Placing Technology: An Interview with Yuk Hui

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Abstract
In this interview, the editors met with Professor Yuk Hui, the originator of the notion of cosmotechnics, to discuss the implications of cosmotechnical thinking for architecture, urbanism and design. While Hui's work contains strong implications for architecture and spatial disciplines, he has rarely addressed them directly. In this far-ranging discussion, Hui brings together diverse topics, including the philosophy of Lewis Mumford, the cross-cultural history of cybernetics, and technology's connection to sacred space.

Keywords
Cosmotechnics, technology, cosmology, architecture, worlding

Yuk Hui is a philosopher currently based in Rotterdam, where he is professor of philosophy at Erasmus University. Being a wanderer in the past decades between Asia and Europe (Hong Kong, London, Paris, Berlin, Hangzhou, Tokyo, Rotterdam) – a situation resonant with what he describes as *Heimatlosigkeit* in his new book *Post-Europe* (2024) – Hui developed a deep familiarity with both Western and Eastern philosophy. His 2016 monograph titled *The Question Concerning Technology in China* proposes the radical concept of cosmotechnics and explores its possibilities through an ambitious reappraisal of the history of technological thought in China. Hui's work responds to a number of active debates in philosophy and the humanities, such as the ontological turn, cosmopolitics, eco-modernism, postcolonialism and transhumanism. Though it connects to a number of analogous debates in architecture and spatial disciplines, such as preservation, geo-engineering, or the homogenising effects of global capitalism, the implications of cosmotechnics have not been thoroughly considered in architectural and urban discourse. We spoke to Yuk Hui to hear his thoughts on the implication of cosmotechnical thinking in the fields of architecture and design.

Editors: It's clear to many of us that the notions of technodiversity and cosmotechnics have profound implications for thinking about the intersection between the philosophy of technology and design disciplines such as architecture and urbanism. But how exactly should we think about their connection?

Yuk Hui: Not being a scholar of architecture, there are few concrete things that I can say. But, let me try to make a couple of connections. First of all, as we know, a shelter, a cave or a house is one of the earliest forms of *spatial* and *technical* adoption of the environment (and not

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simply adapting to it), and there have been long histories. Architecture obviously implies different forms of technics or technologies. If you look at historical buildings and so on, there have been different technologies employed in different geographical regions. What are the implications of these technologies for us today in thinking through what I called technodiversity? How could we, from the perspective of architecture, begin to think about such a diversity? Today, because of globalisation, or better, planeterisation because globalisation, as we were said, had come to an end, which is officially announced in the trade war between the USA and China, we tend to be synchronised to use a standard way of building and urbanisation. This culminated in what Rem Koolhaas called 'the generic city' two decades ago – that cities everywhere will look like airports, a universal model of urbanism; now this discourse is succeeded by that of smart cities, in which cities will be built for automation, but not vice versa.

The second point is that architecture is about living, about how to dwell in a *place* (in contrast to space), and this implies many other considerations, such as cultural, aesthetic, cosmological and geographical factors. Architecture is not only about a material construction, but rather it is a large constellation of various relations between different agencies. These relations could easily be obscured and even eliminated, but they should be projected into the future because they enrich our knowledge about living instead of promoting a form of life determined by consumerism. Today, this diversity is very much ignored because of the emphasis on functionality (which is itself mostly determined by industrialism, consumerism, tourism and so on), though at the same time, we also see many other architectural manifestations in order to address this impasse. When I was in Lisbon in the early summer, I passed by Kengo Kuma's new project at the Centro de Arte Moderna, and I was enchanted by the motto on the wall of the construction site 'we are living in the era of the garden not of the architecture'. Garden is one way to look at these relations; at the same time, there are different gardens – Chinese gardens, Japanese gardens, European gardens, etcetera; they all express these relations in different ways and give different weights to them.

Editors: The concept of cosmotechnics has a strong methodological value, because it implies a different way of thinking about history. There has been considerable overlap between the history of architecture and the history of technology – both in their content and methods. Could you say more about what cosmotechnics means for our understanding of history?

Yuk Hui: I don't pretend that I know much about architecture, let me just start with something obvious: In the twentieth century, the history of technology as well as the history of architecture and the arts was very much determined by a materialist understanding. For example, the emergence of new materials such as iron changed the facades of many buildings in Paris, and later glass brought in a new relation between housing and light. So, one could of course read the history of the arts, the history of architecture, and more, through technological progress or more precisely technological determinism.

One cannot ignore the profound analysis from a materialist point of view, for example in the work of the palaeontologist André Leroi-Gourhan, who explains the strong agency of matter in the invention of tools. Also, in the domain of media, this was of course already explored by Walter Benjamin and the tradition that followed him, in order to understand the radical transformation brought to us by technology. For example, Benjamin rightly pointed out that it is not productive to ask whether film and photography are art or not. Rather, one should ask in what ways these new technologies change the nature of art itself.

On the other hand, this strong materialist, sometimes even Marxist point of view might have been revolutionary in the twentieth century; today such claims seem to me to be quite obvious or even banal. This materialist perspective is very limited as a form of historical analysis, though Marx himself is far more complicated than this. That is the reason that I wanted to bring forward a more comprehensive way to understand the history of technology. Technology, of course, because of its material nature, has enormous agency in determining social and cultural development. But at the same time, through what I call cosmotechnics, not only the cosmological, but also aesthetic and other kinds of thinking also have an important role in the development and uses of technology.

So in a very broad sense, what I'm trying to do is to depart from the materialist reading, which implies a kind of technological determinism, and move toward a different framework where we could think of other ways to deal with technological progress. And maybe in my own words, I would say to find a *place* for technology. That is, not simply let technology determine what is to come, but to situate or to place technology *through* the other, and *with* other ways of thinking, be they religious, aesthetic, philosophical, socio-political.

Simondon, in *The Mode of Existence of Technical Objects*, after he analysed the evolution of the technical object and the relation between the human and the world mediated by technology, recognised that this analysis was still not sufficient. We have to think about the genesis of

technicity. That is to say, we must understand the genetic relation of technological thought to other kinds of thought, and we should not simply take the technology as the sole determining force in historical development. This opens a new methodological approach to technology, which still needs to be further elaborated.

Editors: It's good that you bring up Simondon. His concept of technicity, and his articulation of the reticular relationships between technologies, environments and users is something that a number of contributors to this issue pick up.

In a recent lecture at Princeton, you present Simondon as one of the philosophers whose work has invoked a notion of bifurcation, along with André Leroi-Gourhan, Henri Bergson and Lewis Mumford. Mumford, one of the great historians of both technology and architecture, wrote about the opposition between mechanistic and organic tendencies in technology. Could you talk a little about what role Mumford's thinking has played in your work?

Yuk Hui: The title of my last book, *Art and Cosmotechnics* (2021), is a reference to Lewis Mumford's 1952 lectures that were later published as *Art and Technics*. I also engage with him extensively in my new book *Machine and Sovereignty* (2024), in which his concept of the megamachine is central. Nevertheless, I am also critical of Mumford's work, because I think he belonged to a generation of the twentieth century that tried to confront the technological civilisation with a fantasy of organism, or more precisely, of an organismic operation of society. Mumford thought that if we could understand society in an organismic way, then we may be able to overcome industrialism, which he saw as the source of the devastation of the nineteenth century.

What does Mumford really mean by organism? How was this opposition between organism and mechanism established? And how valid is this opposition today? These were the questions that I tried to deal with in my book *Recursivity and Contingency* (2019), where I claim that one way of reading the history of modern philosophy is to understand it through the opposition between mechanism and organism.

In the seventeenth and early eighteenth century, Europe was dominated by mechanism, which we can identify with many great philosophers such as Descartes. But in the second half of the eighteenth century, we see the emergence of the kind of counterargument against mechanism, namely organism. From Kant on, we see that this opposition between mechanism and organism is everlasting. Bergson, Whitehead, and Mumford actually belong to the late stage of the historical period of thought based on this opposition; Mumford also refers frequently to Whitehead as his theoretical authority.

This is how I understood the theoretical background of Mumford's criticism of technology. But this seems to me to be rather simplistic. In many of his works, for example *Art and Technics* and his major work on political thought *The Myth of the Machine*, we encounter a concluding proposal to model culture according to an organismic form, including both architecture (he gave the example of Frank Lloyd Wright, and we might find it later in Japanese metabolism and others as well) and the megamachine (which he calls the new *organum*). The megamachine refers to what I would call political form, for example, the polis, empire, monarchy, the modern state. Mumford opposes this organic megamachine to the mechanical megamachine, namely the Hobbesian absolute monarchy.

We then arrive at the question: Is this opposition still valid today? In the second half of the twentieth century, cybernetics claimed that the opposition between mechanism and vitalism had already been overcome, because machines were now able to simulate the behaviour of organisms. We find this claim not only in the work of Norbert Wiener, the founder of cybernetics in 1948; but also in Simondon's reading of Wiener, when he said in 1958 that machines are becoming organic. Note that Mumford was aware of Wiener's work, but he holds two different attitudes to Wiener's cybernetics and Walter Cannon's homeostasis. Today, with the rise of artificial intelligence, bioinformatics and so on, this opposition seems to become ineffective, since the technology of our time cannot be reduced to the kind of mechanism of Descartes. This is a major problem in the critiques of ChatGPT, as some critics claim that the ChatGPT AI is still mechanistic, whereas humans and human thinking are organic. This is, in my view, an epistemological mistake.

But how can we move away from this? It seems to me that we need to liberate our epistemological understanding from the opposition between mechanism and organism, which only truly belongs to a specific moment in European history. However, this doesn't mean that we should look for another candidate, such as vitalism, but rather that we should aim at a radical opening of the question of epistemology towards different ways of knowing, of interacting with non-human beings.

Although Mumford provides rich historical expositions of the subject, there are limits to his theoretical framework. It's also important to note that this way of thinking persists and is not limited to Europe. Today, if you ask some Asian philosophers, what is difference between Western thought and Eastern thought, many will still tell you that the difference is that the East is organic, and the West is mechanistic. The fact is that in Chinese thought, such an opposition

was only adopted by the Chinese intellectuals and the sinologists in the early twentieth century, for example, in the theory of medicine, martial art, and so on.

Editors: Cybernetic ideas have had a profound effect upon twentieth-century urban thinking, particularly in the post-war United States. This cybernetic view of cities has become deeply entrenched all over the world, but has reached something of an apotheosis in present-day China. What do you make of this development?

Yuk Hui: Perhaps the most significant development in urbanism, not only in China, but beyond, is the idea of the smart city. Leaving aside Mumford's organic architecture, the thing that could really automatise the part-whole, and part-part relations of the city are digital computational networks. This brings us to questions of resilient infrastructures.

Infrastructure becomes something very significant in the late twentieth century. As some authors have observed, if we look at the Euro, we no longer really see human figures on the money – only infrastructures. You see arcades, bridges. Today, it is not Churchill, not Thatcher, not Biden, but rather infrastructure that is the true embodiment of power.

The acceleration of 'smartness' is much stronger in East Asia than elsewhere. We see this, for example, in the ubiquity of digital payment systems which are integrated in communication, transportation, and so forth; also the deployment of auto-pilot cars, since this involves the reconstruction of the road systems to minimise accidents. There exists an imperative of modernisation, which is itself a historical consequence of China's tragic confrontation with the West 150 years ago. This imagination is deeply rooted in European modernity and consciously carried further in the geopolitical world through increasing competition.

Editors: Time, or temporality, is a significant theme in *The Question Concerning Technology in China.* Your argument there is heavily concerned with axes of time – their synchronisation, convergence and possible bifurcation. A crucial factor in the development towards technological singularity is an erasure of diverse relationships to time. The infrastructures that you just described are part of a cybernetic paradigm that has greatly accelerated this erasure.

At the same time, the history of cybernetics is anything but unitary. It contains complex and contradictory trajectories across many different localities. In architecture, there have been a number of cybernetic experiments, such as interactive environments, responsive environments and 'soft architecture', which deploy very different concepts of time. Do you take these multiple histories into account when you talk about the intellectual legacy of cybernetics?

Yuk Hui: This is a complicated conceptual issue, and it also depends on the method we use to study the history of a discipline. Since the beginning cybernetics was identified as a universal science, a universal way of grasping the operation of the world but also unifying other academic disciplines. There are two key concepts in so-called first-order cybernetics: the first is feedback; the second is information. We see feedback in almost all phenomena, whether natural or social. The psychologists, neuroscientists and computer scientists involved in the cybernetic movement were all very much inspired by the concept of feedback. The Cartesian mechanism, by contrast, has no concept of feedback due to the linearity of the mechanistic reasoning.

Norbert Wiener once said that if we look at Chinese cosmology and its implications for politics, it is actually a feedback system: the emperor could be punished by the heavens for doing wrong. The heavens act as an algorithm of a moral feedback system. But later, of course, we see that the term feedback also gave rise to the concept of recursion in so-called second-order cybernetics. This concept was central to the later work of Gregory Bateson (who speaks about a recursive epistemology), and as well as to Von Foerster's *Cybernetics of Cybernetics* and Niklas Luhmann's *Society of Society.*

What interests me is the transition from the concept 'feedback' to the concept 'recursion'. This is because it leads to different observation systems, different models of interaction and so on. British cyberneticists like Stafford Beer also talked about the power of recursion. So that, for me, is the essence of cybernetics: an idea of how to grasp the whole and how to understand the interaction between the whole and different parts in terms of recursive movements, determined by a certain telos. This basic epistemological question and the unified model might be undermined when we look at cybernetic projects from a macroscopic view, for example, a national economy. There have been experiments in cybernetics in the US, in the Soviet Union, in Latin America, in China, Poland, and so on; I have documented these in a book I recently edited titled *Cybernetics for the 21st Century Vol. 1: Epistemological Reconstruction* (2024). The book tries to provide a retrospective view of the development of cybernetics in the twentieth century, the various nuanced understandings, and the failure of appropriating cybernetics in different regions of the world beyond the US. However, I don't know enough about architecture to go through those experiments you mentioned.

Editors: In *The Question Concerning Technology in China* you discuss the work of Tim Ingold who, as you note, has also proposed a unity between practices and the environmental milieu in his concept of 'sentient ecology'. You warn, however, that Ingold's analysis, which is based on a particular reading of Bateson's work, risks reducing humans and their environments to a cybernetic feedback model, overlooking 'the absolutely overwhelming and contingent role of the cosmos'. Can you elaborate on this?

Yuk Hui: In fact, I responded to this in a comprehensive way in an article published in 2020 called 'Machine and Ecology'. As I said earlier, it has been suggested that cybernetics has already resolved the problem of dualism. If the critique of modernity begins from a critique of dualism (of body and mind, human and animal, nature and culture, and so on), can we then say that we have in fact already resolved the problem of modernity, or at least that cybernetics, as a unitary logic, shows the way out of modernity? Today many people still use this dualism as a way to critique our contemporary situation, arguing that our social, political, cultural problems stem from our dualist ways. But in fact, cybernetics has already brought about a non-dualistic paradigm.

However, even with the concept of feedback, cybernetics failed to consider the question of locality. This is obviously important when it comes to architecture, because a building is always built in a locality or a place, not in a generic space. In the wake of globalisation, of course, we believe that there is only space and not place – meaning that our spaces could be homogeneous. Now, we have completely overcome the obstacle of place or distance. Electronic transactions happen across the world at the speed of light. For many people, especially economic planners, place is no longer a question, because we have achieved a kind of conquest of space. But that we've given up the question of place is one of the biggest mistakes of our time. This is one of the limits of cybernetics. And that's why I wrote that Ingold's reading of Bateson stops at the very appealing but limited model of feedback between humans and the environment. What I was trying to say is that we must take into consideration the question of locality, rather than relying on a generic model based on feedback. Today, the most important question for us is how to *place* cybernetics: how do we put cybernetics in its proper place by considering the question of locality? Because the question of place has to do with the sacred, with geography and so on.

Although he doesn't mention him by name, Simondon was heavily influenced by Mircea Eliade's *Images and Symbols,* in which he claims that place is not homogeneous. Rather, some places possess a kind of sacredness. However, this concept of hierophany has been disappearing throughout the process of modernity. For Eliade, when we look at a locality, for example at a specific region, there are always some places that have a kind of magical power. For example, an old tree, a gigantic rock, the source of a stream, or the summit of a mountain. These are places that are energised with a certain kind of magic power. A region is then not a homogeneous space, but rather a constellation, a network of such magical places. It doesn't mean that we should and could return to this original magic unity, since it is impossible; but it is important to recognise the heterogeneity of places. These are the aspects that are not taken into account in the cybernetic feedback model. Cybernetics as a theoretical model is still something that tries to provide a universal solution to all things. But we know that there is no such thing – there is no universal solution. Cybernetics, as something that can overcome a dualistic logic, must necessarily be situated in a place, that is, in a locality.

Editors: Postcolonial discourse is one of the core subtexts to cosmotechnics, especially with regard to this question of locality. You've written that postcolonial theory has been limited by its fixation upon narrative, a preoccupation that obscures technology's material reality. On the other hand, cosmologies are forms of narrative, and are largely inseparable from the myths and stories by which they are known and communicated. We find this interesting, because stories and narratives say as much about an imagined future as they do about our supposed past, and so have implications for articulating alternative futures (perhaps the core agenda of cosmotechnics). What is the place of story and narrative in cosmotechnics?

Yuk Hui: In *The Question Concerning Technology in China*, I was not trying to criticise narratives in general. Instead, I was trying to critique a particular kind of postcolonial thought, which sets out with the good intention to challenge universalism. These critiques foreground alternative myths, different narratives, in order to show that the universal is more or less an imposed hegemonic order.

While this universalist critique was particularly important in the twentieth century, we quickly arrive at another question: how should we embrace relativism? And is relativism an answer to the problems we have today? We are well aware of the problems that relativism entails. If a country or a state commits an injustice, for example abusing women, it can simply claim that this is its culture and tradition, and others should not intervene. Such a relativism may in fact provide an excuse for expansion, exploitation, and social violence, mirroring universalism. We need to challenge universalism, but we also have to confront the

problem of a reactionary and superficial relativism. This is an unresolved question and it's a very important one in the twenty-first century.

The second problem with this emphasis upon narrative is that it can only produce a difference based on identity, and it is not yet able to produce a true difference that can drive historical progress. And it doesn't allow us really to move away from modernity or to overcome modernity. For example, creating different kinds of technologies that are not Eurocentric, and that allow us to respond to our local problems, goes beyond a difference in identity.

Therefore, my book on China is actually not only about China – it only uses China as an example in order to suggest that it's possible for us to imagine a technodiversity or a multiple cosmotechnics to come, based not in a difference in identity, but rather a difference of worlding. This is not yet a solution (since there is no solution as such), but it appears to me to be the beginning of an attempt to address the problems that we are confronting by bringing technology to the fore. That is to say, to depart from the discourse on identity (which is also a bio-political technique)– whether national identity or postcolonial identity – and move toward the construction of new kinds of community, and new understandings of historical development. This relates to my earlier point about placing cybernetics in a locality. Can we use these technologies today, for example, to build forms of community that allow us to address these problems? But instead, everyone continues using Facebook or Twitter – this is a very concrete question.

This is why I say that we have to deviate from a narrative of identity towards a construction of technological difference, which will give us more agency to respond to the problems we are confronting today. And in saying this, I don't mean to devalue or reject the efforts of postcolonialism. I believe that in the twentieth century it was very important to challenge universalism, which, especially after the Second World War, was dominated by the European knowledge system. But such a critique needs to be renewed.

Editors: What do you make of the various 'futurisms' (Afro-, Sino-, and so on) on which you sometimes draw in your work? Do you think they avoid the trap that you just described of the 'identity-centric' responses to questions of technology and difference?

Yuk Hui: Today many people don't really like reading, but they like making claims about things they don't know – a symptom that resonates with social media. They look at the cover of the book and the table of contents, and then they come to a conclusion. Sometimes, they don't even need to see the table of contents. People assume that because I wrote a book about China in relation to technology, that I must be a Sino-futurist, or a Chinese nationalist. Or that because I engaged with Heidegger, that I must be a Heideggerian. I was trying to reread the history of thought in China from the perspective of technology that didn't exist before, and to provide a critical framework to look at the current technological development in China and beyond.

Today, it seems clear that the technological myth is more and more becoming an ideology, for example the various myths related to AI, such as AI apocalypses, robot revolts, intelligence explosion, or post-singularity governance. But if you think about the ecological crisis that we are facing, this is something much more concrete. Look at the amount of rain we had this year, at the extreme weather in the summer. We have to combat these industrial myths and propaganda and imagine different forms of technological development. I think now we should all collectively ask, what is to be done?

In the summer of 2023, I was approached by an organisation in Brazil who wanted to work with me on a project on technodiversity. One of the concerns is that Elon Musk's Starlink is now accessible in the Amazon Rainforest. It means that the indigenous people can actually use mobile phones to access the internet, and that they could buy products from Amazon.com. But what is going to happen to these people in the Amazon? What kind of social, cultural, political development is going to happen there? They could, of course, just use what is being made available to them. They could undergo the same kind of modernisation that we have already experienced. But are there other alternatives for us to think about? Are there any alternative social networks? Are there other types of community organisation? Or will they be another victim of contemporary consumerism?

For me, the question of technodiversity – beyond the question of China, beyond the question of ethnocentrism – is very important; for us to think about how to reappropriate modern technologies and to go back to the question of locality. But not the locality as identity politics, like we have been seeing in France and in Germany.

In *The Question Concerning Technology in China* I make a very bold claim: that there's no cosmology as such; there's only cosmotechnics. Because I think that if we talk only of cosmology, if we separate it as a theoretical discourse, then we reduce it to a discourse of identity; for example, that the Chinese are not born of the fault of Adam and Eve, but because of Nüwa, a goddess who created human beings out of yellow soil. These are the kinds of things written in archaeological museums all over the world. The problem is that by understanding them as mere myths, we ignore the technical nature of cosmology. Cosmology is something that allows us to orient, not only

physically on the surface of the earth, but also to orient in terms of our relation to the environment, our relation to animals, plants and other non-human beings. In this sense one should separate cosmology from astrophysics. There is a corelation between the moral and the cosmological. Thus, I gave a preliminary definition of cosmotechnics as the unification between the moral and the cosmological in technical activities.

Editors: Many contributions to this issue have connected your ideas to the discourses of worlding and world-making. Can you speak about how you connect the cosmological with cosmogony?

Yuk Hui: As we know, the Greek word *Kosmos* means world, order, and adornment. All forms of cosmology need a cosmogony in order to understand why the universe is as such. And then we see the role of myth in cosmology, for example, the Greek cosmology had a lot to do with their polytheism, and so on. What I'm trying to emphasise is that cosmogony already implies many moral values and the moral deed of God, of the divine. We find this also in Christianity, and in other kinds of mythical origins of cosmology. The cosmology then carries the trace of these moral values and implies these values in our everyday life. We find this when we look into the case in China, in Japan or other non-European countries. But we also find it in European cultures. If you look into cosmic time, cosmic movements, and so on, you find that in ancient times they regulated our everyday life – they regulated harvest time, hunting time, and so on. In other words, the ancient world, or the antique way of world-making was largely influenced by cosmic time.

Today, we use GPS, which is determined by the clocks of the satellites. Time and space are connected in a new way through the GPS system. By doing so, time is also deprived of its cosmic meaning. But does it mean that this kind of knowledge is no longer relevant? I don't think so. Instead, we need to think about our time in a very different way, especially in a society that promotes speed and efficiency and constantly produces burn-out. This is also why new-age practices and critiques of burn-out have become so popular today. There is a call to return to the countryside (for example in a recent project of Rem Koolhaas), to a different kind of temporality, where one could practice what the Greeks call *skholē* or what the Romans call *otium*. On the other hand, we have to look at history not from a unified temporal axis, but rather think of a different world history, which is not eschatological (since such time didn't exist beyond Christianity). It seems to me that in order to do so, we need a fundamental reflection on and a nuanced understanding of technology.

Editors: You've just published two new books, *Machine and Sovereignty* and *Post-Europe*, both of which focus heavily on geopolitical questions. What are you working on next? Where is your research headed?

Yuk Hui: Like my other books, these two are the culmination of many years of labour. I believe that a renewed understanding of technology must influence fields long governed by technological unconsciousness – an idea that Derrida and Stiegler strived to illuminate, often referred to as deconstruction. I have been drawn to exploring the role of technology in political philosophy, particularly given its critical importance in today's geopolitical dynamics. However, the ambition of *Machine and Sovereignty* is not to comment on contemporary geopolitics; rather, it begins with an extensive engagement with Hegel's *Outlines of the Philosophy of Right* and continues with Schmitt's theory of sovereignty and the *Großraum,* but the aim is to surpass these frameworks. It is a historical-critical study on the question of technology in political philosophy, or, if I may be so bold, a preliminary sketch of a *tractatus politico-technologicus*.

Post-Europe is an even more intimate work, responding to Jan Patočka's concept of post-Europe, the rapid rise of the extreme right, as well as the relationship between Europe and Asia, while also serving as a semi-autobiography. Currently, I am revisiting the question of artificial intelligence, a topic that has captivated me for two decades. Specifically, I aim to focus on both a critique of political economy and a critique of the faculty of desire.

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Biography

Yuk Hui is professor of philosophy at Erasmus University Rotterdam, where he holds the Chair of Human Conditions. He is the author of several monographs that have been translated into a dozen languages, including *On the Existence of Digital Objects* (2016), *The Question Concerning Technology in China: An Essay in Cosm otechnics* (2016), *Recursivity and Contingency* (2019), *Art and Cosmotechnics* (2021), *Post-Europe* (2024) and *Machine and Sovereignty* (2024). He is the convenor of the Research Network for Philosophy and Technology and has been a juror for the Berggruen Prize for Philosophy and Culture since 2020.