The Structuralist Debate:
Conceptual Architecture (1969–1974) between Formalism and Ideology

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Abstract

In 1967 structuralism underwent a theoretical acceleration, establishing its scientific basis through linguistics and semiotics, which allowed it to question its metaphysical and anti-historical premises through its critique of anthropocentrism, and it began to enter into relations with other disciplines, including architecture. Peter Eisenman's interest in the conceptual began with the various versions of his manifesto 'Notes on Conceptual Architecture: Towards a Definition', published between 1970 and 1974; in all these texts, he speaks of 'formal universals', 'deep structures', 'conceptual structures' and 'sign systems' capable of generating meaning. Conceptual architecture was immediately criticised by Diana Agrest and Mario Gandelsonas, who denounced this structuralist appropriation as an ideological consumption of theory. From 1974 onwards, conceptual architecture began to show signs of weakness, but it was only after Agrest and Gandelsonas's critique, which questioned both its assumptions and its entire intellectual trajectory, that Eisenman's theoretical agenda evolved towards a new, hermetic and unknowable code: the exact opposite of what had been advocated.

Keywords

Conceptual architecture, structuralism, ideology, Diana Agrest, Peter Eisenman, Mario Gandelsonas

One Sentence Summary

The linguistic turn in structuralism in the late 1960s influenced Eisenman's approach to conceptual architecture; this was later challenged by Agrest and Gandelsonas, whose critique prompted Eisenman to abandon it.

The history of structuralism, which argues that meaning emerges from relationships and connections between elements, that structures govern social and artistic practices, and which prioritises analysing the system at a given moment rather than its history, is a long and controversial one. It is made up of accelerations, appropriations, disciplinary transitions, shifts both in its own goals and in its relations with other scientific paradigms, entries into the academy, disillusions and misunderstandings.[1] In its first phase, structuralism found its most fertile fields of application in the human sciences, anthropology and linguistics, where, amid rapid success and mutual influences, it established its own real basis, in the open criticism of existentialism. Then, between 1967 and 1968, we observe its development, with the positions of Claude Lévi-Strauss, Roland Barthes, Jacques Lacan and Michel Foucault changing radically, as did the objects of their criticism. As François Dosse noted:

> Were there many structuralisms or simply one structuralism? … In the mid-sixties, both Louis Althusser and Michel Foucault were trying to bring together the most modern social science

research … In 1966, these efforts reached their apex. By 1967, cracks started to appear … This period of deconstruction, dispersion, and ebb, however, only quite superficially affected the rhythm of structuralist research. Research continued elsewhere, in the university, and obeyed another temporal logic. May 1968 had contributed to structuralism's institutional success.[2]

During these years, architectural theory moved away from the analysis of structure through historical narratives, which were problematic both because of their heterogeneity and for being subjective and focused on the human dimension. Structure is sought in topology, in the logical arrangement of forms and in the configurations of spatial systems, where the relationships between elements are the true data of reality; the meaning of architecture as a spatial-textual system therefore no longer lies in the communicative intention of the author, but in its relations to social, political, economic and formal codes. Thus space, not as a place but as a network of topological relations, has a dual role: on the one hand, it is the ontological basis of the structure, its condition of existence; on the other hand, space allows the structure itself to manifest, to be thought and perceived. In the 1950s, both philosophers such as Jacques Derrida and Marxist-structuralist intellectuals such as Henri Lefebvre and Louis Althusser criticised the foundations of structuralism, targeting its critical positions on history and anthropocentrism.[3] Between the rejection of the historical dimension and the death of the author, aspects of the militancy of certain authors such as Foucault can be discerned, aspects which they also propose as ways of rethinking bourgeois ideology.[4]

But these were also the years in which, on the one hand, the French cultural scene witnessed a kind of decline in the figure of the *intellectuel engagé à la* Jean-Paul Sartre and, on the other hand, structuralist thought became institutionalised with its entry into the academia. It was here that the movement broadened and articulated its scientific objectives and met those disciplines that had hitherto remained outside the debate, such as architecture, with which intellectual borrowings, transpositions of definitions and conceptual applications began to be defined. By entering academia, however, Barthes, Lévi-Strauss, Lacan and others also began to define the differences between their positions and to consider the movement itself as something episodic rather than a true philosophical current.

From 1967 onwards, the relationship with architectural theory became more persistent, also facilitated by the rupture that had opened up between academia and the profession. This kind of epistemological break is confirmed by the gradual distancing between the profession, with its social and political tensions, and the repositioning towards intellectual autonomy of academia, directed towards areas protected from the chaos of professional events.

Peter Eisenman and the formal basis of architecture
Peter Eisenman's 1963 PhD dissertation at Cambridge is an analysis of the formal basis of modern architecture carried out with the tools of structuralist analysis.[5] Starting from the autonomy of formal elements, whether visual, geometric or compositional, Eisenman emphasises the rules of form generation, the internal logical structures of transformation, their grammar, relations, repetitions, hierarchies. Eisenman shows here how formal production does not consist of an abstract or fixed idea of form, but is configured by what remains after the iterations of a design process based on the coherent structure of the dynamic rules of transformation of the system itself: 'Any ordering or organization of architectural form within the design process can be called a system: more explicitly a formal system.'[6] It was then, in 1969, at the suggestion of the linguist Max Block and thanks to the texts he sent him from Cornell, that Peter Eisenman began to take a direct interest in Noam Chomsky's structuralism and in the concepts of deep structure, surface structure and the transformative rules that keep them in relation.[7] *Syntactic Structures*, a minor text in Chomsky's oeuvre, thus becomes a guide to the world of architectural criticism for Eisenman, who began to use these terms in the definition of a theory of formal orders in a specific sense. [8] He would call it 'Conceptual Architecture' and theorise the existence of a superficial perceptual order and a deep conceptual order.[9]

In this way, Eisenman adheres to what Barthes describes as the central principle of structuralism: 'The goal of all structuralist activity, whether reflexive or poetic, is to reconstruct an "object" in such a way as to manifest thereby the rules of functioning (the "functions") of this object.'[10] Influenced by these approaches, in 1970 Eisenman published in *Architectural Forum* a review of 'Meaning in Architecture', edited by Charles Jenks and George Baird, in which he polemically described how this anthology consists only of critical texts enclosed within the semantic paradigm, highlighting the interpretive problems of a theory of meaning not applicable to architectural criticism.[11] On the contrary, citing Chomsky as a source for the possible construction of an alternative point of view based on syntax, he proposes a linguistic-structuralist approach as the most appropriate theoretical framework capable of constituting the horizon within which a theory of architectural composition can be

founded: 'This in itself leaves unexpressed the problem of basic regularities which pertain to particular languages as well as to language in general. Syntax in this view of language becomes a rather trivial matter.'[12]

Eisenman's Manifesto *in fieri*: the 'Notes'

Eisenman's decision to define his theory as conceptual came during discussions with the art critic Rosalind Krauss, whom he met at the events organised for the May 1969 CASE 7 symposium: as is well known, the term was already circulating in New York art circles, while the two often worked closely together until the late 1960s.[13] He consolidates his conceptual architecture theory primarily through his interest on the work of Terragni culminated in the two texts published in 1970 and 1971, the various slightly different versions of his manifesto 'Notes on Conceptual Architecture: Towards a Definition', all published between 1970 and 1974, and the articles published in *Oppositions* since its founding in 1973.[14] The work carried out on the versions of 'Notes' itself constitutes an internal debate lasting at least four years, in which Eisenman procedurally modified his point of view as a function of both experience and close dialogue with Diana Agrest and Mario Gandelsonas, who both had studied anthropology and linguistics in Buenos Aires between 1964 and 1966, attended the Barthes seminars in Paris in 1968 and then moved to New York in 1971, where, in contact with Emilio Ambasz and the Graham Foundation, they began to collaborate with the Institute for Architecture and Urban Studies.

Briefly, we can say that the first version was 'Notes on Conceptual Architecture: Towards a Definition' published in *Design Quarterly*: conceptual architecture is here first defined in fifteen footnotes, of which the main text has been blanked out.[15] The second version was published in *Casabella* a few months later and was entitled '*Appunti sull'Architettura Concettuale. Verso una definizione*', a text this time consisting of thirty-eight notes, arranged in a different order.[16] The third, Spanish version was never translated into English, entitled 'Notas sobre arquitectura conceptual: estructura profunda dual', was presented at the symposium *Arquitectura, historia y teoria de los signos* organised by Tomàs Llorens in Castelldefels in March 1972. After receiving criticism in the following months for applying Chomsky's theory too literally, Eisenman corrected the text and sent the fourth version, with the same title, for publication in the conference proceedings in 1974: here, anyway, he reaffirms his conviction of the inseparability of idea and form, whose dialectic defines their syntactic dimension.[17] The fifth version, entitled 'Notes on Conceptual Architecture II: Double Deep Structure', is unpublished, and was later released as a sixth version with further modifications under the title 'Notes on Conceptual Architecture II A'.[18] This would be republished in Japanese, with minor modifications to the contents, as the seventh and last version, under the title 'Notes on Conceptual Architecture (II): Double Deep Structure' in 1974.[19] The text was used in part on other occasions; starting from both his initial presentation of the logic of House I at CASE 7 and the opening section of the 'Notas', Eisenman expands upon the two texts 'House I, 1967' and 'House II, 1969', which were published in *Five Architects* in 1972, republished with additional modifications under the title 'Cardboard Architecture/*Castelli di carte*' in *Casabella* the following year.[20]

What is interesting about this incessant work is perhaps both the monological and dialogical dimensions of the content of the 'Notes', which change in a constant search for a well-founded and credible definition. In all versions Eisenman speaks of 'formal universals' capable of generating meaning. It is here that Eisenman defines the notion of conceptual architecture, despite the acknowledged difficulty of being truly effective in the design phase: indeed, it will always remain problematic to develop purely transformative methods, such as analytical diagrams, while reducing semantic contexts to a pure system of signs. He arrives at a radical definition of conceptual architecture as a system of signs capable of communicating exclusively syntactic relations in their total transparency, based on the innate capacity of the human mind to understand rational rules. From a philosophical point of view, this is nothing new: innatism is a classical position typical of the seventeenth-century debate between rationalists and pragmatists on the nature and possibility of knowledge and its cognitive value, and thus the basis of a possible modern science and epistemology. The definition of conceptual architecture thus revolves around that of a formal universal, which in turn seems a generically understood formal archetype; in any case, a certain ambiguity remains in the definition, as Eisenman would gradually describe such formal universals as 'deep structures', 'conceptual structures' and 'sign systems' capable of generating meanings.[21]

Agrest and Gandelsonas: knowledge and ideology

In the same months of 1970 in which Eisenman began to publish his 'Notes', Agrest and Gandelsonas published an article in Spanish in the Argentine architectural periodical *Summa* in which they related semiology to material inequalities, rather than focusing on signifiers, while offering their own interpretation of two concepts that would be fundamental to their critique: ideology and knowledge in the field of architectural criticism.[22] These

are two classic terms that echo what Barthes called literature, the ideologisation of Western writing in general, and what he had already defined as the 'degree zero of writing', the attempt to free writing from structures of hierarchy and power.[23]

For Agrest and Gandelsonas, by contrast to Eisenman, any introduction of theories and concepts from other disciplines, such as semiotics or structuralist philosophy, into the critical architectural debate is in itself a production of ideology, or what they call an ideological consumption of theory, that is, a negative and illusory invasion from outside the discipline of architecture.[24] Importing the concept of function into architecture, for example, would prevent a genuine and original non-ideological scientific development of disciplinary scientific knowledge (or 'the knowledge'). This critical approach to the ideological consumption of theory is explicitly Marxist and close to Manfredo Tafuri's critique of capitalism, while echoing Althusser's *Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses* (1970).[25] This is unlike their later New York work in which they abandoned the notion of perverse objects for syntactic structures, and move from an ideological critique to a formal analysis. It is a shift typical of the Barthes of *S/Z* (1970) and then of *The Pleasure of the Text* (1973), in which the critique of structuralism is increasingly articulated and politicised, and would find ample echo and theoretical-critical consonance in Agrest and Gandelsonas's later work.

Agrest and Gandelsonas immediately criticised conceptual architecture based on these initial but clear premises. In 1972, Gandelsonas worked on his first American article, 'On Reading Architecture', an attempt to critique the system of meaning that Eisenman was developing. Shortly thereafter, between 1972 and 1973, Agrest and Gandelsonas published a series of articles on the misunderstandings arising from the use of concepts derived from linguistics and structuralism in the field of architecture.[26] The theses expressed in these texts oscillate between ideological consumption in general and the dangers implicit in ideology in Eisenman's work in particular. They constitute the theoretical core of the first texts in which a structuralist-based architectural critique of Eisenman's conceptual architecture developed in the United States, accusing it of being ideological.

Then, on the clear and original basis expressed in 'Linguistics in Architecture' (1973), Gandelsonas offers a second critique of Eisenman's conceptual architecture, confirming the need to distinguish between ideology and theory: the concepts 'syntax' and 'deep structure' need to be carefully defined when transferred from linguistics to architecture. This ultimately led to Eisenman's work being seen as a phenomenon within Western architectural

ideology. Thus, in the space of a few months, the architectural debate took on the complexity of a debate traditionally confined to philosophical and linguistic structuralist circles. While Diana Agrest introduced Marxist categories borrowed from Althusser and Balibar, such as the dialectic between knowledge and ideology, Mario Gandelsonas drew on Julia Kristeva's semiotics, both by applying distinctions such as that between the semiotics of communication and semanalysis, and by re-reading studies on Saussurian anagrams.[27] This broad investigation allowed them to transpose notions such as intertextuality and alternative systems of signification, freed from the direct referentiality between sign and object.

Finally, in the background, the influence of Jacques Derrida, whose deconstruction of meaning, understood as an unstable phenomenon in constant tension between repetition and difference, soon paved the way for a radical redefinition of the relationship between space, language and meaning.[28]

The demise of conceptual architecture

From 1973 onwards, Eisenman responded to such criticism by embarking on a reconnaissance of what was still lacking in his rational theory of architecture, eliminating all direct references to Chomsky and recognising the impossibility of translating his insights into the formal structures of language into architecture. He would continue to define the conceptual structure of his theory as rational, but without mentioning it, abandoning the linguistic analogy and referring only to the conceptual aspects of his theory.

Thus conceptual architecture began to show symptoms of weakness and diminished cohesion, while Eisenman continued to engage with questions of the autonomy of form, albeit from a critical position, appropriating the concept of ideology. A use, however, emptied of its capacity to embody a conflict, whether social, political or even simply formal, given that Eisenman's conception of dialectics is foreign to any Marxist instance.

The final step in the definitive overcoming of conceptual architecture took place in November 1974 with the publication of Eisenman's 'Conceptual Architecture: From the Perception of Form to its Hidden Meaning', then published in *Casabella* the next year, in which he defined a new concept of form as the result of a set of archetypal relationships that influence our sensitivity in relation to the environment.[29] In this critical turn and in line with the radical change of tone, this is the last time he speaks of conceptual architecture.[30]

In the meantime, the critical debate became more international, also as a function of the almost contemporary new theoretical approaches aimed at

Fig. 1: 'Architecture and Urban Planning Round Table 'Theory', held on 24 April 1974 at Princeton University's Architecture Building. A round table discussion on theory from the special spring lecture series organised by Diana Agrest. From left: Peter Eisenman (Director of the Institute for Architecture and Urban Studies), Rodolfo Machado (Assistant Professor of Architecture at Carnegie-Mellon University), Mario Gandelsonas (moderator, Fellow at Institute for Architecture and Urban Studies), Manfredo Tafuri (Director of the Istituto di Storia, Istituto Universitario di Architettura Venezia), Antony Vidler (Associate Professor of Architecture at Princeton University). Photo courtesy of Princeton University Library, Special Collection.

redefining the foundations of the discipline. This happened in September 1973 in Milan at the XV Triennale in the section 'Rational Architecture' by Aldo Rossi and Massimo Scolari, and in New York with the founding of the magazine *Oppositions*, in April 1974 in Princeton with the cycle of conferences *Practice, Theory and Politics in Architecture* organised by Agrest, and in Los Angeles with the last CASE conference, and later in June in Milan, with the first IASS organised by Umberto Eco and in Paris, with the symposium *Histoire et théories de l'architecture* organised at the Institut de l'environnement.

In May 1974, Eisenman defined the beginning of a new cycle of his work, beyond any reference to linguistic structures, conscious or unconscious, in the article 'Haus III: To Adolf Loos and Bertolt Brecht'.[31] This new cycle, not by chance, was born immediately after Eisenman's meeting with Manfredo Tafuri the previous month, which would open up new critical horizons. The new direction was favoured by Diana Agrest, who had invited Tafuri first to Princeton and then to the IAUS.[32]

As a result of this fierce debate, which lasted from 1969 and 1974, challenging the assumptions of the problematic intellectual trajectory on which conceptual architecture was founded, both Eisenman's approach and his critical language would henceforth be inscribed in a new, hermetic and unknowable code. The sign was no longer a transparent object in a conceptual system comprehensible to reason, but had become its opposite.

Notes

1. Gilles Deleuze already described in *Logique du sens* (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1969) how what the structuralist authors had in common was only the name.
2. François Dosse, *History of Structuralism Volume 2: The Sign Sets, 1967–Present* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), *xiii–xiv*.
3. For example, in Louis Althusser, *For Marx,* ed. Allen Lane, trans. Ben Brewster (London: The Penguin Press, 1969).
4. Michel Foucault, 'Qu'est-ce qu'un auteur?', *Bulletin de la société française de Philosophie* (July–September 1969), from a lecture given on 22 February 1969 at the *Collège de France*: 'the function of an author is to characterize the existence, circulation, and operation of certain discourses within a society'. In English translation, Foucault, 'What is an author?', in *Textual Strategies: Perspective in Post Structuralist Criticism,* ed. and trans. Josué V. Harari (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1979), 141–60. Foucault is appropriating a quote from Samuel Beckett here: 'What does it matter who is speaking?', in *Nouvelles et textes pour rien* (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1958, 129), and as in many other Beckett's texts, like *The Unnamable* (1958), to affirm a new method of analysis, the author function, already mentioned in the Roland Barthes's article 'La mort de l'auteur', published in *Aspen* in 1967. It must be remembered that in those months of 1969 Foucault completed the drafting of *L'Archéologie du savoir* (1969), a clear departure from structuralism; the questioning of the relationship between work and author can be even traced back to 1966, when he worked with Gilles Deleuze on editing the French edition of the works of Nietzsche, an author who would influence his position on the spontaneous attribution of a work to the voluntary expression of the subject.
5. *Architectural Principles in the Age of Humanism* (London: The Warburg Institute, 1949) by Rudolf Wittkower, the teacher of Eisenman's mentor Colin Rowe, was fundamental in providing him with arguments to support his thesis that there is rational and cognitive potential in formal diagrams.
6. Peter Eisenman, *The Formal Basis of Modern Architecture*, PhD dissertation, Cambridge, 1963, 38. Facsimile reprint with same title (Zurich: Lars Müller Publishers, 2006).
7. See the letter of 6 February 1969, reproduced in Mathew Ford, ed., *By Other Means: Notes, Projects, and Ephemera from the Miscellany of Peter Eisenman* (Leiden: Global Art Affairs Publishing), 117, in which Peter Eisenman replies to Max Block, thanking him for the 'papers' sent to him and adding: 'According to my brother [Robert] we have many common interests'. Max Block was Professor of Analytic Philosophy and Language at Cornell. Robert Falk, a former Princeton professor and the client of House II, may also have played a role in shaping Eisenman's thinking.
8. Noam Chomsky, *Syntactic Structures* (The Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1957).

9. 'If Chomsky argues that his theory is valid for explaining even the mental processes underlying innate learning dynamics, effectively transforming it into a cognitive theory, Eisenman's use of Chomsky's linguistics is more metaphorical than literal explication as such. For Eisenman, both language and architecture can be seen in three semiotic categories: pragmatics, semantics, and syntactics. Pragmatics relates form to function, semantics relates form to iconography, and syntactics distinguishes between the relations of the *physical* forms of a space or building and the *conceptual* spaces of a structure.' Thomas Patin, 'From Deep Structure to an Architecture in Suspense: Peter Eisenman, Structuralism, and Deconstruction', *Journal of Architectural Education* 2 (1993): 91.

10. Roland Barthes, 'The Structuralist Activity', in *Critical Essays,* trans. Richard Howard (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1972), 214.

11. Charles Jencks and George Baird, eds., *Meaning in Architecture* (London: Cresset Press, 1969).

12. Peter Eisenman, 'Building in Meaning', *Architectural Forum* 133, no. 1 (1970): 88–90.

13. An initial division between the perceptual and the conceptual was proposed by Sol LeWitt in the catalogue to his 1970 exhibition at the Gemeentemuseum (The Hague) *Sol LeWitt: Haags Gemeentemuseum 25 Juli–30 Aug '70* (The Haag: Haags Gemeentemuseum, 1970) in 'Paragraphs on Conceptual Art', 56–57. The contextualisation of all of Eisenman's work on the conceptual as a polemical response to LeWitt's 1970 catalogue (with particular reference to the axonometric representations of House VI) is described in Desley Luscombe, 'Architectural Concepts in Peter Eisenman's Axonometric Drawings of House VI', *The Journal of Architecture*, 4 (2014): 560-611. In an interview with Carlos Brillembourg, Eisenman explains: 'House II is much more influenced by, say, Rosalind Krauss's writing on contemporary art at the time and the idea of sculpture in the expanded field and the work of minimalist sculptors Robert Morris and Sol LeWitt. By House II, Krauss and I were working closely – she eventually wrote "Notes on the Index" in *October* 3 and 4, which became key to House IV. … We did a project with him [Donald Judd], and one with Michael Heizer … I was working on my own project, which was more influenced by conceptual art, by color field painting, by Krauss's, Michael Fried's, and Clement Greenberg's writings. Then, in the late '60s, my work moved from reading people like Lévi-Strauss and Noam Chomsky to the poststructuralists by the early '70s.' Peter Eisenman, interview by Carlos Brillembourg, *Bomb Magazine*, 1 October 2011, https://bombmagazine.org/articles/2011/10/01/peter-eisenman/.

14. Peter Eisenman, 'Dall'oggetto alla relazionalità: la casa del Fascio di Terragni', *Casabella* 344 (1970): 38–41; Peter Eisenman, 'Object to Relationship II. Casa Giuliani Frigerio: Giuseppe Terragni', *Perspecta* 13/14 (1971): 36–75.

15. Peter Eisenman, 'Notes on Conceptual Architecture: Towards a Definition', *Design Quarterly* 78–79 (1970): 1–5.

16. Peter Eisenman, 'Appunti sull'architettura concettuale. Verso una definizione', *Casabella* 359–60 (1971): 48–58.

17. Peter Eisenman, 'Notas sobre arquitectura conceptual: estructura profunda dual', in *Arquitectura, historia y teoria de los signos. El Simposio de Castelldefels,* ed. Tomás Llorens (Barcelona: La Gaya Ciencia, 1974), 202–22.

18. Peter Eisenman, 'Notes on Conceptual Architecture II A', in *Environmental Design Research: Fourth International EDRA Conference* vol. 2, ed. Wolfgang Preiser (Stroudsburg, PA: Dowden, Hutchinson & Ross, 1973), 319–23, and in *On Site* 4 (1973): 41–44.

19. Peter Eisenman, 'Notes on Conceptual Architecture (II): Double Deep Structure', *A+U Architecture and Urbanism* 35 (March 1974): 177–184.

20. Peter Eisenman, Michael Graves, Charles Gwathmey, John Hejduk and Richard Meier, eds., *Five Architects – Eisenman, Graves, Gwathmey, Hejduk, Meier* (New York: George Wittenborn & Company, 1972); Peter Eisenman, 'Cardboard Architecture/*Castelli di carte: Due opere di Peter Eisenman*', *Casabella* 374 (1973): 17–31.

21. Eisenman, *Appunti sull'architettura concettuale*, 56.

22. While these debates took place mainly in New York, in Argentina an influential journal like *Summa* played a crucial role in shaping architectural historiography, theory and criticism, as the intellectual voice of the region. As a platform for critical thinking, *Summa* reinterpreted issues such as post-structuralism, semiotics and formalism in local and regional contexts, not only on a theoretical level but also in relation to practice.

23. Diana Agrest and Mario Gandelsonas, 'De la semiologia, los objetos perversos y los textos ideologicos', *Summa* 32 (1970): 73–74. They later published another text on the subject in another non-architectural journal: Agrest and Gandelsonas, 'Critical Remarks on Semiology and Architecture', *Semiotica* 3 (1973): 252–271. Agrest and Gandelsonas would be present in the new institutions of international linguistics, proving that the architectural community had taken an interest in these scientific fields.

24. See Agrest and Gandelsonas's answers included in 'Letters', *Oppositions* 3 (1974): 111, 117–18.

25. There are different definitions of 'knowledge' and 'ideology' within the structuralist debate: the meanings Louis Althusser uses are respectively more akin to a 'product of theoretical practice' and to the 'relationship between human being and the world'.

26. Mario Gandelsonas and Diana Agrest, 'Semiology and Architecture: Ideological Consumption or Theoretical Work', *Oppositions* 1 (1973): 93–100; Mario Gandelsonas, 'Linguistics in Architecture', *Casabella* 374 (1973): 17–31; Mario Gandelsonas, 'Linguistics, Poetics and Architectural Theory', *Semiotext(e)* 2 (1974): 88–94.

27. Louis Althusser et al., *Lire le Capital* (Paris: Éditions François Maspero, 1965); Julia Kristeva, *Σημειωτική: Recherches pour une sémanalyse* (Paris: Les Éditions du Seuil, 1969); Julia Kristeva, *La révolution du langage poétique* (Paris: Les Éditions du Seuil, 1974).

28. Jacques Derrida, *L'écriture et la différence* (Paris: Les Éditions du Seuil, 1967).

29. Peter Eisenman, 'Conceptual Architecture: from the Perception of Form to its Hidden Meaning', 'Architettura Concettuale: dal livello percettivo della forma ai suoi significati nascosti' *Casabella* 386 (1974): 25–27.

30. An almost unknown text/manifesto by Eisenman was included in the catalogue of the exhibition *Contemporanea. Incontri internazionali d'arte*, held at Villa Borghese in Roma, from 30 November 1973 to 28 February 1974. Peter Eisenman, 'Conceptual Architecture: From the Perception of Form to its Hidden Meanings', in *Contemporanea. Incontri internazionali d'arte*, ed. Achille Bonito Oliva et al. (Florence: Centro Di, 1974).

31. Peter Eisenman, 'House III: to Adolf Loos and Bertolt Brecht', *Progressive Architecture* 55 (1974): 92–98.

32. Following the text published in the catalogue for the 1972 MoMA exhibition *Italy: The New Domestic Landscape*, Tafuri's first English-language publication was 'L'Architecture dans le Boudoir: The Language of Criticism and the Criticism of Language', *Oppositions* 3 (1974): 37–62, a text that he had presented a few months earlier in Princeton, at the conference organised by Diana Agrest *Practice, Theory, and Politics in Architecture*, with the title 'A Theory of Criticism', and a few days later as a lecture at the IAUS. Tafuri, then a member of the Italian Communist Party, had only been granted a visa to enter the US for a few days.

Biography

Andrea Canclini is an assistant professor of architectural humanities at Lancaster University School of Architecture. He holds degrees in architecture and philosophy and a PhD in history, theory and criticism of architecture. His doctoral research focused on the reception of French thought in American architectural discourse between the 1960s and the 1980s. Previously, he taught theory in contemporary architectural design at the Politecnico di Milano and was a visiting professor at the Beirut Arab University. There, he conducted fieldwork in Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut. He has participated in and organised several international conferences and symposia and his work has been published worldwide. His main area of research is between critique and history of modern and contemporary architecture and its theoretical and cultural foundations. He sits on of the editorial board of *Khōrein: Journal of Architecture and Philosophy*.