaced each time at the moment of a production process. In brief, searching for a middle ground in order to escape

the false alternative of opposing on one side 'the radical critique prodding the unhappy consciousness of architects and architecture seen as a pure ideological production or a transparent agent for the domination of class',[46] and on the other side the sociologists who have lent themselves 'with application and without too much questioning, to a conception of the role of social sciences in their liberal or technocratic versions, where space is perceived, in an integrating vision, as the immediate equivalence to the needs that those sciences were supposed to render explicit'.[47]

'The piano movers who attempted to push the walls'

Hence it cannot be unilaterally affirmed that the sociologists were themselves not, at a certain moment, interrogated about their educational practices. Nor can it be denied that architects have advanced a certain distance down the road, allowing fertile debates to emerge.[48] In summary, without doubt Huet and many of his colleagues miss the 'wild-west' period of the UP in which everything had to be reconstructed, and the period in which journals such as 'AMC' or 'Architecture d'aujourd'hui' spoke as much, if not more, about the actuality of the schools and of research as about the results of competitions, building sites and inaugurations. In 'Les aventures spatiales de la raison', Henri Raymond's testimony on this cooperation, he recalled with nostalgia the early 1970s when he frequented 'a *milieu* in which the passion for architecture was only equated by the complete negation of all actual possibility of any architecture whatsoever', identifying it with 'piano movers who would attempt to push the walls to let it change place', with students who continually questioned their teachers, including Raymond, 'about our promises, our hopes: to reinvent an architectural education while looking forward to reinventing architecture'.[49] This story continues today: a group of 'young' sociologists, accompanied by some former pioneers,[50] has decided forty years later to set up an annual seminar to reassemble the memory of these sometimes stormy bonds, under the title: 'Des sociologues chez les architectes, 1967-2007: histoire(s) d'une rencontre' ['Sociologists amongst the architects, 1967-2007: history(ies) of an encounter']. It is the inheritance that makes the heir, as Pierre Bourdieu used to say.

Notes

1. See in this context our thesis carried out under the direction of Monique Eleb and Jean-Louis Cohen and published in Éditions Recherches in 2005 under the title *Les architectes et Mai 68*.
2. Paul-Henry Chombart de Lauwe, *Un anthropologue dans le siècle* (Paris: Descartes & Cie, 1996), p. 95; see also pp. 60, 80 and 93-94.
3. Ibid. pp. 198-99.
4. In 1966, a commission of cultural affairs and of artistic patrimony was created around Eugène Claudius-Petit with a think-tank dedicated to architecture.
5. It was at Clermont-Ferrand during the Occupation that Lichnerowicz, guided by Henri Cartan, met Jean Dieudonné, Charles Ehresmann and Laurent Schwartz, the kernel of what would become the collective Nicolas Bourbaki. Since the mid-1950s, André Lichnerowicz had actively participated, with Jacques Monod and Jean-Louis Crémieux-Brilhac and Etienne Bauer of the Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique [Commissariat of Atomic Energy] and close to Pierre Mendès-France, in the group that prepared the colloquium of Caen (1956) which contributed to the revival of French research under De Gaulle. In the mid-1960s, Lichnerowicz participated in the works of the Commission d'étude des enseignements littéraires et scientifiques [Study Commission of Literary and Scientific Education] established by Christian Fouchet to accompany from January 1965 until early 1966 the application of his reform. Other participants included Lichnerowicz's colleagues from the Collège de France Jules Vuillemin and Fernand Braudel - the former would withdraw from the commission after the first meeting - Georges Vedel of the faculty of law in Paris, Robert Flacellière, the

director of the Ecole normale supérieure, and scholars of all disciplines (including young Michel Foucault). Later, from 1975, André Lichnerowicz would be one of the advisors of the publisher Autrement and in particular of the collection 'Mutations', at the side of Jacques Attali, Henri Atlan, Jean-Michel Belorgey, François Bloch-Lainé, Jacques Le Goff, Serge Moscovici, Claude Olievenstein and Joël de Rosnay.

6. Founded in 1971, Plan construction et architecture [Construction and Architecture Plan] has an interministerial vocation, coordinating various research programs on urban development, construction and architecture. Multi-year programmes are implemented through subsidised research projects, field demonstrations and pilot projects, as well as via actions directed at promoting innovation.
7. A call for tenders with significant success: 220 projects were submitted, of which 95 originated from the institutions of architectural education; half of the 50 commissions were received by these institutions. See J.-P. Lesterlin, 'La recherche architecturale', Dossier: recherche scientifique et prospective urbaine, *Urbanisme*, no. 157 / 158 (1977).
8. See *Architecture-Mouvement-Continuité*, no. 34, July 1974.
9. 'Texte d'orientation; recherche architecturale', call for tenders 1976, DGRST / Secrétariat d'Etat à la Culture, Direction de l'Architecture, CORDA, archives EAPV, p. 1.
10. 'La recherche architecturale; texte d'orientation', call for tenders, March 1974, reproduced in *Cahiers de l'a.d.r.i. 1*, no. 3-4, éd. UP1 (October 1981), pp. 53-64, here: p. 60.
11. 'Objectifs des étudiants et enseignants architectes et plasticiens groupés autour de l'appel du 10 janvier 1969', éd. UP6 (July 1969), p. 23.
12. 'A true intellectualisation of the design work'; 'the research has provided an exit route for French architecture from its provincial ghetto'; 'a fertile decade'... See 'Consultation de recherche: théorie et projet architectural', call for tenders 1980, reproduced in *Cahiers de l'a.d.r.i. 1*, n°3-4, éd. UP1 (October 1981), pp. 21-27, here: pp. 21-22.
13. Ibid. p. 21 and p. 24.
14. Thus, this question is absolutely significant: 'can it [architecture theory] be constituted as an autonomous discipline or must it content itself with being a tissue of discourses introduced into the specific field of architecture, but with the concepts borrowed from other disciplines?', ibid. p. 24.
15. 'La Recherche Architecturale; texte d'orientation', p. 55.
16. 'Consultation de recherche: théorie et projet architectural', p. 23.
17. 'La recherche architecturale; texte d'orientation', p. 64.
18. Interview with Bernard Huet, Paris, January 1996.
19. Interview with Henri Raymond, Paris, February 1996.
20. Henri Raymond, *Henri Raymond, paroles d'un sociologue. Vers une histoire architecturale de la société*, conversations with Jean-Pierre Frey (Paris: L'Harmattan, coll. 'Villes et Entreprises', 2006), p. 220.
21. This 'turn' was common amongst teaching architects, but could also be observed in other forms in the planning administration and in the construction industry. We think, for example, of the testimony of Bernard Hirsch, one of the pioneers of Cergy-Pontoise, who opened the chapter in his book, dedicates to sociologists, with this very severe diagnosis: 'Before May 1968 [NB: one can well ask why he chose this date!], the sociologists didn't have the reputation of agitating destructors that they have acquired today [in 2000]. It was, on the contrary, a fashionable corporation and not a single team of urbanism could keep its reputation if it didn't include a set of sociologists'. The problem, as the author notes, is that the expectations have been too high: 'I imagined [...] that [they] would offer a better equilibrium and would replace the moroseness with the joy of life'. Nothing less. See Bernard Hirsch, *Oublier Cergy… L'invention d'une ville nouvelle, 1965-1975* (Paris: Presses de l'école nationale des ponts et chaussées, 2000), Ch. XXVI, 'Relations avec les sociologues', pp. 146-49.
22. See in particular no. 10, 'L'architecte, l'urbanisme et la société' (Paris, October 1969), with contributions by Jacques Lautman, 'L'architecte et l'état', pp. 408-22; Raymonde Moulin, 'Avons-nous besoin d'architectes?', pp. 389-406; Marie-Françoise Fichet, 'Féaux et manda-

rins', pp. 519-26; and Claude Soucy, 'La ville et ses contradictions' ; *Esprit*, no. 10, Paris, October 1969, pp. 503-16.

23. Interview with Paul Chemetov, Paris, October 1994.
24. Philippe Boudon, *Pessac de Le Corbusier* (Paris: Dunod, 1969).
25. J.Ch. Depaule, L. Bourg, P. Pincemaille, 'Pessac', Centre de recherche, d'architecture, de construction (RAUC), unpublished, 1970. For a retrospective report of the works of Jean-Charles Depaule on these questions of popular appropriations, on the 'savages of architecture' or the 'Sunday architects', as he calls them, see, from the same author, 'Savoirs et manières de faire architecturaux: populaires versus savants', in Monique Eleb and Jean-Louis Violeau (eds.), 'Savant, populaire', *Les cahiers de la recherche architecturale et urbaine*, no. 15-16 (Paris: Monum - Éditions du patrimoine, July 2004), pp. 13-28.
26. *L'Architecture d'aujourd'hui*, no. 282 (September, 1992), pp. 9-11.
27. Interview with Pierre Granveaud, Paris, April 1996.
28. Interview with Olivier Girard, Paris, July 1996.
29. This raised the issue of a genealogy of the notion of 'intermediate space' for the architect and anthropologist Christian Moley, one of the protagonists of this French story of relationships between architecture and the social sciences in the aftermath of '68. See Christian Moley, *Les abords du chez-soi, en quête d'espaces intermédiaires* (Paris: Editions de la Villette, 2006).
30. Marion Segaud, *Anthropologie de l'espace. Habiter, fonder, distribuer, transformer* (Paris: Armand Colin, 2007), p. 25.
31. Interview with Roger-Henri Guerrand, Paris, April 1996.
32. It is notably in 'Le temps des méprises' that Lefebvre cites as an example his 'friend' Ricardo Bofill: 'he constructs and he has the imagination of a concrete utopianist. [...] Each in his own way, Ricardo Bofill with the 'Cité de l'espace' and [Constant] Nieuwenhuis with 'New Babylon', turns around this determination of a new unity that would bridge the separation between architecture and urbanism and that would be in the scale on which one is able to work and produce'. See Henri Lefebvre, *Le temps des méprise*s (Paris: Stock, 1975), pp. 246-47. This example has nevertheless left its mark on Lefebvre and ten years later, in December 1986, in one of his last interviews given to an architectural journal, in *AMC* (no. 14 [new series], pp. 6-9), he again returns to it, evoking once more Constant, Bofill and his 'Cité de l'espace' like a dream of totality where space and the social would be finally reconciled through 'something which is neither the free-standing house, nor the accumulation of people in housing estates' (p. 8), briefly evoking the 'megastructure', the old utopian dream of architects.
33. Hervé Le Bras, *Entre-deux pôles. La démographie entre science et politique*, conversations with Julien Ténédos (Montreuil: éditions aux lieux d'être, coll. 'entretiens', 2006), p. 18.
34. Ibid. p. 19.
35. The publication in 1992 of the article of Christian Devillers, cited above, coincided not only with the elaboration of the Frémont report, but also with the first wave of tenureships in more than twenty years. The author worried that due to this 'lobby of exterior disciplines [...] more powerful than ever, and close to the central administration', that 'the actual project of tenureship will place the practicing architects in an inferior institutional position, at risk of remaining dependent on temporary contracts. He therefore did not see any need, and even perceived a danger in giving permanent positions to the teachers that he calls 'exterior'; 'by cutting them from their roots and their academic legitimacy, one grants them a marginal position and a strong probability of sclerosis, all this by giving them perfectly illegitimate power over the institution of architectural education'. Therefore it is necessary 'to give permanent positions only to teachers who cannot receive such positions elsewhere, that is to say teachers in architecture and in the internal disciplines of architecture'.
36. Published in *AMC*, no. 34 (July 1974).
37. In 1986, in the already quoted interview given to *AMC*, Lefebvre outlined the problems posed by the 'immense distance [...] between the social demand [that Lefebvre persisted to see as the demand for a 'new space'] and the command by the authorities' [contenting them-

selves with archaism or technological instrumentality], identifying in this distance the cause of numerous problems with contemporary urban space (p. 7).

38. In 1975, during a study day organised on the 24th of February by the Centre de recherche en sciences humaines (Centre for Research in Human Sciences) of the Institut de l'environnement, Henri Raymond proposed a research program in sociology related to the thinking of Francastel by adapting his work to art and architecture. See Henri Raymond, 'Architecture et société', (pp. 55-60) p. 57, in 'Sociologie-Architecture', *Cahier Pédagogique' no. 6, group 'Sociologie*, (Paris: Centre de recherche en sciences humaines, Institut de l'environnement, 1975).
39. See Christian Devillers, 'Typologie de l'habitat et morphologie urbaine', *Architecture d'aujourd'hui*, no. 174 (July-August, 1974), pp. 18-22. In this article, Devillers recalls his graduation from UP8, demonstrating once again the fertile symbiosis that took place at that moment between schools, research and journals, including the project of disseminating research work that Huet undertook at *L'Architecture d'aujourd'hui*.
40. Henri Raymond, 'Commuter et transmuter: la sémiologie de l'architecture', *Comunications*, no. 27, 'Sémiotique de l'espace', (Paris: Seuil, 1977), pp. 103-11, here: p. 106. On the following page, Raymond defined the 'commutateur' ['switcher'] as 'the term which institutes, at the commanding side, a certain set of specific social - spatial relations and which mutually institutes, at the side of the architect, specific homologous relations'.
41. Ibid. p. 111.
42. Christian Gaillard and Monique Eleb, 'Le savoir et la provocation', pp. 13-26 in *Espaces des sciences humaines. Questions d'enseignement en architecture*, (Paris: Centre de recherche en sciences humaines, Institut de l'environnement, 1974).
43. In her foreword, Monique Eleb noted that 'the classic demand addressed to humanities, as it is habitually formulated, implies that one can establish an exhaustive list of needs and that it is possible to directly translate them to the level of the architectural conception'. This question provoked an uneasiness amongst sociologists who'don't have an immediate answer' and who refuse to move towards a solution. Knowing that 'if the notion of need is inadequate to give an account of what should be addressed by other notions, we only replace the problem'... In brief, one has anyway difficulties to avoid these aporias and incomprehensions... without challenging the notion of 'need', one cannot escape the aporia (pp. 3-4). See Monique Eleb (ed.), *Besoin(s). Analyse et critique de la notion*, 'Cahier pédagogique', no. 5, group 'Psychology and Space' (Paris: Centre de recherche en sciences humaines, Institut de l'environnement, 1975, second semester).
44. Jean-Charles Depaule, 'Avant-propos', in 'Sociologie-Architecture', *Cahier Pédagogique*, no. 6, group 'Sociologie' (Paris: Centre de recherche en sciences humaines, Institut de l'environnement, 1975), pp. 5-6. In this issue, Jean-Claude Barthez also examines this notion of 'need' and 'the reticence of sociologists to venture into the minefield created by the demands of architects', remaining, in the best case, mere 'voyeurs' of architecture, and in the worst case, critics... In conclusion, Barthez holds onto the 'cultural model' as a possible way out, as 'concept-intermediary'. See J.Cl. Barthez, 'Les sociologues et la demande des architectes', ibid. pp. 7-16, here: pp. 12-13.
45. A series of seminars were held throughout the year 1976-77 at CERA (heir to the Institut de l'environnement), under the direction of Depaule and Mazerat, addressing the controversial notion of 'cultural models', preparing the ground for a publication of CERA in spring 1977.
46. 'Radical critique' that was, by the way, the natural penchant of Krier and Culot, the architects who directed the *Bulletin des AAM*, the journal in which Depaule published this text.
47. Jean-Charles Depaule, 'La sociologie dans l'enseignement de l'architecture', *Bulletin des archives d'architecture modern*, no. 17 (1980), pp. 17-21, here: p. 17. Depaule reveals here his references, including the analysis of Greek space by Jean-Pierre Vernant, the Kabyle house by Pierre Bourdieu, the work of Henri Raymond with the research on the suburban house as a system of differences, as well as the book *L'enfant et la vie familiale sous l'ancien regime* by Philippe Ariès.
48. A good illustration of such a debate can be found in

the same issue of *AAM*, in the annex to the article of Depaule (pp. 20-21), in a debate between the teachers-researchers at Versailles (Catherine Bruant, Jean Castex, Jean-Charles Depaule, Philippe Panerai, Michèle Veyrenche).

49. Henri Raymond, *L'architecture, les aventures spatiales de la raison* (Paris: C.C.I. / Centre G. Pompidou, coll. 'alors:', 1984), pp. 12-13.
50. Véronique Biau, Christophe Camus, Olivier Chadoin (coord.), Isabelle Grudet, Gérald Houdeville, François Lautier, André Sauvage, Jean-Louis Violeau. The call for contributions can be found on the website of Laboratoire Espaces du ravail (LET / ENSA Paris-La Villette), www.let.archi.fr.

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Biography

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Notes on Narrative Method in Historical Interpretation

K. Michael Hays

I have learned to think of History in a Marxist sense as comprising a constant becoming of modes of production. The present is a site contested by past and future histories, the now being a set of traces of the past and anticipations of future presents in our social structure. This notion of History is even more emphatic in the Althusserian-Lacanian sense of the Real as that which can never be known, has no presence, but nevertheless is at the same time 'produced' by the Imaginary and the Symbolic. History is the black hole you can never see but which nevertheless controls the wobbles and trajectories of all the things (like buildings and texts and cities and landscapes) that we historians and theorists care about. History, the becoming of modes of production, is determinant of all representations and how they do their work.

Theory takes history as its subject matter, and there can be no writing of history without theory. The more theory, the more access to history. Theory is the practice that produces concepts and categories to map the Real of History. So the practice of theory will ultimately have to deal with some version of the Imaginary and the Symbolic, since in this schema, these are the orders that attempt to manage and make sense of the Real.

Architecture is a primary exhibit in theorising History because architecture is the most complexly contested and negotiated of all cultural representations and productions. Issues of perception, subject formation, language, image, and code are fundamental in the study of the architectural Imaginary and Symbolic. The determinate context of a single building comprises all the technological, economic, juridical, and psychological forces that drive production in the city. And the conflictedly overdetermined claims and demands placed on a building by society - its patrons, its publics, and by the city - are both figured and repressed in its very form. Thus in the careful and close constructions of the historian, architecture appears as a precious index of the social fact, and of History itself.

The role of the historian is not principally to describe buildings or architects, to produce biographies, explications, and specialised commentaries - though we do that, too. The role of the historian is rather to be concerned with the larger conditions on which architectural knowledge and action is made possible: with the multiple agencies of culture in their ideological and historical and worldly forms.

I have come to think of history this way by studying architecture historiography - its great Hegelian tradition and its own critiques of that tradition, not least among which is the work of Manfredo Tafuri. Writers of architecture history since the nineteenth century have attempted to reconcile a materialist understanding of history with the undeniably psychological, experiential effects of architecture. Trying to understand that tradition in turn led me to certain works outside of architecture, especially those of Theodor Adorno, Louis Althusser, and others of a 'Freudo-Marxist' tendency, to use loose shorthand.

And trying to understand that body of work led me to contemporary figures like Fredric Jameson who, necessarily perhaps, also had to confront Manfredo Tafuri. Therefore, while this set of notes may in fact be nothing more than an outline of my own position, they feel to me like inescapable conclusions.

I will suggest here that narrative is the privileged mode of exposition in historiography - of writing history, writing the history of a discipline, a cultural practice, and a medium. I am reminded, of course, that this suggestion appears just after a time when there was much said about that privileged place of narrative, at least of the kind that assumes history is something you can see, be a witness to, be present at. Most famously, Jean-François Lyotard made the interdiction against any grand narrative and against all totalisations. But we can accept Lyotard's criticism of the narratives of legitimation (indeed Lyotard's own account is more of a report of their spontaneous decline than a call for their wilful destruction) and still insist that it is not contradictory to say that critiques of certain narratives can themselves be narratives, just as when Lyotard states that 'every utterance should be thought of as a "move" in a game', his statement is itself a move in a language game. Indeed, it is part of our problematic as historians that we should try to accomplish the almost impossible task of thinking historiography itself as a historical and ideological production in its own right, of thinking the historian as part of the process viewed. This is a task more complicated than any objective apprehension of a merely external kind of structure or influence or bias, such as we sometimes get from some less theoretical practices.

This issue of narrative does not usually concern studies such as small-scale formal analyses of individual buildings or texts, though I think that narrative does leave its traces even on those writing projects. Like critique, narrative practice is transgeneric, which is to say that even synchronic studies are tacitly narrative episodes in a larger story. And even synoptic studies - those that treat an entire career, for example, or an entire group movement as a single project - are in fact condensations of open narrative processes.

A fundamental problem of writing history is to solve the dilemma: Any strictly empiricist account of history is impossible, and architecture can never be understood as simply a copy or reflection of historical conditions. Nevertheless, history is real and architecture is representational (even if not in any straightforward way). Narrative solves this dilemma, at once avoiding any reflection theories of art and problems of verisimilitude and, at the same time, constructing a material basis for architecture's representational function.

We can enumerate a few features of narrative:
1. Narrative is a precondition for dialectical thinking: a sense of necessity, even of necessary failure - of closure, of ultimately irresolvable contradictions - is one of the hallmarks of dialectical thinking that can be conveyed only through narrative. The owl of Minerva takes flight only at dusk.[1] Dialectical interpretation is always retrospective, always tells the necessity of an event, why it had to happen the way it did. To do that, the event must have already happened; the story must have already come to an end. This last may seem obvious but it is important to add that such histories of necessity and of determinate failure are inseparable from some ultimate historical perspective of reconciliation, of some future, of the 'end of prehistory' in Marx's sense. The past has to be written as the determinant of the present so that the present can also be a past for a future.

2. The writing of history can be thought as taking place within a series of cascading levels, which mark a widening out of contexts. First, within the structure of an architectural signifier, the object of study is still construed more or less as the individual building or project, events or situation, with the form as a signi-

fier and an architectural concept as its signified. The architectural sign, then, is the unit made up of these two components. Second, the architectural sign is understood at a higher level as the signifier of a set of concepts that organise our understanding and experience of the architectural sign. We can use Althusser's term and call this a theoretical problematic. The architectural sign together with its theoretical problematic produces and is produced by a particular ideology. That ideology is itself a kind of imaginary map of a socially symbolic field. Perhaps this is not an inaccurate way of understanding the fundamental role played by architecture in Fredric Jameson's notion of cognitive mapping, which may be understood here as the provisional totalisation of an imaginary, ideological form and the social fact that is its ultimate referent. On this view, the ultimate horizon, to return to our previous formulation, is the Real of History itself [fig. 1].

The structure should be read forward and backward at the same time. Which is to say that History is both the unrepresentable absent cause of the 'superstructural' activities such as architecture and cognitive mapping, even as History is produced by the same such Imaginary-Symbolic cultural activities and practices.

3. Such a model of architecture and history is dependent on a perspective that reads the work of architecture against a context or situation reconstructed or rewritten as having latent contradictions, so that the historian then has the ability to interpret a given work of art as a provisional 'solution' to that situation. Implicit here is the construction of a history of architecture in terms of a series of situations, dilemmas, and contradictions, in terms of which individual works, styles, and forms can be seen as so many responses or determinate symbolic acts.

Understood this way, the construal of contexts and situations construed as contradictions is productive in the long run. A contradiction is really a singular substance about which different things can be written, and multiple perspectives generated. It then requires theoretical work to show that the two contradictory things are related - the one implied by the other in some unexpected way. To present architecture as the unexpected symbolic resolution of a conflicted social situation is perhaps the historian's greatest intellectual thrill.[2]

To understand architecture as a symbolic resolution of a social situation suggests that the deep problem of contradiction is representational, which is thus also related to narrative. Contradiction is the step just before representation: The historian shows a situation in a conflicted moment; a response is anticipated and doubt about a possible resolution is raised. This is also where we insist that it is the formal-aesthetic dimension that does social work, that in the very folds of the aesthetic object the social contents are richly operative. Then the historian triumphantly shows how architecture both 'solves' the contradiction (even if the 'solution' is a negative one of sublimating or suppressing the very existence of the contradiction in architecture's form).

I shall refer to my own paper on Mies van der Rohe's Seagram Building as an example. In that paper I argued that Mies's much discussed abstraction should not be understood as an absence of representation or figure, but rather the contrary: it is the achievement of the limit condition of representation at a certain moment in time, the moment of the explosive expansion of consumer culture. Henri Lefebvre articulates for us this new condition as a kind of space that is produced as it is consumed - abstract space. 'Thus space appears solely in its reduced forms. Volume leaves the field to surface, and any overall view surrenders to visual signals spaced out along fixed trajectories already laid down in the "plan". An extraordinary - indeed unthinkable, impossible - confusion gradually arises between space and surface, with the latter determining a spatial abstraction which it endows with a



Fig. 1: The Real of History

half-imaginary, half-real existence.'[3]

My argument in the Mies paper is that the abstraction of Seagram's empty plaza and glass curtain wall is an architectural figure - a symbolic resolution of the contradiction of Mies's desire to maintain the fullness of aesthetic experience and the actual, practical impossibility of aesthetic profundity in the context of total reification. Mies's abstraction of surface is both the consequence and perfect representation of consumer capital and a profound refusal to accept the complete dissolution of the traditional aesthetic experience. I quote myself:

The crucial move of Mies is to pose abstraction as at one and the same time the ultimate achievement of reification - the separation and neutralisation of the full range of experience being the precondition of abstract thought - and a historically new experience, the only possible experience adequate to everything we have lost in reification. Here I circle back to the epigraph with which I began: art must submit to reification in order to preserve the possibility of something more true. What results in the Seagram building is a series of transductions whereby abstraction changes its nature as it passes from the social to the aesthetic and back again. The plaza at Seagram is perhaps the first pulling back from the alienating life of the metropolis, and the assertion of the architectural surface as the support for that space is commensurate with that withdrawal. At this point, however, reification is borrowed back from the social in the form of the volumetric ready-made of the high-rise building and, even more, in the perception of the abstract surface. Then, in a final moment of transfer, reification appears as the experience of abstraction. By producing the abstract, architecture acquires a means to escape that same status, to refuse to become a mere thing among things. Abstraction - the pure sound of the Sirens, the organising absent presence - is the maximal limit of the avant-garde.[4]

4. Within a narrative structure, periodisation is a technique that allows epistemic access to historical differences in a situation, allowing articulation of what can appear as an undifferentiated mass or a bunch of incoherent differences. But periodisation is an initial move, not a final one. We should not think in terms of uniform periods and radical breaks but rather more nuanced shifts, making the placement of the specific work in the historical field every more complex and differentiated.

The case of the Seagram Building is an example of small-scale periodisation. The materials for Mies's optical surface were already present in his early skyscrapers in Chicago. The specific case of Seagram was made possible by a series of events - those related to the emergence of the new apparatus of surface perception, like the television screen, magazine advertising, and large billboards - whose results were seized on and 'detourned' toward specific ends. These events take centre stage only retroactively, and retroactively can be understood as the pre-history of the form that was to follow.

Thus does narrative history involve the narration of the necessity of the outcome. Althusser puts this point in terms of contingency and necessity:

Instead of thinking of contingency as a modality of or an exception to the necessary, one must think necessity as the becoming-necessary of contingent encounters.[5]

5. The technique of dialectical reversal is related both to the perception of necessity and contingency, and to the situational character of narrative. This can take many forms. In the work of Tafuri, for example, it usually takes the form of showing the physical and social city as the Other of the building, then showing that the outside of the practice of architecture itself - understood in an expanded sense as including urbanism and city planning and territorial management - is the vaster totality of the

economic system, the 'last instance', as Althusser put it. So the great European urban projects of the 1920s like the Siedlungen in Berlin, Frankfurt, and Vienna, for example, come up against their other in the seemingly 'extrinsic' obstacles of financial speculation and the rise of property values that ultimately causes their absolute failure and an end to their utopian vocation.

In the Seagram example, the appearance of abstraction is itself a dialectical reversal insofar as Mies's abstraction arises out of what Lefebvre called abstract space and also appears as the negation of the same.

6. The technique of mediation or transcoding is one of the best lessons from theory: to cross or shift an interpretive code or analytic term from one domain to another, testing one against the other, finding the limits of each, causing each to interpret the other. In the Seagram example, surface is the mediating term and figure, which is operative in the popular cultural perceptual apparatus and in the curtain wall, but operative in different ways.

The mediatory function releases unnoticed complicities and commonalities between different items or events that were thought to remain singular, divergent, and differently constituted. Mediating among different discourses has sponsored a rich literature that addresses itself to a whole range of practical issues - the role of the unconscious, the socially constructed body, ecology, the politics of spatial relations, and more.

7. Totalisation is meant to function as a prescription to strive constantly to relate and connect, to situate and interpret each object or event in the contexts and conditions of possibility that enable it and limit it. Of course, this is practically impossible; totalisation must remain an aspiration of the historian, not an accomplishment. The aspiration to totalise leads us back to the problem of representation, for the totalisation is an absent structure rather than something that can be grasped empirically or even analytically. Like History, the totalisation is not available for representation. And yet we must strive to narrate it.

In particular, I have in mind the Sartrean terminological version wherein 'totalisation' is opposed to a hypostatised and inert 'totality' to become the correlate of 'praxis' itself. That is, the reified 'practico-inert' is to totality as praxis is to totalisation, the last being understood as a 'developing activity which cannot cease without the multiplicity reverting to its original statute… The activity attempts the most rigorous synthesis of the most differentiated multiplicity'.[6]

By totalisation I do not mean a normative unity imposed by architecture or the historian on a situation where none actually exists; nor do I mean that the particular must everywhere represent the general. A totalisation is not a unity. I have in mind, rather, a discontinuous finitude in which seemingly discreet and compartmentalised events and images are made to relate to one another in concrete and material ways, or better, are made through a mediating figure to be seen again as relating to one another, since they were never really separate to begin with.

We can think of the early Miesian plan grid and reiterative steel frame, together with the serialised facade as the spatial figure adequate for an entire range of modern experiences, from the standardisation and mass production of Henry Ford's assembly lines, to Fredrick Taylor's labour processes and workshop organisations, to the reification of Georg Lukács's modern labourer. In the Seagram building that grid is morphed into an optical surface, a new mediating figure that also includes the surface of the billboard, the surface of television, the surface of abstract space itself. This example suggests a way in which an architectural figure can carry the idea

of a real social situation within itself as a constant reminder, like a phantom limb that has been surgically amputated but nevertheless emits a constant reminder of its non-existence.

We must recognise here, of course, that through its very success in so modulating and focussing our perception of the situation, the totalising process also survives in the form of reified categories that should be understood as an obstacle to spontaneity and heterogeneity. Perhaps any totalisation must end up being transformed into its own representation, as Sartre said, 'just as the unity of a medallion is the passive remnant of its being struck.'

8. I have listed a few of the attributes of narrative method. I will close by saying something about the particular form I believe that narratives must take. While it is certain that new modes of analysis and exposition should be constantly explored, the fundamental work of the historian is writing.

I would like to attribute to the writing of history a certain programmatic difficulty. First, writing should sink itself into the unnaturalness of the work of writing history, of the hermeneutic situation, of the historicity of the historian and the written-ness of historiography. Of all the techniques, this is perhaps the most difficult: thinking historiography as a historical and ideological production in its own right. It is also a matter of thinking the positive side of ideology as well as the negative, at the same time, of understanding that ideology makes things possible as well as closes things down. Second, history should be written so that something - some final resolution, some mystery - remains something out of reach. We should be suspicious of a thesis that de-mystifies too much, that makes the architecture under analysis look easy. The reader should be asked by the writing, instead, to constantly think another side, an outside, an external face of the apparent concepts, which can never be visible or accessible but which we must vigilantly reckon into our sense, in the form of effects. This requires sentences that strive to hold contradictory concepts together.

To put it a different way, the practice of writing I am proposing would be a force that thickens the situation, slows thinking down, that keeps something of the human mystery that stands opposed to a text that is too packaged and easy.

It is at this point that we should also recognise that no method or tool of interpretation should be discarded offhand. In other words, the least interesting way to intervene in a debate over techniques of interpretation is to declare one of them right and the others wrong. Almost any technique has some local validity, some possibilities as well as limitations, and depending on the project, a variety will have to be tried out and combined. What is most needed is openness and flexibility of mind, and generosity of spirit.

Notes

1. G.W.F Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, trans. by S.W. Dyde (Amherst, N.Y: Prometheus, 1996). An excellent account of historical necessity as theorised by Fredric Jameson is Steven Helmling, *The Success and Failure of Fredric Jameson* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2001).
2. Claude Lévi-Strauss interprets art as such a symbolic resolution. See especially *Structural Anthropology* (New York: Basic Books, 1963).
3. Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, trans. by D. Nicholson-Smith (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1991), p. 313.
4. K. Michael Hays, 'Abstraction's Appearance (Seagram Building)', in *Autonomy and Ideology: Positioning an Avant-Garde in America*, ed. by R. E. Somol (New York: Monacelli, 1997).
5. Louis Althusser, 'Le courant souterrain du matérialisme de la rencontre', in *Écrits philosophiques et politiques*, 1 (Paris: Editions Stock/IMEC, 1994), p. 566.
6. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, trans.

by A. Sheridan-Smith (London: New Left Books, 1976), p. 46.

Biography

K. Michael Hays is Eliot Noyes Professor of Architecture Theory at the Harvard University Graduate School of Design. Hays received his Master of Architecture in Advanced Studies from MIT in 1979, and a PhD at MIT in 1990. He was the editor of the architecture journal *Assemblage* (1986-2000) and of the readers *Oppositions* and *Architecture Theory since 1968*; he has written about Mies van der Rohe, Ludwig Hilberseimer, and Hannes Meyer, as well as contemporary architectural theory.

The Cunning of Architecture's Reason

Mark Jarzombek

Foreword

This paper starts by asking a rather simple question about architecture and its modernity. In what way do we put these two terms together? I will not talk about Modernism-the-style, or about the history of industrialisation, but about the philosophical foundation of the question. When did philosophy define what we call the modern? This is usually answered by pointing to the Enlightenment, and to Reason and its instrumentalities, in science and capitalism (usually perceived in a negative way, if we can think perhaps of Theodor Adorno). Translated into architecture, this approach leads through Karl Marx to a separation between capitalist architecture and an architecture from below, on the assumption that the latter is more authentic - and here we could think of Henri Lefebvre. Manfredo Tafuri, who also proposed a theory of architecture out of a critique of Reason, pointed to the emergence in the late eighteenth century of a utopian impulse that together with a crisis of subjectivity redefined architecture in a way that would come to a head with the modernist movement.[1]

I will stay within the framework of the Enlightenment, but would like to commence with another type of Reason, namely with Hegel's cunning Reason, a starting position that has the advantage that Hegel deals extensively with architecture, allowing us to trace the detailed activities of this cunning in regard to architecture. To fit the philosophical needs, architecture had to be thoroughly redefined in relationship to then current humanist models, but once architecture's position had been established philosophically, Hegel demoted architecture in the name of the dialectic's higher cultural aspiration. Architecture, a type of victim of the cunning of Reason, was given metaphysical content, but not a metaphysical purpose. In this paper I try to partially deconstruct the modernity that is disguised within this manipulation.

1.

In 1951 in Darmstadt when Martin Heidegger first gave the lecture, 'Bauen Wohnen Denken', the architects in the crowd, Hans Scharoun among them, could hardly restrain their enthusiasm, and when, in 1971, the text was published in an English translation, its success was a foregone conclusion.[2] The excitement it generated - and one cannot deny its lure even today - was based on the rather simple historical fact that this was the first time in over a century that a major philosopher had expressed himself directly on the subject of architecture. Though the sparkle of this philosophical engagement with architecture has waned in recent years, its after-effects are still felt today. It is not important in this respect who may or may not have been influenced by Heidegger. Rather, after Heidegger, *all* architecture, philosophically speaking, underwent a transformation. The question is not how did Heidegger change architectural practice, but what is architecture *as a philosophical project* after Heidegger?[3]

To answer that question, we have to turn to the

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moment when architecture - and more precisely architecture's history - first became a philosophical issue to begin with, namely in Georg Friedrich Hegel's 'Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik' (1832).[4] It could easily be seen in which way Heidegger undermined the Hegelian tradition, but I will argue that instead he brought a type of closure to Hegel on the subject of architecture. What I mean by 'closure' - which has, of course, a specific architectural referentiality - is the subject of this paper since it was Hegel who made the theme of 'en-closure' so central to the question of architecture to begin with. But instead of interpreting Hegel's definition of architecture from the outside in, with the usual pronouncements about the status of Idealism and its remoteness from reality, I will work from inside out to show a sub-text that is, as I see it, a complex prefiguring – though certainly unintentional - of the modern architectural problematic.

2.

It is to be expected, given the time period in which Hegel was writing, that a discussion of architecture starts with a discussion of its beginnings, but these beginnings, for Hegel, are by no means simple, and certainly far more complex than imagining architecture's historical or mythical origins.[5] In fact, long before the chapter on architecture in his 'Vorlesungen', Hegel has engaged the subject of the philosophy, religion and art again and again, to interlace these issues and to avoid at all cost the appearance of 'storytelling'.[6] For this reason, he rejects the argument of Laugier - that 'newfangled French, philosophizing expert', (borrowing some choice words from Goethe) - pointing out that Laugier's claim that ramming 'four sticks in the ground' can in no way rise to the level of true philosophy.[7] He argues that we also have to look past the diverse fields of empirical particulars, and in this he was clearly resisting the archaeological tendencies of the age. And finally, he warns against the tendency to envision man and architecture as separate and distinct, with man, in the name of divinity, exercising his will over the material world.[8] This type of duality presupposes that architecture exists before its true purpose, so Hegel argued, has been determined.

Instead, to get to the true beginnings, we have to look, according to Hegel, not at the concrete world, but at a point in conceptual time where the 'difference between man and building did not yet arise',[9] namely when architecture first served 'to stimulate thought'.[10] He describes this unity as 'riddle-like',[11] for it appears akin to the unity with the divine; that unity no longer exists, however, since the divine has retreated [*zurückgezogen*] from reality, gathering its 'finitude into itself and elevating itself [*sich erheben*]' over baser reality.[12] It is as compensation for this *Negativität*, as Hegel calls it, that the dialectic launches itself on its inimitable course, creating as a consequence the impulse to art and architecture.[13] This conceptual - and a-historical - moment, once it had been established in the minds of mankind does not yield a simple series of art works as one might expect, but a protracted struggle between thought [*Denken*] and Imagination [*Vorstellung*],[14] form [*Gestalt*] and meaning [*Bedeutung*],[15] and interiority and exteriority. The first art 'to break a path' through these entanglements and to attempt at least 'an adequate representation of the God-head', so Hegel argues, was none other than architecture,[16] as it was the first art to attempt to 'purify' the inorganic from its rote materiality.[17] From this beginning, architecture develops into its own sphere, moving from the Symbolic Age to the Classical and then, finally, to the Romantic age, which Hegel equates with Christianity. In this way, Hegel dispatches with the conventional, centuries-old, distinction between theory and practice and elevates architecture into something quite different, namely into a trope for the beginning of mankind's history toward the self-determinant Spirit.

The building type that brings this history to a determining moment is the medieval cathedral, where the enclosure - *Umschliessung* - has been

placed in conceptual alignment with the building's interior.[18] The basic elements of this unification, for Hegel, were, of course, already present in ancient architecture. The Egyptian pyramids were all exteriority whereas the subterranean labyrinths that they also built, all interiority.[19] Even with the Greeks, exteriority and interiority were, according to Hegel, separate and distinct: the agora filled with people, on the one hand, and the temple with its cella, on the other hand. The open was all open and the closed all closed. By the time of the medieval cathedral, however, interiority had become fully architectural. It was no longer perceived as inhabited by the deity alone, but as a 'room for the whole population [*Volk*]'.[20] On the outside, the 'entrance halls and colonnades' that typified early Christian architecture and that cluttered its external image fell away, with the building rising 'freely into the heights',[21] allowing those on the inside, 'a concentration and elevation [*Erhebung*] of their thoughts',[22] an *Erhebung* that corresponds to the demands of the *Geist*. The result is what Hegel calls 'a total enclosure' [*eine totale Umschliessung*] - a world 'made by man and man alone for his worship and his pre-occupations with his inner life'.[23] In the broader scenario of Hegel's philosophy, the cathedral, filled with the pulse of life, serves as the jumping-off point for a discussion of a human interiority, or *Innerlichkeit*, filled with the productions of the Spirit, namely the sculptures, paintings, poems and music that constitute the principal expressions of the Spirit from here on out.

3.

The critical term, *Umschliessung*, or enclosure, appears throughout Hegel's discussion of architecture and is also unique in his text to the history of architecture. Hegel traces what he sees as its historical origins to ancient caves used in cult practices in the form of an enclosing of 'the image of the divine'.[24] Though these caves are pure *Umschliessung*, oriented to the interior with no externality to speak of, they are the dialectical predecessors of the walls and roofs that will eventually define *Umschliessung* in more proper architectural terms.[25] It is no accident that the example Hegel mentions in this context is the Mithra cult where caves were used, so he points out, as the setting for the ritual purification or *Reinigung* of the soul. *Umschliessung*, in other words, has a *philosophical* purpose in the early development of the dialectic that far transcends the need for security.

But unlike the other arts, whose purpose in relationship to the Spirit was defined as obvious, the architecture of *Umschliessung* had a long way to go to find itself. It became, as Hegel phrased it, a *suchende Kunst*, a searching art. The main problem was that externality and internality lay in different geographical and temporal places. But as a gerund, *Umschliessung* ('an enclosing') has no fixed – and as we shall see no predictable - physical attributes, and thus exists as a force, or *Trieb*,[26] that can move from building to building and from material to material in a series of paratactic transformations, from the inside surface of a cave, to the mud and stone walls of the Egyptians, all the way to the refined complexities of the Gothic architectural system. As a gerund, *Umschliessung* also allows Hegel to break with the conventional discourse about the making of a building. There is, however, significantly, no specific craft unique to *Umschliessung*. This allows it to overcome the question of its disciplinarity in so far as it had to shake off its attachment to sculpture. For this reason it only came into its own after the Greeks. But from then on, starting with the Roman basilica, the root relationship between enclosure, interiority, and purification defines the principle narrative of architecture's development until it ends, finally, in the complex forms of the medieval cathedrals.

4.

The gesture of opening the doors of the history of philosophy to architecture turns out, however, to be an ambiguous one, for it becomes clear that even by the time of the cathedrals, architecture had still not achieved a *true* 'free-standing existence', but, as

Hegel clearly states, a mere impression [*Eindruck*] of it, that being all that is required at this particular moment in the development of the dialectic.[27] *Eindruck* is here not a Platonic reduction of metaphysical truth to representation. It is more optimistic and foreshadows the reality to come. Nonetheless, it is still only just a glimpse into the future. As a result, despite the advances one sees with these buildings, their interiors, for Hegel, were still deficient. 'Here there is a sermon; there a sick man is brought in. Between the two a procession drags slowly on.' As a result, 'nothing fills the building completely, everything passes quickly; individuals and their doings are lost and dispersed like points in this grandiose structure.' Worshippers wander around 'like nomads', whereas above them, 'these gigantic constructions rise in their firm structure and immutable form'.[28]

What Hegel portrays is not an easy alliance between form and meaning; on the contrary, the two are in a high degree of tension; architecture can frame interiority, but it cannot in itself bring forth 'the inner life as inner'.[29] It can at best 'symbolize it',[30] and thus Hegel's claim that even though architecture has a history that stretches into the Romantic - into the modern - it is an art form wedded to externality, to *Äusserlichkeit*.[31] As a consequence, the 'true objectivity of representation' that Hegel demanded of original art works is, in the final analysis, impossible for architecture.[32]

5.

The ambiguity of architecture's philosophical status is an unmistakable subtext even in the way Hegel frames architecture's beginnings. Architecture, Hegel writes in the opening lines of his chapter on the subject, 'is conceptually the beginning of art,' yet in asking where architecture has begun 'we must thoroughly exclude [*ausschliessen*] the empirical facts of history'.[33] The reason for this is that only when stripped of its scholarly and non-philosophical modalities, can architecture provide an environment that can operate in the name of philosophy's higher calling. Of all the arts, architecture is most clearly defined by the rupture between the empirical and the philosophical, since it is precisely at the beginning of history that empirical circumstances are at their most tenuous and yet potentially at their most meaningful. This rupture has undeniable implications. Architecture can never return to the empirical, even as a corrective. In order for architecture to be more than just a question of function, but part of the conceptual world of philosophy, it has to permit philosophy to strip it of empirical foundations. The fate of architecture lies completely in the hands of philosophy, and yet it becomes philosophical at the moment it becomes revisionist.

Another complication is introduced when Hegel argues that the first buildings are not architecture pure and simple, but an awkward blend, or *Vermischung*, of architecture and sculpture.[34] The pyramids, for example, are more sculpture than architecture. It is only in the Romantic Age, some three thousand years later, that architecture in the form of the cathedrals manages to purify itself of its sculpturality. The very moment architecture has matured into its proper sphere of activity, its history, from the *philosophical* point of view, at least, comes to a close.

And in a last and most cutting twist - compared to architecture that in all its long history 'labors to bring [itself] nearer to an expression of spirit' - sculpture, when it begins the next phase of the development of Spirit, can do the same instantaneously; no thousands of years of having to accommodate the troublesome problems of gravity, materiality and *Zweckmässigkeit*. When sculpture appears - in the first sentence of the chapter on the subject, after the chapter on architecture - it is described as nothing less than 'the miracle [*Wunder*] of Spirit's giving to itself an image of itself'.[35] A *Wunder*, according to Hegel, 'enters directly upon what is purely external and particular, breaks it up, inverts it, makes it into

something completely different.'[36] With sculpture, philosophy can finally, and spectacularly, distance itself from its messy, and, one should emphasise, self-created, entanglements with architecture.

Architecture's downfall - as the dialectic moves on to what it sees as higher art forms - is total. Architecture 'the most incomplete of all arts', as Hegel phrased it, remains, despite its vast history, and despite its prominent positioning at the beginning of the dialectic, a medium that in the final analysis is 'incapable of portraying the Spirit in a presence adequate to it'.[37]

6.

Architecture is a pawn in the cunning of Reason, a cunning that was meant to explain the transcendence of Spirit; but that is, in the context of architecture, the slippery ground on which architecture's modernity is based. Philosophy imparts to architecture a prominence that no Humanist theorist of earlier centuries could have dreamt of, but it also entails a break from the discourse of practice to the philosophical, from the scholarly to the theoretical and from the history-of-buildings to a history-of-ideas. To unravel the consequence of this cunning - to see the puzzle within the puzzle - that is to where we have to turn our energies.

7.

Let me first condense what I see happening. Architecture begins its life as a modern philosophical project by a series of alienations and forced detachments from its presumptive disciplinary realities, realities that have enclosed and trapped it, according to Hegel, in the narrow discourse of scholarship and ideology. Though freed to engage the philosophical, architecture is denied an ongoing role in the advancement of metaphysics, has its origins in a competing artistic medium, has a philosophical history that is not related to its empirical history, and, finally, becomes architecture at the very moment it becomes no longer relevant in the dialectic of History, namely in the shift from work to miracle. In other words, Hegel makes architecture into something one can call 'not-architecture': not a real building, but an 'enclosure', not an ancient building, but a 'sculpture'; not a real history, but a conceptual one; not a free standing production, but the appearance of one, and not a miracle of representation, but a labour that ends in a mere simulacrum.

I would like to argue that these dislocations still today haunt the architectural problematic. It is not the specificity of Hegel's argument, nor even the trace of his considerable influence in nineteenth and twentieth century aesthetics that I am talking about, but a more substantial claim about architecture in general. The history of modern architecture - which is also the history-of-architecture-and-the-crisis-of-its-modernity - has the shape of a history of *not-architecture*, the history of architecture being *not itself*. It finds its first definition in this respect in the writings of Hegel. And finally, and most importantly, the history of post-Hegelian architecture - philosophically speaking - is the history of how architecture operates with and *within* the disassociations that were mandated by philosophy.

8.

Before I can elaborate on this historiographic premise - and attempt to bring to the fore the theory of modernity that is embedded within it - let me return to Heidegger, for he had hoped to dispense with the tradition of Hegelian aesthetics altogether. Unlike Hegel, who approaches the problem of beginning cautiously, on philosophical cat feet, Heidegger claims to see beginnings clearly. But it is not architecture that he is interested in but *bauen* (to build), and even though in sidestepping the problem of architecture he bypasses the question of its civilisational narrative, *bauen* has a history all its own, one that derives from nothing less than *ich bin*, or 'I am'.[38] To explain this, Heidegger employs an onomatopoeic word game in which *bauen* is linked backward in time to *buan* (notice the shift in sylla-

bles and missing e), then to *bhu* (note the lopping off of a syllabic unit), then to *beo* (note the shifting of the vowels) and then to bin. In this way, Heidegger arrives at the first words of creation, spoken by a mythological Black Forest farmer stomping around on his newly cleared field. Wife and children, and even the need for food, protection and clothing - some of the conventional arguments about the beginning of civilisation - are not yet in the picture. Nonetheless, out of the blunt syntactic eruption of *ich bin*, there emerges through its repetitions (this is, after all, the only thing the farmer can utter every time he needs to speak) a host of creative misspellings and syllabic slips that over time develop into words like *Bauer* (farmer) and *Nachbar*, (neighbour) - and, of course, *bauen* thereby creating a social and spatial web around Being's originary force.[39]

The historical development of Heideggerian 'Being' is, however, two- sided, for as it becomes ever more historical, it also undergoes a series of 'distortions and over-paintings [*Übermalungen*]' that ultimately 'trivializes' its presence.[40] In other words, as one moves from *ich bin* to *ich baue*, and thus away from Being and toward the potential for social life, one is also at the mercy of the forgetfulness of language. In making a link between *bauen* and Being, Heidegger thus asks us to realise in what way the word *bauen* had not only developed through time, in a positive sense, but had also been damaged by its eventual replacement, architecture, which had produced not places in which 'one dwells', but rather an endless continuum of housing, factories, and highways.

Despite Heidegger's attempt to construct an alternative to Hegel's civilisational history, his premise relies on Hegel in a very direct way. Following Hegel's critique of scholarship, Heidegger argues that his (philosophical) history does not need history in the conventional, empirical sense. That type of history, Heidegger argues, 'will petrify into fatelessness'.[41] From Heidegger's perspective, Hegel's mistake, however, was that though he separated History from its empirical equivalency, he still had to adhere at some level to empirical verification, and this weighed philosophy down with disciplinary protocols that were not properly philosophical. Philosophy, thinking in Heideggerian lines, should use its critique of scholarship to invent a new type of history, one that could just as easily be a complete fiction. And what better way to prove the power of philosophy in this context than to show how something as hard and culturally grounded as architecture can succumb to something as ephemeral as a play on words.

9.

Hegel and Heidegger, when taken together, leave architecture without a place to go. For Hegel, modernity-as-history-of-Spirit becomes ever more metaphysically apparent, leaving architecture to become ever more entangled in the web of philosophy's cunning. For Heidegger, modernity-as-history is nothing more than background noise with architecture just another element in the inevitable downward slide. Articulated most cruelly, architecture's history is nothing less than the history of its erasure from the modernity-of-Spirit (Hegel) and its theory is nothing less than its equivalency with the negativities of modernity (Heidegger). If Hegel gave to architecture an internal struggle only to abandon it on the roadside of metaphysics, Heidegger sees architecture with not even the potential for dialectical redemption. It is a negative that like a cataract darkens ontological sight. It is difficult to tell - from an architectural point of view - which is the worst poison.

10.

Post-Hegelian philosophy has more often than not translated these implicit negativities into a project that can only be described as anti-architecture. The writings of Henri Lefebvre serve as an example.

On the surface, Lefebvre moves well past Hegel

in shifting the discussions from a historical-philosophical project to a social-philosophical one. For example, unlike Hegel's *Umschliessung* with its emphasis on closure, Lefebvre discusses a window 'as a transitional object', with 'two senses, two orientations: from inside to the outside and from the outside to the inside'.[42] Instead of looking at the wall, he looks *through* the wall; instead of seeing the separation between inside and outside as the mark of the philosophical, he sees the philosophical in the dynamic, social interchange between inside and outside.

And yet, even though Lefebvre wants to shift the terms to a social production of space, the lingering Hegelianism is all too noticeable. Lefebvre acknowledges, for example, that an architect can create such 'living spaces' as the Taj Mahal, but he notes: 'We are not concerned here with architectural space understood as the preserve of a particular profession within the established social division of labor'.[43] This elevation of a 'living' architecture from the strictures of practice - which is akin to the Hegelian notion of *Umschliessung* as an *Erhebung* over practice - quickly deteriorates into a polarity between what the philosopher can promise and the architect can deliver. He states, for example, that 'it is the architect's job to reproduce' a 'welcoming space',[44] but he goes on to claim that architects in actuality do little more than manipulate signs to create an 'impression of intelligibility'.[45]

His negativist reading of Hegel is also apparent when he argues that because the Bauhaus expressed the 'architectural requirements of state capitalism', it, therefore, 'fell to the painters … to reveal the social and political transformation of space'.[46] Lefebvre then picks up Heidegger - despite his disavowal of Heidegger - to drive the stake into the heart of the matter. He claims that by the 1920s, because of what he calls 'facadism', architecture opened itself up to 'total *spectacularization*' (his emphasis).[47] The medieval churches, by way of contrast, so he argues, were not 'produced in order to be read and grasped, but rather to be *lived* (his emphasis) by people with bodies and lives in their own particular context'.[48] Similarly, he praises the capitals of the Romanesque cloister (and note that these are sculptural), since even though they may be different in their details, these differences operate 'within the limits permitted by a model'.[49]

In encountering here these vaguely moralising pronouncements - tinted by an historical nostalgia that one finds in neither Hegel nor Heidegger - it is clear that the author has only taken into consideration the vacuation of philosophy from architecture in Hegel and not the more complex entanglements of the two disciplines in Hegel's writings.

11.

What is it about architecture that - philosophically speaking - degenerates into a discourse of its inadequacies? It is, as we have seen, not simply its association with capitalism, bourgeois professionalism, and industrial consumerism. These are just the modern-day predicates in an equation between architecture and modernity that begins somewhere else.

To answer the question more fully, one must return again to the issue of *Umschliessung*. At its root is the verb *Schloss*, which can mean something as small as a lock or as big as a castle, but in either case refers to a mechanical or quasi-mechanical object. This term, therefore, from the beginning, puts architecture at a disadvantage since it is the engagement with the human body that, for Hegel, allows the Spirit to find its interiority. Yet *Umschliessung* has an important quasi-philosophical meaning. In his *Vorlesungen*, Hegel discusses the word *schliessen* ('to lock' or 'to close') to demonstrate how philosophers can use a 'symbolic term' to designate the closure of an argument.[50] *Um-schliessung* could thus be translated as 'bringing philosophy to a secure enclosing.'

The play on (en)closure in Hegel is now clear. Only by having something removed from the discussion, namely its empiricism, could architecture - over a long period of time - overcome its *Vermischung* to turn inward - to 'a forgetting of external nature'[51] - to define the potential for a pure interiority and to complete and resolve the movement from one purification to another. Architecture encloses itself in the name of philosophy, and in reverse, philosophy encloses itself in the name of architecture. Philosophy and architecture bring each other to a close.

12.

Or so it seems.

It is not just *Umschliessung*'s gerundic nature that allows architecture to engage both its history and its philosophicalness, it is the striving by architecture to become a '*totale Umschliessung*', - 'a totally enclosed enclosing' - that parallels, and fulfils, the complete exclusion [*Ausschliessung*] of the empirical that took place at the 'beginnings' of architecture. It is this striving for completeness that results in the architecture of the Christian era having a space that is 'gripped together' and combined 'into the most secure unity and clearest independence', even if it is partially an illusion.[52]

Hegel, however, can't help but noting - as an aside - that *Umschliessung* has a history that transcends the philosophical. He states that unlike the medieval cathedral, some Protestant churches have regularised seating and placed people in boxes which look 'like stalls' [*wie Ställe*] in a barn.[53] The root of *Ställe* is the same as the verb *stellen*, meaning 'to place something,' or to immobilise it. Between the nomadism in the Catholic church and the stationariness in the Protestant church there is here replayed, for Hegel, that ancient shift from primitivism to civilisation - from migrant hordes to settled, agrarian communities. But it has, architecturally speaking, deteriorated into something negative - we might call it 'the modern' - the apparitions of which ghost through Hegel's book and his writings in the form of barbs and asides against the 'superficiality', of the times.[54] Hegel was, of course, a Lutheran and his criticism of the stalls should not be seen as a criticism of Protestantism, but as a criticism of an architecture that fails to function according to dialectical needs. What can we make of his comment, therefore, except to claim that it is nothing short of a brief appearance of something unruly outside of the dialectic, a force that even the dialectic cannot fully control?

Umschliessung transgresses its mandate of purification. After all, the stalls are not made by an architect, but by a furniture maker, which means that architecture, in the closing moments of its dialectical history, and under the nose of the philosophical master, winds up *vermischt* with a lesser art and so becomes contingent on something as immaterial as a wooden plank. *Umschliessung* - which can take the form of everything from cave walls to stone buttressing - moves into its most radical paratactic dematerialisation. None of this was intended in the narrative of *Umschliessung*. It was supposed to end with the pre-programmed inadequacies of the cathedral (with its implied criticism of Catholicism), but what happened instead was that enclosing leaked out of the system and moved beyond philosophy to take on a life of its own, and, once purged of its historical, disciplinary, physical, and even, in the end, its *architectural* prerogatives, it did not listen to its philosophical instructions.

There are two places, Hegel intimates, where this is evident, in the debasing stalls of a Protestant church and in the gardens of the French kings where walls are formed by bushes. Both are mentioned in the lecture without any indication of how they fit into the broader discussion.

Trees are planted in a strict order besides one another in long avenues, they are trimmed, and real walls are formed from the cut hedges; and in this way nature itself is transformed into a vast resi-

dence under the open sky.[55]

Umschliessung - no longer a philosophical project but something that is applicable in more neutral circumstances - becomes *vermischt* with what we might today call interior architecture, on the one hand, and with landscape architecture, on the other hand. In these conditions, architecture, from a philosophical point of view, is condemned to irrelevance - and this was certainly Hegel's reason for finishing the history of architecture in this way.

However, perhaps something else has taken place. Architecture has escaped the confinements of philosophy and disguised itself - and thus learned to protect itself - in the thematics of its messy origins. Unlike the other arts, which are carried along by the dialectic into the ethereal realm of high culture and metaphysical purpose, architecture moves onward into a more vacuous history free from philosophical oversight. Architecture, existing in a state of philosophical abandonment, becomes an easy target for philosophical punishment.

13.

The desire to see *past* architecture, to charge it with a history that is for all practical purposes extrinsic to its assignment, but that threatens to become its very essence, imparts to architecture an energy that defines its philosophical credibility, but that also, in the end, confuses its philosophical host. *Umschliessung* - from the beginning - was, however, not pure philosophy, but a philosophy-in-historical-translation, given that it was designed as an embrace of the temporal, as a way to move the history of Spirit along and to bind together disparate realities. It is not connected to human effort, which are the traits associated with the higher arts, and as such it cannot be framed in empirical terms. It thus moves *past* its philosophically-mandated enclosures to become an autonomous force, to stand on a threshold between architecture and philosophy. *Umschliessung* is thus a 'not-architecture', but neither is it pure philosophy. It is *vermischt* with temporality, and this predicts - from the beginning - architecture's transitoriness in a philosophical narrative.

14.

The history of *Umschliessung* has two tracks through Hegelian time. On the one, just discussed, it leaks past the boundaries set for it; its symbolic past erupts into new *Vermischungen* that guarantee its alienation and yet independence from philosophical mandates. It demarcates a space of activity that is part philosophical, part a-philosophical.

On the other side, when still locked inside the enclosures of philosophy, it turns against its master. *Schliessen*, as Hegel himself explains, is a word that when used by a philosopher, is not trapped by the literalness of the word. Its symbolic past has 'been forgotten'. This means that in order for the philosophical to come to a close, it has to force architecture to follow philosophy's footsteps - to forget its roots not only in nature, but also in its symbolic history. As a result the cathedral can only become a *totale Umschliessung*, when its exteriority is no longer relevant, and indeed the architecture of the great cathedrals 'give effect to the forgetting of the exterior world of nature and the distracting activities and interests of finite existence'.[56] At its beginnings, *Umschliessung* was one-sided, just the inside of a cave; at its endings, it is one-sided again. The long struggle to bring inside and outside into relationship is over; the outside, in essence, looses.

There is, however, a consequence of this forgetting; the exterior of the cathedral begins 'to have an independence of its own, because it has tasks of its own to fulfil'.[57] In the name of the dialectic, a new medium is born, the façade that signals architecture's inadequacy with respect to the philosophical; it also signals the end of philosophy's commitment to architecture at the moment it becomes urban.

This delamination of exterior and interior is, of course, predicted by the dialectic in which interiority

- becoming the subject of its own expression - develops an 'exteriorless expression' [*äusserlichkeitslose Äusserung*] which can be translated as 'an externalized expression with no externality as such'. In this sense, externality is released from its philosophical clamps. It 'no longer has content [*Inhalt*] or purpose [*Zweck*]'[58] and becomes, in fact, potentially 'indifferent and vulgar'.[59] It is this separation that is meant by a *totale Umschliessung*.

But the problem is that starting as an attempt to reign in *Äusserlichkeit* - to turn architecture, implausibly, inwards - *Umschliessung* winds up producing *Äusserlichkeit* as such. Architecture exists now as a double phenomenon, defining interiority in the name of the dialectic, but wedded to an exteriority that - though created by the dialectic - wants a history freed from philosophical management. Separated at the beginning from the empirical, architecture is now separated from the philosophical, and this means that it has, by definition, *no history*. The façade, a necessary by-product of architecture's dialectical advancement, lives its life as yet another symptom of the falsity that the dialectic can see, but is powerless to transform.

What began as a redemption of architecture in the name of history winds up producing an art form with no history. What began as a crisis of its materiality ends as a crisis of its superficiality. What began as a claim for a new context for the understanding of architecture ends up placing architecture in conflict with its urban potential. Form and meaning drift apart and can from now on encounter each other only as enemies.

15.

Though *Umschliessung* was intended to be seen in a positive sense as the production of a safe haven for the activities within, it is also 'a locking up' or 'a locking in' - in an eighteenth century dictionary its Italian equivalent was given as *chiasura* - and as such has no entrances and exits; it is, precisely, total. In the early eighteenth century, when the term *Umschliessung* first became current, it was used principally as a military concept in the context of urban fortifications.[60] This inherent militancy is implied not only in the constraining stalls of the Protestant church, but also in the requirements placed on sculpture, which is, of course, all about stationary objects. Hegel begins his discussion on sculpture by noting that though sculpture has 'emancipated itself from its architectural purpose', it must retain 'a permanent relation with spaces formed architecturally'.[61] A sculpture, for Hegel, cannot be considered outside of its context. Sculpture begins its history by being 'put in its place'. Like a good soldier or good servant, it can only be comprehended when properly disciplined.

The reason is clear, unlike architecture which has a history, according to Hegel, devoid of craftsmen, sculpture is the first art where the Spirit demonstrates the skill of making. The real story of the Spirit thus begins here, and there is much at stake. Architecture, because it is conceptual and without agency - is thus called on to enforce the contextualism of sculpture. Hegel tries to carry the positive aspects of this exchange forward, but it is clearly driven more by the compulsion for the logic of enclosure than by the nobility of Spirit. *Umschliessung* has to be 'total' so that sculpture cannot escape the gaze of philosophy. What philosophy allows architecture cannot be permitted the presumed higher arts.[62]

16.

Unlike philosophers who can 'forget' the symbolic underpinnings of what it means to 'lock up an argument,' the architecture-of-*Umschliessung* cannot. Its root violence is never far from mind. The word thus points to both the consciousness of its association with the philosophical *and* to its literalness. Separating nature on the outside and art on the inside, it does not allow the Spirit out of its protected containment. The church entombs the dialectic; it becomes nothing less than *die Umschliessung des*

Geistes.[63] It becomes not an ephemeral substance that floats elegantly through history transforming mud, stone and bricks into various philosophical 'enclosures', but an agent in its own right. It marches across the borders of the chapter on architecture to assist the dialectic in mastering sculpture, whereas back home, in the cathedrals, it forcibly purifies itself of sculpture, by 'breaking ornamentation apart and rendering it into little pieces [*zerstückeln*]', and spreading it over its surfaces.[64] In that sense, architecture at its most remote and dispassionate - standing back from the play of metaphysics, and having seemingly exhausted itself in its grandiose forms - becomes cruel and inhibitory.

17.

The dialectic produces architecture as the alienated subject - one that is either unhinged from the philosophical or untamed by it.

Architecture, touched by the wand of philosophy, can still continue, however, to claim for itself a civilisational cause, but only by disguising its philosophically - or repressed - predicted inadequacies in this respect. Of all the arts, architecture is the only one that is post-metaphysical. It had once been enclosed within the horizon of the metaphysical, but now exists stripped of metaphysical purpose. Here lies the problem of where to locate the 'theory' of modern architecture.

18.

In Hegel, architecture or rather its equivalent, 'not-architecture' survives as part fiction, part fact, part freedom-creating, part freedom-denying, and part church, part prison. The theme of enclosure that binds this history to philosophy and that imprisons it in its own cunning carries through in Heidegger, but in reverse. On the surface, there is an uncanny similarity between, on the one hand, Hegel's Protestant churchgoer, contained in his stall, and its dialectic opposite, the 'nomads', wandering about in the nave of a Catholic cathedral, and, on the other hand, Heidegger's onto-centric *Bauer* and his dialectical opposite, the 'rootless' truck driver. In both cases, the philosophical fights against the spectre of motion and staticness while at the same time having to establish itself purposefully - and cunningly - as a discourse that itself moves through an illusory and artificial history in search of the stable.

On the surface, however, Heidegger had intended to go past Hegel given that his philosophical *Destruktion* was meant to bring us into sight of a *bauen* that produces a new unity of the physical and the social. Architecture was not seen as the frame - and (en)closure - of philosophy, but in direct lineage with Being itself. However, since it was many times removed from Being, the redeeming force of language - as it slips and slides its way into the present - turns out to be a slow-acting poison that dooms *bauen* at the very moment it becomes not quasi-historical but empirically historical. The fiction that was meant to show that there was an alternative to architecture, namely *bauen*, embeds within it - albeit unwittingly - the legitimacy of architecture itself, which, like a virus, has learned to survive in unfriendly conditions; it infects and ultimately undermines Being, entering the system unnoticed already at the first linguistic break from *bin* to *bhu*.

Architecture, though ostensibly that which is a negative associated with urban life - note that the philosophies of both Hegel and Heidegger are anti-urban - begins a type of production in the form of an alienation from the philosophical, but the philosophical *bauen* has a history that ends only with bauen and thus can never be anything with physical attributes. It is the very opposite of *Umschliessung*, which has any number of material embodiments.

One must remember, in this respect, that whereas Immanuel Kant defined *agere* (to make) as separate and distinct from *opus* (a work), Heidegger's *bauen* (to build) never becomes *der Bau* (the building). It never becomes a thing in dialogue with its making.

For Kant *opus* lay at the core of social existence. It allowed judgment to take place and with judgment the potential for social advancement and enlightenment. Heidegger dispenses with this argument. *Bauen* can never become anything more than an activity endlessly reproducing itself. Despite all its purported positivities, *bauen* - cut off from the principle of judgment - is at its core afraid that it could produce something that could potentially become a mere sign of its presence; in other words, *bauen* can never produce an actual building. And in reverse, the built object cannot refer back to its maker. 'When we are facing a cathedral', Heidegger writes, 'we are faced not just with a church, a building, but with something that is present, in its presence'.[65]

Though architecture as such, for Heidegger, is insufficient to explain the presence of buildings *philosophically*, *bauen* – by its own devices - is unable to explain the not-architecture that it hopes to produce. It can do little more than push its production in front of it and *away* from it, reinstating again and again the very thing that it purports to challenge, namely architecture. But because the gulf between *bauen* and *der Bau* is unbreachable, and because architecture can, in fact, produce things regardless of how we evaluate them, bauen remains unrequited. Like a ghost, it can haunt the system, but it cannot touch it, much less bend it to its ambitions. *Bauen* is locked out - the word *Ausgeschlossen* comes to mind - from any viable contact with architecture. In other words, *bauen* and the prosaic empiricism of architectural objects stand on the same ground of exclusion.

19.

Bauen and *Umschliessung* close each other off. Both, in different ways, can only produce their own activity without referentiality. *Umschliessung*, however, moves from material to material, and is, in comparison to *bauen*, an unwanted - or perhaps one can say 'accidental' - dialectical manifestation of the unsettled modernity. *Bauen* has no materiality at all, and thus, though it avoids the problem of insubstantiation, can only levitate as an unrequited desire, inflicting pain onto everything that it is not.

20.

A philosophy today that critiques architecture fails to realise that architecture is a self-constructed projection of the Enlightenment fascination with an alienation that it cannot explain. Post-Hegelian philosophy can thus chastise architecture for its superficiality - as an extension of its philosophical beginnings - while also taking it to task for its cruelty, the cruelty of enclosure itself - as an extension of its philosophical endings. Post-Hegelian philosophy thus always wants to either set limits for architecture - in response to the former - or continue to deform it - in response to the latter. Even Adorno relishes the double trap in which architecture - after Hegel - is destined to fall again and again.

If out of disgust with functional forms and their inherent conformism, it [architecture] wanted to give free reign to fantasy, it would fall immediately into kitsch.[66]

This sentence is not about architecture. It is philosophy (mis)recognising its failure to incorporate the a-dialectical in its discursive machinery.

21.

But now (i.e. after Heidegger) there is no hidden external concept that can be called upon to redeem architecture from its travail. The trap has been closed. The battle is over. Architecture cannot escape the humiliations and dialectical negativities that have over time come to define it. Nor can philosophy now bring it to heel. Architecture exists as a reconstituted negation of itself, meaning that there is simply no further depth to which criticism can reach. Jean Baudrillard can write that the Beaubourg in Paris is 'a monument to mass simulation', 'a carcass', 'a mausoleum', and 'a cadaver'.[67] But the last laugh is on him. Is this not the nightmare

that haunts Hegel's cathedral, replete with its 'empty interior' and 'space of deterrence'?

One comes to the conclusion, as awkward as it may be, that architecture comes into view at the very moment that its detachment from the progress of Spirit in Hegel - enclosed in a philosophical dialectic and yet ungrounded both in the history of the past and in the history of the present - becomes its alienated re-attachment to itself. The double bind of architecture has become a double negation. What was meant to be a harmless by-product of the dialectical imagination now tortures Being into powerlessness. Architecture becomes the fetish of philosophy.

22.

All in all, the story of architecture (and its associated 'history' and 'theory'), when viewed from this perspective, is a desperate one. From the early nineteenth century onward, it was seen philosophically as a limited form of consciousness that has been transcended by the other arts. But it was, in actuality, working in a *post*-philosophical status (unbeknownst to the philosophers), subsuming its lack of importance into the body of its production. This was the pathology that was to play itself out again and again, and that unifies all architectural production to this day. Not even modernism, despite its anti-historicism, could redeem architecture from its accumulated negativities. Functionalism was not a liberation, but all that was left over in the dying days of the Hegelian spectre, its premise already contaminated by the Hegelian demotion of architecture to the extended labours of *Zweckmässigkeit*. And yet, like a force of nature, architecture, first abandoned and then maligned, first given over to its passivity and then to its pathology, managed to survive, but now - and as long as there is philosophy - as a double negation. Perhaps the Beaubourg attracted so much ire from Baudrillard because it is a building that actually provokes the naïve negativities that are latently possible in the Hegelian-Heideggerian world to enclose enclosure, while at the same time *fulfiling* the very premises that Hegel put into play, namely that of an architecture/not-architecture.

Architecture - after Heidegger - is a negative tautology.

23.

And so today, we stand before the uncertainty of what architecture is and, more specifically, of architecture's singularity, where the word 'architecture' when written alone in a sentence survives to indicate a space of practice that obscures something that is neither a singular nor a plural. To solve the problem, architecture - in a state of dialectical abandonment in philosophy - needs to be paired with architecture *itself* in the equation: 'architecture/architecture'. This equation is not a demand for a new type of architecture, but a *description* of architecture as it exists today in the lost intersection between time and space, between an uncertain history and an uncertain future. The duality of the words points to architecture's various tautological multiples. And, because it is split against itself, the equation points to the repression of one word by the other, and to the latent history of not-architecture. Unlike the deforming energy of the translation from *bin* to *bauen* that left one at best with an ephemeral 'poetics' with its pretences of science and rigor, a more properly 'deforming translation', to use the words of Jacques Derrida, starting with Hegel's architecture of cunning ends at a point where architecture can bring out of hiding its underlying dialectic of impossibility.[68] In this way we can protest against the attempts to erase, forget, deny, if not overtly obliterate architecture's historical and theoretical unsituatedness in post-Enlightenment thought.

This doubling of architecture - this building on and inversion of the double negative - allows architecture to *re-enter* the philosophical, but in a way that protects it from the philosophical compulsion to begin the discussion through a replication of

the negation. Kant asks how do we judge judging. Hegel makes it clear that it is not history that he is interested in but the history-of-history. Similarly Nietzsche asks not what value is, but what is 'the value of value?'. Heidegger asks, what is the being-of-being? This doubling - an architecture all its own - brings both criticism and its object into alignment, thus reflecting both the strength and weakness of modern philosophy. Would it not be right to integrate this architectural ideogram into architectural speculation - the architecture of architecture - for it would allow us to see architecture's history as a signifier of philosophy's cunning in the context of architecture's modernity.

24.

My interest in these remarks is to reinvest critical discourse about architecture with something more than an appreciation of architecture's numerous disciplines, its technical masteries, its design virtuosities, or even the assumption that a presumed avant-garde holds the key to architecture's purpose. Rather, I claim that architecture cannot escape from the cunning that gave it the complex set of rules-of-engagement by which it came to develop its cultural activities. I want to re-establish the primacy of that particular history to architecture, awaken it to its hidden dialectic, by which I mean, once again, not that architectural history (the discipline) holds the key to understanding architecture, but that architecture exists *only* by means of a historical function that is equivalent to the complex terms of its *lack* of historical relevance as a philosophical project. Having been attached to - and indeed made equivalent with - philosophy's higher aims and then, simultaneously, detached from these aims, architecture had to situate itself as best it could within the frameworks of existing disciplinary structures; it also gave itself over to the mandates of its philosophical (dis)associations. And yet today - located in the shadow of both Hegel and Heidegger - that which we call architecture exists in a limbo of not being truly alive and yet not ever being quite dead. It is in this context that we should seek both a theory and practice (and even the history) of architecture.

Notes

1. Perhaps as an aside. A critique of the 'worn out idealist historicism' (Manfredo Tafuri) points us in the right direction, but does not go far enough. It only rejects the linearity and over-determinism of the Idealist project, but does not account for that part of the Idealist project that has transcended its own location in the history of philosophy. It is the *residualness* of Hegel's de-positioning of architecture, not his philosophy as such that is the problem at the core of architecture's relationship to its self.
2. The lecture was published in 1954 in Martin Heidegger, *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1954). It was published in English as 'Building Dwelling Thinking' in *Poetry Language Thought*, ed. by J. Glenn Gray, trans. by A. Hofstadter, (New York: Harper, 1971), pp. 143-63.
3. The question could be what is the architecture-philosophy project 'after Derrida'? But I want to remain with Heidegger and not jump ahead to more contemporary positions; in order to work deconstruction into the system, I believe we have to be more precise about the 'after Heidegger' question first.
4. There is not enough space here to deal with the question of Immanuel Kant, except to point out that though he does treat architecture in his philosophy and though his philosophy, as Derrida has made clear, engages architecture metaphorically, he does not deal with the history of architecture as such, except in the most rudimentary way.
5. Hegel uses the words *Architektur* and *Baukunst*. The differences are subtle yet important, but are not a primary concern in this paper.
6. G.W.F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik, 1835-1838* (Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am Main, 1986), I, p. 127.
7. Ibid. II, p. 316.
8. Ibid. II, p. 268.
9. Ibid. II, p. 632.

10. Ibid. II, p. 273.
11. Ibid. I, p. 412.
12. Ibid. I, pp. 113, 130.
13. Ibid. I, p. 108.
14. Ibid. I, p. 136.
15. Ibid. I, p. 430.
16. Ibid. I, p. 117.
17. Ibid. I, p. 117.
18. Ibid. II, p. 334.
19. Ibid. II, p. 289.
20. Ibid. II, p. 340.
21. Ibid. II, p. 350.
22. Ibid. II, pp. 335, 336, 332.
23. Ibid. II, p. 333.
24. Ibid. II, p. 307.
25. Ibid. II, p. 290.
26. Ibid. I, p. 453.
27. Ibid. II, p. 332.
28. Ibid. II, p. 341.
29. Ibid. III, p. 224.
30. Ibid. I, p. 117.
31. Ibid. I, p. 123.
32. Ibid. II, p. 352.
33. Ibid. II, p. 26. Here, we could discuss Hegel's rather contentious relationship with the academe, but I prefer not to stray too far from the arguments themselves.
34. Ibid. II, p. 279.
35. Ibid. II, pp. 351, 362.
36. Ibid. II, p. 168.
37. Ibid. III, p. 130.
38. See: Martin Heidegger, 'Building Dwelling Thinking', *Basic Writings: From Being and Time (1927) to The Task of Thinking (1964),* ed. by David Farrell Krell (San Francisco, CA: Harper, 1993) pp. 348-9.
39. Ibid. It is quite possible that surrealist poetry that was all the rage in the 1950s influenced Heidegger in this, for there is something Dadaistic in the way words are being rubbed against each other in the Heideggerian world that produce the illusion of a history far more profound than what can actually be proven by historians of etymology.
40. Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1993), p. 2.
41. Martin Heidegger, *What is called Thinking* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 166.
42. Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), p. 209.
43. Ibid. p. 211
44. Ibid. p. 210.
45. Ibid. p. 144. He can't resist using the pejorative word 'designers', which he places in italics.
46. Ibid. p. 304.
47. Ibid. p. 143
48. Ibid. p. 125.
49. Ibid. p. 150.
50. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik,* I, p. 397.
51. Ibid. II, p. 333.
52. Ibid. II, p. 332.
53. In English these partitions are called pews or box pews.
54. George Friedrich Hegel, 'Objective Spirit: Human Conduct and Philosophic Truth', in *Hegel: The Essential Writings*, ed. by Frederick G. Weiss (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), p. 261.
55. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik,* II, p. 350. Hegel is, of course, describing Versailles, which he visited in 1827.
56. Ibid. II, p. 333.
57. Ibid. II, pp. 342-43.
58. Ibid. II, p. 144.
59. Ibid. I, p. 140.
60. See the entry *Umschliessung*, here in its Old German spelling, in the dictionary by Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm; http://germazope.uni-trier.de/Projects/DWB (April 2007).
61. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik,* II, p. 352.
62. Sculpture encounters 'the modern,' in Hegel, on the question of clothing. If one wants to portray a contemporary, the sculptor is not allowed to portray fashion, but must dress people in generic costumes.
63. I interpreted here from the following sentence: 'Zugleich erhält die romantische Architektur das Geschäft, in der Gestalt und Anordnung ihres Gebäudes den Inhalt des Geistes, als dessen Umschliessung das Bauwerk dasteht, soweit dies architektonisch möglich ist, hindurchscheinen und die Form des Äusseren und

Inneren bestimmen zu lassen.' (Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik,* II, p. 335)

64. Ibid. II, p. 345.
65. Heidegger, *What is Called Thinking*, p. 98.
66. Theodor W. Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, trans. by R. Hullot-Kentor (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. 32. Adorno is also quite Hegelian in his praise of Hans Scharoun's Philharmonic Hall in Berlin. 'Its purpose is expressed in and through the building' (p. 44).
67. Jean Baudrillard, *Simulacra and Simulation*, trans. by S. Faria Glaser (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994), pp. 61, 63.
68. Jacques Derrida, 'Deconstruction in America: An Interview with Jacques Derrida', Interview with James Creech, Peggy Kamuf, and Jane Todd, *Critical Exchange*, 17, Winter (1985), 22.

Biography

Mark M. Jarzombek is Associate Dean of the School of Architecture and Planning at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Professor of the History and Theory of Architecture. He has worked on a range of historical topics from the Renaissance to the modern. He has also worked extensively on nineteenth and twentieth century aesthetics. His most recent book, *The Psychologizing of Modernity, Art, Architecture and History* (2000), attempts to historicize a complex set of issues around the question of subjectivity and modernity. Jarzombek is currently working on a set of essays on architecture and modernity.

Architectural Theory: A Construction Site

Ákos Moravánszky

Territory and problems - *theoria*

Like all young academic disciplines, the theory of architecture is still in search of its identity, as its representatives strive to define the boundaries of their territory. But what is this territory? Obviously, there must be specific problems waiting to be solved by architectural theorists if taxpayers' money is to be invested in the creation of new chairs, professorships, and design-based academic grades, which is a completely new and somewhat puzzling phenomenon. Undoubtedly, even mathematics would no longer be on the university agenda today if it did not contribute substantially to the development of new technologies; what then can we expect of architectural theory?

The field of architectural theory should be defined on the basis of the problems the discipline is intended to solve. But disciplines for architectural problem solving, from the design of a doorknob to regional planning, already exist. What kind of specific tasks does architectural theory have to tackle, what kind of inquiries does it intend to pursue? The future standing of architectural theory, indeed perhaps its survival depends on the answers to these and similar questions.

We can debate the value of etymology in understanding the usage of terms, but its capacity to question generally accepted, fixed meanings is beyond any doubt. The Greek origin of the word theory, *theoria*, is illuminating. *Thea* is an occurrence which wants to be understood, and *theoros* is an observer, an envoy sent by a *polis* to a place of oracle like Delphi, to be present at the oracle and report it to his principals with authority, that is, without altering it, 'for neither adding anything would you find a cure, nor subtracting anything would you avoid erring in the eyes of gods' - as the poet Theognis of Megara (6th Century BC) had warned the *theoros*.[1] The meaning of theory, therefore, indicates a particular way of observing: the way of the detached and uncommitted spectator, rather than the participant. It seems, therefore, that the original meaning of *theoria* leaves no space for a pro-'projective' interpretation, with its interest in performance and production.

However, important questions remain. The decision of the Athenians whether to start a war against the Persians or to take a defensive stance depended on the report and interpretation of the oracle's utterances by the *theoros*. The *theoros* created a narrative in order to bridge the gap between human intelligence and divine interaction. The narrative of the *theoros*, however, had to be negotiated: in cases where the Athenian ambassadors declined to accept an oracle, they refused to confer authority to the *theoros*. We have to ask, therefore, whether detachment will give us a more profound insight than participation, or whether observation itself is a kind of intellectual participation. According to Hans-Georg Gadamer, the *theoros* becomes part of the festive celebration by attending it; via his attendance, the *theoros* acquires a qualification and certain privileges. Being a spectator is an

authentic form of participation, Gadamer wrote in his 'Truth and Method'.[2] Earlier, Martin Heidegger pointed out, in his essay 'Science and Meditation', that in the Greek world '... a way of life (bios)' was based on *theorein*.[3] *Bios theoretikos* was defined by the philosopher as 'the way of life of those who contemplate, who look in the direction of the pure appearance of things present',[4] in contrast to the *bios praktikos*, the existential mode that essentially implies action. However, even though Heidegger was aware of the difference, he stressed that: '... one thing must be kept in mind at all times: *bios theoretikos*, contemplative life, especially in its purer forms, is for the Greeks supreme action'.[5]

Architectural theory: aesthetics or discourse?

This brief excursion into the difficult problem of observation/reflection versus participation might explain why many theorists of architecture were of the opinion that architects involved in the process of designing buildings are unable to understand what they called the 'essence', the most important principle of architecture, unaffected by individual languages. In his essay 'The Paradox of Architectural Theories at the Beginning of the "Modern Movement"', published in 1951, the architect and architectural essayist Paul Zucker claimed: 'While architects in all German academies and institutes of technology at the end of the nineteenth century were taught in terms formulated by the holy trinity of Schinkel, Bötticher and Semper, new architectural theories were formulated from another side. Now no longer creative architects, but theoreticians began shaping a new approach toward architecture: Wölfflin, Schmarsow, and Adolf von Hildebrand...'.[6] Zucker stated the primacy of theory for modern architecture in shifting its focus from the issue of 'functional expression' toward the more substantial issues of space, volume, symbol, and abstraction: 'It will be up to the architects of the second half of our century to express in their creations those ideas which were the intrinsic problems of the theoreticians of the first decades of our century'.[7]

Zucker was, of course, focusing on the written statements of architects and not only failed to recognise that the issue of space was already very much an 'intrinsic problem' for architects in the first half of the twentieth century (e.g. Frank Lloyd Wright, Adolf Loos, or the Cubist architects in Prague), but also that this design work - along with new discoveries in the field of optical perception or psychology - contributed to the elaboration of theories on the *Wesen der Architektur* ('essence' or 'nature' of architecture) as formulated by architect-theorists such as Fritz Schumacher, Paul Klopfer or Geoffrey Scott. Although Zucker himself worked previously as a designer, his strict division of 'architects' and 'theorists' followed the supposed gap between observation and participation.

Ideas emerging outside of architecture will fertilise the practice of architecture by producing, in turn, a specific knowledge, Zucker emphasised. We can easily extend the scope of Zucker's investigation and consider other periods in which architecture as a discipline underwent a sweeping re-evaluation of its entire program. One major shift was the crisis of Vitruvianism in the seventeenth century and the subsequent rejection of nature and the proportions of the human body as models for architecture. Another blow, still resounding in the writings of Aldo Rossi, was delivered by Etienne-Louis Boullée, who rejected Vitruvius' statement that architecture was the art of building and stressed the *production de l'esprit* as the constitution of architecture.[8]

Finally, the great theoretical systems of the nineteenth century attempted to look at the extra-architectural variables such as production, technology and material, from the perspective of their capacity to guide architecture toward an adequate, unified style. The speculation about space and its symbolism replaced the architectural theory of the nineteenth century, which was centred on issues of construction, technology, and the evolution of styles.

In his 1951 essay, Paul Zucker described architectural theorists as 'those who deal preponderantly with problems of architectural aesthetics'.[9] The equation of architectural theory with aesthetics was a general phenomenon during the first half of the twentieth century. 'This is certainly not a theory of building technology but of building-art [*Baukunst*], therefore an aesthetics', Herman Sörgel already wrote in 1918 in the introduction to his important handbook 'Theorie der Baukunst', which consists of a historical-critical part (from Semper to Hildebrand), a theoretical-methodical part (aesthetics of perception) and a practical-applied part (ranging from material and technology to style and truth).[10] Sörgel saw the task as the mediation between the architect and the philosophically or historically educated theorist, using aesthetics as a 'rational' antidote against similarly 'rational' functionalism. Many important theorists trained in art history, such as Rudolf Wittkower, Rudolf Arnheim, Ernst Gombrich and Paul Frankl, developed analytical methods that became important tools for architects, often mediated by architectural critics like Colin Rowe. It is puzzling that Hanno-Walter Kruft disregarded practically all of them in his voluminous 'History of Architectural Theory' (1985). His chapters on twentieth-century architecture exclusively discussed the statements of practicing architects.[11] The fact that the authors who for Zucker represented architectural theory were now replaced by Van de Velde, Gropius, van Doesburg and Mies van der Rohe, indicates a major shift in the definition of architectural theory: not the aesthetics of architecture, but architecture itself in its structural relations with social life is now the focus of attention.

We can locate the origin of this paradigm change in the situation of around 1968. Indeed, we can speak of the birth of a new architectural theory, as the conjunction of architectural history and politically engaged architectural criticism. The term 'aesthetics' was now carefully avoided by the representatives of this new theory as something superficial and unworthy of attention, since the real significance did not lie in the visual appearance of a building but in its socio-economic existence. The problem with this line of argumentation is that the elimination of aesthetics as a means of evaluating architecture as a product of human labour radically limits the means of making a critical judgment vis-à-vis the product (which is a pity, since the real differences between the proposals of Rem Koolhaas and the architects of New Urbanism lie in their respective aesthetics, rather than in their social programs). Still, the reconfiguration of architectural theory was, in retrospect, successful in the sense that its representatives could gain the necessary attention by establishing an international network of intellectuals from in- and outside the discipline, forming a 'critical' mass and acting as a resonating board. The Any conferences, held each year between 1991 and 2000, were a case in point, even though the interest in a real exchange of ideas had declined during the final meetings.

Manfredo Tafuri's thesis regarding the impossibility of a critical architecture contributed to the institutionalisation of a critical theory of architecture.[12] After 1973, 'Oppositions', the journal of the Institute for Architecture and Urban Studies, founded by Peter Eisenman, Kenneth Frampton, and Mario Gandelsonas, played a major role in this respect. The editors of 'Oppositions' wanted to create a committed critical voice, outside of academia or the architectural profession, although university journals such as Yale's 'Perspecta', with its characteristic mixture of historical analysis and new projects, certainly served as a point of orientation. Still, the effect of the long-lasting hegemony of Clement Greenberg's formalist aesthetics in the United States should not be underestimated. Just like 'October', the journal for theoretical inquiry in art which announces its rebellious spirit already in its title, 'Oppositions' became the forum for opinions calling the traditional foundations of architectural culture into question.

The initial goal of the editors of and contributors to 'Oppositions', to revise the historiography of modernism by critically investigating its socio-economic underpinnings, soon had to be revised itself: the journal shifted its focus toward the processes of signification in language and culture in general, and understandably, easily found allies in literary theory (the postmodernism of Fredric Jameson), semiotics (W.J.T. Mitchell, Norman Bryson), and in post-structuralist and deconstructivist philosophy. It is rather remarkable that, in spite of all its programmatic claims, the sociology of art made almost no impact in the U.S., except maybe for a slight interest in Pierre Bourdieu's work. Following the closure of 'Oppositions', its successor 'Assemblage', founded in 1985 by architectural historian K. Michael Hays and literary theorist Catherine Ingraham, wanted to anchor the new journal in the poststructuralist academic discourse. The attempt of 'Oppositions' to 'open' up traditional architectural journalism with historiographical and critical tools helped 'Assemblage' to assign new roles to architecture. Strategies of literary criticism, such as misreading, and concepts borrowed from philosophy, psychoanalysis or linguistics were used as guiding ideas for interpretations of design as well as design proposals. The growing distance from design practice, on the other hand, yielded the applause of a relatively small, mostly academic audience.

The rifts between architectural historians (writing for the established scholarly journals such as 'The Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians'), architectural theoreticians (writing for journals such as 'Oppositions', 'Assemblage' or 'Any'), and architects were impossible to overlook. The question was whether the discipline was self-contained, with an established object of study and a given methodology, or - as Louis Althusser defined science - whether it was a discipline which had a theory for its object of study. Architectural historiography itself became the object of theoretical research, with anthologies of architectural theory now a genre of its own, by now filling many library shelves.[13]

As a result of this development, it is no longer possible to study architectural history without a critical reflection on the method of the study itself and without a certain grade of interdisciplinarity. However, the multitude of topics and methods which have appeared in architecture theory journals very rarely resulted in real interdisciplinary research; on the contrary, the restructuring of schools as a consequence of the Bologna process and the necessity to secure funds has forced parts of the discipline to emphasise uniqueness and 'core competences'. The recent 'iconic turn' is a telling example: art historians, historians of science, and architects are trying to establish their own interpretation of the 'image', producing competing definitions of a *Bildwissenschaft* (science of images) - thus, it is no wonder that Klaus Sachs-Hombach speaks not of one discipline, but of disciplines of 'image science' in his anthology of relevant texts of *Bildwissenschaft*.[14]

Mining for metaphors

Ironically, architectural theory today, both as analysed by Kruft and as represented on the pages of 'Oppositions' and 'Assemblage', is an historical artefact; it is easy to compare them and see how traditional methods of historiography and iconography have been replaced by new approaches configured by psychoanalysis, deconstruction, epistemology, and by gender and cultural studies. Appropriation has become the proof of criticality both in architectural theory and in design, starting with the 'death of the author', followed by the critique of representation, resignification and so on. Eisenman's understanding of Chomsky's linguistic distinction between surface and deep structure, of 'post-humanist' displacement and de-centring, of Derrida's misreading, all invented to call certain basic statements of hermeneutics into question, is, basically, metaphorical. By 'using' them in order to justify decisions of architectural design, Eisenman cancels their critical potential and turns them into

'illustrations'.

We should not underestimate the liberating effect of these and similar ideas on architecture; the attention to developments in other disciplines and in other fields of culture was a significant change. But this new theory soon began to wither as it had increasingly lost touch with design practice. The most important warning signs were not so much the discounted theory books in the sales' bins of bookstores, but the grant applications showing no interest whatsoever in discovering anything new, yet bolstering a refined jargon which identified the authors as followers of intellectual fashions. This situation has had and still has devastating consequences both for scholarship, which can only decline without practical knowledge, and for practice, which expects some theoretical basis at least in order to establish the qualitative differences between possible results. It was in the catalogue of Peter Eisenman's exhibition Cities of Artificial Excavation, notably, that the art critic Yve-Alain Bois rang the alarm bell, stating that the symbiosis of architecture and philosophy is turning into a mutually exploitative relationship:

During the last ten years or so we have seen architectural theory achieve its level of incompetence. It is simply not the case that architects write such good books or that philosophers have such interesting ideas about architecture, and in a sense Eisenman's recent exchange with Jacques Derrida marks a recognition, on both sides, that perhaps it is now time to put an end to the reciprocal trivialization of their own discourses and the flood of gobbledygook that poured out of their sycophants' word processors.[15]

Bois accused architects like Eisenman of translating certain key concepts of the latest philosophical thinking into architectural form, rather than trying to understand its deeper significance - an accusation which could be directed against other architectural trends with theoretical implications as well. In recent years we have seen that architectural theory makes a rather deliberate use of complex theories of natural sciences, such as genetics. It seems that many universities only bestow recognition, and therefore support, on disciplines that can be labelled 'sciences'. The results are clearly visible in the attempts of universities to have architectural design recognised as scientific research - arguing that science itself lacks the solid basis and methodological rigor with which it is normally associated. Facing the consequences, architectural theoreticians today are either happy to give up the observation post of the *theoros* and jump on the bandwagon of architecture marketing, or to withdraw to their studios to dedicate themselves to the *recherche patiente* in pursuit of the precision and delusion of the masterwork.

Design as research

A similar development can be observed in art, where a growing number of artists use methods taken from natural sciences such as biology, genetics or geography. During the 1990s we have seen a new strategy emerging, moving rapidly away from the traditional concept of art and replacing it with notions borrowed from natural sciences. Catherine David, curator of 'Documenta X' in 1997, was interested in the responses of artists to phenomena such as global migrations and the transformation of cities and landscapes under such pressures. Artists such as Olaf Nicolai and Rosemarie Trockel exhibited their biological crossover-experiments, and Rem Koolhaas presented the results of his 'field work' in China, introducing 'a number of new, copyrighted concepts, that [...] represent a new conceptual framework to describe and interpret the contemporary urban condition'.[16] Satellite imagery became particularly important for presenting the urban condition of Europe, as in the work of Stefano Boeri and the Multiplicity group, or in Switzerland, in the work of Studio Basel. Artists such as Peter Fend and Ingo Günter also use satellite photography of crisis regions to create the utopia of a 'Refugee Repub-

lic'. Architecture, urbanism and art appropriate the terminology, concepts and visualisation methods of science: 'a world of numbers turns into diagrams. These diagrams work as emblems for operations, agendas and tasks. A ''datatown" that resists the objective of style', MVRDV write in the introduction to their book 'Metacity Datatown'.[17] Diagrams as emblems: the groundwork is laid here for a new iconography which is staged as a 'reality show'.

Nobody seems to mind whether an artwork masquerading as 'research' fulfils the criteria of a research work in natural science - the possibility of verification, for example - as long as the work has an aesthetic value. But the problem is difficult: art has an almost nostalgic longing for regaining 'usefulness' and for a 'task', though ties to the market and the production conditions of art prevent artists to consider themselves 'free'. However, design and architecture show art a to be mirror image of itself, a mirror image of which art is horrified: a mere aesthetic shell for the social world. If an artwork is planned, generated or executed using the latest computer-controlled machinery, it is not the precision of CAD that will be appreciated, nor the sophistication of a cutting-edge processing package that will make a work of art out of CAM programs - not even when these programs are used in order to drive a milling machine to create a sculpture.

While for art the 'void' of a blank sheet of paper or a video screen without theoretical or technological certainties is essential, architecture and architecture schools tend to fear any such void and fill it with solid knowledge from the very beginning of a curriculum. The task of theory to demonstrate the provisional character of such 'fillings' is not a rewarding one, not even regarding its closest ally, architectural history, since the separation between the past and its representation is frequently pasted over. Implicitly or explicitly, architectural theory should investigate this separateness from the perspective of narrativity or by analysing the connection of historic consciousness to collective and individual memory. While Hayden White speaks of a total discontinuity between the messy, chaotic past and its 'preparation', its ordering for consciousness, Paul Ricoeur sees a connection based on narrativity. Everyday life and action have a narrativity based on the experience of the past, present and future; memory has a temporal structure, which makes memory and history parts of a continuum - even if there are breaks in this continuity. The *process of collecting* and selecting information introduces a first break between the heterogeneous historical material and the envisioned homogeneity of what is seen as the 'representative' body of work, followed by additional breaks of *interpretation*: the interpreter has to identify causes and construct convincing narrative structures. If architectural theory criticises these constructs as such, should it propose alternative explanations?

All these doubts are connected with the central issue: should every school of architecture define the channelling of young people toward the 'profession' as their most important task? And if the 'profession' itself is diversified today, should theory not try to act as a mediator between the different actors who shape the identity of the school? The problem with 'criticality', or rather, the possibility of a critical self-reflection, posits theory within the framework of an architectural school with specific problems.

MoMA's 'Deconstructivist Architecture' show in 1988 clearly exhibited the early signs of exhaustion - critical theory giving way to the theoretical packaging of the latest design propositions. The strong oedipal desire of 'projective' theory (albeit this term was not around yet) for a satisfying relationship with the market or even the willingness to deliver branding services for design practice are understandable after the long abstinence in the post-1968 era. Contemplating architectural theory's 'will to anthology', critics like Sylvia Lavin urge architectural theoreticians to return to their roots in architectural

history studies in order to achieve the 'long-awaited radicalization of history'.[18] The important question is whether this new desire will result in changes in the discipline, or whether built architecture will be given short shrift once again.

Bachelors, masters, and masterpieces

The questions regarding architectural theory take on a new meaning and urgency in the context of architectural education. In a school of architecture there are as many architectural 'philosophies' as design studios, since those who teach architecture certainly could not do so without theoretical reflection. University presidents, in their relentless efforts to turn their institutions into 'centres of competence' funded by the state and by private research grants, opt for 'design as research'. This term suggests that the advanced education of architects is aimed at comparability and the enhancement of the quality of written coursework. This, in itself a positive development, nicely fits in with the process of neo-liberal restructuring of higher education. Such doctorates frequently consist of a curious mixture of the traditional PhD thesis and the idea of the 'masterpiece', as required by the medieval guilds in order to be admitted into their ranks. In the announcement of a university course for a doctorate in the Liberal Arts in Hungary, for instance, we may read: 'Our course realises the old world of traditional master courses: the focus of the course is the making, designing and realising of the independent masterpiece'.[19] While it is easy to comment on such reanimation of the past with sarcasm, it demonstrates the need to cling on to authority, and, primarily, that the mere 'presence' of the master facing the 'void' we discussed above is a necessity in an art school. Let us now return to some of those remarks and see how the situation differs in an architectural school, and examine the consequences for theory.

An architectural school is always deeply embedded in the larger intellectual context of the time; today, this seemingly means that architectural education has been purged of all its metaphysical and teleological elements. Nobody would agree today (certainly not openly) with Otto Wagner, that the 'mysterious and overwhelming power' of architecture has to do with the 'innate ability' of the architect.[20] But many of these discarded concepts are returning through the back door, as the celebration of the star architect or, as we have seen, in the myth of the masterpiece. The design studio is a ripe ground for such developments, since it could not exist without a consensus in terms of a so-called 'design philosophy'. As Charles Correa wrote about the dilemma of education: the studio of the master is one model, what he calls 'the guru-chela system - a wonderfully effective process which unfortunately can all too easily result in the kind of brainwashing from which the chela [the apprentice] never recovers. In the other model, we have the kind of healthy contemporary scepticism which ends up with learning hardly anything at all'.[21]

A 'design philosophy' tends to conceal its own ideological nature as a highly personal ars poetica, not leaving much space for critical questions and understanding. If this 'philosophy' only serves the justification of a design practice, the use of the term 'theory' is unwarranted. On the other hand, an offensive strategy to subsume design practice would damage theory in the long run, because the unfulfilled as well as unfulfillable claim for a 'theory-guided architecture' could result in theory's self-inflicted isolation. The history of architecture, e.g. the different meanings and programs 'rationalism' has taken on during the last century, demonstrates the limits of normative theory, just as it demonstrates the potential productiveness of theoretical 'errors' for architecture. Instead of condemning ideologies as documents of false consciousness, we should regard them as the possibility of the mind, capable of transcending the determinacy of knowledge by the actual social situation.

In order to pave the way for new experiments

in architecture, one must be critical of theoretical schemes and abstractions and build a method deductively, searching for a reflective equilibrium. We can agree with Aldo Rossi that 'l'architettura sono le architetture', but not in the sense that he meant it, that is, as the presence of the past in a dead language of architecture, but rather as a chain of experiments, as trials (and errors), as 'constructs' with a 'constructedness' which is not only unconcealed but appreciated as an essential 'quality' we have to take into account and work with.

This means that the problem for a school of architecture lies not in the 'criticality' of the kind of architectural theory we described as emerging from the spirit of 1968, and subsequently becoming a sort of ennobling patina, but in its discursive nature. But the disciplinary specificity of architecture resists a discursive approach, and architectural students frequently question the usefulness of theory which undermines the foundations of practice, such as place, style, identity, tectonic, context, and even the notion of the 'project' itself, without articulating a constructive proposal. Projectivity does not seem to provide an answer; its claim of performativity lacks the program to regain its organising power over contributions from other specialised disciplines and practices.

Nevertheless, all this does not mean that theory has to withdraw into ineffectiveness. The practice of theory, however, has to remain rooted in language, and should affect the use of language. A course in architectural theory has to question the very terms of architectural discourse. Theory should focus on the terms of our discipline, which are so close to our 'core beliefs' regarding architecture that we usually take their meaning for granted. In order to understand an architectural problem, however, we have to learn about the history of its central terms, the meaning of the words in their respective, relevant theoretical 'surroundings'. 'Space', for example, had a very precise meaning for August Schmarsow, the German art historian who was among the first to analyse architectural space in 1893, and similarly precise, but quite different meanings for Martin Heidegger, Henri Lefebvre and Fernand Braudel. Is the notion of 'space' limited to the sum of these meanings in their respective surroundings? Can the architectural meaning of 'function' be clarified by summing up the mathematical, biological and mechanical understandings and usages of the word? Can we distinguish between correct and incorrect usages? Yet, is it not precisely the unwarranted intrusion into the discourse of architecture of a term developed by another discipline that triggers a process of induction, setting the scene for a new condition? These are questions of a different kind than the question regarding the tensions in a cantilevered support. We can only expect such archaeological work and critical reflection to help us gain an understanding of the problems of space, function or tectonics, not to 'solve' them. In this respect, the terminology of architectural theory is closer to that of philosophy than to that of the natural sciences.

Theory in an architectural school (a discipline which has different tasks than architectural theory in general) has to be helpful in relating questions arising from the confusion regarding the meaning of the words themselves to other, extra-architectural problems. Reflecting on issues such as space or identity requires further thought on issues of politics or the ethics of genetic research. Such a linguistic *bricolage* produces outcomes that are by no means predictable - but could, nevertheless, lead to stimulating results, when the student succeeds in grasping seemingly diverse phenomena at a glance.

This might sound like a withdrawal of architectural theory into the realm of language. We are indeed dealing with language, but it would be wrong to see this focus of theory as a withdrawal. Indeed, after a period of theory alienating architects and the general public, it could now create a rhetoric to influ-

ence our understanding of our environment, which is itself organised on the level of language. Any attempt to turn architectural theory into a research modelled on the ideal ontological quality of the natural sciences, delivering permanent results for practice to build on, will necessarily fail. On the contrary, the very requirement that theory should not be directly involved in design practice, but help students to grasp the underlying problems and their historic roots, will allow theory to exert its influence on design development.

Notes

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3. Martin Heidegger, 'Wissenschaft und Besinnung', in *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1954), p. 52.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Paul Zucker, 'The Paradox of Architectural Theories at the Beginning of the "Modern Movement"', *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians*, Vol. X. No. 3 (Oct. 1951), p. 9.
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8. Étienne-Louis Boullée, 'Architecture. Essai sur l'art', in *L'architecte visionnaire et néoclassique. Textes réunis et présentés par J-M. Pérouse de Montclos* (Paris: Hermann, 1993), p. 45.
9. Ibid.
10. Herman Sörgel, *Theorie der Baukunst: Architektur-Ästhetik* (Munich: Piloty & Loehle, 1918), p. V.
11. Hanno-Walter Kruft, *A History of Architectural Theory from Vitruvius to the Present* (London: Zwemmer, 1994).
12. Manfredo Tafuri, *Architecture and Utopia: Design and Capitalist Development*, trans. B. Luigia La Penta (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1976).
13. See Sylvia Lavin, 'Theory into History or, The Will to Anthology', *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* 58/3 (September 1999), pp. 494-99.
14. See Klaus Sachs-Hombach (ed.), *Bildwissenschaft: Disziplinen, Themen, Methoden*, 2.ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2005).
15. Yve-Alain Bois, 'Surfaces', in *Cities of Artificial Excavation. The Work of Peter Eisenman, 1978-1988*, ed. by Jean-François Bédard (Montréal; New York: Centre Canadien d'Architecture & Rizzoli, 1994), p. 41.
16. Rem Koolhaas, Bruce Mau, 'Pearl River Delta', in *Das Buch zur Documenta X: Politics-Poetics* (Ostfildern: Cantz, 1997), pp. 590-92.
17. MVRDV, *Metacity Datatown* (Rotterdam: 010 Publishers, 1999), p. 18.
18. Sylvia Lavin, *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* , pp. 494-99.
19. *DLA képzés - Doctor Liberalium Artium*, ed. by József Mécsi (Pécs: Pécsi Tudományegyetem, 2007), unpag.
20 Otto Wagner, *Modern Architecture: A Guidebook for his Students to this Field of Art*, trans. by Harry Francis Mallgrave (Santa Monica: The Getty Center, 1988), p. 62.
21. Charles Correa, 'Learning from Ekalavya', in *The Education of the Architect: Historiography, Urbanism, and the Growth of Architectural Knowledge*, ed. by Martha Pollak (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1997), p. 447.

Biography

Ákos Moravánszky has been Professor of the Theory of Architecture at the Institut gta (Institute for the History and Theory of Architecture) of ETH Zurich since June 2005. Born in Székesfehérvár, Hungary, he studied architecture at the TU Budapest. He received his doctorate at the TU Vienna in 1980. He was a Research Associate at the Zentralinstitut für Kunstgeschichte in Munich and at the Getty Center in Santa Monica, California. From 1991 until 1996 he was Visiting Professor at the MIT (Cambridge, Mass.). In 2003/2004 he was Visiting Professor at the University of Applied Art in Budapest. The main areas of his research are the history of East and Central European

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Max Raphael, Dialectics and Greek Art

Patrick Healy

In the following article I would like to outline what is required for a theory of art in the late work of Max Raphael, by showing that it is a response to a problematic first formulated, but left unanswered, by Marx, and which can be seen as developed by Raphael in his writing, especially the text he devoted to a dialectic interpretation of Greek art, with special reference to temple architecture. In detailing this latter study it will be possible to see how Raphael's understanding and analysis is guided by his account of an empirical theory of art, and contributes to its further elaboration.

For Raphael an empirical theory of art requires that it is possible to envisage making art an object of scientific cognition, and he takes scientific method for what it is, or what it has become in the course of its development. If there is no exact theory of art then Raphael puts this down to self-imposed limitations; the most significant of which is that every domain of knowledge must be built up from elementary units e.g. the point in mathematics, the cell in biology, the sensation in academic psychology. A further entailment from this is that more complex entities must be constructed out of such elements with no reference to any concept of the whole.

For the facts of art Raphael argues that one should start with a more highly structured element whose components are variable, and which enter into many combinations, mutations; that is to say, he wants to replace an abstract system of concepts, each designating a simple thing by simple terms, with a system of variable elements and variable functions. In the domain of art scientific method could be enlarged by pairing the concept of particularity with a concept of totality. For Raphael this requirement flows from the way in which the universal manifests itself in the particular, and further it is not sufficient to 'subsume' the particular under the universal.

A further consideration for an empirical theory of art is that since art transforms historical realities into symbols, and this leads to a hierarchy of values, it cannot be studied without reference to values, nor can a sharp line be drawn between history and existence, as in the natural and social sciences.

Raphael envisages a theory of art constituting of three parts – phenomenology, history, and criticism, and as these parts are independent, as history is not dissolved in art, nor art in history, it is necessary to introduce constitutive categories, such as element, totality and relation, and for Raphael the new and important category of realisation, for understanding the universal and particular. Again it should be observed that each category is implied in each of the others, and that all of these categories, including descriptive concepts of form, over-all form, configuration, realisation, are to be defined solely by the way they are built up and developed in works of art.

Taking just one example, which becomes valuable for the later reading of Raphael, that of over-all form or configuration, *Werkgestalt*, one is neverthe-

less dealing with a stage in a process, a stage in which a number of concrete factors have combined in a unique way and which has become relatively independent. In the concept of *Werkgestalt* we have the analysis of form as a process, for Raphael does not use the term 'form' to signify abstract relations, such as proportions or symmetry, which can then be applied, rather, it indicates, as form, something concrete and material with a content and structure, where abstract relations are merely regulative factors; that is to say for Raphael form is a constituted existent, and every actual form is constituted as effective form, and of course there are various types and degrees of form, choice of material, means of representation, sensory qualities, and types of modelling, the manner of combining them being then determined by a given content which becomes accessible in the course of constituting form.

What unifies the yet unknown content and the nascent form with autonomous existence, is the method governing the artist's choice and the kind of synthesis achieved, as Raphael adds in the notes he prepared aboard the ship Murzinho on the 17th of June 1941, when fleeing from persecution in Europe: 'The fundamental problem of an empirical theory of art is thus neither content or form, nor content and form, but the method by which an artistic form is created for a given content.'[1]

A central problem for Raphael is his identification of what he describes as the brilliantly formulated but still unresolved theory of art, as expressed by Karl Marx in his 'Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie':

But the difficulty is not in grasping the idea that Greek art and epos are bound up with certain forms of social development. It rather lies in understanding why they still constitute with us a source of aesthetic enjoyment and in certain respects prevail as the standard and model beyond attainment. A man cannot become a child again… But does he not enjoy the artless way of the child and must he not strive to reproduce its truth on a higher plane? Why should the social childhood of mankind, where it had obtained its most beautiful development, not exert an eternal charm as an age that will never return? There are ill-bred children and precocious children. Many of the ancient nations belong to the latter class. The Greeks were normal children. The charm their art had for us does not conflict with the primitive character of the social order, from which it had sprung. It is rather the product of the latter, and is due to the fact that the unripe social conditions under which art arose and under which alone it could appear also could never return.[2]

For Raphael, Marx's thinking here sounds 'pretty bourgeois', almost indistinguishable from the contemporary adumbrations of the Swiss historian Jacob Burckhardt.[3] There is a failure to deal with the problem raised in the work of Marx, and indeed Raphael finds the term 'eternal charm' doubly untenable, both as eternal and as charm.

Raphael contends that art is an ever renewed creative act, the active dialogue between spirit and matter, and that the work of art holds creative powers in a crystalline suspension from which again it can be transformed into creative energies. Indeed, for Raphael art is not an opiate but a weapon: art is the productive act which dissolves frozen and reified elements and which gives form to this process by combining opposites into a unity.

However, to understand art what is required is the development of an active analysis. Such an analysis needs to flow from the created work to the process of creation. Artistic creation should be shown as directed towards an individual idea, or conception, where the subjective-conditional, and the objective-absolute elements are combined, that is, directed towards totality and necessity, and such an active analysis of art, 'must replace the world of things with a hierarchy of value'.[4]

The most significant change which can be witnessed in the later work of Raphael is that it is art and the study of art that allows for a movement from the work to the process of creation.[5] Referring to the pragmatic and aesthetic attitude towards art, Raphael observes that neither does justice to the work of art, because the work of art is reality enhanced, which engages the senses both as a whole and in every one of its details and is yet a symbol of non-sensory meaning, which extends down to the still deeper layers without ever ceasing to appeal to our senses.

This enhanced reality, which has so misleadingly been called 'illusion' is not ready made but develops before our eyes and in our minds, not in the sense that we witness an objective spiritual development, a growth from germ to completion. We see how form is constituted by a specific artistic method and how form follows necessarily upon form. That is what I meant when I said that art leads from the work to the process of creation. The icy crust of mere presence has melted away and we experience the creative process itself in the new, enhanced reality in which it both appeals to our senses and suggests an infinite wealth of meaning.[6]

By following Raphael's analysis of the temple of Zeus at Olympia we can watch his later theoretical insights at work,[7] and see an example of what he means by active analysis. I will briefly outline the problem that is initially at play for Raphael, the understanding of the classical body in his analysis of the temple of Zeus at Olympia, and of how a principle of balance and equipoise, along with the showing of unrestrained movement, can take place in the severe tectonic rigour of Doric architecture. This allows one with a concrete example to understand his active analysis at work, and may be construed as his detailed response to the question raised in the work of Marx about Greek art.[8]

Thanks to the researches of Max Raphael it is possible to address this question directly, as he too sought to understand the notion of the classical body from investigation of the central figure in the west pediment of the temple of Zeus at Olympia, and insisted that at the heart of this art is dialectics, which is fundamentally inimitable, being, as he says, one of the supreme ironies of history that such a dialectical art should come to be regarded as the most dogmatic, 'as the mother of all academies'.[9]

If we examine the central figure we see that, like the pediment, it is most closely related to the architecture, and within the pediment it is closely related to other figures; this suggests a relation as part of a community and a 'formal whole'. Thus the two conceptions of the figure exclude the conception of it as a body confined to itself, that is, self-contained and primarily and absolutely autonomous.

As would be expected given the formal difficulty attached to pediments populated with relief figures, the triangular space imposed by the tectonics of the roof involved difficulties for the sculptor. As might be observed it is impossible to show characters of the same dimension in a triangular frame, whose height progressively shifts. One solution was to vary the module. An example of this, rare and fairly extreme, can be seen in the apotropaic Gorgon figure of the Temple of Artemis at Corfu, probably early 6th century BC, where the menacing, striding figure of the Gorgon is accompanied by a visibly diminished figure of Chrysaor, and smaller figures fill in at the angles.

Another solution was to vary the attitude. Thus figures could be shown in various attitudes, kneeling, crouching, recumbent, standing. This 'method' can be seen in the early Siphnian Treasury at Delphi, around 525 BC, and the Megarian treasury at Olympia. It has been argued in explanation that the Greek artists rapidly and through trial and error found solutions which then quickly established themselves as conventions, and the quest



Fig. 1: An illustration of the west pediment of the temple of Zeus in Olympia. © The editors.

for verisimilitude, the striving towards the greatest possible similarity between image and reality, led to the abandoning of the shifted or varied module as at Corfu, and the search was on for better pictorial responses to the architectural constraints. So, as the metope favours subjects with two or three actors, and the continuous frieze favours many groups, for pediments with the necessity of showing people lying and kneeling, the battle scene became popular, although not obligatory. Uncertainty ended about methods of responding to the pre-imposed restraint of architecture in the early fifth century. Accordingly it is then argued that the definitive formula was adopted in 480 BC at the Temple of Aegina, and twenty years later, at the Temple of Zeus in Olympia.

In the analysis of Raphael, the varying height of the pedimented area only partly determines the choice and arrangement of the objects presented in it; its shallow depth determines the type of modelling, which in this case is in high relief. The varying height of the pediment which increases as one moves from the sides to the centre, imposes a distinction between main and secondary figures, and a gradation in the importance of the action, and even a specific manner of regulating this action.

The strongly accentuated centre imposes a symmetrical arrangement and precludes a continuous development from a beginning to an end, and since the slanting sides of the triangle suggest a rising movement if they are seen from both ends, and a falling movement if they are seen from the apex, the dimension of width is broken up into two opposed directions, and this is what raises the problem of their unity. Similar problems arise in the dimension of height. The form of the pediment compels the artist to decide not only whether each of his figures can suggest a rising or falling movement, but as to how each of them should embody both movements in its own way.

In the dimension of depth the figure, the human figure, is situated between the open space in front, with its light and air, and the impenetrable wall behind, so that the volume of the body can be developed only in parallel and diagonal directions in relation to its two different boundaries. Raphael makes the telling observation that the outstretched arm and the head of the central figure of the west pediment suggest the form of a half pediment, thus the form of the pediment has been introduced into the human figure. Conversely, the asymmetry of this figure has been carried into the symmetrical form of the pediment.

The height of the pediment at mid-point, that is the height of the pedimental triangle, performs two functions; it coordinates all symmetrically located elements, and it introduces a paradoxical asymmetry at the point of convergence. There is then a double function: one of centring and one of breaking-up. However, the tallest and significant central figure in the west pediment is not supported by a column, but stands above a void which opens into a dimension of non-being. This suggests the formlessness of fate and the absolute necessity to which even the god is subject. In the east pediment of the Temple, Zeus is placed over a similar void. Fate encompasses all.

However, it must be noted that the middle axis of the edifice is at first purely ideal, and remains intangible and invisible. It is framed by an architectonic form in the triglyph and achieves plastic form only in the pediment. At the very point where the ideal axis achieves physical existence it is broken and shifted. Instead of the previous apparent perfect symmetry, there is a balancing of the similar and symmetrical, but uneven masses around an axis. This is a fluid balance. It is a synthesis of actual imbalance and ideal balance.

The architecture discloses the dimension of non-being in the human figure, the human figure



Fig. 2: Details of west pediment, temple of Zeus at Olympia. © The editors.

discloses the fundamental conflicting character of the being of the architecture. The triangular form of the pediment does not determine the forms of figures and groups directly. But, rather, the determination is indirect in so far as it is itself determined by the architectural whole of which it is part.

Within this architectural whole the geometric triangle does not occur in the pediment only, as a form that mediates between the vertical columns and the horizontal stairs and entablature. From the corners of the stereobate over those of the stylobate, and of the anta behind the peristyle, sloping lines lead into depth. These lines, taken with the horizontal lines of the staircase mark the beginning of a triangle that is complete only ideally in the interior of the cella.

In his study of the Doric Temple, Raphael had drawn attention to the significance of the ideal triangle for the Temple of Paestum, where it touches the lower corners of the abacus in the two central columns, which is so important for the static play of forces, while in the corner columns it touches the upper corner of the abacus, so that the contraction of the intercolumniation of the façade is closely related to the height of the abacus, and the phenomenon of contraction and tapering becomes recognisable as two variations of the same idea.[10] The real pedimental triangle that crowns the temple façade is thus just the combination of the ideal triangle in the dimension of height and dimension of depth and related to the space, the perpendicular forces of load and support, and the proportions.

There is another relation between the triangular pediment and the rectangular peristyle which is not directly perceivable, but can be rationally recognised and responded to in its effect. The two slanting sides of the pediment suggest two movements, one rising from the corners to the centre, the other falling from the centre to the corners. This is also matched in the peristyle by the fact that the spacing between the columns is greater at the centre than at the sides. The greatest height and the heaviest part of the pediment is above the widest intercolumniation, the point of weakest support. If we disregard this structural paradox, which seems resolved in the pediment by the linking of perpendicular forces with the horizontal thrust, it remains that the two movements, along the columns and ideally on the horizontal, continue in the peristyle. They are not, however, related internally.

In contrast to this, the simultaneous centripetal and centrifugal movements in the pediment are effected along two slanting lines, which are so to speak the parallelograms of directions. They are the results of two vectors, horizontal and vertical. Thus, their function is one of mediation. The triangle begun in the peristyle is completed in the pediment, but nevertheless, it only remains a part. It is a part not only of the actual front, but also of the ideal rectangle, whose diagonals we can obtain by extending the sides of the pedimental triangle. The actual triangle becomes part of the enveloping ideal space that is not embodied in material form, just as the space surrounding the structure, below the pediment, remains invisible.

The basic attitude to infinite space is expressed in the dimension of depth and height. The intention is to limit the space physically and to express only a part of the whole, but at the same time to express the whole in the part. The slanting lines of the pediments are the result of two forces, not just of two vectors. The upward thrusting force, the support, is gradually de-materialised with the tapering of the columns. The down thrusting force, load, is increasingly materialised in order to hold back underground powers in the horizontal stairs. The pediment mediates between the two forces. It should not be looked upon as a static frame, but as a field of opposing forces, which has become form.

The central figure in the west pediment continues the rising movement from below, but starting from

a void. It is not the continuation of a column. The figure, at the same time, has in the head a closeness to the apex of the pediment, and is more exposed to the ideal pressure from above than to the force up-surging from below.

Raphael fully rejects the interpretation of the Greek Temple as a plastic body without spatial dynamism, as a solution of a purely mechanical problem. The Greek temple embodies and is the embodiment of the dialectical interaction of antithetical forces of various kinds, spatial, physical and intellectual. Architecture here embodies such forces in a permanent, finite, harmonious and clearly articulated structural body; the most important element of this is the depth of the pediment. This reference to depth refers to the intrinsically small interval between the open space in front and the pediment wall behind. The sculptor is guided in his treatment of this space in the same way as the architect applies his treatment to the space between the stereobate and the cella wall.

Above the stereobate, between the steps and the corona, the air-filled space opens up, and this is part of the artistic method, as this space is differentiated from the surrounding atmosphere by the over-all character of the structure. Directly behind it on the stylobate there is a space filled with bodies and air, rich in contrast between lights and dark, warm and cold, and which performs important functions, front and back. It is bounded by the air-filled space in front, and by the air of the pteron at the back, imprisoned between the ceiling and the walls. The latter space lies in the shadow, which grows gradually darker inside. The alternations between full and empty, light and dark, warmth and coldness, over the whole width of the front are knit together by the modelling plane, i.e. the imaginary plane parallel to the frontal and back planes, which passes through the row of columns. This static modelling plane is supplemented by a dynamic factor.

Standing in front of the middle axis of the temple, we see the two centre columns almost frontally, the next two at an angle, and the two corner columns at a sharper angle. The columns never stand exactly in the axes of the stylobate and thus the lights on them are distributed asymmetrically. This creates a great variety of light, ranging from brilliance to darkness. This is further enriched by the varied light and dark areas inside. Lights and shadows of various intensity and quality play on the surface on all sides.

Raphael concludes then as to the architect's intention. The conception of the Greek architect starts from an ideal structure closed on all sides. This is transformed into actual artistic structure by, 1: opening the ideal wall to admit surrounding air and light, so that an air-filled space is placed in front of the space encompassed by the building, 2: opening the part behind this air-filled space at several points and creating an alternation of masses and voids and a vibration of the void around an axial plane, 3: indicating a diagonal which runs from the corners of the steps and through the corner columns, cutting across all the parallel planes on both sides to the centre, and 4: leaving one solid wall which checks the play of masses and lights, only to open up behind it the inner spaces. It is the same principle of alternating air-filled spaces and portions of the wall and diagonal intersections, which is applied by the sculptor in his treatment of the space of the pediment.

The argument for unity is further enhanced by the consideration of the column, showing that it was created because the architect felt the need to break up the ideal wall, and to express the contrast between the full and the void as a stage in the process of opening up depth. Ridges and grooves run along the entire column in unbroken straight lines. These rigid rational geometric lines constitute as it were the outer aspect of the activity and mechanical forces between centre and periphery. They enable us to view the column as a complex

of forces that are tied together visibly at its neck, in order then to open up of their own accord and to spend themselves.

The form of the echinus can be read as a reversal of that of the shaft. The Greek column is not compelled to support, but does so, as it were of its own accord. Although the column originates in space-forming forces that have nothing to do with the perpendicular static forces of load and support, it is a form that not only provides support, but is also in perfect balance with all the other forces, so that developing energy and actual structure constitute an indissoluble unity.

What Raphael shows is that, just as the column was developed from the ideal wall, so the human figure was developed from the shallow space of the pediment in accordance with two principles, that of the supporting and relaxed leg, and that of rotation. These principles are combined with the boundaries of the block in a three-dimensional system of co-ordinates that is shifted in several directions.

The starting points of the architect and the sculptor are different; the architect starts from the spurious infinity of physical space, which he transforms into a finite spatial body that contains the true infinite. The sculptor starts from the finiteness of the physical body and tries to express in it the infinity of the totality of the spiritual and artistic space. The two paths cross and complement each other in a single reality whose material surface is the unity of all developed oppositions. Both sculptor and architect use the same method.

The column is first and foremost an architectonic function and form, serving mainly to give form to space and to embody the play of forces. When these forces have achieved formal existence, the human proportion is added. Conversely, in the human body the forces of load and support are secondary, subordinated to forces which both physically and spiritually are greater than the perpendicular forces, because they come from the earth and from consciousness.

Only at the historical moment of Greek creation were these qualitatively and essentially different elements linked by being subject to the same artistic principle. Here we can understand the body more clearly. According to Raphael's theory the mechanical play of forces in the objective world is analogous to the play of ideas in consciousness. Subject and object, being and consciousness, are in accord, or coincide through the mediation of the human body. It is the human body which, once thinking and being have been conceived as distinct entities and have entered into a sufficiently close relationship, can become the vehicle of the synthesis of both, because the human body shares in both.

In this conception of what is an epistemological problem, mechanism and organism cease to be an absolute antithesis, and mechanism, within certain limits can be treated artistically in analogy to the organism, as an organism can be treated in analogy to mechanical forces. The consequences for architecture which Raphael draws from this are as follows: firstly, the entablature is placed like a continuous horizontal band on the individual vertical columns, and since no column is directly connected with the one next to it, it is the whole row of columns that support the entablature. Secondly, the round echinus and the square abacus are fitted to each other as closely as possible. This is very much in contrast to the tall blocks on the top of Egyptian columns. And thirdly, each of the two elements influences the form of the other; the weight of the entablature is expressed in the column by the entasis, and the rising movement of the column is expressed in the triglyph above the abacus. The difference between the two influences is shown in the triglyphs, which seem to be flowing downwards, and is stressed by the guttae. The presence of a homogenous chain of supporting forms, the mediat-

ing function of the capital, and the influence of each formal element on the other distinguish the treatment of the perpendicular forces in the Doric temple from that of any other architectural order.

It should be noted that the treatment of forces varies according to whether or not they come into contact with full masses or a void. Such variations reflect the original opposition between the full and the void. Further variations occur in the treatment of these oppositions. The full is rendered in the squat form of the echinus or the abacus which does not yield to pressure and embodies the pure zero point. The void is rendered either in the narrow dividing line, between the echinus and the abacus, or, in the shadows which envelop the entire capital.

It is a result of the type of interpenetration between the full and the void, that grants the predominantly dramatic, or lyrical, even one can say, epic character to the temple. These differences depend on the line of vision of the viewer and vary with it. There can be no schematic interpretation because of this issue of visibility of the perpendicular forces, for example of the sculpture.

The body is related not only to the architecture but also to other human figures in the pediment. They together form a meaningful and coherent unity. The method of representing action is of course influenced by the pediment division into symmetrical halves. One sees the principle of axial articulation asserted not only in the central figures, but also in the two figures and even in the three figure groups. There is neither priority given to space nor to time. Statics and dynamics are developed simultaneously. The interplay between them characterises the composition as a whole. There are self-abolishing antithetical movements, and symmetries within an over-all symmetry, and this is what marks the individual figures.

Because of the way in which static and dynamic elements are unified, action is not portrayed in the form of a narrative with a beginning and an end, or in the form of a sum of simultaneous episodes. Instead, we have a limited number of groups, each showing a specific moment of the action, and suggesting the moments that preceded and followed it. The artistic action develops from the centre to the corners, whilst the real action, develops from the corners to the centres. Yet, the tension between the two is preserved. The mirror-like symmetry between the two halves of the pediment serves to stress the contrasts between the struggling parties and between moments of dramatic suspense and moments of activity.

This makes it finally clear why asymmetries within the over-all symmetrical order are so important here. For it is only by means of asymmetries and *contraposto* that movement in time can be expressed in static terms. But, only those asymmetries and *contraposto* which serve to express differences with respect to time, stages of development, or intensity are artistically justified. Otherwise they degenerate and become mechanical, as Raphael suggests they often do in Renaissance art. For example, in the two figure groups the asymmetries play an even clearer role than in the single figure composition, one group of which faces towards the centre whether placed on right or left, whereas the other faces away. This indicates clearly that the two triads on either side of the pediment are separated by a time gap. Failure to recognise the dialectical play of time and space exemplified in the sculptural work leads inevitably to the pseudo-classical *contraposto* and the academic organ-pipe arrangement.

The relation between whole and part is not one of direct dependence. The whole does not directly determine the parts. This absence of dependence and direction is made possible by the operation of a formal mathematical principle which governs the geometrical shape and the proportions of the whole and the part, so that their harmony is achieved

independently and each preserves an appearance of freedom. Its mathematical character shows that it was conceived as a link between the idea and phenomenon. The order to which the conflicting forces aspire was an order of being. The whole was always conceived as an articulated whole, which was not allowed to impinge on the independence or freedom of the part, no more than the parts were allowed to break up the whole.

The proportions that governed the parts were adjusted to the proportions that governed the whole, as elements of the latter. The absolute dimensions of the elements determined the proportions. From the whole a unit of measurement was derived by a series of operations and the unit of measurement led back to the whole by a series of operations in reverse. Therefore the community of elements in the Doric temple cannot be expanded, the temple is a finite whole, incapable of any metaphysical approximation to the infinite.

For Raphael the work of art was not an imitation of reality or a merely imagined ideal; it was the idea conceived of as the unity of the actual and the possible, it expressed the ideal of unity between the controlled and the yet uncontrolled sectors of the world. It was the embodiment of the artist's vision of unity.

A further series of observations on the axial system is in place, and helps to grasp what is essential for classical art all the way down to the deployment of particular techniques. It is this which gives Raphael's analysis such power that it can help one understand the finite body of the architecture both in its making and as process. The axial system in its relation to the original block plays a prominent part. Each axis introduces a specific orientation into the undifferentiated body of the block, and this results in a separation which sorts out one direction from the other and opposes it to them, so that the block is built around the axes.

Each axis reduces one of the planes of the block to a line and finally all the lines to a point, so that the two operations can be carried out in every dimension in two directions, and further the directions can be said to converge or diverge. This leads to a twofold process, depending on whether we view it from without or within; that is to say, the block is reduced from planes to lines to a point, or vice versa, the point can be expanded into space. Space is transformed into an active process with this shifting of the axial system. The key question here is, what is the cause of this shift, which results in a figure characterised by subjection to space and freedom to determine space? An understanding of classical art depends then primarily on the relationship obtaining between figure and space, or, to state it more precisely, on man's relation to space as defined by his stance.

Clearly, space is not created by the adding of one part of a body to another. Neither is it the case that a body is created by a concretisation of specific parts of space. Space and body are in the main two different qualities of the existent, with different metaphysical accents. The artist first creates provisional boundaries for space, which are not those of the human figure but of the block itself. He then makes the figure move in space, first within the same boundaries, and then in relation to the horizon of nature. He defines the boundaries of this space that has been enlarged into a bounded infinity as a variation of the pediment triangle.

The classical artist thus attempts two things, to measure space by man, and man by space, or, in other words, to reduce space to human dimension, and to move man in space to the extent that he can determine it. The block and the pediment play the part of mediations, but both leave a portion of space unformed, or give it only an outside, frame-like boundary. Here one can speak of the finite self-fashioning as expressed in the figure's stance which 'anthropomorphises' the abstract system of co-ordi-

nates. The academic formula of the supporting and relaxed leg, of load and support, have completely obscured the historical uniqueness and complex nature of the classical Greek stance by interpreting it in purely mechanical terms.

The three elements which signify diversity in the figure analyses from the Olympia pediment are extension-flexion, raising-lowering, and rotation-counter-rotation. The supporting leg suggests that it has not been disturbed by an outside force, but is tied to the ground and capable of providing support. The relaxed leg suggests it has been disturbed, and is detached from the ground and thus incapable of providing support. Here, there is a simultaneous and differing effect of a cause, which is shown by different reactions as observed by the artist. The supporting leg is capable of providing support only because it is itself supported by a firm and resistant body. This body can only be the earth. This is what gives it the strength that caused the other leg to bend. The resulting flexion creates an angle, which with the angle of the arm, opened out in the opposite direction, creates also alternating convexities and concavities. These recur in rounded forms at the edge of the drapery, on the opposite side of the figure, where they clearly suggest waves.

In that sense earth is opposed to water. But apart from that interpretation, there is the fact that we have one leg bound and held by the earth and the forces of the earth, and beside it a leg that is about to move, that contains all possible movements, but does not move, that is a merely potential movement that is not followed by an actual movement. It is this mobility, both momentary and permanent that makes the flexed leg incapable of providing support. Thus, load and support within the human body, the statics of its perpendicular forces, are dependent upon forces that transcend the individual body. The classical position of the legs has been interpreted as a reduction of the Egyptian walking position, but one is more justified in deriving the movement of rotation from the dancing step.

The new stance could be interpreted as a synthesis between two ritual movements, running and dancing. The new synthesis is based on the comparison of complete finitude of stationary point with the infinity of open space. The stance embodies the elements of initial disturbance, resistance, restored balance, potential and actual movement, and an unsupported load floating in space.

The play of the perpendicular forces is also only part of a greater interplay, whether interpreted as disturbance and restoration of balance, or, as freedom and un-freedom. Even though the function of the perpendicular forces is thus restricted, it is of fundamental importance because it humanises conflicting extra-human forces and resolves the conflict between them on a human plane.

Differently from the articulation in archaic art of the stone masses as determined exclusively by the proportions and forms of the human body, classical art conceives of the human body as a complicated play of self-regulating levers, each acting upon others and reacting to them, and action and reaction always balanced in accordance with the principle of the organic muscle. The classical body is a machine constructed after the pattern of the living organism, and muscular action is suggested even where the position of the masses could be accounted for by gravitation alone.

One can thus gain a clearer picture of the function and significance of the axial system. It is not a geometric pattern that determines the work a priori. It serves to illustrate the interplay of the antithetical forces that are grouped around the point of intersection of the co-ordinates. The axial system embodies all these forces, it expresses both the disturbance of the initial state of absolute repose and the effort to restore balance by measuring the deviation from the former and the approximation to the latter, the

interval between potentiality and actuality, between wish and fulfilment. It unifies the diverse forces into a single cause, making the latter visible. This unifying function extends beyond the figure, for it is the axial system that links the figure to the block, the block to the pediment, and the pediment to the architecture, thus it is the nucleus of an integral work of art.

The axial system also performs another function; it provides an over-all frame for the figure and its parts, which links the universal and the concrete, idea and forms. This is the biune cause, the polar that Raphael identifies for the mechanical and organic elements, the statics and the dynamics of the human body being used to solve problems which involve far more than the human body, but are the only means that the classical stance indicates by which man, for all his dependence on forces outside of him, can become spontaneous by balancing them against one another, and asserting his freedom as a being that supports itself and restores its own balance.

Some of the forces, such as those which disturb the position of absolute repose and shift the vertical axis to the left, are extra human. Others are human, such as forces of resistance originating in the inertia of the human body, the conscious forces that restore the balance, and the spontaneous forces that break apart the restored balance, implying human activity in the outside world. The non-human forces can be divided into efficient or moving causes, and final causes. The former include the earth forces, the ancient equivalent of gravitation, the forces of personal fate, *daimonion*, and the forces of universal destiny, *ananke*. The final causes assume three forms: *gestus* of the action, Moira, or fate as recognised or desired justice, and living harmonious form.

Thus in speaking of the biune cause, it is recognised that the balance in question is not between two different things, but between two forces of essentially different kinds. This also defines the action represented in the human figure, the action which is potentially started on one side of the figure, where it is directed against both the cause of the original static balance and the disturbance, to be actualised as the restoration of balance, where it must be transferred to the other side. This transfer is affected by an ideal rotation of the space behind the figure's back, as if this space symbolised the shrine in which the consultant of the oracles slept, in order to receive dreams that determined their actions.

The biune cause is the key to understanding the classical conception of man, just as cosmic-mystical monism is the key to understanding the Indian, dualism to that of the Egyptian, and triunity to that of the Christian conception. It is the human figure which fully embodies the operation of the biune cause that shifted the axial system. The question then is, how did the artist embody the unity between the inner and outer world in matter as such?

When we turn to the sculpture we must say that the statue does not merely translate an idea into a language of the senses. It is also the material embodiment of the idea, and one needs to understand how matter as matter becomes the vehicle of the unity of opposites. This requires a precise material analysis. One can begin by examining the question of perception. Light penetrates into the marble, animates it without dematerialising it. Classical art is bound to marble to such an extent that one could say it would not exist without it. No other art has ever used marble for the same purpose or treated it in the same way as classical art.

From observations on technique Raphael draws a number of inferences about the creative method:

1. The number of tools was deliberately limited. The Greek artist was not guided by ideas of efficiency engineering. His primary aim was not to produce results with a minimum of labour. Rather, he made

the greatest intellectual effort to achieve the best possible results in accordance with the immanent requirements of the given work. Its effectiveness is inherent in its intensity; it is not imposed on it in advance.

2. Individual layers were successively removed from the block, which was explored in depth from all sides. In each of these operations the sculptor never lost sight of the figure as a whole and aimed at a spiritual-physical surface, instead of a natural or technical-physical. As a consequence no part of the form was treated more naturalistically than the whole, and every detail reflected the overall conception, neither the individual form nor the composition is at any stage divorced from the stone medium. Thus both naturalism and abstract naturalism were excluded.

3. The work of carving with the point and the work of polishing with pumice or sand were not treated as independent of each other; contours were not opposed to interior forms. The initial rough planes obtained by the point were worked over with the claw tool before they were evened up and polished by friction. The artist aimed consistently at actualising the natural potential of the medium. Objective apprehension and exploration of the medium was determined by the idea, to the same extent as it made possible the realisation of the idea. The idea being realised not only in the medium but also in the means of visual expression, that is, line, colour and light.

The latter point supports the proposition that it is the essence of classical art to represent the individual idea not so much through the human figure, but as the human figure. Even in the argument with regard to the light and form it is necessary to understand that it is closely related to the conception of an air-filled space. It differs from the Egyptian conception of juxtaposing full and empty areas in the block, and endowing both with equal intensity, and it also differs from the conception of absolutely empty space in which, or, in front of which things are placed. The void is regarded as mere appearance, matter is known as of two kinds with different qualities, and the qualities of air and stone are linked when each penetrates into the other, and internally when bodies occupy air-filled space, giving it, as it were, a spiritual-material quality, while the air dematerialises the bodies. In this way sculpture is linked to the space outside it, and its distance from the viewer becomes an element of the work and is given form like the other elements. This is why a Greek sculpture seldom looks into the void; it gazes directly or indirectly at the viewer.

We can then say that the classical artist recognises that ideality and reality are opposites, and that he accepts this opposition as an absolute necessity. He does not spiritualise matter nor conceive of it as a metaphysical substance, he does not conceive the process of creation as a gradual descent from ideality to materiality, or, as a gradual ascent from materiality to ideality. He achieves the union of the two without blurring their antithetical character, so that each preserves its own specificity. The two are equally important and they form a union in which materiality has become ideal without ceasing to be material, and ideality has become material without ceasing to be ideal.

Ideality is potential materiality just as materiality is potential ideality. The self-realisation of this biunity implies that the potential materiality of the ideal, and the potential ideality of the material have been realised. The two processes lead to a point where materialised ideality and idealised materiality become identical, and this identity is the *Gestalt* of the process, the being of the method. In classical art the objectively given and the subjectively posited coincide without losing their specificity. There is no pantheistic-mystical fusion of the opposites into a sameness, rather each preserves its separate existence, and the two find their unity in man, in the idea

of his consciousness, which is at the same time the surface of his body. The mode of reality embodied in classical art can be called the self-constituting form of material ideality.

Thus the aesthetic feeling expressed in the figure, its mode of reality and its inner composition, disclose that the subject treated is man and his relationship with space and fate in its human and extra-human aspects. The conception of man, space, and fate embodied in it are determined by specific historical conditions, and reflect a specific level of material and spiritual production rather than nature. The type of artistic structure being dealt with here is not based on imitation of the natural human organism, although human forms are used to embody the visual representation.

The biune principle is developed into a dialectical process which results in a single form; within the form the conflict between the two opposites is not eliminated. For this reason the type of structure realised here is not quasi-organic, that is, it is not a system in which a series of causes coincides with a series of ends. Although the type of structure is not patterned after the natural human organism, the conception underlying the work is realised in the human figure, which expresses the ideal of unity between natural and historical man, and between man as empirically given and the Idea of man.

What is the kind of man suggested by the figure? Its physical appearance is largely determined by proportions, for example the unit of measurement is clearly indicated in the head and feet. The minor difference between the dimensions stresses the importance of their relationship for the over-all figuration, *Gestaltbildung*. The fact that the part of the body which is least free and the part which is freest are linked in their inner composition denotes that everything outside the body is related to the body, is made inherent in the body. The unit of measurement and its sub-divisions, one half and one third, remain effective as a measure throughout the figure, but they are rarely exact, and least of all at the most emphasised places. Everywhere there is slight deviance from the fundamental unit, and as a result the metric structure has a rhythmic quality combining necessity and freedom.

In this structure, next to deviations from the exact unit of measurement, combinations consisting of multiples of the unit and with added halves or thirds play a special part. To overlook the difference between metric structure and rhythm, or to imprison the composition in mathematically exact grid lines, would be to reduce the creative process to a lifeless mechanism.

To the proportions that determine the interrelationships between individual forms and harmonises them with one another, one must add the internal proportions of these forms themselves. No part of the body is overly contracted at one place or overly extended at another, and nowhere is the continuity between two parts broken or in an exaggerated way stressed. The strongly in-drawn hips, for example, which characterise the archaic type of human being is eliminated, and the shoulders are no longer considerably broader than the hips. Bones are emphasised when this is justified by their function, e.g. knees, hips, shoulders, so that the body appears as a solid structure.

Elsewhere the bones are surrounded by flesh in such a way that bones seem to attract the flesh, incite a cleaving, and hold it firmly, and the flesh seems to loosen the bone. The simultaneous effect of tightness and looseness rests no doubt on the treatment of the muscles, which are fully adequate to their function. The part they play is not overstressed and it gives a strong impression of spontaneity.

The mechanical functions involved in the living interplay of the parts of the body are clearly shown, yet they are fully integrated into the whole, precisely

because each part performs many functions, spatial, measuring, static, compositional, which relativise one another, and because the artist's imagination is concentrated on the reality of the form as a whole. We are shown changing tensions and relaxations, that is, there is slight quantitative variation in the unit of energy and volume; because energy no longer serves magical purposes, it is conceived of as the living force of the human body, expressing the interplay between action and reaction.

So, the figure stands within the block whose greatest height, without the head, equals six units and whose width at the hips equals one and a half units, with a drapery or two. Between the shoulders and the hips the torso forms a rectangle within the rectangle of the block. Then the width decreases considerably, and the lower part of the body even seems narrower than it is, because the area occupied by the two seems reduced by being in the shadow. The entire lower body could be inscribed into an angle, parallel to the frontal plane, and with its apex located between the feet. If its sides were extended to the armpits they would abut against the rectangle of the torso. The resultant figure links the centre of the bottom side of the block with the corners of its top side, and consists of a rectangle placed above a triangle.

In classical man sensibility is neither dominated by irrational emotions, nor rationalised by the understanding. It is expressed as a balance between man's physical and spiritual forces. It is love for the world as a whole, not for specific material objects, nor the metaphysical Idea of Ideas. This sensibility is not passive receptivity, for the *sensorium* is faced with a force which prevents man from becoming the product of his environment. This force does not merely react to stimuli, but is spontaneous and capable of initiative. The *sensorium* has as its counterpart a *motorium* which stimulates action as such, rather than action in response to outside stimuli. The balance between *sensorium* and *motorium* is not brought about directly, but through the mediation of consciousness, which sets limits to both, thus achieving not only external balance but also internal unity.

Sexuality is emphasised to the extent that the sexual organ seems to be situated at the centre of the vertical axis. It is not localised in any other respect and it has become absorbed in the sensual quality that characterises the entire surface of the body. Sexuality is not conceived of as an imperious instinct, but as tempered eroticism, in which the active and passive sexual functions are balanced, and which never falls into the excess of ungratified passions or mystical ecstasy. All particular qualities have been replaced with a state of pure intensity, which is midway between tension and relaxation. Affectivity is always restrained and permeated with sensibility; the latter is the outward manifestation of the former and the former adds warmth to the latter.

Emotion is never murky or irrational, it is clear, conscious, lucid, and it repays these gifts of the intellect by divesting it of its coldness and rigidity, by transforming knowledge into wisdom. This wisdom does not refer to a beyond, a transcendent divine world or to immortality; it remains on the human plane, midway between physics and metaphysics, necessity and freedom, *ananke* and *daimonion*. Man seeks to unify these opposites without appealing to an external or superhuman force, by creating a definite, permanent form, a living artistic reality, in which the inner sense is identical with the external senses, just as the idea is identical with the body and the body with the Idea.

Thinking is a self-knowing being aware. Taken in itself this awareness expresses a mode of being which is outside the chain of causality and the play of forces, because it has carried out the one task that confronted it, to centre the world around man and to link the two together, to represent man as

shaping himself and the world as a living form in the universal scheme of a disturbed state of repose and a restored balance.

Man acts in conformity with his nature if, out of knowing awareness, out of self-knowledge, he discovers the point where spontaneous initiative and free activity become possible. The purpose of the activity is always the same, to restore an order that has been disturbed, to fulfil one's own *daimonion* through the fulfilment of *ananke*. Man is therefore always responsible for his actions. Since man shapes his own destiny he cannot transfer this burden to another, he cannot lose himself in a nirvana, he cannot surrender himself to a mediator, sorcerer or mystagogue, he cannot be absolved from his responsibility by a father confessor.

Classical man could only act in this life, and for him catharsis does not follow the action, but precedes it, or, more accurately is inherent in it. Classical man stands then in an artistic and philosophical conception of space which is centred around him, concentrated in him, and at the same time extends beyond him, defines his conflict as human, a conflict that is not created by man, but that is inherent in him, and that he cannot elude.

In our figure man is related to himself, and he is related to a being transcending him. The former relationship defines his axis, the latter the foundation on which he rests. These two relationships define the viewer's relationship to the figure and the interval between the two. If man were exclusively defined by his awareness of himself, his task of harmonising and unifying his individual qualities into a purely intensive whole would be a mere aesthetic play, a kind of aesthetic self-education, which might be useful socially. If man were exclusively defined by a reality transcending him, if he had no autonomy, no task of shaping himself, he would be without greatness, dignity or beauty.

But, if man lives at the point where two dimensions intersect, one representing the forces that determine him, and the other his own power to determine the force outside him, and if his consciousness can encompass the extra-human forces and confront them with the idea of man who shapes his own destiny, restoration of the disturbed balance can no longer be regarded as aesthetic play, it becomes expressive of man's fate.

In summary, Raphael's analysis leads to a biune principle, which does not manifest itself as such, but by its effects - the opposition between gravity and consciousness, *daimonion* and *ananke*, finitude and formlessness - so that the man represented and the viewer live simultaneously in all dimensions, which meet at a single point. Each of these spatial and spiritual dimensions has its own inner opposite in a form that is both abstract and concrete, potential and actual. These various modes of being as well as the various dimensions remain at first separated, one beside the other, but also in the greatest tension with each other, a tension that is measurable by pure intuition. They remain bound to one another and we see no development, no process of emanation. Just as in the original block all dimensions and directions are both present and absent, so all the modes of being are present and absent at the point where the dimensions and directions intersect. This co-existence is not developed as something objective, but is posited as something subjective, however, in such a way that the positing is immanent in the objective without being able to manifest itself.

After the contrasts between dimensions and modes of being have been rendered concretely, in the medium or in the stance of the figure, they are balanced against one another, so that the opposites are equally stressed. Then the opposites are unified without losing their identity. This process results in a new unity, the *Gestalt*, which is individual form as well as total form. This method of dialectical synthesis is seen in the transformation of marble into an

artistic medium and form, and in the transformation of the block into space and a human figure; in the simultaneous development from inside, axis, and from outside, block boundaries; in the unity of the inner and the outer world, of body and soul; in the linking of various human capacities.

This dialectical part of the method, which is very different from Hegelian dialectics, discloses the following features: 1. It operates in several modes of being simultaneously; 2. all contrasts derive from a single source and converge towards a single goal, and 3. it is a finite act, not an infinite process, which aims at definitive form, at a permanent though dynamic and living reality.

There are two methods, or two stages rather of the one method applied on different planes, and equally valid for two different modes of being. One expresses the relation between potentiality and actuality, without a one-sided or double process of emanation, and the other expresses the movement of the opposites within the real itself. Each is apprehended differently, that is, by a different combination of thinking and perception. There is also a third stage of the method, which is usually referred to as the composition, i.e. the unification of the individual forms into the total form, internally coherent, self-contained and living, only because no form can express it adequately.

Every individual form is developed fully as an image of the whole, but independently of the whole, and conversely the whole is not the sum of the individual forms. The two opposite movements, from the parts to the whole and from the whole to the parts, specify several layers of being and bring them into balance. In this logic of form there are notable discrepancies, which is a sign that the finished work of art preserves the biunity of the principle, and that the principle does not manifest itself as such.

The will to form, to form in accordance with a logical method, is thus inseparable from the absolute recognition of the existence of a reality that cannot be formed. This invests classical man with his sublimity. Like Ulysses during his visit to Circe, he knows that he is threatened from two sides, the sorceress can change him into a swine, the goddess can give him eternal youth and immortality. But he is equally unwilling to be turned into a beast or made into a god. His blundering search, his struggle against the elements, his humanity are dearer to him than the immortality of the god. Precisely because classical man prefers the consciousness of his own self to the powers of earth and heaven, of the underworld and of Olympus, the method of this consciousness, no matter how much it may aim at absolute permanence, cannot be a repetition of a dogma, the imitation of something ready-made, but must be a self-constituting dialectical development and construction, not merely of a single human body in space, but of a new type of reality.

This reality is neither metaphysical nor empirical, but a true synthesis, not a fusion, of all other realities, which both preserves and transcends the oppositions inherent in each of them. With the creation of such an artistic reality the work of art ceases to be a sign of something else, to refer to something outside of itself. It lays claim to be the sole and total resolution of all contradictions. In attempting to achieve the impossible, such works become timeless. The idea of human perfection is to be achieved by man's own efforts.

In classical sculpture then, the human figure does not play the part of an artificial mediation between matter and spirit, but that of a stage in the process of unifying the two by dematerialising the medium and materialising the spiritual expression. For this reason the material characteristics of the human figure do not imitate the natural surface qualities of living human beings. We have three elements, the natural medium, marble, the figure which is both material and nonmaterial, and the expression or

spiritual material of the artistic idea, that is essentially the idea of man, as finite body, mortal and self-creating. It needs again to be stressed that all these elements are of equal importance, and that they interpenetrate in such a way that the specific character of each is altered, though none loses its individual identity.

This interpenetration of equally important but distinct elements is unique, because the object represented whose natural qualities have been transformed, namely the sculpted figure, serves as a vehicle for the other two elements. In so far as it is a synthesis of these two elements it is not at a higher level; it merely represents the qualitatively new mode of being to which all these elements have attained, they have now become a living, structured, and thus limited, though not finite unity.

This classical dialectics must not be confused with Hegelian dialectics, which is not Greek but Christian, and which is conceived as an infinite process, each synthesis being followed by its antithesis, whereas classical dialectics consists precisely in this, that the unification of opposites is a simple and finite process completed with the creation of form. In Greek art, geometric form and organic form are equally stressed and modifying the other without losing its specificity.

The two form an indissoluble union, which does not express a metaphysical principle, but a human action. The artist is aware of the disparity between the human spirit and the cosmic soul, he suggests that the two can be harmonised in the human figure, which is thus conceived of as an image and likeness of the ordered cosmos. This synthesis of spirituality and sensuality, of essence and appearance, means that a form can be both perceived by the senses and grasped by the mind, and this form is both self-constituting process and structured reality. It is a form identical with content, because the form absorbs the content and posits itself as content.

Traditional philosophy does not supply a term to denote the reality that is suggested by such an analysis of the content and method of classical art, and Raphael coins the notion of a Real-Idealism, a term that he suggests has the merit of indicating that classical man was not released ready-made from the natural medium of marble, but only by transforming its properties in a creative act.

Notes

1. Cited in Max Raphael, *The Demands of Art*, trans. by N. Guterman (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968), p. 225.
2. The full account by Marx can be found in the Marx-Engels collected works (MEW, i.e. *Marx-Engels Werke*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin), in the concluding pages of *Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie*, 1857, MEW, vol. 13, p. 640 ff.; also Max Raphael, *Arbeiter, Kunst und Künstler* (Dresden: Verlag der Kunst, 1973), especially 'Prolegomena zu einer marxistichen Kunsttheorie', pp. 256-363; and Max Raphael, *Proudhon, Marx, Picasso* (Paris: Editions-Excelsior, 1933).
3. For a succinct analysis of the failure of Marx see 'The Struggle to Understand Art', in Max Raphael *The Demands of Art*, pp.186-87: 'And there are good reasons for this. If we apply to the thesis that art is an ideological superstructure, its own presupposition, i.e. that of historical materialism, we find that historical materialism itself is only an ideological superstructure of a specific economic order - the capitalistic order in which all productive forces are concentrated in the economic sector. A transitional epoch always implies uncertainty: Marx's struggle to understand his own epoch testifies to this. In such a period two attitudes are possible. One is to take advantage of the emergent forces of the new order with a view to undermining it, to affirm it in order to drive it beyond itself: this is the active, militant, revolutionary attitude. The other clings to the past, is retrospective and romantic, bewails or acknowledges the decline, asserts that the will to live is gone - in short it is the passive attitude. Where

economic, social, and political questions were at stake, Marx took the first attitude; in questions of art he took neither. He reflected the actual changes of his time, which is to say he made economics the foundation of thought which it had become. He did not lose sight of the further problem, but as he could not see the solution, he left it unsolved. Had he been able to show that an active attitude towards art also exists, he would have brought the understanding of art up to the level of his revolutionary position.'

4. This can be found in Max Raphael, *The Demands of Art*, pp. 183-204.
5. The first book-length publication of Raphael was *Von Monet zu Picasso* (Munich: Delphin Verlag, 1913). The other principal publications during his lifetime were *Idee und Gestalt* (Munich: Delphin-Verlag, 1921); *Der dorische Tempel* (Augsburg: Filser Verlag, 1930); *Proudhon, Marx, Picasso* (Paris: Editions-Excelsior, 1933); *Zur Erkenntnistheorie der konkreten Dialektik* (Paris: Editions Excelsior 1934); *Prehistoric Cave Paintings* (New York: Bollingen Series, 1945).
   I date his later work as running from 1933-51. His earliest article publication dates from 1910.
6. Max Raphael, *The Demands of Art*, p. 191.
7. The principal contrast with earlier and late work, turns on the shift from Raphael's earliest theory of the creative drive as developed in *Von Monet zu Picasso* (1913), and his development of a dialectical epistemology in *Zur Erkenntnistheorie der konkreten Dialektik*, published in Paris in 1934.
8. The most readily available text for this is, Max Raphael, *Tempel, Kirchen und Figuren*, ed. by H.J. Heinrichs (Frankfurt-am-Main: Suhrkamp, 1989). See pp. 293-399, 'Der klassische Mensch, dargestellt am Peirithoos im Westgiebel des Zeustempels von Olympia'. It is this text from which my summary is drawn.
9. The phrase 'mother of all academies' occurs in the foreword to the text 'Der klassische Mensch dargestellt am Peirithoos im Westgiebel des Zeustempels von Olympia', in the following context: 'Das Zentrum der echten klassischen Kunst ist Dialektik. Es ist eine der erstaunlichsten Ironien der Geistesgeschichte, ein besonders ungeheurliches Umschlagen ins Gegenteil, das gerade die dialektischste Kunst zur dogmatischsten, zur Mutter aller Akademien geworden ist'. See Max Raphael, *Tempel, Kirchen und Figuren*, p. 298.
10. For this argument see Max Raphael, *Der dorische Tempel*.

Biography

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The Vast and the Void
On Tate Modern's Turbine Hall and 'The Unilever Series'

Wouter Davidts

Installations should empty rooms, not fill them.
Robert Smithson[1]

You don't show emptiness. You show the wish for it to be full. There is nothing rewarding in emptiness.
Juan Muñoz[2]

In 2005, Tate Modern published a report evaluating the first five years of the institution's existence. In the introduction, entitled 'A New Landmark', director Sir Nicholas Serota states with pride that Tate Modern has turned out to be one of the capital's most favourite buildings. 'In five years', Serota notes, 'more than twenty million visitors have taken possession of the building itself, notably enjoying the experience of being in the great Turbine Hall'.[3] Throughout the other essays in the report the public success of Tate Modern is invariably coupled to the existence of the Turbine Hall, the large entry-space to the museum. In 'A New Space for a New Art', Martin Gayford labels 'the huge cavern of the Turbine Hall' as 'the most startling and novel feature' of the new museum and an 'unprecedented' space for the display of art.[4] Ron Smith, in 'The Political Impact of Tate Modern', believes that the building is one of the few that 'take[s] your breath away - especially when you walk into the Turbine Hall for the first time'. While the 'sheer scale' of the space is fascinating, its 'vastness […] means that even with huge numbers coming, the building happily absorbs them'. Smith subsequently reads the space's potential to house and gather a huge crowd as an expression of the gallery's ambition 'to make the case for openness, for inclusion, for welcoming all comers'. The space allows the institution to 'includ[e] those who may be new to modern art but have come simply to marvel at the space and the architecture. Tate Modern tempts them in to see the building, and then shows them the art too. And many will come away liking it'.[5]

Throughout the report of 2005, the Turbine Hall is invariably portrayed as one the most important features of Tate Modern. The colossal space apparently succeeds in generating a perfect marriage of architectural ambitions and institutional desires on the one hand, and architectural achievements and institutional triumphs on the other, allowing both the *institution* and the *building* to emerge as vastly successful. In 'Architecture in Motion', architecture critic Rowan Moore examines the different merits and qualities of the building. One of the main reasons why 'Time Out' readers voted Tate Modern their favourite London building in 2005, Moore argues, is 'the generosity of its space'. The Turbine Hall, he continues, 'is a huge free gift to the public. Imposing though it is, it does not dictate to visitors how they should experience it, which, in a time when public space is used ever more intensively to market, to sell and to deliver messages, is a precious quality'. The 'relative reticence' of the design by the architects Herzog & de Meuron, not only added to the success and popularity of the building, but also left 'the place open to interpretations by artists'. Moore finds proof in 'The Unilever Series', the art installation series that Tate Modern initiated after striking a substantial

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sponsorship deal with the Anglo-Dutch consumer goods giant Unilever in 1999. Since the museum opened in 2000, it has commissioned each year a new piece of sculpture for the 500 foot (155m) long, 75 foot (23m) wide and 115 foot (35m) high Turbine Hall.[6] The American sculptor Louise Bourgeois was the first to 'tackle' the space in 2000, followed by Juan Muñoz ('Double Bind', 2001), Anish Kapoor ('Marsyas', 2002), Olafur Eliasson ('The Weather Project', 2003), Bruce Nauman ('Raw Materials', 2004), Rachel Whiteread ('Embankment', 2005) and Carsten Höller ('Test Site', 2006). Doris Salcedo's most recent intervention opens in October 2007. 'The Unilever Series', Moore lyrically suggests, 'are not part of the architecture, but they are the fulfilment of the architect's intentions'.[7]

The past seven installations of 'The Unilever Series' make up a rather diverse palette of artworks. All of the invited artists reacted to the commission in a rather idiosyncratic manner, producing works that differ radically from one another on a formal, material and conceptual level. In fact at first sight there is not much that ties the different works together other than the space that they were commissioned for, which each artist claimed to have been intimidated by when receiving the invitation. While Juan Muñoz called the space 'a killer' and his successor Anish Kapoor described it as a 'very complicated space that was not made to host art', Olafur Eliasson labelled it as the direct outcome of 'the development of unfocused and undesignated space' in museums in the last two decades.[8] Rachel Whiteread in turn disclosed that 'it was very daunting' to occupy the space, whereas Nauman experienced the task as 'extremely difficult' since he had to cope with a space in which 'you can't fake it'.[9] None of the artists had, in fact, ever been commissioned to conceive a piece for a space of such dimensions.[10] All of them did, indeed, struggle with the size of the Turbine Hall and came up with their proper strategies to tackle it. But without doing too much injustice to the different artists and the particularities of their respective installations, one can say that in all cases this lead to a major leap in scale in the work, whether it was through enlargement, expansion, multiplication, amplification or mere inflation. Louise Bourgeois used the hall simply as a large gallery, but made, in addition to the 'three gigantic steel towers', her 'biggest spider ever'.[11] The late Juan Muñoz didn't resize his familiar figurines, but substantially expanded the environment in which he placed them. 'Double Bind' split up the second part of the hall with a massive floor, serving as a vast support structure for a dozen of his well-known introvert characters. With the spectacular 'The Weather Project' Olafur Eliasson successfully transposed his previous mostly small-scale perceptual and sensory investigations to the size of the Turbine Hall, transforming the latter with a mirrored ceiling, a bright yellow artificial sun and puffs of smoke, creating a magical environment which has by now become legendary. Since the work exceeded the size of his previous commissions, Eliasson was forced to change to a bigger studio for its production.[12] Rachel Whiteread faced the difficulty to scale up her celebrated strategy of casting to the size of the Turbine Hall. During the preparations of 'Embankment', she expressed her worry that it was 'a lot of space to fill'.[13] Ultimately, she opted for an object of bodily scale - a cardboard box - and multiplied it. The resulting 14,000 casts of different boxes were stacked to occupy the second half of the Turbine Hall and created a massive labyrinth-like structure. Even Bruce Nauman, who made the most intangible intervention with the audio-installation of 'Raw Materials', succumbed to the temptation of grasping the Turbine Hall as a whole. Although the work left the Hall physically empty, merely using sound to occupy it, it nevertheless reinforced the largeness of the space. Carsten Höller pragmatically resized one of his illustrious sculptures for 'Test Site'. The artist provided the museum with four slides that took visitors from different floors to the ground level of the Turbine Hall. In previous years, Höller had installed six other versions of these slides, starting

at the Kunst-Werke Berlin during the 1998 Berlin Biennale, and later in Milan, New York, Boston and Helsinki. The slides in Tate Modern were simply the largest. The most straightforward example of sculptural inflation was Anish Kapoor's 'Marsyas', an elusive, trumpet-shaped sculpture, made of red synthetic membrane that stretched from one side of the Turbine Hall to the other. The work grew so big that its bigness came to be regarded as a feat in itself. While the 'Evening Standard' played upon the century-old Anglo-French rivalry by remarking that 'Marsyas' 'dwarfed the Concorde', 'The Times' noted that 'Kapoor's colossal sculpture' was almost as high as Nelson's column, and as long as 17.5 double-decker buses. 'The Independent' in turn observed that it was longer than the Cross Channel Car Ferry. Adrian Searle's review in 'The Guardian' however summed it up best, stating that the work 'managed something difficult - to be at once stupid and unforgettable'.[14]

The following article is an attempt to examine what giant artworks, such as 'Marsyas' and the other sculptural interventions in the Turbine Hall, after the major leap in size and scale they have performed, still manage to be, to accomplish, or to communicate? It is quite remarkable that none of them actually engaged on a substantial - i.e. semantic - level with the building, the institution Tate Modern, let alone the institution's broader cultural, economical or political context. All of the actual installations bore witness to a rather literal or physical use of Tate Modern's Turbine Hall as a site, in contrast to the more functional or discursive approach that marks most contemporary art installations.[15] The artists of 'The Unilever Series' literally stayed inside and tried to fill the space, whether it was with steel sculptures, synthetic forms, ambient light, sound or playthings. So we inevitably face the question of what these works offered, besides an often undeniably spectacular and memorable art experience. Can we still speak of a significant, let alone critical, encounter between the different parties involved: art, architecture, institution and public? At least in terms of the last, 'The Unilever Series' turned out to be vastly successful. The installations often drew bigger crowds than many of the institution's exhibitions - with a remarkable 2.3 million visitors in six months for Olafur Eliasson's 'The Weather Project'.[16] While some regarded the Series' attractiveness as the ultimate proof of the idea that 'great art can be popular', others discard it as the final capitulation of installation art to the demands and logic of the culture industry and the ultimate subsumption of the latter's early critical ambitions.[17] Neither the populist faith in art's broader appeal nor the by-now familiar laments about the spectacular competition between art institutions and the resulting architectural and artistic gigantism is yet very useful for an analysis of enterprises like 'The Unilever Series'. Whereas the former silences all substantial criticism of them, the latter inhibits an assessment of their complex reality. In many respects, we are obliged to take them seriously, if only for the fact that they exist and will not disappear soon, and for the huge amounts of money, space and attention they consume.

Kitchenette or cathedral

But wait. What about really big art? Big enough to be heard over the guilty giggles and sticking far above the shoulders of those slacker slouches? Big stuff that makes you wonder what it cost, even in a time when money is out of control. […] Big is what matters. Big isn't everything, but may be the only thing that will get noticed. The only thing that might compete with the din of style in its roar of ubiquitous, mutating manifestations.
Robert Morris[18]

Notwithstanding its unique character, 'The Unilever Series' is symptomatic of a recent international trend. As one of the largest art commissions in the artworld, taking place in arguably the largest museum space in the world, and given to a group of widely acclaimed contemporary artists, it is nevertheless not alone in its genre. In recent years, the

world has witnessed the launch of ever-larger art commissions for increasingly vast spaces, resulting in all the more colossal artworks, from the Guggenheim Bilbao to Dia:Beacon in New York and the Gasometer in Oberhausen. In 2007, the city of Paris announced a new yearly commission for the central nave of the Grand Palais, appropriately entitled 'Monumenta'.[19]

In the 2004 article 'No More Scale. The Experience of Size in Contemporary Sculpture', the American art historian and critic James Meyer discusses the contemporary artworld's demand for an art of size. In his opinion, it's the deplorable outcome of the artworld's spectacularisation and expansionism throughout the last decade and the parallel profusion of large international exhibitions and 'destination' museums of inordinately vast proportions. Meyer refers to Hal Foster's remark on the Guggenheim Bilbao in 2001 that 'to make a big splash in the global pond of spectacle culture today, you need to have a big rock to drop'.[20] And such a 'big rock', Meyer continues, 'must in turn be filled with works of adequate size, spectacular works, works, in short, that can deliver an audience: wall-size video/film projections, oversize photographs, a sculpture that overwhelms'.[21]

Meyer sets off his article with a critique of Olafur Eliasson's 'The Weather Project' of 2003. He points out that many of Eliasson's works recall 'the phenomenological debates around Minimalism and the various practices of institutional critique they inspired' and aim at a similar criticality and reflexivity. But notwithstanding the catalogue and publicity's proclamation of the project's critical and reflexive aims and the installation's straightforward disclosure of its 'construction', 'The Weather Project', Meyer argues, failed in its ambition. Despite the dutiful rehearsal of 'the tactics of institutional critique', it did not engage an active and self-reflexive spectator, but merely delivered 'a mass audience that cannot fail to be overwhelmed by the magnitude of the installation itself'. But then Meyer faithfully repeats the by now three decades old adage of institutional critique, i.e. that every artistic intervention must resist or critically disclose the conditions of display. He blames Eliasson's project for the fact that '[t]he museum is not so much "revealed" as transformed into a destination, an event'. 'The Weather Project', he notes, 'is hardly unique in this regard. More and more, we are accustomed to installations that are keyed not to the individual body and its perceptual grasp but to an increasingly grandiloquent architecture'. In trying to compete with the size of the many pompous contemporary museum buildings and spaces, art has lost any sense of scale. Where once scale, according to Meyer, 'implied a calibrated relation between a viewer and work within a modernist gallery of knowable proportions', in many contemporary art practices 'a scale that exceeds our perceptual understanding - i.e. size - has become prevalent'. Since the present-day concept of installation has increasingly come to depend on the experience of size, 'the phenomenological and critical ambitions of an earlier period' are at risk.[22] All art that engages with sizeable spaces, Meyer seems to suggest, is bound to be complicit with the cultural and institutional agendas that have informed and still govern the space, to fail to sustain a critical stance within it, and ultimately to fall short in providing the viewer with a significant experience. In other words, big is bad by definition. Meyer acknowledges the countercultural meaning of size in the antimonuments of Claes Oldenburg, the large Earthworks of Michael Heizer and Robert Smithson, and the ephemeral outdoor projects of such artists as Dennis Oppenheim and Alice Aycock, as these suggested a kind of art that could not be easily bought nor exhibited within the white cube. But he does not cease to advocate a phenomenological sense of scale. Size is marshalled in art to 'overwhelm and pacify', while scale, on the condition that it returns 'in the phenomenological sense as a formal quality', will be 'capable of inducing awareness and provoking thought'.[23] To Meyer, it is not

architecture but the viewer's body that is the reference, that sets the standard.

The clear-cut opposition between architectural scale and somatic scale, however, is based upon a limited understanding of the role of size and scale in architecture. It fails to acknowledge that they are not mutually exclusive, and that size in architecture does not necessarily rule out somatic sensibility or awareness. To put it simply, not all big buildings and big spaces 'dwarf' their visitors. As far as scale is concerned, the sheer physical size of a building or structure is not a critical issue in itself. Scale is by definition relational and perceptual. In architectural scale it is the relationship of the parts to the whole that is at issue.[24] Moreover, Meyer's plea for a notion of scale that entails 'a constant adjustment adequate to particular sculptural ideas', does not exclude architecture either. Because what happens if 'particular sculptural ideas' relate to architecture, an architectural object, even a big one?[25]

In a recent conversation between Olafur Eliasson and the French artist Daniel Buren, a widely known protagonist of institutional critique, the latter stated that his 'philosophy is that I could engage a kitchenette or a cathedral, but the work has to be in scale with the space'. While Buren expressed his reservations about those works 'that have become spectacular for their own sake', he stressed that 'if I agree to make a work in a place that's a priori spectacular, my work has to have at least an aspect of that'. Working in spectacular or gigantic spaces does not mean 'that you can't make a conflict or a contradiction or even open up a question about the space'.[26] Buren suggests in other words that, although all giant artworks run the risk of being complicit with the needs of the museum in a global climate of spectacular competition, they are not immediately suspect. It is first and foremost a matter of critically relating the artwork to the size of the space the artist is confronted with, and finding the right scale. From this perspective, Meyer's criticism itself is marked by an omission that is quite revealing. Meyer builds his argument on a thoughtful reading of the phenomenological ambitions of 1960's Minimalism and its attention to the bodily presence, awareness and perception of the viewer in space. But he fails to expand his argument with the critical extension of the minimalist conception of space by institutional critique, which is the shift from space as a formal and abstract container towards space as a contingent entity: a crucial shift that identified the *specificity* of a given site or context. In its ambition to reveal the dense though often imperceptible weave of political, cultural and economic interests that determine the reception of a work of art in the museum and gallery, institutional critique repeatedly addressed the specific architectural character of these places, as if to convey the value architectural space accords to its objects. Meyer, however, seems to consider this to be only a task for artists. It is up to them to 'reveal' the actual role and significance of a space. But the obligation goes both ways. In order to fully criticise a work, a profound understanding of the work's actual context is indispensable on the part of the critic as well. It is too simple to blame the artworks for not critically engaging with the space and failing to convey a self-reflexive spectator. The contribution and impact of the architecture needs to be brought into account as well. But this is precisely what is lacking in Meyer's analysis and criticism of the different artistic interventions, and Eliasson's in particular, in Tate Modern's Turbine Hall. His only description of the Turbine Hall is that the space is 'enormous'. How that 'enormousness' in reality manifests itself, is not mentioned.

In the introductory essay to the catalogue of Carsten Höller's 'Test Site', Tate Modern curator Jessica Morgan rightfully suggests that 'it is not sufficient [to] argue that the problem lies in creating the Turbine Hall and in particular in designating it as an art space'. It seems 'oddly perverse', Morgan continues, 'to insist on an experience of art as limited to a certain scale or to a particular type of apprecia-

tion'.[27] It is even more inappropriate to simply claim that the space is too big. In order to fully criticise the role of the Turbine Hall's size and scale and its impact on the different artworks and installations that have occupied it so far, a substantial analysis of its peculiar architectural character and constitution is indispensable. The space is far more than a mere abstract emblem of the global inflation and growth of museum and exhibition spaces. It is rather a particular exponent of this tendency, with a distinct architectural form and appearance. Before one can actually criticise the gigantism of both the space and the artworks, it is necessary to illuminate what constitutes the gigantism in both cases, and how it mutually informs them.

Turbine Hall

Even now, when they look at the building, many people think: 'what have they actually done?'. Because they don't know that actually there was nothing there - it was full up with machinery. A large part of our work consisted in clearing up […]. And then we actually invented the building as a museum. But this invention of the building always kept close to what was actually there.
Jacques Herzog [28]

When the Tate Gallery announced its decision to locate the new branch for modern and contemporary art in the Bankside Power Station, designed by Sir Giles Gilbert Scott, it provided a double motivation. Firstly, the institution wanted to make a difference in the international museum league. Whereas fellow-institutions such as the Centre Pompidou in Paris, the Museum of Contemporary Art in Los Angeles, the Guggenheim in Bilbao and the Museum of Modern Art in New York opted for a purpose-built structure or a brand new extension, the Tate preferred the conversion of an existing building.[29] A questionnaire that was sent to artists worldwide while the project was being drawn up, revealed that most artists, when asked which spaces they preferred to exhibit in, favoured day-lit conversions of existing buildings, where architectural intervention was minimal.[30] In an interview with Cynthia Davidson for the magazine 'Any' in 1996, Serota states that 'the experience of the last 20 years' has revealed 'that some of the best installations of contemporary art have been made in converted warehouse buildings'.[31] Tate Modern was not to become an architectural *prima donna* or a signature building, but a museum that would suit the needs and desires of contemporary art and artists, a building with 'sufficient patina […] for the art to be comfortable rather than simply on show'.[32] Secondly, the choice for an existing building was driven by more pragmatic reasons. The Tate would never have had the resources to erect a new building of such size and magnitude on a different site in the centre of London. But the benefits were not merely financial either. It also allowed the institution to bypass the destructive political and administrative rows that affect most large new buildings in London.

Whereas the pragmatic grounds sounded reasonable, the motivation in terms of artistic preference radically conflicted with the chosen building. In reality, the Bankside Power Station did not correspond to a customary warehouse building at all. The only space in which initially - i.e. before the conversion - the architectural specificity of the Bankside Power Station could be experienced, was the giant Turbine Hall in the middle. Both the Boiler House and the Switch House, respectively at the left and right side of the Turbine Hall, were completely filled to the ceiling with heavy industrial equipment and machinery. Once these were removed, the building emerged as a colossal spatial envelope, supported by a steel skeleton and enclosed by a thin brick skin. Eventually the power station was just a large and empty hall of such size that there was simply no architecture to be converted. It simply did not provide the loft-like spaces that the Tate so much advocated as the primary reason for its choice of building. To transform the building into a functional museum with regular galleries and service spaces, a completely

novel architectural scheme and structure - in fact a totally new building - had to be introduced.

From the time of their entry for the first stage of the architectural competition in November 1994, the Swiss architects Herzog & de Meuron intelligently denied this 'empty' condition of the building. Even more, they wittily exploited it. They actually made everyone believe that there was an original industrial structure that could be brought into play. In their first design scheme of 1994, the architects write that '[t]he architectural concept for the conversion of the Power Station is radically simple, economical and almost self evident. It takes the maximum profit from the existing building structure. It really deals with the existing volume and with the existing materials'. But upon closer inspection, their scheme merely safeguards the original spatial zoning and massing of the building: '[t]he volume of Boiler House will […] be very densely filled up with spaces of very different functions, forms and sizes. This density will be opposed to the void of the Turbine Hall'. Of all the participating teams in the first stage of the competition, only Herzog & de Meuron preserve the space of the Turbine Hall in its totality.[33] Their plan is to convert it into an 'entrance hall whose generous space reminds [them] of urban passages'. While the brief for the first stage of the architecture competition does not specify whether the space of the Turbine Hall is to be used for proper museum purposes - it leaves it open to the architects to preserve the space for a second phase in the building campaign, although 'it might be used as an open unfinished space in the interim' - Herzog & de Meuron immediately do.[34] They define it both as public vestibule *and* display space: '[the] Turbine Hall [is] not only spectacular because of its bold industrial appearance and because of its logistical advantages for orientation and access to all internal areas: it will also be a wonderful exhibition space for temporary and special installations, whose dimensions are beyond the possibilities of the display spaces in the Boiler House'.[35] The architect's suggestion is the object of 'substantial enthusiasm' by the jury and serves as one of the main factors for the 'unanimous decision to shortlist [the architects] for Stage 2'.[36] In their design for the second stage in January 1995, Herzog & de Meuron follow the same general line. While on the one hand they portray the Turbine Hall as 'one of London's most powerful new public spaces', they once again stress the necessity of the strategy to leave its 'industrial appearance […] untouched': it allows visitors to experience 'the spatial power of Turbine Hall […] at its apex'. The Turbine Hall will function as 'the building's centre of gravity' and the starting point for all further visits. But far more important is the architect's detailed description of the encounter with specific artworks in the Turbine Hall. After having entered the museum from the North entrance and standing on the platform in the middle of the Turbine Hall, the reader is addressed as a future visitor and invited to descend into the Turbine Hall and look at the artworks: 'Perhaps you would like to see some of the temporary art installations in Turbine Hall from less of a distance. You could take the escalator moving down a few metres into Turbine Hall and land squarely in front of Rachel Whiteread's *House* or Dan Graham's *Cinema*'. This first encounter, so they suggest, serves as an attractive pretext for further exploration of the museum galleries: 'Did that inspire you to see more contemporary art or had you always wanted to see the Rothko paintings in their new space here at Bankside. You can take one of the lifts, so close at hand, and arrive at any suite you like'.[37] The accompanying perspective drawing of the Turbine Hall immediately became, as Cynthia Davidson remarked, 'the seminal image from the competition'.[38] While the drawing proficiently communicated the strategic simplicity of the winning design, it above all promised a friendly encounter between art and architecture in the vast space of the Turbine Hall. But upon closer inspection, it achieves the latter in a particularly intriguing if not outright misleading manner. While it is Whiteread's 'House' of 1993 that is both mentioned in the text

and drawn on the architect's plans, it is the work 'Ghost' of 1990 that actually figures in the drawing. It is not that the architects used two different works, but their difference in size that matters. 'Ghost' is the plaster cast of the interior of one room, whereas 'House' is the cast of an entire house. In Herzog & de Meuron's perspective, 'Ghost' is thus far bigger than in reality - one only needs to keep the 23m width of the Hall in mind. It is, in other words, blown up to the size of 'House' to 'fit' the Turbine Hall, whereas the actual 'Ghost' would look minute in it. Although this perspectival gesture might be a simple ploy of the architects, it is significantly misleading and prophetic at the same time. While it skilfully masks the fate of all the artworks that will later be put on display in the space, it first and foremost foretells the formal strategy that will haunt the artworks to be commissioned for the space: inflation.

In Herzog & de Meuron's final design, tension between the old building and the newly inserted architecture is largely absent. The only relics of the former Power Station are the original gantry cranes that have been retained in the Turbine Hall, to be used in moving works of art and to carry a flexible lighting system. Neither the industrial character nor the beloved patina of the former structure surface in the exhibition spaces. They are, one after the other, refined white cubes. The 'purpose-built museum' that the Tate so consciously wanted to avoid is skilfully shoved into an old brick crust. The bay next to the entrance hall has been neatly filled up right up to the ridge with five floors of gallery spaces, and the new steel frame, which supports the whole structure, is situated exactly behind the existing steel columns. It is not clear where the new architecture starts, where the existing building ends, or where the two meet; Herzog & de Meuron blend them together almost seamlessly. At the opening of Tate Modern, Serota noted that Herzog & de Meuron created, ultimately, 'completely new, architect-designed exhibition spaces'.[39] The Turbine Hall is the only place where the so-called art-friendly character of the industrial structure actually appears, and this is paradoxically the space in which the representational aspect and spectacular nature of the architecture of many new museums is at its best. But even more absurd is that precisely the type of space that was supposed to make the artists feel at ease and stimulate them to get to work, is blown up to such dimensions that it no longer corresponds to a regular working space. Ultimately the choice to leave the central core of the building empty caused the very heart of the museum, as Tate curator Catherine Wood rightly commented, 'to become a huge container that holds nothing: a void'.[40]

Herzog & de Meuron's choice for a very plain finishing of the space, only amplified the void status of the space. On the ground, the architects provided a grey, polished floor. They restored the steelwork and painted it dark charcoal grey. They repaired the brickwork on the Switch House wall to the South and painted it grey as well. The solid bridge that breaks the Hall in two and connects the North entrance with the future South entrance, is painted black, as well as the stairs descending to the ground floor. The only bright elements are four light-box windows that overlook the Turbine Hall from the new gallery levels to the north. These provide artificial light for the Turbine Hall, indicate separate levels, and afford views both over the Hall and from the Hall into the gallery levels. In this 'grey universe', as a journalist once described it, seven artists were about to install their 'biggest work ever'.[41]

A voyage to the Land of Lilliput

At the Place where the Carriage stopped, there stood an ancient Temple, esteemed to be the largest in the whole Kingdom; which having been polluted some Years before by an unnatural Murder, was, according to the Zeal of those People, looked upon as Profane, and therefore had been applied to common Uses, and all the Ornaments and Furniture carried away. In this Edifice it was determined I should lodge. The Great Gate fronting to the North

Fig. 1: Roman Ondák, ‘It Will All Turnout Right in the End’, 2005–2006 (Installation, mixed media; Overall dimensions 3,6 x 2,5 x 15,8 m), Installation view, Tate Modern, London, 2006. Courtesy the artist, Gallery Martin Janda and gb agency, Paris. © Roman Ondák.

was about four Foot high, and almost two Foot wide, through which I could easily creep. On each Side of the Gate was a small Window not above six Inches from the Ground […] being fixed within four Inches of the Gate, allowed me to creep in, and lie at my full Length in the Temple.
Capt. Gulliver, 'Gulliver's Travels. A Voyage to Lilliput', 1727. [42]

In the summer of 2006, the artist Roman Ondák installed 'It Will All Turnout Right in the End' in the Level 2 Gallery, a small gallery at ground level next to the North Entrance of Tate Modern. Invited as the last artist to participate in the 'Untitled Series' - a series of small commissioned shows of young and emerging artists, or the junior-Unilever Series so to speak - Ondák filled the space of the gallery with a meticulously reconstructed scale model of the Turbine Hall. He shrank the Turbine Hall to the size of the Level 2 Gallery, reducing it to about a tenth of its size.[43] At first sight, Ondák's miniature version of the Turbine Hall did not reveal much about the space. The space looked exactly the same, only smaller. The work nevertheless performed a significant double reversal. Firstly, while most if not all of the artists within 'The Unilever Series' scaled up their works to the vast size of the Turbine Hall, Ondák's work scaled the Turbine Hall down to the customary size of a gallery. And secondly, it did literally the opposite of what the Turbine Hall and most of the works in 'The Unilever Series' have been accused of. Ondák's miniaturised version of the Turbine Hall did not 'dwarf' the visitor, nor, as James Meyer remarked on Kapoor's 'Marsyas', 'reduce the viewer to a Lilliputian stature'; it made the latter too big. Through the artist's deadpan twist, the viewer got to play the character that makes the Lilliputians appear so minute: that of Gulliver, the world traveller.[44]

Ondák, however, was not the only artist to make a scale model of the Turbine Hall – despite being the only one to present it as a work in itself. During the preparations of their Unilever commission, Kapoor, Eliasson and Whiteread made one or several scale models of the Turbine Hall, as pictures in their respective catalogues confirm. Kapoor made several rather table-sized replicas to test out different shapes and sizes of the vellum. Whiteread made a model to try out different forms and piles of the resin boxes. Eliasson, in turn, made a medium-sized version of the Turbine Hall in his studio in Berlin to test out the mirrors, sunlight and smoke in preparation of 'The Weather Project'. Four pages with pictures at the end of Eliasson's catalogue document these tests. While some present close-up views of the model with fluffy clouds of smoke or with different versions of the radiant sun, others show Eliasson and his assistants using the model. Two pictures in particular are quite striking. The first shows an interior view of the model with a tiny white plastic figure, the other depicts a standing person who neatly fits into the model by bowing his head. These pictures actually disclose the two dominant relations towards the space that so far have been manifest in the occupation of the Turbine Hall and the attempt to cope with its size: the minuscule and the overscaled, either Lilliputian or Gulliver; the former position being the one the viewer is forced to take up, and the latter taken up by most, if not all of the art installations.

The amusing play on the antagonism between Gulliver and Lilliputian, giant and dwarf, or gigantic and miniature in both Ondák's and Eliasson's model of the Turbine Hall on the one hand, and the peculiar resemblance between all the models and the actual space on the other, point at one of the most essential qualities of the actual space: its gigantism. In the book 'On Longing', Susan Stewart points out that the gigantic and the miniature, although oppositional at first, depart from a same distorted relationship to reality: '[b]oth involve the selection of elements that will be transformed and displayed in an exaggerated relation to the social construction of reality'. The exaggeration however takes on a different



Fig. 2: Turbine Hall, Tate Modern, London. View during Carsten Höller's 'Test Site', December 2006. Photograph by Jean-Pierre Le Blanc. © Jean-Pierre Le Blanc.

form: ‘while the miniature represents a mental world of proportion, control, and balance, the gigantic represents a physical world of disorder and disproportion’. The most typical miniature world, according to Stewart, is the domestic model of the dollhouse, while the most typical gigantic world is the ‘vast, undifferentiated space of the sky’.[45] Despite their difference in size, both the miniature and the gigantic however are comparably difficult to portray: ‘The literary description of the gigantic involves the same problems of detail and comparison as that of the miniature, but whereas description of the miniature approaches an infinity of relevant detail, description of the gigantic frequently focuses on movement and its attendant consequences’.[46]

This simultaneous likeness and difference in describing the miniature and the gigantic is at work in Ondák’s model of the Turbine Hall in a significant manner. In his miniature version of the vestibule of Tate Modern, there is, in fact, not much ‘infinity of relevant detail’ to be discerned. The faithful reconstruction is marked by a similar lack of material density in the real space. In the model, the space appears as bland, undifferentiated and ‘featureless’ as in reality. The actual Turbine Hall holds neither the kind nor the amount of detail that can be shrunk in order to produce the later density of a miniature. As such, Ondák’s model ‘reveals’ that the Turbine Hall is not so much a literally big space as it is a gigantic one. It demonstrates that the Turbine Hall’s gigantic nature is not so much a matter of actual dimensions, but of how its size actually takes shape. It is the direct product of the ineffable material constitution, abstract character and bland appearance of the vestibule. Even when miniaturized to the tiniest detail, the space retains all the aspects of the gigantic. And this applies to the preparatory models of the other artists too, but then in a reverse sense. Despite their differences in degrees of abstraction, they all come remarkably close to reality. Even Kapoor’s schematic model which resulted from his ‘diagrammatic’ approach of the space - ‘imagining the space as a box with a shelf in it’ - shows little difference to the actual Turbine Hall.[47] The same goes for Whiteread’s and Eliasson’s models. They look astonishingly similar to the real Turbine Hall.

If we return, finally, to ‘The Unilever Series’ and the different installations, it becomes manifest that precisely this gigantism of the Turbine Hall presents the critical challenge. Since it makes the architecture of the space into both a difficult target and a difficult source. The gigantic constitution of the space defies the long-established strategies of site specificity and by extension, institutional critique. The space apparently lacks those architectural elements - windows, doors, stairs, thresholds, etc - that have traditionally been seized upon to ‘reveal’ the particularity and contingency of the architectural and institutional ‘framework’. And if they are present, they simply vanish in the vapid space of the Turbine Hall. In addition, the space most shrewdly secretes its own history. Those few elements that recall the industrial past of the building have either received an insipid finishing or smoothly blend with the new architecture. The industrial architecture of Tate Modern does not constitute a historically resonating context, but an aesthetically pleasing background. The result is a site that appears to be devoid of specifics, a context that seems to confront the artists with the critical impossibility to draw something ‘specific’ from it. It is as though there are no stories to unravel, no details to amplify, no hidden or back spaces to disclose, no hidden mechanisms to expose, no institutional regimes to divulge in the Turbine Hall. The only ‘thing’ the Turbine Hall has to offer, as it were, is a vast and empty space: a void. But the Turbine Hall’s nullity is undeniably its most important, if not its most ‘specific’ quality. Hence if there is one aspect that demands further scrutiny within the upcoming editions of ‘The Unilever Series’ - and we have yet another five to go - it is whether there is more to this void than to be filled.

Notes

1. Robert Smithson and Allan Kaprow, 'What Is a Museum? A Dialogue between Allan Kaprow and Robert Smithson (1967)', in *Robert Smithson: The Collected Writings*, ed. by Jack D. Flam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), pp. 43-51 (p. 44).
2. Juan Muñoz and James Lingwood, 'A Conversation, May 2001', in *Juan Muñoz. Double Bind at Tate Modern* (London: Tate Publishing, 2001), pp. 67-77 (p. 77).
3. Nicholas Serota, 'A New Landmark', in *Tate Modern: The First Five Years* (London: Tate Publishing, 2005), pp. 5-6 (p. 5).
4. Martin Gayford, 'A New Space for a New Art', in *Tate Modern: The First Five Years* (London: Tate Publishing, 2005), pp. 7-12 (p. 7).
5. Rt. Hon. Chris Smith, 'The Political Impact', in *Tate Modern: The First Five Years* (London: Tate Publishing, 2005), pp. 17-22 (p. 19).
6. The first sponsorship in 1999 consisted of £1.25 million. In 2004, Tate Modern and Unilever renewed the sponsorship contract for another £1 million, granting the institution additional funding for the series to continue until 2008. In July 2007, Unilever extended its sponsorship of 'The Unilever Series' for a further five years, until 2012. The third sponsorship over five years consisted of £2.1 million, which brought Unilever's total support of 'The Unilever Series' to over £4 million. For a critical assessment of Unilever's sponsorship of Tate Modern, see: Chin-tao Wu, *Privatising Culture. Corporate Art Intervention since the 1980s* (London, New York: Verso, 2003)
7. Rowan Moore, 'Architecture in Motion', in *Tate Modern: The First Five Years* (London: Tate Publishing, 2005), pp. 29-32 (p. 30).
8. Juan Muõz, as quoted in Adrian Searle, 'We are not alone', *The Guardian*, 12 June 2001, p. 13; Anish Kapoor, as quoted in Pierre Saurisse, 'Questions à Anish Kapoor. La peau sculptée', *Beaux Arts Magazine*, 226 (March 2003), p. 40 ; Olafur Eliasson, 'Behind the Scenes: A Round-Table Discussion', in *Olafur Eliasson. The Weather Project*, ed. by Susan May (London: Tate Publishing, 2003), pp. 65-95 (p. 70).
9. Louisa Buck, 'The Mistress of Negative Space, *Art Newspaper*, 14, 163, November (2005), p. 38; Robert Storr, 'Sound Waves. Bruce Nauman in conversation with Robert Storr', *Tate Etc.*, 1, 2 (Autumn 2004), pp. 94-101 (p. 101).
10. Only Anish Kapoor had experience with this kind of large-scale site specific installations. In 1999 he created the work 'Tarantara' for the BALTIC Centre of Contemporary art in Gateshead. Over 50m long and 25m wide, the work filled the shell of the Baltic Flour Mills, before the construction of the new building began.
11. Frances Morres, as cited in Steven Henry Madoff, 'Towers of London. Louise Bourgeois: I Do, I Undo, I Redo, 1999-2000', *Artforum*, 38, 10 (2000), 162-165.
12. Philip Ursprung, 'Machines in the Studio', unpublished paper, presented during the session 'The Fall of the Studio. Reassessing *l'atelier d'artiste* in the Poststudio Era' (Chairs: Wouter Davidts & Kim Paice), College Art Association 95th Annual Conference, New York, 14 February 2007.
13. Rachel Whiteread, as cited in Richard Cork, 'Breaking the ice [Rachel Whiteread at Tate Modern (Special Supplement)]', *Art Review*, 57, October (2005), p. 4.
14. Adrian Searle, 'Silly, yet quite unforgettable', *The Guardian*, 9 October, 2002.
15. I obviously refer here to James Meyer's distinction between literal and functional site in his seminal article 'The Functional Site; or, The Transformation of Site Specificity', in *Space, Site, Intervention. Situating Installation Art*, ed. by Erika Suderburg (Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), pp. 23-37. In her important study on site specificity, Miwon Kwon defines three different paradigms: phenomenological or experiential; social/institutional; and discursive. See: Miwon Kwon, *One Place After Another: Site-Specific Art and Locational Identity* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2002).
16. On its last day, the Tate proudly proclaimed that Eliasson's ambient installation 'had more visitors than Bluewater, the largest shopping complex in the world'. See: Tate Press Release, 'Transforming Tate Modern: A New Museum for 21st Century Britain', London, 25 July 2007, p. 6. 'The Weather Project' also solicited diverse reactions from the public, including extraordi-

nary social interactions between complete strangers. Most famously during a visit of the American President George Bush to London, anti-war protesters used their bodies to spell out the message 'Bush go home' in the mirrored ceiling. In a hilarious piece in 'The Guardian', Adrian Hardwicke, front house manager at Tate Modern, listed some of the other responses. Hardwicke recalled 'a couple intimately engaged beyond what [one] would normally expect in a public space', a visit of '50 people dressed as Santa Claus', and ultimately, a 'visitor [who] brought in his blow-up canoe and sat there surrounded by strangers pretending to paddle towards the sun'. The seemingly 'ordinary man, middle-aged and reasonably well dressed, […] packed up and moved after 15 minutes'. Adrian Hardwicke, 'Secret diary of an art gallery attendant', *The Guardian*, 18 March, 2004.

17. Daniel Birnbaum, 'Best of 2003. Olafur Eliasson, The Weather Project (Tate Modern, London)', *Artforum*, December (2003), 124; Claire Bishop, 'But is it Installation Art', *Tate Etc.*, 3 (Spring 2005).
18. Robert Morris, 'Size Matters', *Critical Inquiry*, 26, 3, Spring (2000), pp. 474-87 (p. 482). Morris presents a merciless analysis of the emergence of large-scale artworks since the 1960s, or what he labels as 'the Wagner effect in art'. Whereas he published the article in precisely the same year that Tate Modern opened and the Unilever Series were launched, he already argues in the most prophetic terms that those museum objects that generate sufficient Wagner effect, 'provide simultaneous phenomenal aesthetic fetishes that are also transcendent and generally nationalist cultural idols, which sometimes dazzle as totemic objects pragmatically guaranteed by massive dollar signs and historical pedigrees - all delivered in the package of a sensational event'.
19. German painter Anselm Kiefer was the first artist to provide the central nave of the Grand Palais with the installation 'Sternenfall', a series of twelve supersized boxes and a series of towers. Usual suspect Richard Serra and Christian Boltanski are next in line. Serra is definitely the most cherished artist in the global competition between museums. When the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao opened in 1997, it proudly presented Richard Serra's massive sculpture 'Snake' (1996-97) in the museum's 'Fish' Gallery. In 2003, the Dia Center for the Arts opened a new branch in the immense spaces of a former box factory, containing amongst others Serra's impressive 'Torqued Ellipses' (1996-2000). A year later, Serra was again commissioned by the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao for seven new works, resulting in the permanent installation 'The Matter of Time' in the 'Fish' gallery.
20. Hal Foster, 'Why All the Hoopla', *London Review of Books* (August 2001), reprinted as the chapter 'The Master Builder', in *Design and Crime (and other diatribes)* (London, New York: Verso, 2002), pp. 27-42 (p. 27).
21. James Meyer, 'No more scale. The experience of size in contemporary sculpture', *Artforum*, 42, 10 (2004), 220-28. For a thoughtful critique on the use of the notion of (the) spectacle by both Meyer and Foster, see: Dan Smith, 'Size Matters', *Art Monthly*, 282 (2004-05), pp. 1-4.
22. James Meyer, 'No more scale', pp. 222-23.
23. Ibid. p. 228.
24. Tay Kheng Soon, 'Problem of scale in architecture', *Indian Institute of Architects Journal*, 58, 1 (1993), pp. 5-7; 9-10.
25. In the article 'The Scale of Man' - quite surprisingly listed as 'The Space of Man' in the Table of Contents - in the May 1970 issue of 'Arts Magazine', art critic Gregoire Müller explores the then-recent growing in size of artworks by such artists as Richard Serra, Claes Oldenburg, Michael Heizer and Walter De Maria. Müller situates the tendency to produce large-scale artworks within the ambition of contemporary art to 'make more evident and to contest unconscious systems which direct visual perception' and to this end, the resulting artworks are 'the first to attempt to unsettle one of the oldest and most solid notions – that of the human body as the point of reference for all measure'. And precisely at this point Müller also situates the inability to deal with these kind of gigantic works: they are assessed 'solely relative to architectural space'. The problem, Müller pointedly states, goes 'beyond the conflict with

architecture (….) [and] is more general and essential'. Gregoire Müller, 'The Space of man / The Scale of Man', *Arts Magazine*, 44, 7 / May (1970), pp. 42-43.

26. Daniel Buren, Olafur Eliasson and Tim Griffin, 'In Conversation: Daniel Buren & Olafur Eliasson', *Artforum*, 43, 9 (2005), 208-14 (p. 211).
27. Jessica Morgan, 'Turbine Höller', in *Carsten Höller. Test Site*, ed. by Jessica Morgan (London: Tate Publishing, 2006), pp. 11-18 (p. 12).
28. Jacques Herzog and Dietmar Steiner, 'Tate Modern, London', *Domus*, 828 (2000), pp. 32-44 (p. 40).
29. For a more extensive analysis of Tate Modern's reconversion strategy, see: Wouter Davidts, 'Art Factories. Museums of Contemporary Art and the Promise of Artistic Production', *Fabrications, The journal of the Society of Architectural Historians, Australia and New Zealand*, 16, 1 (2006), 23-42.
30. Although the decision to use the Bankside building had already been taken, the Tate eagerly grasped at the results of the questionnaire not only to legitimatise the choice of an existing building, but also to underpin the scheme ideologically. See Nicholas Serota, as cited in Daniel Birnbaum, 'Tate Show. Daniel Birnbaum on Tate Modern', *Artforum*, 38, 8 (2000), 39.
31. Cynthia C. Davidson, 'An interview with Nicholas Serota and Richard Burdett', *Any*, 13 (1996), 21-58 (pp. 43;46).
32. Ibid. p. 46.
33. The other architects that were shortlisted for the first stage of the architecture competition were Alsop & Störmer (UK), Arata Isozaki & Associates (Japan), David Chipperfield Architects (UK), Future Systems (UK), Michael Hopkins and Partners (UK), Nicholas Grimshaw and Partners (UK), Office for Metropolitan Architecture (The Netherlands), Rafael Moneo (Spain), Renzo Piano Building Workshop (Italy), Rick Mather Architects (UK), Rolfe Judd & Claude Silvestrin (UK) and Tadao Ando Architect & Associates (Japan). The architects that were shortlisted for the second stage, were Chipperfield, O.M.A., Renzo Piano and Tadao Ando. For an overview of the designs in the different stages of the competition, see amongst others *Tate Gallery of Modern Art. Selecting an Architect* (Exhibition Catalogue), ed. by Rowan Moore and Sharon Gethings (London: Tate Gallery / Blueprint, 1995); Building *Tate Modern. Herzog & De Meuron Transforming Giles Gilbert Scott*, ed. by Rowan Moore and Raymund Ryan (London: Tate Gallery, 2000) and the theme issue on Tate Modern by the magazine *Any*, 13, 1996.
34. 'Tate Gallery of Modern Art. Competition to Select an Architect', London, Tate Gallery of Modern Art, 1994 [Competition brief Stage 1], p. 16.
35. Herzog & De Meuron Architects, 'Tate Gallery of Modern Art. Competition to Select an Architect. Stage 1. Competition Entry Herzog & De Meuron Architects', London, Tate Gallery, Tate Gallery Research Centre, Archives [Architectural Competition; Stage 1], 1994.
36. Victoria Walsh, 'Tate Gallery of Modern Art. Competition to Select an Architect. Stage 1. Minutes from assessor's meeting on 14 & 15 November 1994', London, Tate Gallery, Tate Gallery Research Centre, Archives [Architectural Competition; Stage 1], 1994.
37. Herzog & de Meuron, 'Tate Gallery of Modern Art. Competition to Select an Architect. Stage 2. Competition Entry Herzog & de Meuron', London, Tate Gallery, Tate Gallery Research Centre, Archives [Architectural Competition; Stage 2], 1995.
38. Cynthia C. Davidson and Luis Fernández-Galiano, 'Exquisite Corpse. New York / Madrid', *Any*, 13, 1996, 13-49.
39. 'Conversation. Nicholas Serota, Jacques Herzog, Rowan Moore', in *Building Tate Modern. Herzog & De Meuron Transforming Giles Gilbert Scott*, ed. by Rowan Moore and Raymund Ryan (London: Tate Gallery, 2000), pp. 37-57 (p. 55).
40. Catherine Wood, 'EMBANKMENT', in *Rachel Whiteread. Embankment* (London: Tate Publishing, 2005), pp. 25-33 (p. 32).
41. Anne Picq, 'Bruce Nauman: Grand Oeuvre Sonore', *Beaux Arts Magazine*, 247 (2004-2005), p. 43.
42. Jonathan Swift, *Gulliver's Travels*, ed. by Robert Demaria Jr. (London: Penguin Books, 2001), p. 29.
43. Whereas the Turbine Hall measures about 155mx23mx35m, Ondák's rescaled version was approximately 15mx2.5m3.6m (length, width, height).
44. Whereas Ondák reduced the Turbine Hall to about a

tenth of its size, the difference in size between the Lilliputians and Gulliver is 1/12.

45. Susan Stewart, *On Longing. Narratives of the Miniature, the Gigantic, the Souvenir, the Collection* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), p. 74
46. Ibid. p. 86.
47. Anish Kapoor in 'A Conversation. Anish Kapoor with Donna De Salvo (June 2002)', in *Anish Kapoor, Marsyas* (London: Tate Publishing, 2002), pp. 60-64 (p. 60).

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Biography

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Book review

Peter Eisenman: 'The Formal Basis of Modern Architecture'

Arie Graafland

For quite a while, Peter Eisenman's dissertation lived the life of a mystery text. Many architectural theorists knew about it, but it was not published until 2006.[1] The facsimile reprint by Lars Müller finally makes available the complete typographic script that Eisenman defended in August 1963 at the University of Cambridge.

Eisenman's formal theory, influenced by Wittkower's pupil, Colin Rowe, who was the American architect's mentor during his time in Cambridge (UK), is based on the primacy of *form*. The notion of space is not discussed. Volume is, in fact, the most important critical category in the text. Architecture, in this framework of interpretation, is a three-dimensional volume developing in time and space. This architectural volume is open to different internal, and, to a certain extent, external forces resulting in distortion and deformation, a line of thought characteristic in Eisenman's career up till the present. In this sense, his dissertation was quite formative for his development both as an architect and a theoretician. In Eisenman's view, architectural thinking in the early sixties tended to emphasise history and iconography, except when issues of techniques and technology were involved. Linguistics and semiotics become architectural issues in the seventies, and Eisenman's dissertation more or less anticipates these concerns and questions.

Additionally, Eisenman's dissertation should be considered as *critical* rather than historical, examining propositions concerning form in a theoretical, not a historical way. 'Critical' in this case, means of course, that this book opposes the account of architecture in social theory. His argument is that logical and objective considerations can provide a conceptual and formal basis for any form of architecture. Eisenman is not interested in the isolation of modern forms per se; he is interested in a language and order which uses geometrical solids as absolute points of reference for any form of architecture. He is looking for an inherent order derived from a geometric reference. To this end, he analyses the work of Le Corbusier, Aalto, Wright and Terragni - the first and the last becoming the most important figures in his own future work; indeed, Terragni's work returns in a new publication in 2003.[2]

Architecture, for Eisenman, is in essence the joining of form to intent, function, structure, and techniques in the sense of primacy in the hierarchy of elements. Eisenman differentiates a subdivision of form into two types: generic and specific. The generic form is Platonic, a form in three dimensions, while the specific is the actual physical configuration in architecture which is realised in response to a particular intent and function. In architecture the emergence of the specific form follows from a consideration of these conditions. No building develops from a Platonic notion of form, but from intent and function. Form in this sense is specific and generic at the same time. Specific forms cannot be judged as good or bad in themselves, and do not comply with any subjective interpretation of beauty, style or taste.

Specific forms should relate to what Eisenman defines as the essence of a building. Form is examined in its relation to structure and techniques; structure may be thought of as the bones, veins and arteries of a building while techniques are, in turn, the ligaments of a building. To be able to understand volume, he introduces the notions of movement and experience. In the development of formal systems there should be clarity and comprehensibility in the transmission of an idea from 'author' to 'receiver', notions from communication theory in the 1950's, and hence the need for a formal ordering. Ordering rests on the systematic organisation of vocabulary; that is to say of volume, mass, surface, and movement. Eisenman attempts to show that architectural systems must develop from both the external situations and the internal functional requirements. In fact, like syntax it governs all organisation. Architecture is considered a formal language with a grammar. Buildings are like language, intentional; indeed, architecture orders itself by certain rules like language. In linguistics 'semantics' is the science of the meaning of words and sentences, the part that is suppressed in Eisenman. 'Grammar' is conceived of as the study of forms and constructions. Words form sentences by being arranged according to strict laws, or order. When treating grammatical categories, traditional grammar distinguishes parts of speech, modalities, and syntactic relationships.[3]

However, semiology concerned with objects has never convincingly shown the difference between structure and grammar. In the end, architecture might have structure or order, but it has no grammar. Inherent in language is a sort of theory of truth in the sense of a distinction between 'sense' and 'nonsense'. Yet no theory of truth for objects exists. In an earlier attempt to analyse Eisenman's Bio-Center entry for Frankfurt, I examined his building as 'semiotic material', a notion I borrowed from Julia Kristeva's linguistic theory.[4] 'Text', for Kristeva, is a specific domain of the semiotic, following syntactical and grammatical rules, which do not apply in the world of non-linguistic systems like architecture.[5] Kristeva's example is painting, Giotto's work in particular. But for painting one could read architecture.

Eisenman's empirical architectural proofs were explicated by eight buildings he analysed in great detail. The beauty of these examples actually lies in the analytical drawings, not in their grammar. Each building is re-drawn by hand and analysed as a field of different forces. Corbusier's Pavillon Suisse in Paris (1930-32) is analysed in the sense of 'compression', 'a crushing action applied to the sides', a 'pressure' that is acknowledged on the rear wall and so on. Proceeding this way, Eisenman can distance himself from notions of 'free form' architecture, a distancing still present in his current work, which, of course, is completely different from his early Houses. Corbusier's Cité de Refuge (1933) in Paris is characterised by the same mechanisms, with a 'suction effect' of the entry bridge. Frank Lloyd Wright's buildings are, in contrast, of a linear nature - one parallel to, and one perpendicular to dominant external axes. The syntax in this case is the resolution of internal and external requirements, and as such becomes quite similar to the syntax used in the two buildings of Le Corbusier.

In Wright's Avery Coonley House (Riverside, Illinois, 1907-8), the development is also based on syntax, but only when aided by his elaborate grammar. In the Martin House, the other example Eisenman discusses, both syntax and grammar can be resolved because of the strong systemic control, whereas in the Coonley House a very strong initial ordering seems to be vitiated by a constantly changing grammar.

With Aalto the possibility of analysis using syntactic models gets even more complex. Alvar Aalto's work is more difficult to understand as a specific grammar. The lack of an easily definable perceptual order gives the impression that there is a lack

of systemic order in his work. Yet also in this case, Eisenman's analysis shows Aalto buildings to be close to the grammar of Corbusier - a dominant volumetric order is combined with a secondary movement order. The so-called 'organic' development of Aalto's work is not in contradistinction to any formal order; his architecture can indeed be analysed in formal terms. Architectural elements are still regulated by a formal syntax and ordered by a formal system.

The work of Terragni, who will play an important role in Eisenman's future work, is analysed as a mass-surface dialectic. Obviously, a concern with an internal volumetric ordering is present in Terragni, but only as it relates to this primary mass-surface system. The Casa del Fascio (1932-6) can be read either as a solid block that has been cut away, or as a series of planes that have been placed together much as a deck of cards. These formal devices seem to originate from an almost academic study of Le Corbusier's notion of mass-surface. But whereas Le Corbusier initially sets up the grid and then plays with surface or mass as a foil to it, Terragni often fuses the two to achieve the desired ambiguity. Subsequently, Eisenman defines a field of forces: the syntactic order is dominant with the cross axis in the Casa del Fascio, accentuated by the three square bays and terminated by the memorial altar which provides a cushion absorbing the pressure at the end of the movement system.

In the last chapter of Eisenman's 1963 dissertation, he discusses closed and open-ended theory. Starting from a brief analysis of the treatises of Alberti and Durand as close-ended, through Choisy, Gaudet, Summerson and Banham, Eisenman arrives at Gropius and Giedion, to present his central argument: the confusion between moral and formal criteria in modern architecture. According to Eisenman, the contemporary critic in the early sixties should not interpret and direct architecture, but rather provide some kind of order, some point of reference. Theory should abandon both the historical nineteenth-century tradition and the polemical twentieth-century tradition. Theory must establish a system of priorities based on a logical consistency, in other words the formal manifestation of conceptual ideas, excluding both metaphysical consideration and aesthetic preference. Ultimately, Eisenman's dissertation should be understood as an attempt to read architecture as an open-ended system of volume and form. Of course, much could be said about the language-based underpinnings of the dissertation, but the real value of the argument is the precise way in which Eisenman analyses the masterpieces of modern architecture.

In dissertations submitted today, I rarely come across attempts by architects to carry out rigorous formal analysis of buildings realised by others. The contemporary discourse is exclusively about 'the new'. Despite notions of 'the projective' in the USA, 'research by design' in the Netherlands, or other recently introduced concepts dealing with theory and practice, Eisenman's dissertation is unique in its attempt to 'reconstruct' buildings by re-designing them.

Notes

1. Peter Eisenman, *The Formal Basis of Modern Architecture: Dissertation 1963*, *Facsimile* (Baden: Lars Müller Publishers, 2006).
2. See Peter Eisenman, *Giuseppe Terragni: Transformations, Decompositions, Critiques* (New York: Monacelli, 2003).
3. Julia Kristeva, *Language, the Unknown: An Initiation into Linguistics*, translated by A. M. Menke (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), p. 32.
4. Arie Graafland, 'Peter Eisenman: Architecture in Absentia', in *Peter Eisenman: Recent Projects*, ed. by Arie Graafland (Nijmegen: SUN, 1989), pp. 95-125.
5. Ibid. p. 100.

Biography

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Review article

A Vision for Brussels: Fuel to the Urban Debate or, at Last, an End to the Brussels Trauma?

Isabelle Doucet

Introduction

On the 15th of March 2007, the exhibition 'A Vision for Brussels: Imagining the Capital of Europe', curated by Pier Vittorio Aureli and Joachim Declerck from the Berlage Institute in Rotterdam, opened its doors at the Brussels BOZAR, in the honourable presence of the city's architecture and urbanism *beau monde*, and with nobody less than José Manuel Barroso, Guy Verhofstadt and Charles Picqué to deliver the opening speeches. The exhibition leaflet announces 'a concrete plan for Brussels as a proper European capital, a European project for the city that connects the different social, spatial and cultural layers of the city in order to provide Europe with a concrete face'. Completing a vision with a concrete project seems indeed a logical outcome of a research project carried out, since 2004, by an international architecture team comprising of sixteen members. But is that really so?

The exhibition and its accompanying publication 'Brussels - a Manifesto. Towards the Capital of Europe' is an occasion to reflect on how Brussels reflects on Brussels.[1] During the last decade, several architecture and urbanism publications on Brussels have emphasised the need for a strong vision for this European Capital. Is it an assumed failure of these studies that allows Berlage to claim a 'Vision for Brussels', as though it were the first? And how does 'A Vision for Brussels' relate to some other 'brand new' attempts to turn a vision for Brussels into reality: two new journals about 'planning the capital' and another Europe-in-Brussels exhibition, running concurrently?

But delimiting the evaluation of 'A Vision for Brussels' to its relevance for Brussels would be to underestimate its disciplinary critique - as expressed in the manifesto: whereas the exhibition deals with Brussels, the manifesto creates no doubt regarding its twofold ambition to question both Brussels and the architecture and urban design disciplines. Brussels, Europe and especially Architecture are the protagonists in this Berlage show.

'A Vision for Brussels': the exhibition

When entering the exhibition, the stakes become immediately clear: fifty years after the Treaty of Rome (1957) 'the time is ripe for an ambitious project for a fully-fledged Capital of Europe'.[2] Since the current crisis of Europe is also the crisis of Brussels, the exhibition explores the mutual significance of both: how can Brussels give form to the European political project and what are the challenges related to the presence of Europe in Brussels? In a projected film by Robin Ramaekers, Brussels personalities such as François Schuiten, Gérard Mortier, Guy Verhofstadt, and Geert Van Istendael confirm that Brussels is architecturally a disaster, that there is a lack of vision and that the dream about architecture in Brussels is, in reality, a nightmare.

The transit zone towards the second room subtly announces a shift from a conceptual to an architectural language with a large map of the Brussels Capital Region displaying the nine project sites.

Subtlety dissipates when it comes to discussing the nine sites in the second room by means of large drawings and models. Here architectural form and scale rule. Each of the nine dispersed project sites intermingles offices, housing, and symbolic public buildings and places. They are held together by the 'Archipelago' figure - as an alternative for the 'master plan' - including a new 'EU Promenade: a shared ground for all citizens'.[3] The Archipelago figure promises not only to better distribute housing and other European functions over the city and its vacant lots; it also promises new encounters between the citizens of Brussels and Europe. However, it remains unclear who are meant by 'citizens' and how encounters will take place concretely.

What *does* become clear, when moving from the conceptual to the project area, and especially after reading the manifesto, is that this project is first of all a disciplinary critique: a refusal to accept that, in a context of endless compromises and unclear powers, architecture and urbanism would be powerless and inefficient. On the contrary, it aims to demonstrate that 'the essence of architecture's intrinsic uniqueness is its *form*'[4] and that the 'subject of this operation is urbanity itself, seen in its phenomenological trace of our being within the city through the immediate experience of its form'.[5] It is *by means of* architecture, so the organisers believe, that the idea of Europe can get a concrete form, as a 'political' project, as 'a supranational "federal" European horizon'. By announcing the end of the era of megalomaniac building projects and the definitive end to the trauma of Brussels, 'A Vision for Brussels' indeed directs its critique at both Brussels and the architectural discipline. Berlage's prestige as an institute, its exhibition in the respected BOZAR and the significant press attention cannot but awaken Brussels' policy makers. But does it convince architects as well? If not the exhibition, then maybe the publication 'Brussels - a Manifesto' and a colloquium, in which renowned Brussels scholars such as Lieven De Cauter and Eric Corijn participated, might do so. With Brussels, Europe, and Architecture as the main characters in the Berlage show, it is, however, *Architecture* that plays the leading part. 'A Vision for Brussels' is a disciplinary critique, test-driven on Brussels' soil. Once again, Brussels is confirmed in its role of a battlefield and as a breeding ground for experiment.

The Brussels battlefield

Spatial planning in Brussels provides evidence of a stubborn tradition of negotiation and compromising. Historically it is characterised by a flexibility towards foreign governors, by a preference of maintaining the neutrality of the country and of materialistic short-term solutions, and by a deep distrust of grand ideologies.[6] Nevertheless, Brussels has never been short of ambitious projects. Inspired by nineteenth century Haussmannian Paris and industrial London, as well as by twentieth century world trading New York, Brussels too developed and realised grand projects: a neo-classical, megalomaniacal transformation of Brussels by King-urbanist Leopold II and zealously modern projects in response to the modern movement. Notwithstanding the deep social and morphological scars that these projects left behind in their urge to develop a new, ordered and modern Brussels – such as the destruction of entire popular quarters - the 1960s-1970s urbanism reinforced this tradition by emulating Le Corbusier's ideas 'in a hasty and mediocre manner'.[7] Due to a failed urbanism, bankrupt real estate developers, and numerous unfinished construction sites, the city centre was gradually abandoned by its population, while architectural designs were increasingly driven by political and administrative negotiations. Brussels, as a locus of conviviality, was replaced by a place serving only real estate and economical interest. While a disciplinary concern grew about the problematic role of the Brussels architects as the ultimate 'decorators of bitterly negotiated office and hotel projects',[8] the concern about the loss of local identity generated an aversion towards any grand ideology and the creation of urban resistance

and pressure groups. Significantly, the term 'Bruxellisation' was invented by Brussels' urbanists, to describe the 1960s-1970s anarchic development of a historic city in the hands of real estate developers. Despite the pressure groups' difficulty to create powerful and influential counter plans, their anger is fed, even today, by an ongoing planning opportunism and architecture and planning disasters. The 'flexible' climate of this city - in the midst of an architectural, planning and demographic crisis as well as in the midst of a split country without a strong identity - proved the ideal breeding ground for the gradual development of the European Union.

'A Vision for Brussels': not quite new?

Despite 'A Vision for Brussels' and its 'myth of the new', attempts to conceive a proper urban reflection on Brussels already exist. Instead of erasing those efforts, it makes sense to unravel what distinguishes 'A Vision for Brussels' from its predecessors. Rather than 'trying to keep one frame stable', one could 'register the links between unstable and shifting frames'. By doing so, one can trace the 'connections between the controversies themselves rather than try to decide how to settle a given controversy', such as the 'A Vision for Brussels' exhibition.[9]

'Vacant City' was based on a series of 'think-ins' for developing innovative scenarios for the Brussels vacant site of the Mont des Arts. By combining urban and architectural design with a 'theoretical programme' or 'discursive scenario', the proposals are 'concrete fuel for the debate' rather than utopian.[10] Similarly, 'A Moving City', exploring Brussels' nineteenth-century industrial Canal Zone and its post-industrial 'vacancies', combines project proposals with analyses and theoretical essays. Here, the theoretical reflections derive from empirical explorations - rather than vice versa - and form a basis for the design projects. As a result of an organic research process, it delivers a sequence of 'random indications of the dynamics of the contemporary suburb'.[11]

The approach of 'Brussels, Capital of Europe', also known as the Koolhaas study, is evaluated by most intellectuals as inappropriate for dealing with Europe in Brussels.[12] It is experienced as disturbing that 'even great architects as Rem Koolhaas talk about the European quarter as though the city did not exist' or write reports as mere 'brilliant platitudes, a few plays on words, jokes and visions carefully detached from the Brussels context'.[13] What should be done, therefore, if even Koolhaas does not have an answer? A more realistic approach, fine-tuned to the specific Brussels situation can be found in 'OmbudsPlanMediateur', the winning competition entry by the collective Aries / MSA (Moritz & Simon Architects) / Idom.[14] It proposed a European civic and cultural pole that would serve as an urban catalyst, whereas the urban would be expressed 'through the mixity of its functions and uses' while a new platform would be launched 'for debate on the European question and the urban question'.[15] Rather than developing a vision based on a mere weak and legitimising enhancement of diversity and multi-culturalism, this project includes the 'concrete' appointment of an urban project coordination and management unit.[16] More recently, and with similar concreteness and realism, 'Change: Brussels Capital of Europe' observed that Brussels might be running out of hope, and that this hope might only be rediscovered by tracing the 'genealogy of the wounds and the strengths of this thousand year old city'.[17] With the help of discussions with architects, this study aimed at rebuilding the city based on genuine, possible projects. That 'Change' aimed at creating a continuous debate is demonstrated by its follow-up publication, 'Re-Change', a 'light' version that was born within only a few weeks, presenting a selection of readers' reactions to the prequel.

Apart from these attempts towards a *proper urban reflection* about Brussels and Europe, the need to involve the *citizen* has been emphasised as well. 'OmbudsPlanMediateur' emphasises *democratic participation* without falling into the trap of a

bottom-up versus top-down debate, a debate that is problematic in both Brussels and the architecture and urbanism disciplines. Strategies building on everyday experiences (inspired by Michel De Certeau and Henri Lefebvre) often prove either powerless or end up being applied merely to modest planning issues. Beyond such debate, Carola Hein has repeatedly argued for a strategy to create (European) capitals using a 'bottom-up' approach, because 'the intervention of the citizens would increase the legitimacy of the EU and counterbalance what is often considered to be a democratic shortcoming'.[18] As such, Brussels could become a 'hub for the polycentric and itinerant capital […] a figurehead of a network of headquarter cities'.

A vision for the architectural discipline, after all

'A Vision for Brussels' addresses the 'current disciplinary disbelief in architecture and especially towards its main specific manifestation: *form*'.[19] 'A Vision for Brussels' reacts against an architecture that 'enhances spectacle to manifest its presence in the city'[20] and against 'spectacular interventions that are only seen within their self-referential appearance'.[21] Instead, it argues for architecture as 'injections with a big needle' offering itself as the 'provider of symbolic space'. It argues for artefacts that are large in scale but modest in form: a 'new, vast and silent monumentality' but 'without useless utopian-megastructural enthusiasm or gigantic gestures of *architectures parlante*'.[22] Moreover, 'A Vision for Brussels' considers the strength of the architectural form an alternative to those studies on the 'everyday' denying the potential power of architecture. According to Elia Zenghelis, writing in the manifesto, the 'celebrated "informality" of our contemporary cities (sprawl, "bottom-up urbanism", "self-organisation" and other similar "mythologies") is in the majority of cases a "Trojan Horse" for the manipulative politics of urban exploitation'.[23] Although one could agree with Zenghelis to the extent that, indeed, 'everybody is welcome to participate as consumer, while nobody is invited as ruler', this does neither legitimise doing away with participatory efforts from the everyday altogether nor their replacement by a 'new monumentality' that nevertheless remains abstract and unclear regarding its implementation in the Brussels reality and the concrete meaning it allocates to *citizenship*. In the Brussels context of 'resistance to new-build [*sic*] projects as well as nostalgia for the city that had been lost',[24] one could argue that it is legitimate to criticise an architectural activism that reclaims the city for its inhabitants by means of a traditional model for the city and by refusing *any* new project 'with little attempt at nuance'. But 'A Vision for Brussels' falls short of reconnecting its monumental architecture with the surrounding Brussels context and with the operative meaning it allocates to *citizenship* in such a heterogeneous and often problematic morphological, social and economic fabric.

'A Vision for Brussels': hard to grasp or hard to criticise?

The exhibition's starting point is promising: attempting to give form to the relation between Brussels and Europe, to do so through architecture, and to stress the importance of European symbolism. Apart from developing a vision for Brussels and Europe, it finally put architecture back on the agenda as well, which was needed for a city like Brussels, suspicious of *grand ideologies* while 'licking' its historical urban wounds. 'A Vision for Brussels' opens again the way for a radical thinking about Brussels and for the creation of *one* single vision, *one plan* (the archipelago plan uniting nine sites), and *one* architecture (new monumentality) for the whole Brussels territory. Planning on a regional scale and reintroducing 'a great urban design concept' is indeed the only way for Brussels to get out of a 'societal debate that has been dominated by local interests since the 1970s'.[25] 'A Vision for Brussels' gives new hope for the frustrated position of the Brussels architects.

More problematic is its translation into a realistic

architectural and urban project: as an architectural, social and democratic project, the proposals remain far too abstract and unclear. This is especially problematic regarding the meaning of 'citizen' - much more so than regarding the concrete implementation in the Brussels context - since it is precisely here that emphasis is placed, yet at the same time obscurity is produced. As such 'A Vision for Brussels' circumvents not only precision and concreteness, but also possible critique. For example, the claim that 'for the first time new public spaces make an encounter possible between the citizen and the European Institutions' is impossible to verify.[26] *How* this encounter would take place, *who* is meant by 'citizen' and *how* the design of the public spaces would contribute to this encounter, remains unclear: the architectural proposals hardly surpass their manifesto-level. In the Brussels context, where diversity sells well and chaos is beautified, but, at the same time, a context of economic paradoxes, it is indispensable for architecture to address notions such as 'citizenship', 'participation' and 'heterogeneity' simultaneously politically, socially and design-wise. When, for example, creating '850 terraced houses and gardens, for those inhabitants who want to escape the density of Brussels', it should question *who* are meant by 'inhabitants': those who have the economic opportunity to escape? 'A Vision for Brussels' seems to avoid questions of such order by archiving them too hastily into the closed stacks of small-scale, bottom-up urban approaches. As a disciplinary critique, it indeed argues for a rediscovery of architectural 'hardware' - form, urban artefact and landmark - as a way to counter a disciplinary over-emphasis on the city's 'software'. Nevertheless, with its insufficiently elaborated proposals, the project suffers in fact more from its obscured *conceptual* concreteness than from its lack of architectural detailing. Indeed, the replacement of the master plan by the 'Archipelago plan' is much less questionable than the enhancement of rather arbitrary urbanism entities such as the 'mirror city'. Moreover, 'A Vision for Brussels' self-claimed rhetoric of the radical, the new, and the controversy, risks silencing its opponents as traditionalists resisting innovation.

Beyond 'A Vision for Brussels': cleaning up the urban battlefield

That 'A Vision for Brussels' does not stand alone in reinforcing a thorough urban dialogue is demonstrated by a series of preceding studies - as delineated by this article - and by a series of concurrent initiatives as well. 'A Vision for Brussels' follows its predecessors in combining a vision for Brussels with design proposals, in enhancing Brussels' multicultural character and heterogeneity as an asset rather than a problem, and in building further on the idea of Brussels as a post-national capital. In contrast, however, to the charm and political correctness of romanticising the 'image of Brussels as a "vacant city" or *terrain vague*'[27] - as in 'Vacant City' - or the charm of urban dynamics - as in 'A Moving City' - 'A Vision for Brussels' prefers to 'transform the entropic nature of the vacant sites into urban artefacts' and enhance architectural scale to make 'recognisable urban parts […] intelligible as new metropolitan city sections'. What distinguishes 'A Vision for Brussels' is that it forms a disciplinary critique; that it is about architecture much more than it is about Brussels. Architecture *itself* is enhanced as both the test and nurturing ground for a new urban vision. The exhibition promises the visitor 'a global and concrete solution', which in the end implies that the enhanced tools, such as architectural form, urban artefact and scale, when applied correctly, hold the key to 'solving' the crisis of architecture and the city in *different* contexts, in *any* context.[28]

Much less controversial than 'A Vision for Brussels' is the concurrent exhibition 'Building(s) for Europe: the Changing Face of Brussels', in the European Parliament. This exhibition displays an inventory of the architectural and urban development of the European Quarter by means of a historical overview, architectural models, a documentation centre

(including urban plans and reports) and an impressive scale model of the entire Brussels Region.[29] The simultaneous publication 'Bruxelles: Capitale de l'Europe' by Thierry Demey completes this exhibition as a more detailed and historical description of the developments and architectural patrimony of the European Quarter. The exhibition's 'vision' is limited to the wish that if 'Brussels wants to remain the political capital of Europe', then initiatives must be taken to fill in the gaps in the EU district as well as 'designating suitable sites for the future expansion of institutions'.[30] Nevertheless, its extensive display of 'matters of fact' and its denial of an entire history of highly disputed 'matters of concern' can be seen as a statement in itself.[31] While 'A Vision for Brussels' screams loud and clear in favour of the demolition of the European Parliament - 'a horrible, ugly building'[32] – it is only the guestbook of the 'Building(s) for Europe' exhibition that cries in silence of 'a beautiful exhibition about horrific architecture!'

The new journal 'BrU: Planning a Capital' expresses the position, demonstrated already by the theme of its first issue, 'occupation', that planning should deal with the self-organising (occupational) qualities of space and its users too.[33] Whereas this first issue speaks 'software' next to 'hardware', the second issue ('BrU 02') focuses on the theme of 'imagination' as a response to the controversy around 'A Vision for Brussels'. It does so by giving voice to a manifold of reactions - from cynical to visionary, and from provocative to totally misplaced - and by building further on the grounds of the limited but existing consensus: 'the importance and urgency of a determined and innovative city project … capable of injecting a clear spatial vision into the socio-economic considerations' of the Brussels Region.[34] What it consequently addresses is precisely the role, form and representation of this type of project. 'Brussels Studies', the e-journal for academic research on Brussels, is a second new platform supported by the Brussels Regional Government.[35] Without disciplinary preference, it publishes scientific work on Brussels. Here as well, (new) attention for Europe-in-Brussels can be recognised in two recent contributions by Carola Hein and Philippe Van Parijs.[36] What these two new journals on Brussels confirm is that, indeed, a new way of debating Brussels - and architecture - is in full swing. However, different from 'A Vision for Brussels', their awareness that 'Brussels has never been short of interesting ideas, but the incredible thing is its inability to flesh them out',[37] makes them more attentive to the remaining question whether these efforts can generate a new way of 'making' Brussels, as well.

Conclusion: an invitation to architecture, addressed to Brussels.

'A Vision for Brussels' invited Brussels - and especially architecture - to think big again and to think Brussels *as a whole*. Not only does it encourage Brussels to reflect on its architectural and identity wounds, it invites all architects to rethink the disciplinary position through offering them a new role by raising the significance of the architectural form. One can be grateful for this new hope for both Brussels and Architecture. But, despite its innovation in proposing a disciplinary critique *by means of* a project proposal, one can also question whether it is wise to use Brussels as a vehicle for working out a disciplinary critique. That architecture *as such* would be sufficient for 'solving' the city has not been demonstrated in the project proposals for 'A Vision for Brussels'. It takes more than renewing monumentality and reinforcing the power of architecture to 'solve' Brussels or any other city. The new institutions required to keep architecture and urbanism on the agenda remain to be concretised, as does the manner in which architecture can reconnect with citizenship, and the manner in which diversity and heterogeneity can become operational rather than merely inspirational.

Is it in the end the architect who decides what is good and bad for the city? The Berlage Institute?



Fig. 1: Video projection at ‘A Vision for Brussels’ exhibition. Courtesy of author.

Or Aureli himself, outlining Brussels' future with a thick black marker on a white sheet of paper, from a high-rise tower overlooking the city (as he was portrayed in the exhibition video) [fig 1]? If Architecture and urbanism, as important and powerful tools, aim to translate their visions into concrete but realistic projects, they cannot but reconnect to the city and citizenship. It is time to acknowledge that this does not necessarily implicate a return to the old debates on 'participation' but to a *concrete* and *operative* redefinition of 'citizenship'. Instead, 'A Vision for Brussels'' architectural gestures, at once monumental and obscure, create an illusion of an all-solving architectural answer to our urban *problematiques*. 'A Vision for Brussels' can nurture the current 'mood for change' in Brussels, only when such illusions are relativised and when Brussels is positioned, next to Architecture, as the leading lady of the show.

Did 'A Vision for Brussels' produce a 'vision' for Brussels? Yes, once again. Did it produce 'one' vision? Yes, at last! Did it also deliver a full-blown 'project' for Brussels and a 'solution' to the crisis of architecture and the city? Alas, not (yet).

Notes

1. *Brussels - a Manifesto. Towards the Capital of Europe*, ed. by Pier Vittorio Aureli and others (Rotterdam: NAI Publishers, 2007). The exhibition ran from 16 March until 16 September 2007 (after prolongation due to its success) at the Centre for Fine Arts Brussels (BOZAR).
2. Joachim Declerck in *Opinions: A Vision for Brussels*, visitors' guide for the exhibition 'A Vision for Brussels: Imagining the Capital of Europe' (Brussels: BOZAR, Berlage Institute and A+, 2007), p. 4.
3. Quoted from the exhibition 'A Vision for Brussels'.
4. Elia Zenghelis, 'For a New Monumentality' in *Brussels - a Manifesto*, p. 225.
5. For this and following citation: Pier Vittorio Aureli, 'Architecture after Liberalism: Towards the Form of the European *Capital* City' in *Brussels - a Manifesto*, p. 186.
6. Vincent Cartuyvels, Pierre Loze, 'The History and Symptoms of a Constantly Evolving City', in *Change: Brussels Capital of Europe*, ed. by Joel Claisse and Liliane Knopes (Brussels: Prisme Editions 2005), p. 35.
7. Ibid. p. 60.
8. Ibid. p. 65.
9. Bruno Latour, *Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 24 & 23, respectively.
10. *Vacant City: Brussels' Mont des Arts Reconsidered*, ed. by Bruno De Meulder and Karina Van Herck (Rotterdam: NAI Publishers, 2000), pp. 9-10. 'Vacant City' is a co-production of Brussels 2000 European City of Culture, OSA K.U.Leuven, and the Fondation Roi Baudouin.
11. Studio Open City, *A Moving City: Three Years of Architectural Explorations in Brussels' Canal Zone* (Brussels: Centrum voor Architectuur en Design, 1998), p. 10.
12. In 2001, a group of intellectuals from varied backgrounds (including Umberto Eco and Rem Koolhaas) were invited by Romani Prodi (President of the Commission) and Guy Verhofstadt (Belgian Prime Minister), to discuss Brussels as a European Capital, resulting in 'Brussels Capital of Europe, Final Report October 2001' (unpublished, European Commission, Belgian Presidency 2001).
13. Geert Van Istendael, in *Opinions*, p. 8; Lucien Kroll, 'Brussels New Town', in *Change*, p. 115.
14. The winning entry of the public tender organised in 2003 by the Chancellery of the Belgian Prime Minister (Guy Verhofstadt) and the Cabinet of the Brussels Capital Region's Minister-President (Charles Picqué), for developing the European zone. See *Change*, pp. 212-21.
15. *Change*, p. 214. This 'urban catalyst' is to be implemented on the crossroads of the institutional axis (Schuman-Luxembourg) and the citizens' axis of the Valley of the Maelbeek.
16. It would consist of a board of (70% Belgian and 30%

EU) directors, a consulting committee and an operating structure (directed by an architect-urban planner). See *Change*, pp. 220-21.

17. Claisse and Knopes, in *Change*, p. 19.
18. Carola Hein, 'Brussels and the Headquarter Cities of the European Union', in *Change*, p. 121. The following citation: pp. 120-21.
19. Aureli, in *Brussels - a Manifesto*, p. 192.
20. Joachim Declerck in Jan Braet, 'A Vision for Brussels - Hoofdarchipel van Europa', *Knack Magazine*, 12 (March 2007), pp. 32-35.
21. For this and following citation: Aureli and Declerck, in *Brussels - a Manifesto*, p. 31.
22. Ibid. p. 31; and Aureli, *Brussels - a Manifesto*, p. 191.
23. For this and following citation: Elia Zenghelis, in *Brussels - a Manifesto*, p. 227.
24. For this and following citation: Géry Leloutre and Iwan Strauven, 'Brussels-Europe: An Aporia?', in *Brussels - a Manifesto*, p. 215.
25. Géry Leloutre and Iwan Strauven, *Brussels - a Manifesto,* p. 223.
26. Declerck, in *Opinions*, p. 4.
27. For this and following citation: Aureli, *Brussels - a Manifesto*, p. 191.
28. 'A Vision for Brussels' reuses certain instruments of design and planning such as Ungers' archipelago, Koolhaas' 'Exodus', Rossi's 'silent monuments' and 'urban artefacts', in different contexts.
29. Organised and funded by Fonds Quartier Européen, Fondation Roi Baudouin, and the Brussels Capital Region. It ran from 5 May to 30 September 2007, in the Luxembourg Station (European Parliament).
30. Alain De Neef, *Building(s) for Europe: The Changing Face of Brussels*, visitors' guide 2007. Thierry Demey, Bruxelles, Capitale de l'Europe, (Brussels: Badeaux Guides Histoire Patrimoine, 2007).
31. As by Bruno Latour in 'Why Has Critique Run out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern', *Critical Inquiry*, 30, no. 2, Winter (2004); and *Reassembling the Social*, pp. 87-120.
32. Aureli in the 'A Vision for Brussels' exhibition video by Robin Ramaekers.
33. Initiated by CIVA (Centre Internationale pour la Ville, l'Architecture et le Paysage) and the Brussels Regional Planning department (Benoît Périlleux). See: *BrU 01- Occupation*, ed. by Benoît Périlleux (Brussels: AATL/CIVA, February 2007); and, *BrU 02- Imagination*, ed. by Périlleux and Bunkerhotel (June 2007).
34. Leloutre, 'Editorial', *BrU 02* - Imagination, p. c.
35. Appears monthly since December 2006. Though supported by the Brussels Capital Region, it functions independently as a collaboration between universities (Michel Hubert ed.).
36. Philippe Van Parijs, 'Brussels Capital of Europe: the New Linguistic Challenges', *Brussels Studies*, Issue 6 - 03/05/2007; and Carola Hein, 'The Polycentric and Opportunistic Capital of Europe: a New Model for the Siting and Reallocation of EU Headquarters and the Design of European Districts in Brussels and other Host Cities', *Brussels Studies*, Issue 2 - 18/12/2006 (see www.brusselsstudies.be)
37. François Schuiten, in *Opinions*, p. 16.

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